how one can even begin the process of legitimate metaphysics? — Shawn

Reason. Think logically.

I'm pretty sure David Hume invalidated metaphysics 300 years ago.

Study Spinoza.

The logical starting place has to be the work that the name was invented for, namely, Aristotle's metaphysics. It gave rise to a coherent system of thought which unfolded over centuries and is still being taught to this day. Even if you think Aristotelian metaphysics is fundamentally flawed, and some do, it ought to be the reference point.

I'm pretty sure David Hume invalidated metaphysics 300 years ago. — Wheatley

There is the famous admonition at the end of Hume's treatise, to wit:

If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.

However, as many have pointed out, exactly the same can be said for the book at the end of which this passage appears.

Metaphysics never goes away; it simply adopts different disguises in different cultures.

However, as many have pointed out, exactly the same can be said for the book at the end of which this passage appears. — Wayfarer

It's called 'self-destruction'.

Metaphysics never goes away; it simply adopts different disguises in different cultures. — Wayfarer

Another reason to always be on guard.

However, as many have pointed out, exactly the same can be said for the book at the end of which this passage appears. — Wayfarer

It can be said, but only falsely, since An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding does indeed "contain experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence", such as the verifiable difference between the experience of ideas and the experience of externally existing things via sensation.

Another reason to always be on guard. — Wheatley

:up:



I would define metaphysics as follows: anything left over that won't be explained by more rigorous fields. To the extent that it has value, the field of being and content has been removed from metaphysics by physics, phenomonology, etc. To the extent that it has value, the field of causation and origins has been stolen by science generally and cosmology and evolutionary biology in particular. To the extent that they have value, the constants of nature have been annexed by physics. If any idea in metaphysics is found to have any value, it ceases to be metaphysics and becomes something else. Metaphysics is then all of the ideas that will never be found to have any value. I'd put them in the following groups:

• Metaphysics of the gaps: This Kantian metaphysics relies on things being unknown, such as having an incomplete picture of how mind arises from physical constituents and processes.
• Metaphysics of the unfalsifiable: This relies on the outside chance that an unjustifiable idea might be true, such as the existence of God.
• Metaphysics of ignorance: This relies on the metaphysician not knowing or pretending to not know how something is so they can continue on the basis that it is not, such as the evolution of species or the arrow of time (although some metaphysical questions regarding the arrow of time fall under MotG). The difference between this and MotG is that the latter claims justification via the gaps, whereas this tends to insist on purely metaphysical (i.e. not useful) approaches to well-understood problems.
• Metaphysics of the impossible: This relies on considering only scenarios that are logically impossible or factually untrue, such as the "do otherwise" scenario of anti-determinist free will formulations.

You can do metaphysics then by picking one of the above, say: that the root cause of the creation of the universe is unknown. Despite the fact that everything we do know about the start of the universe comes from astronomy, cosmology, particle physics and the like, the next step is to disregard all of this and insist on a completely useless framework for understanding how it might occur. When asked to justify the framework, you can do so in any of the above four ways: claim that there is no hard evidence for an alternative solution; claim that your solution cannot be disproven; claim that any reference to non-metaphysical knowledge is out of scope, inferior, or invalid for epistemological reasons; and finally claim that anything that follows from your proposal that seems invalid doesn't matter because it's ab initio, therefore independent of how things are or can be in reality.

At least, this has been my overwhelming impression of metaphysics. I have only ever had these four metaphysics discussions or combinations thereof, and have yet to encounter a metaphysics problem that doesn't fall into one of those categories or the remit of a more rigorous approach. Most of the best metaphysics problems seem to be epistemology, or sometimes aesthetics. The worst tend to be nothing more than weakly-disguised theology and/or an unshiftable (i.e. knowledge-independent) belief in mind-body duality.

via Jose Benardete, I think the most concise definition of metaphysics I know - at least in it's classical guise:

"Metaphyscis in its classic sense has always been understood to be the rational investigation of the eternal order. Central to that investigation is the distinction between that which is eternal and that which is perishable, and though metaphysics addresses itself to both of those grades of being, its primary concern lies with the eternal, so that if there is nothing eternal, or if nothing eternal can be known, then metaphysics is an impossibility. The distinction between the eternal and the perishable may be said to be a cosmological one, in that the concept of time is cardinal to it.

