That is not the point that you believe them separate things.
The point is how should they be useful at all if they do not relate to reality? — m-theory
To me it seems you are appealing to some teleology here.
How can you be sure that in order for something to be real it must rely upon teleology? — m-theory
No, the point is that you are drawing the conclusion that if they are useful, then they are "of reality". So the onus is on you, to justify this claim, by supplying an acceptable principle which would necessitate this conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover
Useful in which way, for what? — Metaphysician Undercover
I thought I had done this.This is why we need to define the ends, what are we trying to achieve with the model, in order that we can properly judge its usefulness. If the goal is to deceive, then clearly being useful does not indicate that the model is "of reality". If the goal is to get more funding, then we have to consider the possibility of deception, because we know that the prospects of money may influence some to deceive. — Metaphysician Undercover
If our models were not of something real then it seems to me that they should not produce useful results. — m-theory
There is no such thing as a real circle ... — Metaphysician Undercover
In this sense, any potential aggregate of possible points that are all in the same plane and equidistant from any other single point is a real circle. — aletheist
So if the criteria for being real is that we are encountering some brute or objective fact of nature, then universals or generals are real as limits on being. — apokrisis
Action - being symmetry breaking - has to have a real symmetry that it breaks. — apokrisis
universals or generals are not real — aletheist
It is very real that our models are useful.
Or are you suggesting that this is only imagined as well? — m-theory
The models that assume nature are consistent are useful because...nature does indeed appear to be consistent. — m-theory
I thought I had done this.
Why is producing reliable results not an end? — m-theory
Getting back to the question posed by the thread title, it depends on what we mean by "thing" and "real." If "thing" refers only to an individual and "real" is equivalent to "actual," then that statement is true and no one (except maybe a Platonist) regards universals as "real things." However, if "thing" can also refer to a continuum - a quality or regularity - and "real" encompasses whatever has its characters regardless of whether anyone ever thinks so, then that statement is false. — aletheist
In this sense, any potential aggregate of possible points that are all in the same plane and equidistant from any other single point is a real circle. — aletheist
But what the irrational nature of pi demonstrates is that there is no such thing as the aggregate of possible points equidistant from a single point. That single point which is supposed to be the centre of the circle, with equal lines to the circumference, is non-existent, just like the point where a tangent is supposed to meet the arc of a circle, is non-existent as well. Simply put, the curved line is incompatible with the straight line.. — Metaphysician Undercover
Reliable results are meaningless unless those reliable results can be used for further ends. That is why reliable results are just the means to ends. To produce reliable results is not an end in itself. Suppose I could accurately predict winning lottery numbers. Unless someone is to act on these "reliable results", this would be nothing more than an interesting party trick. It is what the reliable results are used for , which is important here. And. it all depends on what is wanted, what is the end, that dictates the type of reliable results which we seek. Depending on what we are doing, we might want reliable results in weather predictions, stock market predictions, whatever.
So this generality "reliable results" cannot be an end itself, because it is always used for something further. Furthermore, this "something further", which is desired, dictates where we will be seeking reliable results. So for instance, what is wanted, dictates whether we will be seeking reliable results with respect to the weather tomorrow, the strength of the concrete poured in the bridge, the size of the furnace installed in the house, etc.. Reliable results is dependent on what is wanted. — Metaphysician Undercover
What I think we can say instead is that if our models do not represent something real, then eventually they will produce results that are in conflict with our experience. — aletheist
To clarify - universals or generals are not real because they themselves are brute or objective facts of nature, but because they govern the brute or objective facts of nature. Right? — aletheist
So I think that it is only when a model is useful toward a particular type of goal, or end, that we can establish a relationship between the model and reality. — Metaphysician Undercover
But what the irrational nature of pi demonstrates is that there is no such thing as the aggregate of possible points equidistant from a single point. — Metaphysician Undercover
The models we live by are more or less reality-for-us until they break down. — R-13
My point is there is no way to account for why our models are useful if those models are not of something real. — m-theory
My point - in response to mtheory largely - was that they are as much a brute fact of existence as the material particulars which they govern. — apokrisis
