That is not the point that you believe them separate things.
The point is how should they be useful at all if they do not relate to reality? — m-theory

No, the point is that you are drawing the conclusion that if they are useful, then they are "of reality". So the onus is on you, to justify this claim, by supplying an acceptable principle which would necessitate this conclusion. I've already given you the reason why I do not accept that conclusion. I see that in cases of lying and deception, it's very clear that models which are not "of reality" are indeed useful. And, as I tried to explain to you, in cases of simple misunderstanding, models which are not of reality, are still very useful.

There is a principle of efficiency here. One can be using a model, which gets the job done, until another person comes along with a completely different model that is much more efficient at getting the job done. Two completely different models and they are both useful, but one is much more useful than the other, because it is more efficient. Perhaps the more efficient one covers a wider scope, has less exceptions to the rule, or just makes the mathematics easier. The more efficient model might be useful to achieve many more different ends, replacing many different models, or it might just achieve the one end with much less effort. We cannot say that "being useful" is the principle of judgement for the reality of the model, because even the inefficient model was useful. We need to give "usefulness" some parameters, which can relate it to reality. Useful in which way, for what?

This is why we need to define the ends, what are we trying to achieve with the model, in order that we can properly judge its usefulness. If the goal is to deceive, then clearly being useful does not indicate that the model is "of reality". If the goal is to get more funding, then we have to consider the possibility of deception, because we know that the prospects of money may influence some to deceive.

To me it seems you are appealing to some teleology here.
How can you be sure that in order for something to be real it must rely upon teleology? — m-theory

If your means for judging a model in relation to reality is "usefulness" then it is you who is implying teleology. Usefulness necessarily implies purpose, and you have designated this as your principle for judging the reality of the model. So your "reality" is necessarily tied to the purpose for which the model is judged, according to usefulness toward that purpose. Your reality is therefore teleological.

No, the point is that you are drawing the conclusion that if they are useful, then they are "of reality". So the onus is on you, to justify this claim, by supplying an acceptable principle which would necessitate this conclusion. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is very real that our models are useful.

Or are you suggesting that this is only imagined as well?

Useful in which way, for what? — Metaphysician Undercover

The models that assume nature are consistent are useful because...nature does indeed appear to be consistent.

This is why we need to define the ends, what are we trying to achieve with the model, in order that we can properly judge its usefulness. If the goal is to deceive, then clearly being useful does not indicate that the model is "of reality". If the goal is to get more funding, then we have to consider the possibility of deception, because we know that the prospects of money may influence some to deceive. — Metaphysician Undercover

I thought I had done this.
Why is producing reliable results not an end?

You don't get more funding if you don't produce results.

If our models were not of something real then it seems to me that they should not produce useful results. — m-theory

That which is real does not necessarily turn out to be useful, and that which is useful does not necessarily turn out to be real; hence the notion of "useful fictions." What I think we can say instead is that if our models do not represent something real, then eventually they will produce results that are in conflict with our experience.

There is no such thing as a real circle ... — Metaphysician Undercover

Getting back to the question posed by the thread title, it depends on what we mean by "thing" and "real." If "thing" refers only to an individual and "real" is equivalent to "actual," then that statement is true and no one (except maybe a Platonist) regards universals as "real things." However, if "thing" can also refer to a continuum - a quality or regularity - and "real" encompasses whatever has its characters regardless of whether anyone ever thinks so, then that statement is false. In this sense, any potential aggregate of possible points that are all in the same plane and equidistant from any other single point is a real circle.

In this sense, any potential aggregate of possible points that are all in the same plane and equidistant from any other single point is a real circle. — aletheist

Yep. Ideals like perfect circles, or the principle of relativity, represent bounding limits. They are as real as it gets in terms of bounding material actuality. They are continuums in the sense of being complete symmetry states with no brokenness.

So they show how "reality" is dichotomous. Nature has to be divided or separated in this actual way to have the possibility of being.

If there is be material action, some kind of process, then its bounding limits are also just as real, but real in the complementary sense of being the continua or symmetry state that is the formal limit on that materiality.

So if the criteria for being real is that we are encountering some brute or objective fact of nature, then universals or generals are real as limits on being. Action - being symmetry breaking - has to have a real symmetry that it breaks.