That distinction may be translated into what might be styled ontological terms, as a distinction between the necessary and the contingent. What is eternal must also be necessary, and in this sense metaphysics is the science of being qua being, or of being as such, or of being insofar as it is necessary. If there is nothing which is necessary, or if nothing necessary can be known, then metaphysics is impossible." ("The Analytic A Posteriori and the Foundations of Metaphysics")

R.G. Collingwood argued in An Essay on Metaphysics

https://www.amazon.com/Essay-Metaphysics-R-G-Collingwood/dp/1614276153/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=an+essay+on+metaphysics&qid=1593951971&s=books&sr=1-1

that Metaphysics is an historical science the activity of which being discovering what absolute presuppositions were/are held by various groups of people at various times.

And once you know what an absolute presupposition is, notions of "eternal order" are forever blown up and blown away.

The nature of existence.

Harrumph! Metaphysics hogs all the attention on this forum.

What about meta-stamp-collecting? Meta-football? Meta-gardening? Meta-chess?

Don't these disciplines deserve the same analytical scrutiny?

Big deal. When those losers have been arguing amongst themselves for the bulk of millennia as we metaphysicians.....and getting the same nowhere as we....then perhaps PERHAPS, I say, they’ll warrant some modicum of attention.

Just not from us.

A chance reading of Collingwood, once upon a I can't recall when, had spurred me to rethink (the function in, or significance for, reasoning of) metaphysics. One of the very few 'idealists' I haven't tossed into the Humean bonfire.

I would define metaphysics as follows: anything left over that won't be explained by more rigorous fields. To the extent that it has value, the field of being and content has been removed from metaphysics by physics, phenomonology, etc. To the extent that it has value, the field of causation and origins has been stolen by science generally and cosmology and evolutionary biology in particular. To the extent that they have value, the constants of nature have been annexed by physics. If any idea in metaphysics is found to have any value, it ceases to be metaphysics and becomes something else. Metaphysics is then all of the ideas that will never be found to have any value. I'd put them in the following groups:

• Metaphysics of the gaps: This Kantian metaphysics relies on things being unknown, such as having an incomplete picture of how mind arises from physical constituents and processes.
• Metaphysics of the unfalsifiable: This relies on the outside chance that an unjustifiable idea might be true, such as the existence of God.
• Metaphysics of ignorance: This relies on the metaphysician not knowing or pretending to not know how something is so they can continue on the basis that it is not, such as the evolution of species or the arrow of time (although some metaphysical questions regarding the arrow of time fall under MotG). The difference between this and MotG is that the latter claims justification via the gaps, whereas this tends to insist on purely metaphysical (i.e. not useful) approaches to well-understood problems.
• Metaphysics of the impossible: This relies on considering only scenarios that are logically impossible or factually untrue, such as the "do otherwise" scenario of anti-determinist free will formulations.

You can do metaphysics then by picking one of the above ... — Kenosha Kid

Though your metaphysics (positivism) is showing, a handy and insightful synopsis. :up:

I dug up this previous reply to @Shawn:

Metaphysics, again as I understand it, proposes criteria for discerning 'impossible worlds' (i.e. ways actuality necessarily cannot be) from 'possible worlds' (i.e. ways actuality can be) - btw, I'm an actualist, not a possibilist - thereby concerning the most general states of affairs; unlike the sciences, which consist of testing models of how possible transformations of specific, physical (class, or domain, of) state of affairs from one to another (can be made to) happen, and thus is explanatory (even if only approximative, probabilistic), metaphysics explains only concepts abstracted from, and therefore useful for categorizing, (experience of(?)) 'how things are', and does not explain any facts of the matter. Metaphysics isn't theoretical. — 180 Proof

And also this post, where I elaborate further, from an old thread Metaphysics - what is it?

Though your metaphysics (positivism) is showing, a handy and insightful synopsis. — 180 Proof

Haha, yes, the metaphysics of rejecting metaphysics. I'm actually closer to postpositivism. All knowledge is pending post hoc invalidation. But I'm a practical positivist: if our ignorance today is less damning than yesterday, then what we're doing is useful.

