All belief are meaningful.
Some belief are formed prior to language.
Some meaning is prior to language.

Describe those belief for me. This post is not meant to be rude... it's meant to guide the focus to the shrubbery or tree or whatever else you'de like to name that which exists in it's entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices...

Non linguistic belief is one such thing.

There's a gulf between the belief of non linguistic creatures and the belief of language users.

How does what you say here bridge that divide? — creativesoul

I think we take that gulf too much for granted. That gulf seems to depend on opposing some 'conscious' 'mental-stuff' to simple bodily movement. We invest the language we can perform 'in our heads' (interior monologue) with a sort of non-physical something called 'meaning.' For this reason, we think saying that the bridge is flooded is something more than just acting appropriately.

It's 'obvious' why we are tempted or rather almost always automatically talk/think this way. Our sign systems are far more complex, admittedly. But what if we think of speech acts as appropriate behavior ? Making the right sounds? What if we question the intuition of direct access to pure meaning? To universals or idealities?

In short, I suggest thinking in terms of a continuum of more and less complex social behavior, where some of this behavior is the marks and noises we call language. This is also us understanding ourselves as simply complex animals. Is that gulf you mention not connected in some way to the divine spark? Is meaning not functioning for us these days as the divine spark?

When I play hide-and-seek with my nephew, the first place is comes to look is behind the curtain. Does he believe the proposition "My uncle is behind the curtain"? If he does he's very sorely misunderstood the nature of the game, it's entirely predicated on the fact fact that I might be behind the curtain, but I might not. So does he believe the proposition "My uncle might be behind the curtain"? Well, that wouldn't quite capture the situation either. He often looks behind the curtain first, it's his best guess, maybe 50% of the time. So does he believe the proposition "My uncle is behind the curtain 50% of the time", well, he's a smart lad, but he doesn't understand either probability or percentages yet, so he can't believe a proposition he can't understand.

Ramsey's solution is that he believes the proposition "My uncle is behind the curtain" with a probability of 50%. Belief is not binomial, one does not think of propositions as either true or false, but one believes them each to a degree. I believe your house has a front door to a certain degree. — Isaac

So, are you claiming that someone can hold belief to one degree or another, to some specifically quantifiable percentage despite the fact that that individual does not understand probability or percentages, and thus cannot think about his own belief in such terms?

:brow:

Some not only think of propositions as either true or false, but they can also readily argue that that's the case for many as well as knowing exactly what it takes for such statements to be so. Because that's the case, there's a bit of what you've said above that is false on it's face.

The nephew report caught my attention earlier because as it's written, it's untenable. Nonetheless, it's worth more explanation...

When the nephew believes that his uncle is behind the curtain he is thinking about the spatiotemporal location of someone he knows. He is playing a game of hide and seek. He does not look behind the curtain unless he believes that the uncle is there. Or, alternatively, if he has looked in past situations and not found his uncle, the nephew may be uncertain as a result. Of this there can be little to no doubt, but to then render that nephew's belief in terms of percentages and/or probability(as though his belief included them) is to talk about something other than that nephew's belief. If it is the case that he is incapable of understanding probability and/or percentages then it is only as a result of not learning how to play that particular language game. The important point is that the nephew can be uncertain about the whereabouts of the uncle while being completely incapable of talking about how uncertain. If one cannot talk about how uncertain one is, then it makes no sense to report upon their belief as if there is some quantifiable degree of certainty for that individual regarding how confidently they hold some belief or other.

I think we take that gulf too much for granted. That gulf seems to depend on opposing some 'conscious' 'mental-stuff' to simple bodily movement. We invest the language we can perform 'in our heads' (interior monologue) with a sort of non-physical something called 'meaning.' For this reason, we think saying that the bridge is flooded is something more than just acting appropriately. — path

What makes you say that meaning is non-physical?

Belief is not binomial, one does not think of propositions as either true or false, but one believes them each to a degree. I believe your house has a front door to a certain degree. — Isaac

Some belief is either true or false. Your belief is well tempered as a result of your knowing that not all houses have front doors, and Banno's could possibly be one of those.

Again though...

I cannot make sense of this talk of "to a certain degree". To what degree, and how did you arrive at that particular percentage of confidence?

To know what the probability of some event is, one must know all the possible outcomes as well as all of the influencing factors. Otherwise, it's just rhetorical guesswork all 'gussied up' in fancy language.