So if the criteria for being real is that we are encountering some brute or objective fact of nature, then universals or generals are real as limits on being. — apokrisis

To clarify - universals or generals are not real because they themselves are brute or objective facts of nature, but because they govern the brute or objective facts of nature. Right?

Action - being symmetry breaking - has to have a real symmetry that it breaks. — apokrisis

Is this related to the notion that the actualization of any possibility necessarily rules out others?

universals or generals are not real — aletheist

I would say that they're not 'existing things' - to say that they are is to reify them - but they're nevertheless real, in the same sense that the natural numbers are real. Hence, as you know Peirce points out, there's a distinction between 'what is real', and 'what exists' - a distinction which is not generally recognised by modern philosophy.

Have a look at this review - Meaning and the Problem of Universals, Kelly Ross.

Yes, I know; you seem to have misunderstood my comment. I was asking @apokrisis to confirm that the reason why universals or generals are real is not because they themselves are brute or objective facts of nature, but because they govern the brute or objective facts of nature.

It is very real that our models are useful.

Or are you suggesting that this is only imagined as well? — m-theory

I'm not suggesting something else, I agree that models are useful. But "useful" implies purpose. So if it is real that models are useful, then purpose is just as real.

The models that assume nature are consistent are useful because...nature does indeed appear to be consistent. — m-theory

Ok, but now consistency is something different than usefulness. And I would agree that observed consistency is useful, but I don't think we should jump the gun, and conclude that since some things in nature are consistent, and useful, therefore nature is consistent.

Maybe you will consider the following. Consistency is useful. Human beings (as well as other living things) desire to fulfill ends, i.e. they seek to satisfy their wants and needs. Therefore human beings will focus their attention on the consistent aspects of reality, because this is useful for fulfilling their wants and needs. But it would be a fallacy to conclude that all of nature is necessarily consistent.

I thought I had done this.
Why is producing reliable results not an end? — m-theory

Reliable results are meaningless unless those reliable results can be used for further ends. That is why reliable results are just the means to ends. To produce reliable results is not an end in itself. Suppose I could accurately predict winning lottery numbers. Unless someone is to act on these "reliable results", this would be nothing more than an interesting party trick. It is what the reliable results are used for , which is important here. And. it all depends on what is wanted, what is the end, that dictates the type of reliable results which we seek. Depending on what we are doing, we might want reliable results in weather predictions, stock market predictions, whatever.

So this generality "reliable results" cannot be an end itself, because it is always used for something further. Furthermore, this "something further", which is desired, dictates where we will be seeking reliable results. So for instance, what is wanted, dictates whether we will be seeking reliable results with respect to the weather tomorrow, the strength of the concrete poured in the bridge, the size of the furnace installed in the house, etc.. Reliable results is dependent on what is wanted.

Getting back to the question posed by the thread title, it depends on what we mean by "thing" and "real." If "thing" refers only to an individual and "real" is equivalent to "actual," then that statement is true and no one (except maybe a Platonist) regards universals as "real things." However, if "thing" can also refer to a continuum - a quality or regularity - and "real" encompasses whatever has its characters regardless of whether anyone ever thinks so, then that statement is false. — aletheist

Well, M-theory seems to base reality on usefulness, and this means successful at achieving an end. I don't have a strong objection against this basic point, but it is where we proceed from here which is critical. If anything which is successful at achieving ends is reality, then we have fictions and other nonsense as reality. So I think that it is only when a model is useful toward a particular type of goal, or end, that we can establish a relationship between the model and reality. This leaves the question of what type of end is best related to reality.

In this sense, any potential aggregate of possible points that are all in the same plane and equidistant from any other single point is a real circle. — aletheist

But what the irrational nature of pi demonstrates is that there is no such thing as the aggregate of possible points equidistant from a single point. That single point which is supposed to be the centre of the circle, with equal lines to the circumference, is non-existent, just like the point where a tangent is supposed to meet the arc of a circle, is non-existent as well. Simply put, the curved line is incompatible with the straight line..

It depends on what you mean by "exist." — aletheist

Exactly.

How does one get beyond the ambiguity that haunts this kind of philosophy? I'd say look at the results of thinking on that which is not "mere" or "only" thought.

