As I currently see it, there are two sides of the same coin, and that coin is the myth of the given. Somehow the grand edifice of critical thinking is supposed to be erected on one of two versions of the ineffable, either private intellectual intuition or private sensation-emotion. — Yellow Horse
critical thinking is generally supposed to be grounded onexperiencethat we can all agree upon. — Janus
It seems to me that critical thinking is generally supposed to be grounded on experience that we can all agree upon. — Janus
Moreover, let's do a thought experiment and pretend that Isaac Newton was a p-zombie. Is his work any less valid? — Yellow Horse
There was a thread recently about AI generated poetry, and the point I made there is that poems are generally designed to evoke feelings and/or experiences. — Janus
But what consciousness is, is a different question (and a hard question.) — Wayfarer
Prompted by the lack of conceptual progress over more than two decades, I am tempted to speculate that a computer program will not gain the title of International Master before the turn of the century and that the idea of an electronic world champion belongs only in the pages of a science fiction book. — David Levy
Descartes introduced the proposed distinction between mind and matter. So you can where this goes. The 'bearers of primary attributes', which were conveniently describable purely in terms of physics, became also the primary focus, and res cogitans was relegated to being the ghost in the machine.
That's the philosophical sub-text, and I see no signs that you understand it. — Wayfarer
But, to construct this post, you assumed an ontology and its epistemology. So, you are more primary and before those concepts. And, because death, to verify this fact, you must be. You are. QED. — Clay Stablein
It is a principle, not lazy. — Clay Stablein
After the principle is digested and understood as nourishing all concepts that follow, all concepts DO follow. — Clay Stablein
I take no issue with the cogito. — Kenosha Kid
But, to construct this post, you assumed an ontology and its epistemology. So, you are more primary and before those concepts. — Clay Stablein
I feel this is a good litmus test for whether they're genuinely interested in understanding it or are really just protecting some subscribed-to or private belief in magic. — Kenosha Kid
What you've done here is describe the -of-the-gaps argument extremely well: "Science looks like it's got X and Y covered, however Z surely must be outside its reach!" Except then science starts work on Z too, and the machine gets a long-overdue exorcism. — Kenosha Kid
Traditionally, the neural binding problem concerns instantaneous perception and does not consider integration over saccades. But in both cases the hard problem is explaining why we experience the world the way we do. As is well known, current science has nothing to say about subjective (phenomenal) experience and this discrepancy between science and experience is also called the “explanatory gap” and “the hard problem” (Chalmers 1996). There is continuing effort to elucidate the neural correlates of conscious experience; these often invoke some version of temporal synchrony as discussed above.
There is a plausible functional story for the stable world illusion. First of all, we do have a (top-down) sense of the space around us that we cannot currently see, based on memory and other sense data—primarily hearing, touch, and smell. Also, since we are heavily visual, it is adaptive to use vision as broadly as possible. Our illusion of a full field, high resolution image depends on peripheral vision—to see this, just block part of your peripheral field with one hand. Immediately, you lose the illusion that you are seeing the blocked sector. When we also consider change blindness, a simple and plausible story emerges. Our visual system (somehow) relies on the fact that the periphery is very sensitive to change. As long as no change is detected it is safe to assume that nothing is significantly altered in the parts of the visual field not currently attended.
But this functional story tells nothing about the neural mechanisms that support this magic. What we do know is that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene (Kaas and Collins 2003). That is, enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience. So, this version of the NBP really is a scientific mystery at this time. 1
I do have to wonder, though, at the sincerity of someone with an alleged interest in a phenomenon who puts their fingers in their ears when new facts start coming in. — Kenosha Kid
This is not from a philosopher, but a professor of computer science. He explicitly recognises the 'hard problem of consicousness', which is precisely that 'the experience of being' cannot be made an object of scientific analysis. — Wayfarer
:up:What you've done here is describe the -of-the-gaps argument extremely well: "Science looks like it's got X and Y covered, however Z surely must be outside its reach!" Except then science starts work on Z too, and the machine gets a long-overdue exorcism.