:smile:

I've always wanted to use that particular colloquialism. Been quite a while since I was part of such a game...

There's a gulf between the belief of non linguistic creatures and the belief of language users.

How does what you say here bridge that divide?
— creativesoul

I think we take that gulf too much for granted. — path

I would say that in order to take something for granted we must already have become familiar with it.

I do not see that that's the case here.

Is that gulf you mention not connected in some way to the divine spark? Is meaning not functioning for us these days as the divine spark? — path

I have no clue whatsoever what you're talking about.

"The divine spark" is a name. To what does it refer? Make that connection for me, and we'll arrive at and/or have some shared meaning.

Describe this divine spark you talk about.

I speculate that a kind of pre-rational investment in this or that version of the 'hero' or 'target self' quietly drives or controls a rationality that is never 'pure.' — path

Absolutely. I think there's a link there to why we love stories so much - they infuse our culture completely and seem to be almost entirely universal and cross-cultural. The 'Hero', the 'Villain', the 'Quest', from aboriginal Australians to Hollywood screenwriters. I think we've brought into being, or formalised, one of the mechanisms of social cohesion. Create a hero and villain (be this, don't be that), describe the quest (act like this). It's much more powerful a guide when embedded in a narrative than any dry set of moral rules could be - 'love thy neighbour' vs. 'be like Han Solo' - I know which was more powerful a guide in my playground. Why do we need the whole narrative to make it work? - Perhaps because our ideas are really a web of belief (as Quine put it) and we need the whole package to see how it fits together. When other interests take over storytelling though, that worries me...but that's totally off topic. So many threads from this would make good topics on their own.

I think there's a link there to why we love stories so much - they infuse our culture completely and seem to be almost entirely universal and cross-cultural. The 'Hero', the 'Villain', the 'Quest', from aboriginal Australians to Hollywood screenwriters. I think we've brought into being, or formalised, one of the mechanisms of social cohesion. Create a hero and villain (be this, don't be that), describe the quest (act like this). It's much more powerful a guide when embedded in a narrative than any dry set of moral rules could be - 'love thy neighbour' vs. 'be like Han Solo' - I know which was more powerful a guide in my playground. — Isaac

Yes, indeed. I'm glad to be on this page with you. This to me is why literature and philosophy are inseparable. Narratives are a basic to human cognition, it seems to me. Yes we can have technical arguments, but I think they happen against a background narrative. We all absorb a typology of intellectual heroes (to focus on people who argue here and not in Youtube comments.) One is tough-minded or tender-minded. Each hero implies a villain and the reverse. To choose one is to choose both. The story is all of a piece, just like a language.

I am of course enacting a version of the hero by taking a certain distance from this game, describing it as if from above. This is the heroic type of authors of The Social Construction of Reality too. IMV, philosophy, sociology, and psychology are all pretty close in the distance they take from their home culture. Individuals can take an intellectual transcendence of their personality as a target personality. Our conversation right now partakes in that spirit, I think.

I have no clue whatsoever what you're talking about.

"The divine spark" is a name. To what does it refer? Make that connection for me, and we'll arrive at and/or have some shared meaning.

Describe this divine spark you talk about. — creativesoul

Sorry, it was another risky metaphor that didn't work out. What I'm getting at is our human attachment to seeing ourselves as radically distinct from nature. We think our language is far more 'meaningful' than the songs of birds. Other animals make noises. We make propositions and are in touch with a realm of universals or concepts. We think of our marks and noises as vehicles for something immaterial or ideal. Or I think we tend to think so.

I would say that in order to take something for granted we must already have become familiar with it. — creativesoul

I see why you would say that, but I also think that the stuff we take for granted that is most constraining is the stuff we didn't know that we believed. We just enacted our inquiry from the beginning in an apparently 'natural' way. What is left of linguistic belief as opposed to prelinguistic belief if we think of noises and marks on the same plane with other behaviors? If a bird 'warns his friend' of a predator with a cheep, is that linguistic belief? We'd probably say know. If I warn you that the bridge is flooded, is it linguistic belief only because a human made the sounds? And is that connected to some ideal content we imagine attached to the sounds that makes them special?

'In the beginning was the Word, and...'