But what the irrational nature of pi demonstrates is that there is no such thing as the aggregate of possible points equidistant from a single point. That single point which is supposed to be the centre of the circle, with equal lines to the circumference, is non-existent, just like the point where a tangent is supposed to meet the arc of a circle, is non-existent as well. Simply put, the curved line is incompatible with the straight line.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Hi. Respectfully, does this not bring us back to the ambiguity of "exist"? Does there exist a fixed, context and practice independent meaning for the word "exist"? Does the straight line exist anymore than this central point except as a sort of less complex idealization?

Reliable results are meaningless unless those reliable results can be used for further ends. That is why reliable results are just the means to ends. To produce reliable results is not an end in itself. Suppose I could accurately predict winning lottery numbers. Unless someone is to act on these "reliable results", this would be nothing more than an interesting party trick. It is what the reliable results are used for , which is important here. And. it all depends on what is wanted, what is the end, that dictates the type of reliable results which we seek. Depending on what we are doing, we might want reliable results in weather predictions, stock market predictions, whatever.

So this generality "reliable results" cannot be an end itself, because it is always used for something further. Furthermore, this "something further", which is desired, dictates where we will be seeking reliable results. So for instance, what is wanted, dictates whether we will be seeking reliable results with respect to the weather tomorrow, the strength of the concrete poured in the bridge, the size of the furnace installed in the house, etc.. Reliable results is dependent on what is wanted. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree, and I think this is very important. Philosophy (seems to me) is at least as much about deciding what to pursue as it is evaluating the means for figuring out how to get there. Intellectual error is only to be feared in terms of failing to procure the desired state. It's a digression, but I think one can swat away various hyper-skeptical concerns along these lines.

What I think we can say instead is that if our models do not represent something real, then eventually they will produce results that are in conflict with our experience. — aletheist

I agree, but perhaps we experience this terms of reality changing on us. The models we live by are more or less reality-for-us until they break down. Of course there are models that are held at a distance and known to be models, also. But largest, most crucial frames/models (seems to me) are the ones we take for granted in order to construct the models and frames that we know to be such. Perhaps ordinary language is the more or less invisible frame that we have to mostly assume without criticism in order to debate the meaning of "universal" and "existence" in the first place. Of course we cannot doubt all of our language use at the same time, just as we cannot rebuild the boat from scratch as we sail it on the black and seamless sea of philosophy.

Man I will be honest.
I have no interest in readying all that.
Your posts are kind of long winded and seem to miss my point.
You always seem to end up saying because those models serve a purpose, but the purpose of those models is to confirm an assumption about reality, that assumption is that reality is consistent such that reality can be predicted if you apply the correct universal rules.

My point is there is no way to account for why our models are useful if those models are not of something real.

To clarify - universals or generals are not real because they themselves are brute or objective facts of nature, but because they govern the brute or objective facts of nature. Right? — aletheist

My point - in response to mtheory largely - was that they are as much a brute fact of existence as the material particulars which they govern.

But then I am arguing for a process ontology and so there aren't really any brute facts of existence anyway. Everything is emergent.

So if you are thinking of the Peircean position on real/existing, then I would reserve the term, existence, to mean substantial form.

'A theory of substantial forms asserts that forms (or ideas) organize matter and make it intelligible. Substantial forms are the source of properties, order, unity, identity, and information about objects.

The idea of substantial forms dominates ancient Greek philosophy and medieval philosophy, but has fallen out of favour in modern philosophy. The idea of substantial forms has been abandoned for a mechanical, or “bottom-up” theory of organization.' ~ Wikipedia.

I would reserve the term 'existence' for 'phenomena' - broadly speaking, any object which can be known by science.

Peirce says “Existence [. . .] is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate" - from here.

So I think that it is only when a model is useful toward a particular type of goal, or end, that we can establish a relationship between the model and reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right - we create our models with some goal or end in mind, and that is what guides us in ascertaining which parts of reality and which relations among them are significant, such that we then include them in the model and leave out everything else.

