I like your thinking and writing. — NOS4A2

Thank you.

The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determined where I ended up. So to is it with what we do. We do what we do because all the relevant preceding cause/effect events inexorably led up to that very act and no other. We HAD to do what we did.


This is a fundamental point you’re making. But I think it’s an argument for free will rather than against it, because isn’t the cause to each one of your actions, within each anterior state, yourself? — NOS4A2

External factors aside, yes.

If so it follows that you are the cause of your own actions. If you are both cause and effect, what other than yourself can determine your actions? — NOS4A2

I'm not saying the determining causes must come from without, but only that they rob the will of freedom . . .whatever their origin. A person must do whatever he has been directed to do by all the relevant cause/effect events leading up to the moment of the doing. There is no such thing as choosing. To paraphrase: "The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determine what a person does."

Thing is, if there aren't any determinant causes, as some people claim, then exactly what is the Operation that induces a person to choose A over B?

The fact remains, you could not have chosen to have a hot dog (see the OP), which is something free willer denies.

Define "free will" however you like and then tell me how the will goes about choosing Y over Z? — Lida Rose

Well the conflicting case here is that of compatibilist free will. So a good model of that would start with an agent. Agents are entities that interact with the world continuously. Agents act with intention; i.e., they direct their behaviors towards goals. The intention per se, being an intention, can be described loosely as a meaningful direction of behavior. So if we are discussing free will, we are discussing the selection of an intention to act upon. In your question you're labeling these as Y and Z. In this compatiblist model, the nature of the options is that of counterfactual goals... Y is something that "could" be done in the sense that there exists a known way to initiate an action and direct it towards Y, and Z is something that "could" be done in the sense that there exists a known way to initiate an action and direct it towards Z. In a (minimally considered; Pfhorrest gives a more common practical criteria) compatibilist choice, the agent considers two such counterfactual goals and selects one of them to commit to act towards. Given compatibilism's definitive nature, the hypothesis is that this choice occurs in a way compatible with determinism... so in our model we can just commit to that and say that the choice happens deterministically.

Since you are asking the question of "how", I think that deterministic part is the part that bugs you, so let's get that out of the way. We may presume full determinism here. Compatibilists contend that only one outcome can happen in a deterministic universe. But as you apparently contended, only one thing will happen anyway. This would drive a libertarian nuts, since libertarians presume that unless there's some "ontic" way in which the considered-but-not-chosen path "could" happen, that it's impossible to assign responsibility to the agent. But compatibilists don't presume such a thing; all a compatibilist needs (minimally) to assign responsibility is to establish that it was the agent that made the choice. Compatibilist choices aren't "routings" of "reality itself" towards one of many "ontic futures"... they are merely selections of an action to commit to among a set of counterfactual considerations. So to a compatibilist it's simply not relevant how many of those futures there are... what's relevant is simply whether or not it was the subject that did the choosing (see first part of the post again). — InPitzotl

Compatibilism is the wimp's "Yah-but" way of skirting around their acceptance of determinism, and I have absolutely no interest in their "apologetics."

Compatibilism is the wimp's "Yah-but" way of skirting around their acceptance of determinism, and I have absolutely no interest in their "apologetics." — Lida Rose

As a free will agnostic, I'm unconvinced by your ad hominem arguments and appeal to motive fallacies.

I personally find the whole free will debate a bit fishy, on all sides... people have been arguing this stuff for well over 2 millennia... certainly something's off. I find that incredibly interesting. But I find it a bit suspicious that this thread had "Praising A Rock" in the title, that you wrote a 1000+ word op on a philosophy forum complaining about free will, that compatibilism allows for assigning praise and blame in such a way that none of your points stick, and that you find no interest in it.

There is something to this 2+ millennia old idea of compatibilism... it's not a reaction to (at least the modern) determinism. Several people besides me have already pointed this out. Just in case you're interested (the proper way to show lack of interest is to not reply).

I personally find the whole free will debate a bit fishy, on all sides... people have been arguing this stuff for well over 2 millennia... certainly something's off. I find that incredibly interesting.But I find it a bit suspicious that this thread had "Praising A Rock" in the title, — InPitzotl

Suspect away, but just to remind you, it comes from my OP where I said,

This means that praise and blame come out as pretty hollow concepts. As I mentioned, if you cannot do other than what you did why should you be praised or blamed for them? To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter. — Lida Rose

that you wrote a 1000+ word op on a philosophy forum complaining about free will, that compatibilism allows for assigning praise and blame in such a way that none of your points stick, and that you find no interest in it. — InPitzotl

1,172 words to be exact, but who cares other than yourself? And, you mistake argument for complaint. Moreover, I never brought up compatibilism. I believe you were the first to do that.

