The title of the thread is Eternalism vs the Moving Spotlight Theory. I haven't "switched" anything. Read the OP.

Well this was literally the first sentence of your OP:

Following from this and other discussions at this site, I wanted to lay out my view of why Eternalism logically precludes motion. — Luke

But yeah, I don't really care about metaphysical speculation. I'm only interested in eternalism because it seems to fit with our understanding of physics.

But the problem with metaphysical speculations and qualifications should be evident from this. If 1) B-theories are defined by the absense of the passage of time, and 2) Eternalism is a B-theory, but 3) the passage of time is not a meaningfull thing to talk about in eternalism… then maybe something is off with the whole qualification sceme.

Like, instead of insisting on using the qualifications and definitions you set out in the OP, and God forbid trying to logically proof something from them about eternalism, maybe you should be asking the question if they make sense to begin with. That's what I meant with engaging with the ideas, and not merely the pre-defined labels.

If 1) B-theories are defined by the absense of the passage of time, and 2) Eternalism is a B-theory, but 3) the passage of time is not a meaningfull thing to talk about in eternalism… then maybe something is off with the whole qualification sceme. — ChatteringMonkey

I don't know what you mean by "the passage of time is not a meaningful thing to talk about in eternalism". However, if "Eternalism is a B-theory" and the B-theory is "defined by the absence of the passage of time", then time does not pass in Eternalism. Therefore, I argue, there is no motion in an Eternalist universe. That's what I'm arguing for here and what this discussion was supposed to be about.

instead of insisting on using the qualifications and definitions you set out in the OP, and God forbid trying to logically proof something from them about eternalism, maybe you should be asking the question if they make sense to begin with. — ChatteringMonkey

If you want to talk about something else in relation to Eternalism, then start another discussion.

I don't know what you mean by "the passage of time is not a meaningful thing to talk about in eternalism". — Luke

It's not meaningfull because it assumes there is a present moment. If there is no present moment what could passage of time possible mean?

However, if "Eternalism is a B-theory" and the B-theory is defined by "the absence of the passage of time", then time does not pass in Eternalism. Therefore, I argue, there is no motion in an Eternalist universe. That's what I'm arguing for here and what this discussion was supposed to be about. — Luke

But this is all per definition. The conclusion is allready assumed in the definitions, so what's there to talk about?

It's not meaningfull because it assumes there is a present moment. If there is no present moment what could passage of time possible mean? — ChatteringMonkey

I wouldn't call it an assumption; it's how we experience the world. Nonetheless, there is no passage of time under B-theory Eternalism, so the assumption of a present moment is equally absent. I don't understand how this is problematic or meaningless.

But this is all per definition. The conclusion is allready assumed in the definitions, so what's there to talk about? — ChatteringMonkey

Beats me. Some seem to disagree.

I wouldn't call it an assumption; it's how we experience the world. Nonetheless, there is no passage of time under B-theory Eternalism, so the assumption of a present moment is equally absent. I don't understand how this is problematic or meaningless. — Luke

It's problematic insofar you try to derive all sorts of things from it, like say that there is no motion.

If you only say 'there is no passage of time' therefor 'there is no motion' than that is mistake, maybe not strictly logically, but rather in how you didn't adjust the concepts to a different frame.

What I think you should say instead is something like this, 'in an eternalist view passage of time is replaced by things existing at different times' and motion is therefor re-defined as 'an object existing at different spaces and times'. This all a bit crudely formulated, but I'm just trying to get the point across.

What I think you should say instead is something like this, 'in an eternalist view passage of time is replaced by things existing at different times' and motion is therefor re-defined as 'an object existing at different spaces and times'. This all a bit crudely formulated, but I'm just trying to get the point across. — ChatteringMonkey

The passage of time is not "re-defined" under B-theory Eternalism. Time does not pass according to the B-theory. You seem to want to retain temporal passage in Eternalism, just as a different way of looking at it. No: If time passes, it's A-theory; if time doesn't pass, it's B-theory. You can't have it both ways.

The conclusion is allready assumed in the definitions, so what's there to talk about?