I do have to wonder, though, at the sincerity of someone with an alleged interest in a phenomenon who puts their fingers in their ears when new facts start coming in. I feel this is a good litmus test for whether they're genuinely interested in understanding it or are really just protecting some subscribed-to or private belief in magic. — Kenosha Kid
Seems to be your false dichotomy, Wayf, not Kid's. Statements are either "subjective" (i.e. gauge/pov/subject-variant e.g. dispositions, avowals, etc) or "objective" (i.e. gauge/pov/subject-invariant e.g. propositions, claims, etc) and not their referents (i.e. things or facts) e.g. "consciousness".The reason why science can't tackle it, is because it's not an objective matter. So, therefore, you say 'well that means it must be subjective'. They're your only two choices. You ought to reflect on what forces that choice. — Wayfarer
Deny the history of scientific progress to your heart's content but that won't change the fact that, as Konrad Lorenz quipped, philosophy comprehends less and less about more and more, and one day might comprehend nothing about everything. (vide Heidegger, Derrida). Besides, as long as I've read your posts, Wayf, you've complacently assumed the obverse: that whatever science has not yet explained must - can only - be inexplicable, pseudo-philosophical, unparsimonious, woo (of-the-gaps). Usually well-sourced, thoughtful, woo, I'll grant you; but woo nonetheless. :mask:Since joining this forum, you've displayed no comprehension of the philosophical issues, merely the complacent assumption that whatever philosophy science has not yet swept aside, it's only a matter of time until it does.
Statements are either "subjective" (i.e. gauge/pov/subject-variant e.g. dispositions, avowals, etc) or "objective" (i.e. gauge/pov/subject-invariant e.g. propositions, claims, etc) and not their referents (i.e. things or facts) e.g. "consciousness". — 180 Proof
And science can "tackle consciousness", even if only ever in principle, because nature produces and regulates it; and being a 'natural phenomenon' — 180 Proof
philosophy comprehends less and less about more and more, and one day might comprehend nothing about everything. — 180 Proof
The goal of the ancient philosophies, Hadot argued, was to cultivate a specific, constant attitude toward existence, by way of the rational comprehension of the nature of humanity and its place in the cosmos. This cultivation required, specifically, that students learn to combat their passions and the illusory evaluative beliefs instilled by their passions, habits, and upbringing. To cultivate philosophical discourse or writing without connection to such a transformed ethical comportment was, for the ancients, to be as a rhetorician or a sophist, not a philosopher. However, according to Hadot, with the advent of the Christian era and the eventual outlawing, in 529 C.E., of the ancient philosophical schools, philosophy conceived of as a bios largely disappeared from the West. Its spiritual practices were integrated into, and adapted by, forms of Christian monasticism. The philosophers’ dialectical techniques and metaphysical views were integrated into, and subordinated, first to revealed theology and then, later, to the modern natural sciences.
“[Materialism] seeks the primary and most simple state of matter, and then tries to develop all the others from it; ascending from mere mechanism, to chemistry, to polarity, to the vegetable and to the animal kingdom. And if we suppose this to have been done, the last link in the chain would be animal sensibility - that is knowledge - which would consequently now appear as a mere modification or state of matter produced by causality. Now if we had followed materialism thus far with clear ideas, when we reached its highest point we would suddenly be seized with a fit of the inextinguishable laughter of the Olympians. As if waking from a dream, we would all at once become aware that its final result - knowledge, which it reached so laboriously - was presupposed as the indispensable condition of its very starting-point, mere matter; and when we imagined that we thought 'matter', we really thought only 'the subject that perceives matter'; the eye that sees it, the hand that feels it, the understanding that knows it. Thus the tremendous petitio principii reveals itself unexpectedly.”
The reason why science can't tackle it, is because it's not an objective matter. — Wayfarer
I provided a scientific account of why this is a problem, but as you have apparently ignored it — Wayfarer
Since joining this forum, you've displayed no comprehension of the philosophical issues, merely the complacent assumption that whatever philosophy science has not yet swept aside, it's only a matter of time until it does. — Wayfarer
'Phenomena' are 'what appears'. 'The mind' is what phenomena appear to. — Wayfarer
characterising anyone who disagrees with you as failing to comprehend the issues is fallacious. — Kenosha Kid
One man being paid by a religious institution to call time on cognitive science's endeavours and accept that there must be something irreducible and non-physical going on is not "a scientific account". — Kenosha Kid
I will always be on Galileo's side. — Kenosha Kid
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