I would reserve the term 'existence' for 'phenomena' - broadly speaking, any object which can be known by science. — Wayfarer
Hi. Respectfully, does this not bring us back to the ambiguity of "exist"? Does there exist a fixed, context and practice independent meaning for the word "exist"? Does the straight line exist anymore than this central point except as a sort of less complex idealization? — R-13
Again, if "thing" refers only to an actual individual, then that statement is true; but if "thing" can also refer to a continuum, then it is false - there is such a "thing" as a potential (not actual) aggregate of possible (not actual) points that are in the same plane and equidistant from any other single point. This is a real relation, not an existing object. — aletheist
My point is there is no way to account for why our models are useful if those models are not of something real. — m-theory
The irrational nature of pi simply means that we cannot precisely measure the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter; it has no bearing on whether that ratio is real. — aletheist
You've made this or similar assertions numerous times and all that it demonstrates is that you do not understand what "useful" means. — Metaphysician Undercover
To say that a possible, or potential thing (non-actual thing) is real, is self-contradictory. "Real", by definition refers to the actual thing, as indicating its difference from the possible, or non-actual thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
Unless we can establish as a fact, that ideals are what is real, or at least some sort of relationship between ideals and reality, there is no basis for your claim that models must be "of something real", if they are useful. — Metaphysician Undercover
What the irrational nature of pi demonstrates is that a circle cannot have both a circumference and a diameter, in any absolute, or "ideal" sense. These two are incompatible, the diameter and the circumference, as the ratio between them cannot be resolved, in any absolute sense. — Metaphysician Undercover
Even an infinite number of non-dimensional points could not produce a dimensional line, we must assume something in between the non-dimensional points, line segments. — Metaphysician Undercover
So the circumference is incompatible with the diameter, one is two dimensional, the other is one dimensional. — Metaphysician Undercover
How was geocentricism useful, it did not provide accurate predictions? — m-theory
And Newtonian mechanics is still useful, there are simply more accurate models. — m-theory
It provided very accurate predictions, especially as various ad hoc adjustments were incorporated over the centuries. For example, the sun rose and set right when the predictions said that it would. — aletheist
Newtonian mechanics is not what I would call inconsistent with reality.In other words, you now acknowledge that a model can be useful despite being inconsistent with some aspects of reality, as long as the modeler does not consider those aspects to be significant given the purpose of the model. — aletheist
That the sun rises and sets was an observation not a prediction. — m-theory
Newtonian mechanics is not what I would call inconsistent with reality.
That would make it as useless as geocentricism. — m-theory
The prediction of geocentricism was that the earth was at the center of the universe, not that the sun rises and sets.I referred to when the sun rises and sets - i.e., the time of each event - which varies each day. That was a prediction, and it was quite accurate under geocentrism. Likewise for the locations of the stars and planets in the sky - again, with various ad hoc adjustments over time. — aletheist
Newtonian mechanics is how we put men on the moon.Newtonian mechanics will give you incorrect answers for certain scenarios; therefore, it is (to that extent) inconsistent with reality, and thus useless for solving those kinds of problems. It is not entirely useless, though, because it is consistent enough with reality for many other scenarios. Again, whether a particular model is an adequate representation of reality depends on the purpose in for which it is being used. — aletheist
The prediction of geocentricism was that the earth was at the center of the universe, not that the sun rises and sets. — m-theory
To this day Newtonian mechanics is still taught in the classroom because it remains useful.
Newtonian mechanics still produces reliable predictions. — m-theory
If nature was inconsistent and had no universal principles why should our models be useful, and why should we be able to improve upon them? — m-theory
No, the model of geocentrism was that the earth was at the center of the universe. Its usefulness was that it facilitated accurate (enough) predictions of certain phenomena, including when the sun would rise and set each day, and the locations of the stars and planets in the sky. It was when these predictions increasingly failed, requiring more and more ad hoc adjustments to the model, that it became imperative to come up with a different model. — aletheist
Yes - under certain conditions, and therefore for certain purposes, that model is accurate enough. — aletheist
Right - and, returning to the thread topic, the consistency of nature calls for an explanation. Realists believe that the laws of nature are real and genuinely govern actual events, including those that will occur in the future. — aletheist
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.