There is something to this 2+ millennia old idea of compatibilism... it's not a reaction to (at least the modern) determinism. Several people besides me have already pointed this out. Just in case you're interested (the proper way to show lack of interest is to not reply). — InPitzotl

No it isn't. In polite discourse the proper way to indicate one's disinterest in going down a whole other path of discussion is to let it be known. I have an interest in forestalling any further discussion about compatilibism, which is why I said "I have absolutely no interest in their "apologetics"; something that obviously hasn't worked because here you are still wanting to talk about it and me having to reiterate my :yawn: with it. But be assured, this will be my last word about it to you. :smile:

Will is the capacity to act decisively on one's desires.

Free will is to do so undirected by controlling influences. — Lida Rose

Here's what I don't get about this type of argument. The very definition, "having the capacity to act" is equivalent to "initiating an action" i.e. autotelic behaviour. That, in and of itself, contradicts the possibility that will could be "not free." Being subject to external direction, or being externally caused, means that you do not have the "capacity to act." The secondary, dependent assumption contradicts the primary assumption.

If you can "act," you must, a fortiori, be free.

Suspect away, but just to remind you, it comes from my OP — Lida Rose

And that thing in your OP comes from your intuitions. You have libertarian intuitions; that is, you intuit PAP. But you're not the only one with intuitions; compatibilists have intuitions too. But there's an overall context implied by the fact that you're posting on a philosophy forum... I would think people actually interested in philosophy should be interested in analyzing and questioning their intuitions, especially if the intuitions are not universal.

where I said, "This means that praise and blame come out as pretty hollow concepts. As I mentioned, if you (A)cannot do other than what you did

But that means less than what you're making it out to mean. A rabbit (B)can go into my shed, but an adult blue whale (B)cannot go into my shed. I had lemonade last night, but I (C)could have had milk. (A), (B), and (C) all use different senses of the world could/can.

You're presenting a pet theory... that one (D)cannot be assigned praise/blame if one (A)cannot do other than what they do. But why (D)can't they? Why (D)can't someone be assigned praise/blame based on whether or not the (C)could have done otherwise as opposed to (A)could have?

I don't think your pet theory has weight; rather, I think your intuition's messed up.

why should you be praised or blamed for them?

If I choose with intention, because I chose with intention.

To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter."

The rock is not an agent; people are agents. People act with intention; rocks do not go to places due to intentions. People actually mean to do what they (intentionally) do; rocks do not. Those are significant and relevant differences. It's impossible to blame a rock for being where it is because the rock didn't "mean" to go there, but the same cannot be said of a person acting with intent. In fact, it's not even the actual act we tend to hold people responsible for... it is just the intent behind it. (This isn't always true, but in the ways relevant to praise/blame it's true enough for government work as they say).

That we (A)can't do other than what we will do is simply a consequence of the fact that there's only one reality, but we still in that reality are causes of the thing we intend. Determinism doesn't conflict with the fact that we act based on intentions; in fact, the suggestion that we act based on intentions is causal by nature.

In polite discourse the proper way to indicate one's disinterest in going down a whole other path of discussion is to let it be known. — Lida Rose

I'm not buying into that narrative. From start to end, this is a public forum, and when you reply someone it's like ringing their doorbell, especially with this setup. Also, you're not merely indicating your disinterest; you're advancing arguments. And this is not "a whole other path of discussion", it is the thing you're discussing... you're explicit here that you're interested in praise and blame in this previous reply.

I have an interest in forestalling any further discussion about compatilibism — Lida Rose

But your alleged interest does not compel me to share it. And your discussion about compatibilism is where the primary weakness of your argument against the ability to assign blame/praise lies. In theory we could talk about original causation as a third mechanic (besides determinism/randomness), but I think the biggest problem is your acceptance of PAP. It's reasonable to reject original causation until the burden is met demonstrating that it is indeed a possible mechanic, and whereas libertarians tend to demonstrate this by appealing to the fact that we have free will and that it's impossible without PAP, I don't see that as compelling... especially when PAP itself is suspect.

something that obviously hasn't worked because here you are still wanting to talk about it — Lida Rose

...of course it hasn't "worked"; I don't share your interest in forestalling discussions of why you're wrong, and your conveying that interest doesn't compel me to share it.