What I think you should say instead is something like this, 'in an eternalist view passage of time is replaced by things existing at different times' and motion is therefor re-defined as 'an object existing at different spaces and times'. This all a bit crudely formulated, but I'm just trying to get the point across.
— ChatteringMonkey

The passage of time is not "re-defined" under B-theory Eternalism. Time does not pass according to the B-theory. You seem to want to retain temporal passage in Eternalism, just as a different way of looking at it. No: If time passes, it's A-theory; if time doesn't pass, it's B-theory. You can't have it both ways. — Luke

I didn't say redefined, but replaced. There is an notion of time (nevermind the passage of time) in eternalism, right? So what i'm saying is that you should take that notion and how it's used in eternalism (and not the presentist notion) into account when you speak of stuff like motion in that view. That seems pretty uncontroversial to me.

The conclusion is allready assumed in the definitions, so what's there to talk about? — Luke

Sure, if you are content with logical formalism without necessarily saying anything about the world, then that works I suppose.

There is an notion of time (nevermind the passage of time) in eternalism, right? — ChatteringMonkey

Yes, in which time does not pass.

So what i'm saying is that you should take that notion and how it's used in eternalism (and not the presentist notion) into account when you speak of stuff like motion in that view. That seems pretty uncontroversial to me. — ChatteringMonkey

I thought you agreed that there is no motion because time does not pass, and that this conclusion is already contained in the definitions?

I thought you agreed that there is no motion because time does not pass, and that this conclusion is already contained in the definitions? — Luke

Yes if motion is defined in presentist terms of passage of time, then yes that conclusion follows logically.

Logic only speaks to the validity of an argument. If there is something wrong with your premisses than the argument may be valid in that it follows logically, but that doesn't mean the conclusion is true. I'm saying there is something wrong with the premisses, not with the validity of the argument.

Yes if motion is defined in presentist terms of passage of time, then yes that conclusion follows logically. — ChatteringMonkey

How else do you define motion? How can you have motion without the passage of time?

I'm saying there is something wrong with the premisses, not with the validity of the argument. — ChatteringMonkey

What's wrong with the premisses?

What's wrong with the premisses? — Luke

They apply to a presentist view only, and you are using them to arrive at a conclusion about motion in eternalist view.

I'm not even sure 'passage of time' the way you use it, is even essential to motion in a presentist view.

From wiki :

In physics, motion is the phenomenon in which an object changes its position over time. Motion is mathematically described in terms of displacement, distance, velocity, acceleration, speed, and time. The motion of a body is observed by attaching a frame of reference to an observer and measuring the change in position of the body relative to that frame.

There's no mention of anything like past, present or future in there.

Here is what an eternalist might say: There is neither passage of time nor motion. Simply different spatio-temporal locations. Your mind simply apprehends temporal locations as a series of events, rather than as a region of coordinates, and this creates the appearance of motion.

The passage of time is not "re-defined" under B-theory Eternalism. Time does not pass according to the B-theory. — Luke

The passage of time in a B-theory perspective is completely psychological. The soul, as an eternal unchanging being, is thrust into the space-time world, and propelled through that world by a mysterious force. It is the movement of the soul through the space-time world which produces the appearance of time passing.

Since this perspective requires a soul with a unique power moving it through the medium, and most B-theorists would not accept such a premise, the more appealing solution is the simulation hypothesis. This hypothesis removes the source of movement from the soul, thereby removing that mysterious power required to move the soul through the medium, and replaces it with the idea that the entire space-time world is a simulation created by some mysterious power.

In either case, a mysterious power is required to produce the perception of movement.

They apply to a presentist view only, and you are using them to arrive at a conclusion about motion in eternalist view.

I'm not even sure 'passage of time' the way you use it, is even essential to motion in a presentist view. — ChatteringMonkey

To which premisses are you referring? We seem to agree (finally) that time doesn't pass in a B-theory Eternalist universe. I take this to imply that the B-theory Eternalist universe precludes motion.

I'm not even sure 'passage of time' the way you use it, is even essential to motion in a presentist view. — ChatteringMonkey

Presentism isn't really relevant to this discussion. However, maybe you are referring to something like the following observation, found in the Wikipedia article on B-theory of time:

The terms A and B theory are sometimes used as synonyms to the terms presentism and eternalism, but arguably presentism does not represent time being like an A-series since it denies that there is a future and past in which events can be located.