What makes you say that meaning is non-physical? — creativesoul

I'm not claiming that it is. In some ways I'm saying the opposite. But the bigger picture is putting the whole mental-versus-physical distinction on probation. As I see it, we have a whole army of distinctions like that which we can use with great skill more or less automatically in everyday life. But then as philosophers we are tempted to take them too seriously. I don't think we can or ever do know exactly what we mean by 'mental' or 'physical.' I don't think we can make our skill explicit. We can't cough it all up in propositions that finally get it right.

I am strongly asserting that we form, have, and hold beliefs long before language acquisition begins in earnest. — creativesoul

The idea I am playing with at the moment is very much in that direction. If belief is enacted, then 'language acquisition' is just further training in bodily behavior among others. I learn to step around the furniture, that the ball must be under the couch (it couldn't just vanish), and that 'hello' is an appropriate sound in this or that context. Of course our 'linguistic' behavior is extremely sophisticated, but need this sophistication tempt us to thinking it is different in kind? It's fascinating that what we do with our tongues and lips is taken for granted as meaningful in way that balancing on a bike is not.

(Like I said, I'm playing with this idea. But I'm not unserious.)

Yeah, I misspoke. The cat believes it has four feet, not that "I have four feet" is true. — Banno

But 'that it has four feet' is not a proposition. That's what I was getting confused about. You were wanting to define belief as a "a relation between an agent and a proposition", but 'that is has four feet' is not a proposition - "I have four feet" is a proposition. So the cat doesn't have any beliefs because it doesn't understand any propositions...is what I was lead to conclude. So if the cat believes it has four feet, are you saying that it's belief is a relationship between it and the the proposition that it would hold to be true if it could understand propositions? That seems like an incredibly convoluted way of getting beliefs to relate to propositions. Why not simply say beliefs are not related to propositions, or that they are and the cat doesn't have any - these seem like much simpler solutions?

Ramsey. Worth a whole thread. — Banno

Definitely. I was mooting the idea, but not sure I'd do it justice. It might happen one day.

My gut says that neurone don't represent stuff as percentages - amy more than gasses do - but that we can describe what they are doing in terms of percentages - like we do with the temperature of a gas — Banno

I suppose it depends on what you mean by representation. Neurons, of course, represent stuff as axon potentials and dendritic connections, and that's all there is. But that's like saying computers represent stuff as 1s and 0s. It's trivially true, but doesn't get us very far when talking about their function. We talk about computers in terms of code, software, APIs, drivers, RAM, networks etc. It's somewhat contrived, but it's also more true than any other way of talking about them. Its being contrived doesn't mean there's no right and wrong about how a computer works when parsed in terms of code.

I don't see why we should avoid doing the same for brains. Just because they, fundamentally, represent everything as axon potentials and dendritic connections, doesn't mean we have to restrict ourselves to those terms in order to remain accurate, any more than than you'd tell a computer engineer that he was mistaken to talk about 'code' and 'software' when all computers really are is 1s and 0s.

In that vein, there's a significant amount of evidence that the brain does in fact work in probabilities. In fact, although I might be biased, I'd say at the moment it's the predominant theory in cognitive science. The landmark experiment was this one, but the history of concept is summarised in this paper. Basically, the brain does indeed seem to work in terms of predictions, probabilities, in the same way as computers work in terms of software. In actual fact, if I were to put money on one or other, I'd say that it will demonstrated very soon that it is actually impossible for a brain to represent a belief binomially (true or false), that neural systems are just too vulnerable to temporal iterations to represent anything with 100% certainty.

This is what I was getting at with 'divine spark.' Feuerbach was a humanist, materialist, etc., but also influenced by Hegel. He's a strange brew, but fascinating. And I think he fits in here.

The proof of the proposition that the divine essence is the essence of reason or intelligence lies in the fact that the determinations or qualities of God, in so far as they are rational or intelligible and not determinations of sensuousness or imagination, are, in fact, qualities of reason.
...
Man distinguishes himself from Nature. This distinction of his is his God: the distinguishing of God from Nature is nothing else than the distinguishing of man from Nature. — Feuerbach

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/future/future0.htm
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/feuerbach/works/essence/ec10.htm

I was trying to connect our attachment to 'meaning' as something particularly human and more particularly something that haunts human marks and noises exclusively to the intuitively plausible gulf that I still want to challenge between non-linguistic belief and belief proper. We can if we like just think of socially and environmentally appropriate behaviors of varying complexities that are trained into us without worrying much about which organ is involved.
I'm not saying we should forget the distinction but only that we can relax it for a different perspective. By becoming more aware of its roots we can attain more distance from it and more control over it, perhaps.