I think a serious consideration of compatibilism will reveal the flaws in your argument. I could possibly be in error here, but if I am, then I have a vested interest in correcting that error, which counters your vested interest in forestalling discussion of it.

So our interests conflict.

and me having to reiterate my :yawn: with it. — Lida Rose

...but that's the thing... you don't have to reiterate your disinterest in it. All you have to do is not reply. This is a public forum, not your email inbox. So others may be interested in the flaws of your arguments even if you aren't.

But be assured, this will be my last word about it to you. :smile: — Lida Rose

In this case, inaction speaks louder than words. But it's also irrelevant to me anyway. Disinterest is not a compelling argument.

Will is the capacity to act decisively on one's desires.
Free will is to do so undirected by controlling influences. — Lida Rose

Here's what I don't get about this type of argument. — Pantagruel

Not an argument at all, just two definitions.

The very definition, "having the capacity to act" is equivalent to "initiating an action" i.e. autotelic behaviour. — Pantagruel

No it isn't. Whereas "capacity " is a noun indicating "actual or potential ability to perform, yield, or withstand," "initiating" is a verb showing "to begin, set going, or originate."

Suspect away, but just to remind you, it comes from my OP — Lida Rose

And that thing in your OP comes from your intuitions. You have libertarian intuitions; that is, you intuit PAP. But you're not the only one with intuitions; compatibilists have intuitions too. But there's an overall context implied by the fact that you're posting on a philosophy forum... I would think people actually interested in philosophy should be interested in analyzing and questioning their intuitions, especially if the intuitions are not universal.

where I said, "This means that praise and blame come out as pretty hollow concepts. As I mentioned, if you (A)cannot do other than what you did

But that means less than what you're making it out to mean. A rabbit (B)can go into my shed, but an adult blue whale (B)cannot go into my shed. I had lemonade last night, but I (C)could have had milk. (A), (B), and (C) all use different senses of the world could/can.

You're presenting a pet theory... that one (D)cannot be assigned praise/blame if one (A)cannot do other than what they do. But why (D)can't they? Why (D)can't someone be assigned praise/blame based on whether or not the (C)could have done otherwise as opposed to (A)could have?

I don't think your pet theory has weight; rather, I think your intuition's messed up.

why should you be praised or blamed for them?

If I choose with intention, because I chose with intention.

To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter."

The rock is not an agent; people are agents. People act with intention; rocks do not go to places due to intentions. People actually mean to do what they (intentionally) do; rocks do not. Those are significant and relevant differences. It's impossible to blame a rock for being where it is because the rock didn't "mean" to go there, but the same cannot be said of a person acting with intent. In fact, it's not even the actual act we tend to hold people responsible for... it is just the intent behind it. (This isn't always true, but in the ways relevant to praise/blame it's true enough for government work as they say).

That we (A)can't do other than what we will do is simply a consequence of the fact that there's only one reality, but we still in that reality are causes of the thing we intend. Determinism doesn't conflict with the fact that we act based on intentions; in fact, the suggestion that we act based on intentions is causal by nature.

In polite discourse the proper way to indicate one's disinterest in going down a whole other path of discussion is to let it be known. — Lida Rose

I'm not buying into that narrative. From start to end, this is a public forum, and when you reply someone it's like ringing their doorbell, especially with this setup. Also, you're not merely indicating your disinterest; you're advancing arguments. And this is not "a whole other path of discussion", it is the thing you're discussing... you're explicit here that you're interested in praise and blame in this previous reply.

I have an interest in forestalling any further discussion about compatilibism — Lida Rose

But your alleged interest does not compel me to share it. And your discussion about compatibilism is where the primary weakness of your argument against the ability to assign blame/praise lies. In theory we could talk about original causation as a third mechanic (besides determinism/randomness), but I think the biggest problem is your acceptance of PAP. It's reasonable to reject original causation until the burden is met demonstrating that it is indeed a possible mechanic, and whereas libertarians tend to demonstrate this by appealing to the fact that we have free will and that it's impossible without PAP, I don't see that as compelling... especially when PAP itself is suspect.

something that obviously hasn't worked because here you are still wanting to talk about it — Lida Rose

...of course it hasn't "worked"; I don't share your interest in forestalling discussions of why you're wrong, and your conveying that interest doesn't compel me to share it.