:cool:

Finally, there can be no doubt that the one characteristic of "reality" is that it lacks essence. That is not to say it has no essence, but merely lacks it. (The reality I speak of here is the same one Hobbes described, but a little smaller.) — Woody Allen: My Philosophy

The causal relationship between the first principle (i.e., God, or a strong wind) and any teleological concept of being (Being) is, according to Pascal, "so ludicrous that it's not even funny (Funny)." — ibid.

It can be said, but only falsely, since An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding does indeed "contain experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence", such as the verifiable difference between the experience of ideas and the experience of externally existing things via sensation. — Kenosha Kid

No experimental evidence required: the argument is a priori, and the boundary between the 'experience of ideas' - what is that, anyway? how does one 'experience an idea?' - and sensory experience is an extremely porous one.

• Metaphysics of the gaps: This Kantian metaphysics relies on things being unknown, such as having an incomplete picture of how mind arises from physical constituents and processes. — Kenosha Kid

Nothing to do with Kant, other than a misreading.

I'm pretty sure David Hume invalidated metaphysics 300 years ago. — Wheatley

I think Hume did serious damage, but he did so metaphysically.

What does his problem of induction depend on in order to remain relevant? Maintain its force?

When can one define metaphysics? — Shawn

I second the notion that time --- or rather its negation --- is of the essence here. To me it's something like the science of the eternal. For instance, what is the structure of all possible experience? Tell me now, metaphysics, what the future holds, what the past held, if only in outline.

What does his problem of induction depend on in order to remain relevant? Maintain its force? — Yellow Horse

I had my problem with Hume's problem of induction for a while. Many accuse me of not grasping it, but I get the sense that I am missing something. I suppose I must resign and leave it to the philosophers grapple with it.

I suppose I must resign and leave it to the philosophers grapple with it. — Wheatley

I say don't resign. It's one of the greatest hits of philosophy.

Hume:
***
Thus, not only our reason fails us in the discovery of the ultimate connexion of causes and effects, but even after experience has inform’d us of their constant conjunction, ’tis impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our reason, why we shou’d extend that experience beyond those particular instances, which have fallen under our observation.
***
Maybe it was impossible then and is impossible now, but will it remain impossible? It seems that some notion of reason is held fixed here and projected into the future.

So we have yet another version of the structure of all possible experience, seemingly a deeply metaphysical concept, conquering the future from the present.

When reading a history of anti-realism, I kept coming upon similar metaphysical investments in the most outwardly anti-metaphysical thinkers.

If it doesn't conquer time (articulate timeless structure), it's almost not philosophy.

Thus, not only our reason fails us in the discovery of the ultimate connexion of causes and effects, but even after experience has inform’d us of their constant conjunction, ’tis impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our reason, why we shou’d extend that experience beyond those particular instances, which have fallen under our observation. — Yellow Horse

I'm sure there's a whole system of philosophy that goes into the seemingly innocuous word "experience."

Maybe it was impossible then and is impossible now, but will it remain impossible? It seems that some notion of reason is held fixed here and projected into the future. — Yellow Horse

Hume explained that the problem of induction is a problem for us feeble humans. I remember Hume saying something about the whimsical condition of humanity. The problem is very intuitive to many, and I do not expect the majority of philosophers to accept that there is a solution.

So we have yet another version of the structure of all possible experience, seemingly a deeply metaphysical concept, conquering the future from the present. — Yellow Horse

It all comes down to "experience," I suppose. Does the problem of induction rely on empiricism? That's one of the hardest things for me to grasp about Hume's problem; it seems to rely on his philosophical predispositions.

No experimental evidence required — Wayfarer

He invites the reader to compare sensation with memory of sensation or idea. This is a perfectly experimental approach.

Nothing to do with Kant, other than a misreading. — Wayfarer

It has everything to do with Kant, no misreading required. There are some philosophers who claim the entirety of postmodernism comes from this. (I'm not agreeing with them.)

No experimental evidence required
— Wayfarer

He invites the reader to compare sensation with memory of sensation or idea. This is a perfectly experimental approach. — Kenosha Kid

It's not subject to empirical validation, it's still philosophy rather than an objective science. The reliance on first person testimony is why Willhelm Wundt's early attempt at psychological analysis foundered.

Metaphysics of the gaps: This Kantian metaphysics relies on things being unknown, such as having an incomplete picture of how mind arises from physical constituents and processes. — Kenosha Kid

This is badly mangled. The 'God of the gaps' usually refers to fallacious theistic arguments based on the supposed inadequacy of some aspect of science.