In other words, we can try on being naturalists.

[To be a naturalist] is to be the kind of antiessentialist who, like Dewey, sees no breaks in the hierarchy of increasingly complex adjustments to novel stimulation—the hierarchy which has amoeba adjusting themselves to changed water temperature at the bottom, bees dancing and chess players check-mating in the middle, and people fomenting scientific, artistic, and political revolutions at the top. — Rorty

So, are you claiming that someone can hold belief to one degree or another, to some specifically quantifiable percentage despite the fact that that individual does not understand probability or percentages, and thus cannot think about his own belief in such terms? — creativesoul

Yep. Demonstrable understanding of probabilities without being able to use the terms correctly or mathematically in indigenous tribes, in children less than 1 year old, and monkeys. I recently read (though I can't find the paper) that it's been demonstrated even in Pigeons.

If one cannot talk about how uncertain one is, then it makes no sense to report upon their belief as if there is some quantifiable degree of certainty for that individual regarding how confidently they hold some belief or other. — creativesoul

No, in Bayesian terms it isn't wrong. The probability just is the confidence with which he assumes I'm behind the curtain, there's nothing more to probability than that. It's expressed in the frequency at which he looks there, the odds he'd accept if he were to place a bet on me being there...

To know what the probability of some event is, one must know all the possible outcomes as well as all of the influencing factors. — creativesoul

- my bold.

So you don't know the probability of anything then, since you can never know all the possible outcomes? That seems like a waste of the term.

Yep. Demonstrable understanding of probabilities without being able to use the terms correctly or mathematically in indigenous tribes, in children less than 1 year old, and monkeys. I recently read (though I can't find the paper) that it's been demonstrated even in Pigeons. — Isaac

Hopefully you'll be ok with the idea that I do not have the time to go through those studies as I've done in recent past. I've seen a number of documentaries over the past ten years or so that said much the same things you've been advocating in our discourse. I strongly disagreed with the conclusions of Bayesian reasoning at that time as well. This current objection is based upon the same knowledge base.

I know that the behaviour of children less than one year old does not have what it takes to be able to draw the conclusion that that child demonstrates - to us - that he/she/they understand probability. I'm taking a very strong stance here. I would take the exact same stance regarding monkey behaviour.


However...

I'm much less certain about objecting to an indigenous tribe. I would definitely say that it would come of no real surprise to me if such a people had - via oral tradition alone - been able to hand down some belief about how often something(choose an appropriate event) takes place. If they have a favorite spot to go for the explicit purpose of gathering some highly prized items(pick your favorite), but they also already know that those items are not always there to be found, and they thought nothing much else about it, then it would seem that they would have no choice but to be uncertain any time they were on the way.

The uncertainty does not - cannot - evolve into thinking in terms of percentages/probability until that particular language game is learned. Being uncertain does not require drawing such correlations. I mean, understanding probability and/or percentages requires correlations drawn between the number of possible outcomes and the number of actual outcomes. Percentages/probability of something happening are only accounted for - and hence rightly understood - in mathematical terms by using them.

Being uncertain does not.

Anyway...

Could you offer a brief accurate description of the purpose of the experiment and any relevant details thereof? An outline would be great.

I see why you would say that, but I also think that the stuff we take for granted that is most constraining is the stuff we didn't know that we believed. — path

That is based upon the idea that it is possible to take something for granted that is otherwise completely unknown.

Makes no sense whatsoever to me.

Be that as it may...



Some belief is held prior to our becoming aware of that.

Some belief is held only after metacognitive endeavors have begun in earnest.

Regarding the former, "constraining" seems to have quite a bit more negative connotation than is warranted. "Influencing", "guiding", or some other apt description devoid of the notions and/or implications of "good" and "bad" seems to cover the good, the bad, and the in-between.

:wink:

What is left of linguistic belief as opposed to prelinguistic belief if we think of noises and marks on the same plane with other behaviors? — path

An odd question, because the answer has been right in front of you all along.

What is left is exactly what was already there.

Think about that for a minute...

Both linguistic and non linguistic belief exist in their entirety prior to our talking about them as a subject matter in their own right. That is prior to metacognitive endeavors. That is exactly what we're doing here and now. I'm sure you'll agree. To reiterate...