I think a serious consideration of compatibilism will reveal the flaws in your argument. I could possibly be in error here, but if I am, then I have a vested interest in correcting that error, which counters your vested interest in forestalling discussion of it.

So our interests conflict.

and me having to reiterate my :yawn: with it. — Lida Rose

...but that's the thing... you don't have to reiterate your disinterest in it. All you have to do is not reply. This is a public forum, not your email inbox. So others may be interested in the flaws of your arguments even if you aren't.

But be assured, this will be my last word about it to you. :smile: — Lida Rose

In this case, inaction speaks louder than words. But it's also irrelevant to me anyway. Disinterest is not a compelling argument. — InPitzotl

Have a nice day

I'm not saying the determining causes must come from without, but only that they rob the will of freedom . . .whatever their origin. A person must do whatever he has been directed to do by all the relevant cause/effect events leading up to the moment of the doing. There is no such thing as choosing. — Lida Rose

You don't have direct personal experience of yourself choosing between two options? Because I have experienced that many times. And since I experienced it, it would seem to follow that it "exists" in some way (how could I experience something that doesn't exist?).

Thing is, if there aren't any determinant causes, as some people claim, then exactly what is the Operation that induces a person to choose A over B? — Lida Rose

The operation you perform when you choose. Namely, weighing all the different reasons for choosing one or the other and deciding which side tips the scale.

No it isn't. Whereas "capacity " is a noun indicating "actual or potential ability to perform, yield, or withstand," "initiating" is a verb showing "to begin, set going, or originate — Lida Rose

having the "capacity to act" is the same thing as having the "capacity to initiate an action" to be more precise. So if you can "initiate" an action that is the definition of autotelic. Otherwise, you don't have the capacity to act, you have the capacity "to be acted upon".

I'm not saying the determining causes must come from without, but only that they rob the will of freedom . . .whatever their origin. A person must do whatever he has been directed to do by all the relevant cause/effect events leading up to the moment of the doing. There is no such thing as choosing. — Lida Rose


You don't have direct personal experience of yourself choosing between two options? — Echarmion

No, like everyone else, I only have the illusion of doing so.

Thing is, if there aren't any determinant causes, as some people claim, then exactly what is the Operation that induces a person to choose A over B? — Lida Rose

The operation you perform when you choose. Namely, weighing all the different reasons for choosing one or the other and deciding which side tips the scale. — Echarmion

But one doesn't, in fact can't, choose. (We're talking freely choose as with a free will) A person can only do what they're inexorably led to do, and nothing else.

Have a nice day — Lida Rose

Thank you, you too, and I mean that sincerely! Behind all these terminals, we're all just ordinary people.

But let's keep the idle chat down (and the sarcasm)... this forum has a purpose... it's a community of people with a shared interest. That's what we're all here for, and that's whose stage you're borrowing from our kind hosts.

No, like everyone else, I only have the illusion of doing so. — Lida Rose

What is an illusion in this context?

But one doesn't, in fact can't, choose. (We're talking freely choose as with a free will) A person can only do what they're inexorably led to do, and nothing else. — Lida Rose

Well you asked for an operation. If you didn't want to hear about it, why did you ask?

having the "capacity to act" is the same thing as having the "capacity to initiate an action" to be more precise. — Pantagruel

Well it's that precision that makes all the difference. So yes, "capacity to act" is the same thing as having the "capacity to initiate an action"

So if you can "initiate" an action that is the definition of autotelic. — Pantagruel

I always thought "autotelic" meant something like having a purpose not outside itself, (yup, it does---just looked it up) and the purpose to initiate a whole slew of things certainly exists outside the act of initiation.

Have a nice day — Lida Rose

Thank you, you too, and I mean that sincerely! Behind all these terminals, we're all just ordinary people.

But let's keep the idle chat down (and the sarcasm)... this forum has a purpose... it's a community of people with a shared interest. That's what we're all here for, and that's whose stage you're borrowing from our kind hosts. — InPitzotl

You're quite right, and I apologize for the characterization.

No, like everyone else, I only have the illusion of doing so. — Lida Rose

What is an illusion in this context? — Echarmion

The impression that when you do (did) something, you could just as well choose to do (to have done) something else instead.