But, again, the A-series is not the A-theory. My concern in this discussion is with temporal passage, not with the A-properties of past, present and future.

The motion of a body is observed by attaching a frame of reference to an observer and measuring the change in position of the body relative to that frame. — ChatteringMonkey

How is a frame of reference and/or an observer to be understood if time does not pass?

Here is what an eternalist might say: There is neither passage of time nor motion. Simply different spatio-temporal locations. Your mind simply apprehends temporal locations as a series of events, rather than as a region of coordinates, and this creates the appearance of motion. — Echarmion

How does a mind work if there is neither passage of time or motion? How does the human body work? What becomes of our understanding of beating hearts, circulation, respiration, vision, and all the rest?

The soul, as an eternal unchanging being — Metaphysician Undercover

Please don't bring religion into this discussion. Thanks.

In either case, a mysterious power is required to produce the perception of movement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Couldn't you argue that Presentism presumes that same power, it just names it "time"?

How does a mind work if there is neither passage of time or motion? How does the human body work? What becomes of our understanding of beating hearts, circulation, respiration, vision, and all the rest? — Luke

The human body would be less of a problem, since what we know about it is based on perception, and thus would simply be subject to the same construction.

How the mind works is the more interesting question. Given my description, it'd have to be outside the space-time block. That may be the reason @Metaphysician Undercover called it a "soul".

Please don't bring religion into this discussion. — Luke

In case you haven't yet noticed, religion offers the most intelligent understanding of time.

Couldn't you argue that Presentism presumes that same power, it just names it "time"? — Echarmion

Sure that's the case, but the two perspectives are completely different. One says that movement, what Luke calls "change", is the result of the active soul moving through the static universe, while the other says that "change" is the result of time moving in the universe. The eternalist perspective removes the soul from the universe.

How the mind works is the more interesting question. Given my description, it'd have to be outside the space-time block. That may be the reason Metaphysician Undercover called it a "soul". — Echarmion

That's right, the soul is commonly said to be eternal and immaterial, outside the space-time block.

The human body would be less of a problem, since what we know about it is based on perception, and thus would simply be subject to the same construction. — Echarmion

I don't know what "subject to the same construction" is supposed to mean. You said that there is neither passage of time nor motion. I don't follow how this is not problematic just because our understanding of physiology is "based on perception". I get that it's not a problem if there is passage of time and motion, but how is it supposed to work if there isn't?

In case you haven't yet noticed, religion offers the most intelligent understanding of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not interested. Please take it elsewhere.

I don't know what "subject to the same construction" is supposed to mean. — Luke

The core idea here is that "everything you think you know is false" or more specifically: It is possible that the metaphysically objective world is entirely different from the physical world. One of these differences could be that time isn't what we think it is, that our concept of time is a construct of the human mind.

I don't follow how this is not problematic just because our understanding of physiology is "based on perception". I get that it's not a problem if there is passage of time and motion, but how is it supposed to work if there isn't? — Luke

It could simply be that the relations of events in the time dimension are not fundamentally different from the relations of things in the spatial dimension. There'd still be a continuum where changes occur, just like there is a point where your desk ends and a wall begins. Just the specific appearance of a unidirectional passage of time would be just that - an appearance rather than an ontological reality.

The core idea here is that "everything you think you know is false" or more specifically: It is possible that the metaphysically objective world is entirely different from the physical world. One of these differences could be that time isn't what we think it is, that our concept of time is a construct of the human mind. — Echarmion

Sure, and this could all be a dream. That's hardly an explanation.

It could simply be that the relations of events in the time dimension are not fundamentally different from the relations of things in the spatial dimension. There'd still be a continuum where changes occur, just like there is a point where your desk ends and a wall begins. Just the specific appearance of a unidirectional passage of time would be just that - an appearance rather than an ontological reality. — Echarmion

Either there is motion or there is not, unless you know of a third option. I thought you had already accepted that there is no motion or no "continuum where changes occur" in an Eternalist universe. I'm not buying your "never mind the details" argument.