Our current thinking has no effect/affect whatsoever upon what counts as non linguistic or linguistic belief, because those things existed in their entirety prior to our talking about them.



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A relevant aside on the noises and marks...


Thinking about noises and marks as behaviour is very misguided. Noises and marks are products(the result) of behavior, not equivalent to. Besides that, not all noises and marks are meaningful. Those which are count as language use if more than one creature has drawn correlations between the noises/marks and other things(whatever they may be).

That's how it works.

Noises and marks are inadequate for belief, whether it be linguistic or not. All belief is meaningful. Not all noises and marks are.



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If a bird 'warns his friend' of a predator with a cheep, is that linguistic belief? — path

Warnings consisting of particular sounds are language use. It may be of the very very simple variety... but counts as an example of language use nonetheless.

When one warns a friend with a distinct vocalization, and the warning is heeded/understood, then that shows us that both individuals have drawn correlations between the same things. The warning and the thing being warned of. That is basic rudimentary shared belief. If that shared belief consists of correlations drawn between language use and other things, then it is linguistic belief. Warnings are intentional alerts sounded for the very purpose of informing another of danger.

However...

What grounds the assumption that that bird is offering a warning to his friend to begin with? The birds that cheep when approached by a predator are much less often surprised by it's arrival - as a group anyway. That behaviour certainly has it's benefits. Mimicry is profoundly abundant in 'lesser' animals.

To be perfectly clear...

I would not deny that those particular circumstances seem to include the basic elements necessary in order for shared meaning to occur, in order for shared belief to emerge as a result, and as a result of all that, it's not at all a leap to conclude that a very rudimentary version of language use was on display. Very basic correlations being drawn by a plurality of individuals between the sound and a predator.

The sound and the sudden onset of discontent that can only come via past experiences involving that sound are more than enough to conclude that the birds shared some meaningful belief as a result of the vocalization. The sound becomes significant(meaningful) via just being a part of just such correlations.

Underlying point being that intention and purpose are always part and parcel to warnings. The bird cheeping at the sight of danger has no such need. Both explanations adequately explain the scenario. One is much more elegant.

If I warn you that the bridge is flooded, is it linguistic belief only because a human made the sounds? — path

No, it's linguistic belief if it consists of correlations that include language use.

I know that the behaviour of children less than one year old does not have what it takes to be able to draw the conclusion that that child demonstrates - to us - that he/she/they understand probability. I'm taking a very strong stance here. I would take the exact same stance regarding monkey behaviour. — creativesoul

Well then what's the point in me discussing the contents of any experiments with you? They're clearly unnecessary. Whatever magical power you've used to just know things without needing to employ any scientific methodology or empirical investigation of any sort, simply apply that to the issue of indigenous tribes and you'll have your answer, carved in stone for you (or however such divine knowledge arrives).

Alternatively, you could consider the possibility that where thousands of hours have been dedicated to carefully constructing experiments, carrying them out and analysing data on a subject you claim to be interested in, you might, at least, show the slightest respect for that work by not dismissing their results out of hand without even looking on the basis that you've 'had a bit of a think about it'.

From the paper;

There is no consensus about the proper interpretation of the probability calculus (2, 3). Regardless of interpretations, however, the basic laws of probability rest on the same extensional considerations, notably, the principle that the probability of an event equals the sum of the probabilities of the various ways in which it can occur.

They were presented with a set of four chips of two different colors, and had to bet on the color of a randomly drawn chip (Fig. 2A). The odds were 3:1 in favor of the prevalent color. In each task, we considered as correct the bet on the more likely color. The Mayan groups did not differ reliably from each other (bilingual correct: 19 of 20; monolingual correct: 14 of 20), χ2(1 n = 40) = 2.8, P = 0.10. Accordingly, in the following analyses, we collapsed their answers into one group. All groups of participants performed better than chance: Mayan adults (correct: 33 of 40), χ2(1 n = 40) = 16.9, P = 0.0004; Mayan school children (correct: 16 of 20), χ2(1 n = 20) = 7.2, P = 0.007; Italian controls (correct: 18 of 20), χ2(1 n = 20) = 12.8, P = 0.0003. These responses seem to reflect a trend due to experience or maturation: Mayan children performed worse than Mayan adults who, in turn, performed worse than Italian controls. A Jonckheere’s test, however, did not reveal a reliable trend in the data, P = 0.39.