But one doesn't, in fact can't, choose. (We're talking freely choose as with a free will) A person can only do what they're inexorably led to do, and nothing else. — Lida Rose

Well you asked for an operation. If you didn't want to hear about it, why did you ask? — Echarmion

But I do want to hear about it, only something more than the name of an operation I've already dismissed as true. If you truly want to claim choosing is an explanation then tell us the process by which one arrives at choosing A rather than B. I'm all ears.

The impression that when you do (did) something, you could just as well choose to do (to have done) something else instead. — Lida Rose

Ah, sorry for not being clear. I meant to ask what your definition of an illusion is in this context.

But I do want to hear about it, only something more than the name of an operation I've already dismissed as true. If you truly want to claim choosing is an explanation then tell us the process by which one arrives at choosing A rather than B. I'm all ears. — Lida Rose

So, this makes me wonder why you dismiss the thing you have first-hand experience of. You're asking for an explanation, but why do you expect there to be an explanation?

Maybe you expect choice to be the result of some other, more basic process, but I don't think there is a rational reason to expect that. Your mind is the most basic thing you have access to. Everything else depends on it. Including all your knowledge of the outside world. The choice you experience is more basic than the determinism you observe.

The impression that when you do (did) something, you could just as well choose to do (to have done) something else instead. — Lida Rose

Perhaps not "just as well". In a particular situation, say, coming across a lost boy crying for his parents, I might decide to take him to the nearest police officer. I could instead kick the kid in the shins, but I wouldn't. It would not be just as well. It's a ridiculous choice, but in principle the equal of any other option in this formulation of the question.

On which, I notice whenever I see this question in the context of philosophy instead of psychology, the actual process of decision-making never enters into it. The act of choosing may as well be instantaneous and arbitrary, and therefore is not realistic.

The "just as well" point is pertinent, for instance. Human decision-making involves a human in a given mental and emotional state, in a given situation, within a given interval of time (short for urgent problems, long for non-urgent ones), weighing up the potential efficacies of each of a tiny subset of available options drawn from personal experience and emotional reactivity from an uncountably large number of actual possibilities to affect a desired outcome. It sounds deterministic... because it probably is.

Ah, sorry for not being clear. I meant to ask what your definition of an illusion is in this context. — Echarmion

Okay,
An illusion in this context is: the impression that when you do (did) something, you could
just as well choose to do (have chosen to do) something else.

But I do want to hear about it, only something more than the name of an operation I've already dismissed as true. If you truly want to claim choosing is an explanation then tell us the process by which one arrives at choosing A rather than B. I'm all ears. — Lida Rose

So, this makes me wonder why you dismiss the thing you have first-hand experience of. — Echarmion

Because my experience isn't supported by appealing to a free will as its cause. No one has yet to divulge the machinery that drives a free will decision. They simply assert "It Is," and walk away. Meanwhile, it's well agreed upon that everything else in the universes is deterministic. Every outcome is preceded by cause/effect events that inexorably led up to that very outcome and no other. Except, that is, stuff people decide to do. The stuff people decide to do is controlled by free will, and what's free will . . . . . . . ? "HEY! look at that rabbit over there in the underbrush. Ain't he big. Must go a good five pounds, at least."

You're asking for an explanation, but why do you expect there to be an explanation? — Echarmion

Because If there is no foundational explanation for free will then why bother to accept it as true, other than to save oneself from the onerous thought that a person has no control over their thoughts or behavior? One may as well suppose that faeries are at its helm.

You expect choice to be the result of some other, more basic process, but I don't think there is a rational reason to expect that. — Echarmion

If there's no basic process (reason) for choosing A over B then the event could just as well be one of choosing B over A, there being no reason for either. A mental world of true randomness; we do things for absolutely no reason what so ever. When it comes to human activities, mental or otherwise, we may as well take "because" out of our vocabulary.

The impression that when you do (did) something, you could just as well choose to do (to have done) something else instead. — Lida Rose

Perhaps not "just as well". — Kenosha Kid

The illusion assumes equal opportunity.

On which, I notice whenever I see this question in the context of philosophy instead of psychology, the actual process of decision-making never enters into it. The act of choosing may as well be instantaneous and arbitrary, and therefore is not realistic. — Kenosha Kid

But for perhaps the rare exception, I don't believe a free willer sees any of his choices as arbitrary.