Where Kant comes into the picture, is as a corrective to empiricists naive assertion that 'all knowledge comes from experience'. Kant argued against the Empiricists that the mind is not a blank slate that is 'written upon' by the empirical world (as per Locke's 'tabula rasa'). Reason itself is structured according to the possible forms of experience and the categories of the understanding, that give a phenomenal and logical structure to empirical experience. You can't view these 'from the outside', as it were, because they are internal to, or required by, any act of judgement, including those required to make any argument about the faculty of reason. The categories of the understanding can't be circumvented in such a way as to arrive at a 'mind-independent' reality, as they are necessary for any coherent account of objects with their causal behavior and logical properties.¹

Nothing to do with Kant, other than a misreading.
— Wayfarer

It has everything to do with Kant, no misreading required. — Kenosha Kid

Put me in the “nothing” column. Kant wasn’t concerned with the unknown, as much as the unknowable, and the ultimate unknowable, the unconditioned, this alone being the backdrop for pure reason, the speculative, the theoretical or the practical.

And while Kant is still referenced, either pro or con, to this day in serious philosophical discourse, it is more because of his proof for the validity of synthetic a priori cognitions, and all that follows from that proof.

Metaphysics of the gaps, if there is one, would have more to do with human thought and the unthinkable, rather than human knowledge, and relying on the unknown.

It's not subject to empirical validation, it's still philosophy rather than an objective science. — Wayfarer

No, I can empirically verify it myself right now. Pass me an orange...

Kant wasn’t concerned with the unknown, as much as the unknowable, and the ultimate unknowable, the unconditioned, this alone being the backdrop for pure reason, the speculative, the theoretical or the practical. — Mww

The explicit assumption of any -of-the-gaps argument is that the unknown thing in question is unknowable to e.g. science. That was my point. If you're saying that's illogical, I agree.

Be that as it may, for Kant the unknown is contingently so, possibly reducible by experience, the unknowable is necessarily so, regardless of experience. But the unknowable can still be thought, which tends to make “metaphysics of the gaps” a Kantian non-starter.

Be that as it may, for Kant the unknown is contingently so, possibly reducible by experience, the unknowable is necessarily so, regardless of experience. But the unknowable can still be thought, which tends to make “metaphysics of the gaps” a Kantian non-starter. — Mww

Not at all. It is a gap in what we can know as asserted by Kant, analogous to a gap in what we can know, e.g. about the emergence of consciousness as asserted by dualists. There is no difference, other than when Kant asserts it, we take it more seriously. The assertion of a dualist is not that science can in principle explain consciousness but has not yet, therefore dualism. Dualists may be wrong, but they're not that wrong. It is that science cannot explain consciousness, therefore dualism.

It is that science cannot explain consciousness, therefore dualism. — Kenosha Kid

Good point. Arguably, much of logic would be different if we knew the true nature of our existence. Synthetic a priori knowledge, from consciousness, exists for that' similar reason. In principle, if we knew the answers we wouldn't wonder about them.

For example, the Kantian synthetic a priori statement that all events must have a cause, is a synthesis between induction and an innate (a priori) metaphysical sense of wonderment:

Wonder: A metaphysical feature of consciousness with no explanation as to why we actually wonder. Other analogies include the color red, the phenomenon of love, the will, sensations of time, etc..

Most all discoveries in physics involve synthetic judgements. (Logical positivism failed in that sense.)

It is a non-starter, for the excruciatingly simple reason that Kantian metaphysics isn’t as much concerned with the knowable/unknowable, that being an empirical condition either given or possible, as he is with how knowledge is obtained, which is a strictly metaphysical condition, whether given or possible. Hence, what science can or cannot lawfully explain is irrelevant, in juxtaposition to what we can or cannot logically think.

This should be quite obvious, insofar as no science is ever done, that isn’t first thought. And anything that all-encompassing, cannot have any gaps.
—————

It is that science cannot explain consciousness, therefore dualism. — Kenosha Kid

Science can explain consciousness, if science discovers empirical principles under which an iteration of consciousness manifests empirically. The only way for science to be necessarily unable to explain consciousness is for consciousness to be proven with apodeitic certainty NOT to be an empirical condition, which, to date, has not been accomplished, at least with peer review.