In principle, participants might solve the previous tasks by applying some superficial heuristic, rather than a proper chance evaluation. For example, they might bet on the more favorable outcome by considering the absolute number rather than the proportion of possibilities in its favor. To test whether preliterate participants succeed because they apply this “numerosity” heuristic (13), and extend our results, we used a second task [similar to 11] that would show more directly the use of probabilistic reasoning. In each trial, participants had to bet on which of two sets was more likely to yield a winning chip. The simplest trials did not ask for any estimation of proportions, given that one or both sets contained just winning chips (Fig. 3 A and B). Two other trials did ask for this estimation because both sets contained some winning chips (Fig. 3C). In one case, the favorable set contained a larger proportion as well as a greater number of winning chips. In the other case, it contained a larger proportion but not a greater number of winning chips. If preliterate Maya are able to compare the ratio of winning to nonwinning chips across sets, they should succeed in this crucial trial. Indeed, in each trial, all groups performed above chance level (as shown by binomial tests). Task A: all participants performed correctly, P = 0.0009. Task B-left panel: Mayan adults (correct: 33 of 40), P = 0.0002, Mayan school children (correct: 18 of 20), P = 0.0002, Italian adults (correct: 20 of 20), P = 0.0009. Task B-right panel: Mayan adults (correct: 32 of 40), and Mayan school children (correct: 16 of 20), P = 0.006, Italian adults (correct: 18 of 20), P = 0.0002. Task C-left panel: Mayan adults (correct: 37 of 40), P = 0.0009, Mayan school children (correct: 18 of 20), P = 0.0002, Italian adults (correct: 19 of 20), P = 0.0002. Task C-right panel: Mayan adults (correct: 35 of 40), P = 0.0004, Mayan school children (correct: 17 of 20), P = 0.002, Italian adults (correct: 18 of 20), P = 0.0002).

In three tasks, there were k chips of the same color and one chip of a different color. Thus, when k > 3, participants could notice that each chip having the predominant color neighbored k − 1 same-colored chips and only 1 differently-colored chip. Accordingly, they could bet on the “same color” outcome. In three other tasks, there were k pairs of same-colored chips. Thus, participants could notice that each chip had just another chip of the same color and several [actually, 2(k − 1)] chips of different colors. Accordingly, they could bet on the “different color” outcome. As shown in Fig. 4, the rate of Maya’s bets on the same color relation follows the same tendency as the probability of such an outcome.‡ For each participant, we computed an index Q of the quality of their prediction pattern, by normalizing the expected value of the number of correct bets (ref. 15; see also SI Study 3. Probability and Combinatorics). Q ranges from −1 (worse quality) to +1 (best quality). All groups performed above chance level: Monolingual Maya, mean Q = 0.37, SD = 0.53, t(19) = 3.07, P = 0.003, d = 0.69; Bilingual Maya, mean Q = 0.85, SD = 0.25, t(19) = 14.89, P < 0.0001, d = 3.33; Mayan school children, mean Q = 0.58, SD = 0.42, t(19) = 6.20, P < 0.0001, d = 1.39; Italian controls, mean Q = 0.81, SD = 0.38, t(19) = 9.56, P < 0.0001, d = 2.14. A reliable trend (Maya children < Maya adults < Italians, P = 0.03) indicated that performance increased with age and experience, suggesting that some probabilistic intuitions develop into adulthood (24). Unlike in Studies 1 and 2, adult bilingual Maya outperformed monolingual ones, t(38) = 3.67, P = 0.0007, d = 1.16. It is difficult to attribute this result to cultural factors, given that our bilingual and monolingual participants were equally preliterate, and lived in similar socio-economic conditions. Because Study 3 tasks involve mental manipulation of multiple possibilities, this result seems to support evidence for bilingual advantages in reasoning tasks of this sort (16). Despite differences in absolute performance levels, however, the above-chance performance of all groups points to a shared ability to treat possibilities in a combinatorial way.

I haven't cited these sections because I think you might be interested in the results (you've demonstrated you've little interest in anything but supporting your own prior beliefs). I've quoted them to stand as an example of how to investigate some matter you're interested in

• An understanding of the remaining open issues in the field.
• Careful study design, including controls for multiple confounding factors (culture, age, language acquisition).
• Sequential attempts to remove ambiguity in interpretation.
• Appropriate use of statistical techniques to minimise bias.
• Willingness to accept results which cloud the overall picture and offer potential interpretations.