The "just as well" point is pertinent, for instance. Human decision-making involves a human in a given mental and emotional state, in a given situation, within a given interval of time (short for urgent problems, long for non-urgent ones), weighing up the potential efficacies of each of a tiny subset of available options drawn from personal experience and emotional reactivity from an uncountably large number of actual possibilities to affect a desired outcome. It sounds deterministic... because it probably is. — Kenosha Kid

:up:

But for perhaps the rare exception, I don't believe a free willer sees any of his choices as arbitrary. — Lida Rose

And yet this is rather implied by "I could have done otherwise," unless we take that to mean nothing more than "I was capable of doing otherwise." My recollection of the usual free will thought experiment is a thousand replicas of the same person in the same state in the sane situation: a determinist would expect the same outcome 1000 times; a free willer would expect different outcomes.

The illusion you speak of seems to me only an illusion for an extreme definition of free will, free even from causality. But that's a case of setting oneself up to fail. It is I who am in the situation, I who considers the options, I who evaluate the relative efficacies, and I who choses, and I can stand by my choice as being what appeared to be the best at the time, knowing what I knew then. I don't know how much freer I could expect my will to be and still function as a decision-making process.

An illusion in this context is: the impression that when you do (did) something, you could just as well choose to do (have chosen to do) something else. — Lida Rose

Illusion is the wrong word. Illusion suggests a percept, and the notion of free will you're describing is not a percept. Feelings of control, feelings of agency behind an action, and feelings of authorship are percepts, but none of those are based on perceiving alternate futures.

But for perhaps the rare exception, I don't believe a free willer sees any of his choices as arbitrary. — Lida Rose


And yet this is rather implied by "I could have done otherwise," unless we take that to mean nothing more than "I was capable of doing otherwise." — Kenosha Kid

Not if one takes the definition of "arbitrary" into consideration

ar·bi·trar·y
/ˈärbəˌtrerē/

adjective
adjective: arbitrary
based on random choice or personal whim, rather than any reason or system.

Okay,
An illusion in this context is: the impression that when you do (did) something, you could
just as well choose to do (have chosen to do) something else. — Lida Rose

That'd be an example. A definition is something like: an illusion is when something seems to have attributes that it actually doesn't have.

Because my experience isn't supported by appealing to a free will as its cause. — Lida Rose

But, conversely, your experience of choosing is supported by determinism?

No one has yet to divulge the machinery that drives a free will decision. They simply assert "It Is," and walk away. — Lida Rose

Logically, there have to be some things that don't have any further machinery behind them. Otherwise, you run into an infinite recursion of machinery behind machinery. Do you agree?

Meanwhile, it's well agreed upon that everything else in the universes is deterministic. Every outcome is preceded by cause/effect events that inexorably led up to that very outcome and no other. — Lida Rose

That's not actually true. Quantum physics aren't deterministic in this sense. There are multiple outcomes from a single cause.

But apart from that, how do you know the determinism you only observe via your fallible senses isn't the "illusion"? Can you explain the machinery behind causality?

Because If there is no foundational explanation for free will then why bother to accept it as true, other than to save oneself from the onerous thought that a person has no control over their thoughts or behavior? One may as well suppose that faeries are at its helm. — Lida Rose

There is no foundational explanation of space and time, cause end effect, either. Physics describes those, but it doesn't provide a "foundational explanation".

If there's no basic process (reason) for choosing A over B then the event could just as well be one of choosing B over A, there being no reason for either. A mental world of true randomness; we do things for absolutely no reason what so ever. When it comes to human activities, mental or otherwise, we may as well take "because" out of our vocabulary. — Lida Rose

The process is known, as I have already pointed out. It's just that this process is for some reason considered "not good enough" because it doesn't look like the kind of explanation we see in physics. But physics is just another product of the mind.

An illusion in this context is: the impression that when you do (did) something, you could just as well choose to do (have chosen to do) something else. — Lida Rose

Illusion is the wrong word. Illusion suggests a percept, and the notion of free will you're describing is not a percept. Feelings of control, feelings of agency behind an action, and feelings of authorship are percepts, but none of those are based on perceiving alternate futures. — InPitzotl

I'll let you figure out out which meaning I have in mind.


il·​lu·​sion | \ i-ˈlü-zhən
   \
plural illusions
Definition of illusion

1a(1) : a misleading image presented to the vision : optical illusion
(2) : something that deceives or misleads intellectually
b(1) : perception of something objectively existing in such a way as to cause misinterpretation of its actual nature
(2) : hallucination sense 1
(3) : a pattern capable of reversible perspective
2a(1) : the state or fact of being intellectually deceived or misled : misapprehension
(2) : an instance of such deception
b obsolete : the action of deceiving
3 : a fine plain transparent bobbinet or tulle usually made of silk and used for veils, trimmings, and dresses

(Source: MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY)

Because my experience isn't supported by appealing to a free will as its cause. — Lida Rose

But, conversely, your experience of choosing is supported by determinism?[/quotte]
Any such choosing is no more than an illusion.