But what the irrational nature of pi demonstrates is that there is no such thing as the aggregate of possible points equidistant from a single point. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, if "thing" refers only to an actual individual, then that statement is true; but if "thing" can also refer to a continuum, then it is false - there is such a "thing" as a potential (not actual) aggregate of possible (not actual) points that are in the same plane and equidistant from any other single point. This is a real relation, not an existing object. The irrational nature of pi simply means that we cannot precisely measure the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter; it has no bearing on whether that ratio is real.

The models we live by are more or less reality-for-us until they break down. — R-13

Right, and the "breaking down" is what happens when reality confronts us with its independence from our thoughts about it. We maintain our current beliefs until such anomalies create the irritation of genuine doubt, which compels us to undertake inquiry in an effort to reestablish the equilibrium of stable beliefs.

My point is there is no way to account for why our models are useful if those models are not of something real. — m-theory

And my point is simply that the usefulness of our models does not, by itself, guarantee that they are of something real. Geocentrism was a useful model for many centuries. Phlogiston and ether were useful models for a while. Newtonian physics is still a useful model today, even though we know that it is not strictly correct.

My point - in response to mtheory largely - was that they are as much a brute fact of existence as the material particulars which they govern. — apokrisis

I think that Peirce would disagree. He categorized all brute facts of existence under 2ns, but all generals under 1ns (qualities) and especially 3ns (regularities).

I would reserve the term 'existence' for 'phenomena' - broadly speaking, any object which can be known by science. — Wayfarer

The problem with this is that science does not just study "objects," it also studies laws - and in Peirce's terminology, laws are real (3ns) but do not exist (2ns).

Peirce says “Existence [. . .] is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate" - from here. — Wayfarer

He continues, "Reality, in its turn, is a special mode of being, the characteristic of which is that things that are real are whatever they really are, independently of any assertion about them." He also writes elsewhere that existence is a "mode of being of that which reacts with other things," that "existence means reaction with the environment," and "I myself always use exist in its strict philosophical sense of 'react with the other like things in the environment.'"

Hi. Respectfully, does this not bring us back to the ambiguity of "exist"? Does there exist a fixed, context and practice independent meaning for the word "exist"? Does the straight line exist anymore than this central point except as a sort of less complex idealization? — R-13

Our subject is reality, what is real, and this is somewhat different from "exists", because "real" implies a genuine, or actual existence. So even if we allow that ideals or "idealizations" have some sort of existence, what we are trying to determine is their place relative to an assumed genuine, or actual existence, reality.

Again, if "thing" refers only to an actual individual, then that statement is true; but if "thing" can also refer to a continuum, then it is false - there is such a "thing" as a potential (not actual) aggregate of possible (not actual) points that are in the same plane and equidistant from any other single point. This is a real relation, not an existing object. — aletheist

To say that a possible, or potential thing (non-actual thing) is real, is self-contradictory. "Real", by definition refers to the actual thing, as indicating its difference from the possible, or non-actual thing..

My point is there is no way to account for why our models are useful if those models are not of something real. — m-theory

You've made this or similar assertions numerous times and all that it demonstrates is that you do not understand what "useful" means. That is why my posts get so long winded, because I have to say it in so many different ways, trying to get through to you what usefulness is. If you don't read it, then how are you going to understand what is present to my mind, when you use the word "useful".

Do you agree that "useful" is used to refer to something which can bring about desired results, goals or ends? Tools are useful because they can bring about a state which is desired. So the useful thing earns its title "useful" in relation to this desired goal, this end, which is an "ideal". Therefore a model is deemed "useful" according to its relationship to an ideal.

Unless we can establish as a fact, that ideals are what is real, or at least some sort of relationship between ideals and reality, there is no basis for your claim that models must be "of something real", if they are useful.

The irrational nature of pi simply means that we cannot precisely measure the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter; it has no bearing on whether that ratio is real. — aletheist

What the irrational nature of pi demonstrates is that a circle cannot have both a circumference and a diameter, in any absolute, or "ideal" sense. These two are incompatible, the diameter and the circumference, as the ratio between them cannot be resolved, in any absolute sense. This has nothing to do with our capacity to measure, it is this way by definition. Since the line of the diameter is what indicates the position of the centre of the circle, it is therefore impossible that a circle has both a centre and a circumference.