The study took four researchers three years of work to set up, negotiate with contributing authorities and run, plus two statisticians to assist with the results interpretation.

But by all means, if you want to 'have a bit of a think about it' and tell me how they're all wrong be my guest.

I know that the behaviour of children less than one year old does not have what it takes to be able to draw the conclusion that that child demonstrates - to us - that he/she/they understand probability. I'm taking a very strong stance here. I would take the exact same stance regarding monkey behaviour.
— creativesoul

Well then what's the point in me discussing the contents of any experiments with you? — Isaac

You value my input.

There is no consensus..

Earlier you described a group of professionals that were open to suggestions... I suspect it is as a result of the lack of consensus. My stance is novel.

The rhetorical personal attacks seem to come from a place of feeling disrespected. The last set of experiments we discussed also contained a wee bit of that. Don't take it too personal. I've been called "confidently wrong" about stuff that I'm not. I've been confidently wrong when no one else noticed or felt like they could reach me. Anyway...

Thanks for the post. I'll read it immediately upon my return.

When one warns a friend with a distinct vocalization, and the warning is heeded/understood, then that shows us that both individuals have drawn correlations between the same things. — creativesoul

I agree that such a thing is suggested. That's how we tend to interpret the situation. But correlations are beetles in the box, explanatory hypothetical entities. Are we to understand correlations as something mental? But the mental is the inaccessible-by-definition beetle-in-the-box.

I would not deny that those particular circumstances seem to include the basic elements necessary in order for shared meaning to occur, in order for shared belief to emerge as a result, and as a result of all that, it's not at all a leap to conclude that a very rudimentary version of language use was on display. Very basic correlations being drawn by a plurality of individuals between the sound and a predator. — creativesoul

Right. But my issue is this: what does the mentalistic talk of correlations add to the situation? If a species uses and responds to noises as part of a social strategy that is trained into its young and/or is instinctual...and behaves in a self-preserving way...isn't that enough?

Can we not also see humans in this way? Can we think of human language as conventions for the making of marks and noises that help a community thrive? Clearly mentalistic talk is already part of our human conventions, and it's not going anywhere. So what interests me is just approaching the situation as a philosopher exploring what happens when we don't refer everything back to the by definition subjective.

Thinking about noises and marks as behaviour is very misguided. Noises and marks are products(the result) of behavior, not equivalent to. Besides that, not all noises and marks are meaningful. Those which are count as language use if more than one creature has drawn correlations between the noises/marks and other things(whatever they may be).

That's how it works.

Noises and marks are inadequate for belief, whether it be linguistic or not. All belief is meaningful. Not all noises and marks are. — creativesoul

Ah, but that's just the idea I'm challenging! Meeting you half-way, I'd say that marks and noises become 'meaningful' as they are caught up in social conventions. To speak is to make a noise with the throat and the mouth. It is behavior. Of course we human beings are especially proud of this kind of behavior, which with our hands is how we became or like to think we became the lords and masters of nature.

This fundamental belief that there is 'meaning' in a 'mind' is like the belief of philosophy. Of course I am no stranger to such an intuition, such a habit of interpretation. Included in our linguistic conventions are tokens like 'meaning' which feel like they correspond or refer to a 'mind.' We can't stop participating in the everyday intelligibility of such tokens, but we can strive for some distance for their being so utterly taken for granted.

That is based upon the idea that it is possible to take something for granted that is otherwise completely unknown.

Makes no sense whatsoever to me. — creativesoul

Now is the time to try to answer this. Did you ever question whether you had a mind? Did you ever question that there was meaning? We already 'know' that we have a mind for meaning because it's caught up in our childhood training. It's as if we absorb some vague ontology that we never bother to articulate and criticize. I'm not saying that we don't have minds. I'm saying that we operate with vague ontologies that we don't even think to question until some weirdo like Wittgenstein comes along and shows that it has no explanatory function. 'It cancels out.'

If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?

Now someone tells me that he knows what pain is only from his own case! --Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. --Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. --But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? --If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty. --No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. — Wittgenstein

What matters is the synchronization of our doings (including our verbal doings) so that we adapt successfully as a group to our environment. While mentalistic talk is IMO part of that adaptation, as philosophers we can take a closer look and get some distance.