— Echarmion

No one has yet to divulge the machinery that drives a free will decision. They simply assert "It Is," and walk away. — Lida Rose

Logically, there have to be some things that don't have any further machinery behind them. Otherwise, you run into an infinite recursion of machinery behind machinery. Do you agree? — Echarmion

Why does there "have to be"?

Meanwhile, it's well agreed upon that everything else in the universes is deterministic. Every outcome is preceded by cause/effect events that inexorably led up to that very outcome and no other. — Lida Rose

That's not actually true. Quantum physics aren't deterministic in this sense. There are multiple outcomes from a single cause. — Echarmion

I've already conceded that QM events may be random, and I'm not about to qualify determinism every time I mention its ubiquity.

Because If there is no foundational explanation for free will then why bother to accept it as true, other than to save oneself from the onerous thought that a person has no control over their thoughts or behavior? One may as well suppose that faeries are at its helm. — Lida Rose

There is no foundational explanation of space and time, cause end effect, either. Physics describes those, but it doesn't provide a "foundational explanation". — Echarmion

See here

And

See here

If there's no basic process (reason) for choosing A over B then the event could just as well be one of choosing B over A, there being no reason for either. A mental world of true randomness; we do things for absolutely no reason what so ever. When it comes to human activities, mental or otherwise, we may as well take "because" out of our vocabulary. — Lida Rose
— Echarmion

The process is known, as I have already pointed out. It's just that this process is for some reason considered "not good enough" because it doesn't look like the kind of explanation we see in physics. But physics is just another product of the mind.

Naming a process and presuming to "know" it doesn't explain it.

Not if one takes the definition of "arbitrary" into consideration

ar·bi·trar·y
/ˈärbəˌtrerē/

adjective
adjective: arbitrary
based on random choice or personal whim, rather than any reason or system. — Lida Rose

That was exactly the definition I had in mind. I'll leave you to figure it out.

Any such choosing is no more than an illusion.

But what is the mechanism that causes the illusion?

Why does there "have to be"? — Lida Rose

As I said, otherwise you run into a problem of infinite recursion. Any machinery you discover will have moving parts, which will require more machinery to explain, which will have more moving parts, requiring yet more machinery, and so on ad infinitum.

I've already conceded that QM events may be random, and I'm not about to qualify determinism every time I mention its ubiquity. — Lida Rose

Fair enough. We're on the same page there then.

See here

And

See here — Lida Rose

The first link is a very basic overview of space-time. I didn't see anything about the mechanics behind space-time. No foundational explanation for why things are the way the theory describes them.

The second is a list of very technical descriptions of papers. Most of these seem to be related to statistics and algorithms. Not sure how that relates to the question.

Naming a process and presuming to "know" it doesn't explain it. — Lida Rose

I didn't just name it, I described what happens. What else do you want, exactly? Can you give me a detailed explanation of explanation?

Thanks for reading and commenting, Lida! I am glad you found it interesting. I appreciate your suggestion to make a separate thread to show and get comments on my book and will probably do that soon. If you see it, please do try and read as much of it as you can. Your constructive suggestions will be most welcome.

, hello. Thanks for your questions. They are very interesting. On the first, it is a new idea for me. My first reaction is that random thoughts are not very different from external events such as a tiger coming into view in a jungle. At a higher level, if randomness drives anything, so could it have effected the tiger being there at just that moment. While it is interesting, it neither relates to determinism for what happens next in my mind, i.e. what I do with say a random memory or a randomly driven external event, nor the long term utility of the impression of free will as opposed to a deterministic reaction.

On your second point, I have thought about this one, as I was keen on Quantum Physics as an undergrad. The problem I have here is the scale at which these probabilities and uncertainties operate. It seems a stretch that they can roll up to the thoughts through our brain neurons and synapses to form alternatives and choose one of them. The scale, energy and forces seem out of reach of the weak and strong nuclear forces and the wave-particle nature of the particles.

On your last question, Heisenberg's Uncertainty yes, but not Godel's Incompleteness. I will read up on the latter and consider its implications.

Thanks again, and totally appreciate your taking the time to respond.