This is because the point, which is assumed to indicate the centre of the circle, as non-dimensional, is inherently incompatible with the line, which is dimensional. Even an infinite number of non-dimensional points could not produce a dimensional line, we must assume something in between the non-dimensional points, line segments. Non-dimensional points, and line segments are incompatible. In the case of the straight line, the segments between the points are one dimensional. In the case of the curved line of the circumference, the segments are two dimensional. So in a similar way to the way that the point is incompatible with the line, one being non-dimensional and the other being dimensional, the straight line is incompatible with the curved line, one being of a single dimension and the other of two dimensions. So the circumference is incompatible with the diameter, one is two dimensional, the other is one dimensional.

How was geocentricism useful, it did not provide accurate predictions?
And Newtonian mechanics is still useful, there are simply more accurate models.

You've made this or similar assertions numerous times and all that it demonstrates is that you do not understand what "useful" means. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think it is you that does not understand that if nature were not consistent then models that predict consistently would not be useful.

To say that a possible, or potential thing (non-actual thing) is real, is self-contradictory. "Real", by definition refers to the actual thing, as indicating its difference from the possible, or non-actual thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

No; you are ignoring the distinction between "real" and "actual," and instead treating them as synonyms. Realism regarding universals/generals is the view that the real is a broader category than the actual, such that possibilities and regularities (for example) are just as real as actualities. You are simply asserting nominalism - the opposing view that the real and the actual are one and the same. You cannot refute realism by simply insisting on a nominalist definition of "real."

Unless we can establish as a fact, that ideals are what is real, or at least some sort of relationship between ideals and reality, there is no basis for your claim that models must be "of something real", if they are useful. — Metaphysician Undercover

The model itself is ideal, but that which it is intended to represent is real. In particular, a mathematical model - i.e., a diagram - embodies the real relations among the parts of its object; and again, the modeler selects those parts and their relations as those that are significant, given the purpose of the model.

What the irrational nature of pi demonstrates is that a circle cannot have both a circumference and a diameter, in any absolute, or "ideal" sense. These two are incompatible, the diameter and the circumference, as the ratio between them cannot be resolved, in any absolute sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

Huh? The ideal sense is the only sense in which a circle can have both a circumference and a diameter in the exact ratio of pi. The two lengths are not "incompatible," whatever that means; they are incommensurable, which simply means - as I said before - that their ratio cannot be precisely measured as a rational number, not that it is somehow "unreal." The same goes for the ratio between the diagonal and side length of a square. It is not by accident that what we call "real numbers" include not only all rational numbers, but also all irrational numbers.

Even an infinite number of non-dimensional points could not produce a dimensional line, we must assume something in between the non-dimensional points, line segments. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with this, since it is the very definition of a true continuum. No multitude of actual points - not even the infinite total of all real numbers - comprises a line; instead, a line contains potential points exceeding all multitude. Every part of a continuum is itself a continuum, not an individual; every part of a line is itself a line, not a point. The dispute between realists and nominalists may also be framed as the question of whether there are any real continua of this sort; realists say yes, nominalists say no.

So the circumference is incompatible with the diameter, one is two dimensional, the other is one dimensional. — Metaphysician Undercover

This, however, is nonsense; if it were true, then the perimeter of a (two-dimensional) square would be "incompatible" with its (one-dimensional) side length, while the (one-dimensional) diagonal length of a square would be "compatible" with its (one-dimensional) side length. On the contrary, the perimeter and side length of a square are commensurable, but its diagonal and side length are incommensurable.

How was geocentricism useful, it did not provide accurate predictions? — m-theory

It provided very accurate predictions, especially as various ad hoc adjustments were incorporated over the centuries. For example, the sun rose and set right when the predictions said that it would.

And Newtonian mechanics is still useful, there are simply more accurate models. — m-theory

In other words, you now acknowledge that a model can be useful despite being inconsistent with some aspects of reality, as long as the modeler does not consider those aspects to be significant given the purpose of the model.

It provided very accurate predictions, especially as various ad hoc adjustments were incorporated over the centuries. For example, the sun rose and set right when the predictions said that it would. — aletheist

That the sun rises and sets was an observation not a prediction.