But my issue is this: what does the mentalistic talk of correlations add to the situation? If a species uses noises and responds to noises as part of a social strategy and behaves in a self-preserving way, isn't that enough? — path

What 'mentalistic talk'? We can drop the "mental" qualifier if you like. I reject the mental/physical dichotomy anyway. It's not a problem.

Talk of correlations adds a framework inherently capable of taking proper account of non linguistic belief in so far as it's ability to set out the contents.

Talking of cheeps as though it is a strategy assumes what's in question.

Witt's beetle does not apply to what I'm claiming here. Not sure why you keep attempting to apply it.

This fundamental belief that there is 'meaning' in a 'mind' is like the belief of philosophy — path

Not mine.

What 'mentalistic talk'? We can drop the "mental" qualifier if you like. I reject the mental/physical dichotomy anyway. It's not a problem.

Talk of correlations adds a framework inherently capable of taking proper account of non linguistic belief in so far as it's ability to set out the contents.

Talking of cheeps as though it is a strategy assumes what's in question.

Witt's beetle does not apply to what I'm claiming here. Not sure why you keep attempting to apply it. — creativesoul

Perhaps I've misunderstood you. Help me see where I have gone wrong. It does help to know that you also reject the mental/physical distinction.

Besides that, not all noises and marks are meaningful. Those which are count as language use if more than one creature has drawn correlations between the noises/marks and other things(whatever they may be).

That's how it works.

Noises and marks are inadequate for belief, whether it be linguistic or not. All belief is meaningful. Not all noises and marks are. — creativesoul

How do we know whether a group of creatures has drawn correlations? What's the difference between adaptive social conventions and drawing correlations?

I agree that my talk of cheeps was misleading in some sense. I think we agree that the bird doesn't need to know why it is cheeping. The bird needs no theory of the cat as a threat.

I was applying the 'beetle' because I imagined that you were thinking of correlations as essentially mental. I apologize if I've misunderstood that. I wonder if my use of 'conventions' is after all close to your use of 'correlations.'

Perhaps I've misunderstood you. Help me see where I have gone wrong. — path

Ok.

How do we know whether a group of creatures has drawn correlations? — path

It becomes clear sometimes when and if we know what to look for. We can determine, for instance, at least one of the things being connected by the candidate under examination. Pavlov's dog and the sound of bell, for example.

What's the difference between adaptive social conventions and drawing correlations? — path

The difference is that not all belief formation(drawing correlations) involves social convention. However, it is the commonality that is key to understanding. All social conventions consist - in large part - of common belief... shared meaning. Shared meaning is nothing more and nothing less than a plurality of creatures drawing correlations between the same things...

I was applying the 'beetle' because I imagined that you were thinking of correlations as essentially mental. I apologize if I've misunderstood that. I wonder if my use of 'conventions' is after all close to your use of 'correlations.' — path

Could be a number of similarities... I dunno.

The ability of drawing correlations between different things has a few necessary prerequisites, so t speak. It requires a plurality of things and a creature capable of associating, connecting, and/or otherwise drawing correlations between those distinct things. That is where I suspect there is much overlap between Isaac's leaning on the brain and my own position regarding what certain belief content requires as far as brain structures go...

Noises and marks are inadequate for belief, whether it be linguistic or not. All belief is meaningful. Not all noises and marks are.
— creativesoul

Ah, but that's just the idea I'm challenging! Meeting you half-way, I'd say that marks and noises become 'meaningful' as they are caught up in social conventions. — path

I suspect that we're in agreement here on some basic level anyway...

I do not understand which idea is being challenged. I'm hesitant to talk in terms of 'caught up in' social conventions. When marks become one part of a correlation between the marks and something else, they become meaningful. Social convention is simply an agreement upon what else those particular marks ought be and/or will be correlated, associated, and/or otherwise connected to.

If a species uses noises and responds to noises as part of a social strategy and behaves in a self-preserving way, isn't that enough? — path

Enough for what?

Can we not also see humans in this way? Can we think of human language as conventions for the making of marks and noises that help a community thrive? — path

Sure. I would not argue against that notion at all, aside from pointing out that our language is much more than noises and marks, but I suspect we're in agreement here as well.

Clearly mentalistic talk is already part of our human conventions, and it's not going anywhere. So what interests me is just approaching the situation as a philosopher exploring what happens when we don't found or refer everything back to the by-definition subjective.

What does the phrase "by-definition subjective" refer to? It might be worth saying that I also reject the objective/subjective dichotomy...