Either there is motion or there is not, unless you know of a third option. I thought you had already accepted that there is no motion or no "continuum where changes occur" in an Eternalist universe. I'm not buying your "never mind the details" argument — Luke

I just want to note that I don't ascribe to an eternalist view on time, I am just trying to illustrate it for the sake of discussion.

As to your question, objects are arranged in space in an orderly way. Their arrangement can be described without referring to "passage of space" or some equivalent of motion. You can start your description at any point in the coordinate system and move in any direction, look at subsets in arbitrary order etc.

The same thing could be true for time. This wouldn't mean that events are no longer connected to each other. There'd still be the same laws that describe how one event (a region of time) is connected to another. Causality just would not be a line of causes of effects, but rather a web of relations that you can follow in every direction. Motion only appears because you're traveling that web in one direction, seemingly getting events that follow another. Like being on an amusement park ride, where it looks like the animatronics perform a story for you, while in reality they just keep repeating the same thing.

As to your question, objects are arranged in space in an orderly way. Their arrangement can be described without referring to "passage of space" or some equivalent of motion. You can start your description at any point in the coordinate system and move in any direction, look at subsets in arbitrary order etc.

The same thing could be true for time. This wouldn't mean that events are no longer connected to each other. There'd still be the same laws that describe how one event (a region of time) is connected to another. — Echarmion

I'm not here for a lesson on Eternalism, unless it involves an explanation of how anything is supposed to work in a motionless universe, including the supposed illusion of temporal passage.

Motion only appears because you're traveling that web in one direction, seemingly getting events that follow another. — Echarmion

Nothing is travelling.

I'm not here for a lesson on Eternalism, unless it involves an explanation of how anything is supposed to work in a motionless universe, including the supposed illusion of temporal passage. — Luke

And I'm not here to serve on your whim. I have already spend time trying to give you an example, if you don't care for it then I guess I'll just leave you to it.

Nothing is travelling. — Luke

It's a metaphor.

And I'm not here to serve on your whim. I have already spend time trying to give you an example, if you don't care for it then I guess I'll just leave you to it. — Echarmion

I'm attempting to argue that a B-theory Eternalist universe precludes motion. You seem to be assuming motion in your explanation for why there is no motion.

Motion only appears because you're traveling that web in one direction.
— Echarmion

Nothing is travelling.
— Luke

It's a metaphor. — Echarmion

Your explanation for the appearance of motion assumes actual motion: "because you're travelling..." Did I misunderstand the metaphor?

Not interested. Please take it elsewhere. — Luke

You dismiss eternalism because it requires religion to make sense of time passage. That says a lot about you.

I have returned, and nice seeing you all here. First I want, I want to announce that I plan to check grammer on future posts by writing it on paper first. Second is this concept of Eternalism is nonsense.

Evidence is that that we can say time is defined change of events that is now to being has been. Events are all characteristics of reality, and present means the event that contains all true characteristics of said reality.

From this, we can say that a new event means that reality has changed and the event that was the present is now a past event. All past events are ordered from one another with the present as a reference point to which was the present before or after.

I would now like to use a version of zeno's paradox now. Now let me say that space can have infinite series that equals a finite amount. Use calculus to get to that with Summnation. Time ,and thus motion, must be finite and not continous unlike the real numbers in a line. The reason is I will show you is say that you are facing a wall that is two feet away. From where you were, you move to the wall. There. Now did you go through an infinite events between the event you were at the original point and the wall. No, because remember the nature of events is that they occur one after the other. If Event A3 is the present, then A2 must not be the present. If you had been at every real number between the two points then it is impossible for then this would be the case

A=0
A1=1
A2=1+(1/2)
A3=1+(1/2)+(1/4)
.
.
.

Here you can see this would continue forever, there for every event afterwards would be either at or between any A(nth) events. An event B=2 would never happen. Therefore motion of an object can not have existed at all real numberee point between a distance.

You dismiss eternalism because it requires religion to make sense of time passage. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is like saying you dismiss salt because it requires religion to make sense of pepper. Good logic bro.