In other words, you now acknowledge that a model can be useful despite being inconsistent with some aspects of reality, as long as the modeler does not consider those aspects to be significant given the purpose of the model. — aletheist

Newtonian mechanics is not what I would call inconsistent with reality.
That would make it as useless as geocentricism.

That the sun rises and sets was an observation not a prediction. — m-theory

I referred to when the sun rises and sets - i.e., the time of each event - which varies each day. That was a prediction, and it was quite accurate under geocentrism. Likewise for the locations of the stars and planets in the sky - again, with various ad hoc adjustments over time.

Newtonian mechanics is not what I would call inconsistent with reality.
That would make it as useless as geocentricism. — m-theory

Newtonian mechanics will give you incorrect answers for certain scenarios; therefore, it is (to that extent) inconsistent with reality, and thus useless for solving those kinds of problems. It is not entirely useless, though, because it is consistent enough with reality for many other scenarios. Again, whether a particular model is an adequate representation of reality depends on the purpose in for which it is being used.

Or as George Box famously put it, "All models are wrong, but some are useful."

I referred to when the sun rises and sets - i.e., the time of each event - which varies each day. That was a prediction, and it was quite accurate under geocentrism. Likewise for the locations of the stars and planets in the sky - again, with various ad hoc adjustments over time. — aletheist

The prediction of geocentricism was that the earth was at the center of the universe, not that the sun rises and sets.

Newtonian mechanics will give you incorrect answers for certain scenarios; therefore, it is (to that extent) inconsistent with reality, and thus useless for solving those kinds of problems. It is not entirely useless, though, because it is consistent enough with reality for many other scenarios. Again, whether a particular model is an adequate representation of reality depends on the purpose in for which it is being used. — aletheist

Newtonian mechanics is how we put men on the moon.
To this day Newtonian mechanics is still taught in the classroom because it remains useful.
Newtonian mechanics still produces reliable predictions.
But GR produces even better results as a model of gravitation, so it is currently accepted as the more accurate model.

It is true that models improve over time, as does our ability to observe the accuracy of our models.
That newer models produce more accurate results hardly explains why the older models produced consistently reliable but less accurate results.

You raise a fair point though.
If nature was inconsistent and had no universal principles why should our models be useful, and why should we be able to improve upon them?

If nature was inconsistent we might get lucky with a given model, and it remains useful but less accurate, instead what happens is we are able to improve our models by accounting for newly observed consistencies in nature.
That should not be the case should it?

The prediction of geocentricism was that the earth was at the center of the universe, not that the sun rises and sets. — m-theory

No, the model of geocentrism was that the earth was at the center of the universe. Its usefulness was that it facilitated accurate (enough) predictions of certain phenomena, including when the sun would rise and set each day, and the locations of the stars and planets in the sky. It was when these predictions increasingly failed, requiring more and more ad hoc adjustments to the model, that it became imperative to come up with a different model.

To this day Newtonian mechanics is still taught in the classroom because it remains useful.
Newtonian mechanics still produces reliable predictions. — m-theory

Yes - under certain conditions, and therefore for certain purposes, that model is accurate enough.

If nature was inconsistent and had no universal principles why should our models be useful, and why should we be able to improve upon them? — m-theory

Right - and, returning to the thread topic, the consistency of nature calls for an explanation. Realists believe that the laws of nature are real and genuinely govern actual events, including those that will occur in the future.

No, the model of geocentrism was that the earth was at the center of the universe. Its usefulness was that it facilitated accurate (enough) predictions of certain phenomena, including when the sun would rise and set each day, and the locations of the stars and planets in the sky. It was when these predictions increasingly failed, requiring more and more ad hoc adjustments to the model, that it became imperative to come up with a different model. — aletheist

The only prediction it had was wrong, as soon as we were able to observe that it was useless.

Yes - under certain conditions, and therefore for certain purposes, that model is accurate enough. — aletheist

Why should they be useful at all though unless nature is consistent?

Right - and, returning to the thread topic, the consistency of nature calls for an explanation. Realists believe that the laws of nature are real and genuinely govern actual events, including those that will occur in the future. — aletheist

I think it is more accurate to say realists claim the consistency in nature is real, and hence using models with universal laws produces useful results.