Following from this and other discussions at this site, I wanted to lay out my view of why Eternalism logically precludes motion. — Luke
If 1) B-theories are defined by the absense of the passage of time, and 2) Eternalism is a B-theory, but 3) the passage of time is not a meaningfull thing to talk about in eternalism… then maybe something is off with the whole qualification sceme. — ChatteringMonkey
instead of insisting on using the qualifications and definitions you set out in the OP, and God forbid trying to logically proof something from them about eternalism, maybe you should be asking the question if they make sense to begin with. — ChatteringMonkey
I don't know what you mean by "the passage of time is not a meaningful thing to talk about in eternalism". — Luke
However, if "Eternalism is a B-theory" and the B-theory is defined by "the absence of the passage of time", then time does not pass in Eternalism. Therefore, I argue, there is no motion in an Eternalist universe. That's what I'm arguing for here and what this discussion was supposed to be about. — Luke
It's not meaningfull because it assumes there is a present moment. If there is no present moment what could passage of time possible mean? — ChatteringMonkey
But this is all per definition. The conclusion is allready assumed in the definitions, so what's there to talk about? — ChatteringMonkey
I wouldn't call it an assumption; it's how we experience the world. Nonetheless, there is no passage of time under B-theory Eternalism, so the assumption of a present moment is equally absent. I don't understand how this is problematic or meaningless. — Luke
What I think you should say instead is something like this, 'in an eternalist view passage of time is replaced by things existing at different times' and motion is therefor re-defined as 'an object existing at different spaces and times'. This all a bit crudely formulated, but I'm just trying to get the point across. — ChatteringMonkey
What I think you should say instead is something like this, 'in an eternalist view passage of time is replaced by things existing at different times' and motion is therefor re-defined as 'an object existing at different spaces and times'. This all a bit crudely formulated, but I'm just trying to get the point across.
— ChatteringMonkey
The passage of time is not "re-defined" under B-theory Eternalism. Time does not pass according to the B-theory. You seem to want to retain temporal passage in Eternalism, just as a different way of looking at it. No: If time passes, it's A-theory; if time doesn't pass, it's B-theory. You can't have it both ways. — Luke
The conclusion is allready assumed in the definitions, so what's there to talk about? — Luke
There is an notion of time (nevermind the passage of time) in eternalism, right? — ChatteringMonkey
So what i'm saying is that you should take that notion and how it's used in eternalism (and not the presentist notion) into account when you speak of stuff like motion in that view. That seems pretty uncontroversial to me. — ChatteringMonkey
I thought you agreed that there is no motion because time does not pass, and that this conclusion is already contained in the definitions? — Luke
Yes if motion is defined in presentist terms of passage of time, then yes that conclusion follows logically. — ChatteringMonkey
I'm saying there is something wrong with the premisses, not with the validity of the argument. — ChatteringMonkey
What's wrong with the premisses? — Luke
The passage of time is not "re-defined" under B-theory Eternalism. Time does not pass according to the B-theory. — Luke
They apply to a presentist view only, and you are using them to arrive at a conclusion about motion in eternalist view.
I'm not even sure 'passage of time' the way you use it, is even essential to motion in a presentist view. — ChatteringMonkey
I'm not even sure 'passage of time' the way you use it, is even essential to motion in a presentist view. — ChatteringMonkey
The terms A and B theory are sometimes used as synonyms to the terms presentism and eternalism, but arguably presentism does not represent time being like an A-series since it denies that there is a future and past in which events can be located.
The motion of a body is observed by attaching a frame of reference to an observer and measuring the change in position of the body relative to that frame. — ChatteringMonkey
Here is what an eternalist might say: There is neither passage of time nor motion. Simply different spatio-temporal locations. Your mind simply apprehends temporal locations as a series of events, rather than as a region of coordinates, and this creates the appearance of motion. — Echarmion
The soul, as an eternal unchanging being — Metaphysician Undercover
In either case, a mysterious power is required to produce the perception of movement. — Metaphysician Undercover
How does a mind work if there is neither passage of time or motion? How does the human body work? What becomes of our understanding of beating hearts, circulation, respiration, vision, and all the rest? — Luke
Please don't bring religion into this discussion. — Luke
Couldn't you argue that Presentism presumes that same power, it just names it "time"? — Echarmion
How the mind works is the more interesting question. Given my description, it'd have to be outside the space-time block. That may be the reason Metaphysician Undercover called it a "soul". — Echarmion
The human body would be less of a problem, since what we know about it is based on perception, and thus would simply be subject to the same construction. — Echarmion
In case you haven't yet noticed, religion offers the most intelligent understanding of time. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't know what "subject to the same construction" is supposed to mean. — Luke
I don't follow how this is not problematic just because our understanding of physiology is "based on perception". I get that it's not a problem if there is passage of time and motion, but how is it supposed to work if there isn't? — Luke
The core idea here is that "everything you think you know is false" or more specifically: It is possible that the metaphysically objective world is entirely different from the physical world. One of these differences could be that time isn't what we think it is, that our concept of time is a construct of the human mind. — Echarmion
It could simply be that the relations of events in the time dimension are not fundamentally different from the relations of things in the spatial dimension. There'd still be a continuum where changes occur, just like there is a point where your desk ends and a wall begins. Just the specific appearance of a unidirectional passage of time would be just that - an appearance rather than an ontological reality. — Echarmion
Either there is motion or there is not, unless you know of a third option. I thought you had already accepted that there is no motion or no "continuum where changes occur" in an Eternalist universe. I'm not buying your "never mind the details" argument — Luke
As to your question, objects are arranged in space in an orderly way. Their arrangement can be described without referring to "passage of space" or some equivalent of motion. You can start your description at any point in the coordinate system and move in any direction, look at subsets in arbitrary order etc.
The same thing could be true for time. This wouldn't mean that events are no longer connected to each other. There'd still be the same laws that describe how one event (a region of time) is connected to another. — Echarmion
Motion only appears because you're traveling that web in one direction, seemingly getting events that follow another. — Echarmion
I'm not here for a lesson on Eternalism, unless it involves an explanation of how anything is supposed to work in a motionless universe, including the supposed illusion of temporal passage. — Luke
Nothing is travelling. — Luke
And I'm not here to serve on your whim. I have already spend time trying to give you an example, if you don't care for it then I guess I'll just leave you to it. — Echarmion
Motion only appears because you're traveling that web in one direction.
— Echarmion
Nothing is travelling.
— Luke
It's a metaphor. — Echarmion
Not interested. Please take it elsewhere. — Luke
You dismiss eternalism because it requires religion to make sense of time passage. — Metaphysician Undercover
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