Robert Nozick's Experience Machine

Wheatley

I was looking up hedonism on the internet and came across the Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy. Under contemporary objections section, and under pleasure is not the only source of intrinsic value, I came across this:

The most widely cited argument for pleasure not being the only source of intrinsic value is based on Robert Nozick's experience machine thought-experiment. Nozick's experience machine thought-experiment was designed to show that more than just our experiences matter to us because living in reality also matters to us. This argument has proven to be so convincing that nearly every single book on ethics that discusses hedonism rejects it using only this argument or this one and one other. https://www.iep.utm.edu/hedonism/#SH5a

I wondered how such an argument could be so compelling as to convince most ethicists to reject it. I looked up the Wiki page on Nozick's thought experiment, and it does a pretty good job explaining his position. Nozick's case presented by wiki into three sections: the thought experiment, initial concerns, the actual argument, and lastly (and informally) "reasons not to plug in."

The following is laid out by wiki.

The thought experiment:
Nozick asks us to imagine a machine that could give us whatever desirable or pleasurable experiences we could want. Psychologists have figured out a way to stimulate a person's brain to induce pleasurable experiences that the subject could not distinguish from those he would have apart from the machine. He then asks, if given the choice, would we prefer the machine to real life?

Nozick also believes that if pleasure were the only intrinsic value, people would have an overriding reason to be hooked up to an "experience machine," which would produce favorable sensations.

Initial concerns:
Who would run the machines if everyone plugs in? Nozick asks us to ignore this concern, since it does not adversely affect the thought experiment. One could simply stipulate that the machines have been so well designed as to be fail-proof.

The experiment is also open to multiple interpretations. For instance, Nozick claims that you could either map out the rest of your life in the machine before plugging in, or you could unplug periodically to choose your programming for the next cycle. While interesting, these variations do not affect the argument either.

The argument:

P1: If experiencing as much pleasure as we can is all that matters to us, then if we will experience more pleasure by doing x than by doing y, we have no reason to do y rather than x.
P2: We will experience more pleasure if we plug into the experience machine than if we do not plug into the experience machine.
C1: If all that matters to us is that we experience as much pleasure as we can then we have no reason not to plug into the experience machine. (P1&P2)
P3: We have reason not to plug into the experience machine.
C2: Experiencing as much pleasure as we can is not all that matters to us. (C1&P3, by MT)

Reasons not to plug in:

Nozick provides us with three reasons not to plug into the machine.

We want to do certain things, and not just have the experience of doing them.

"It is only because we first want to do the actions that we want the experiences of doing them." (Nozick, 43)

We want to be a certain sort of person.

"Someone floating in a tank is an indeterminate blob." (Nozick, 43)

Plugging into an experience machine limits us to a man-made reality (it limits us to what we can make).

"There is no actual contact with any deeper reality, though the experience of it can be simulated."

(Nozick, 43)

(There is already a lot here, so I will post my thoughts on the OP in the comment section. But still, feel free to comment about anything written in the OP. )

Pfhorrest

↪Wheatley

The only reason I wouldn't plug into an experience machine is concern that there is something that might matter in actual reality that is being hidden from me in the experience machine, and conversely that I am being hidden from the rest of the universe so my power and influence is limited.

If I could live in an experience machine, and there were robots out in the real world keeping an eye on things, doing research into reality, etc, that I could communicate with from inside the experience machine, so that any important information in the outside would would be available to me, and any changes I need to make to the outside world can be made via those robots, then I would see no reason not to do so.

And if in time it became clear that there's never anything new I need to learn about the outside world, and nothing that needs my attention out there (because everybody else is in the experience machine too, and the robots have everything outside taken care of), then I'd gradually just trust the robots to handle it, and enjoy my perfect life inside.

In other words, if there is nothing outside that could disrupt anyone's pleasure on the inside, and nobody else's displeasure outside to concern myself with, then there's no reason not to. All the reasons not to boil down to your own or someone else's pleasure being at risk.

That actually sounds like basically the closest thing to heaven possible, and the end-state of the universe we should be aiming for.

TheMadFool

The only reason not to plug into the experience machine is if there's a non-hedonic reason not to do so. What could this non-hedonic reason be? J S Mill differentiated between higher and lower pleasures and this difference can't be pleasure-based because, arguably, the lower pleasures like sex, good food, wine, etc. are of greater intensity than reading a book or being morally upright and Mill supposedly thought the higher pleasures and not the lower pleasures were the ones to aim for.

Mill's thoughts on hedonism fall short of their mark because people generally prefer the lower pleasures. We need only take a glance at what's trending in the world - nothing sells like sex sells, the food industry counts as big business, the entertainment sector rakes in billions, drug cartels are working in overdrive to keep up with the seemingly insatiable demand of drug addicts, etc. Only childlike naivety can explain someone believing that people have things other than raw, unbridled pleasure on their minds.

I disagree with Nozick's beliefs that people will refuse to plug into an experience machine.

David Mo

Only childlike naivety can explain someone believing that people have things other than raw, unbridled pleasure on their minds. — TheMadFool

Perhaps the hedonist can prove that people who only want more intense pleasure are wrong. That's what Epicurus thought, at least.

For example, an experiment: a rat that can stimulate itself with a lever to get more and more intense pleasure ends up dying of pleasure. It just squeezes the lever again and again and even forgets to eat.
If the human being is not a rat, he should evaluate the limits of pleasure and its consequences.

I don't think the search for more intense pleasure is justified from a hedonistic point of view. Nor do I believe that a moral argument is justified because "people" do it.

TheMadFool

Perhaps the hedonist can prove that people who only want more intense pleasure are wrong. That's what Epicurus thought, at least.

For example, an experiment: a rat that can stimulate itself with a lever to get more and more intense pleasure ends up dying of pleasure. It just squeezes the lever again and again and even forgets to eat.
If the human being is not a rat, he should evaluate the limits of pleasure and its consequences.

I don't think the search for more intense pleasure is justified from a hedonistic point of view. Nor do I believe that a moral argument is justified because "people" do it. — David Mo

The rat example is perfect. People, like the poor rat, will do anything for pleasure, even dying just so that they can get that last microgram of dopamine (happiness hormone) released to achieve orgasmic ecstasy.

David Mo

People, like the poor rat, will do anything for pleasure — TheMadFool

This is factually false. Many people control their pleasures. This is a fact.

Why? This is the (first) question.

TheMadFool

This is factually false. Many people control their pleasures. This is a fact.

Why? This is the (first) question. — David Mo

Let's try tackling this in a different way. There are 4 possibilities concerning Nozick's point of view. I'll list them in order of decreasing preference keeping in mind Nozick's intuitions

List A:
1a. Real and pleasurable
2a. Real and not pleasurable
3a. Not real and pleasurable
4a. Not real and not pleasurable

List A is in accordance with Nozick's view that realness is more important than pleasure. He does intend to show hedonism is false.

However, take the following list, again in decreasing order of preference.

List B:
1b. Actual Heaven
2b. False Heaven
3b. False Hell
4b. Actual Hell

There's no need for an explanation for why Actual Heaven is first choice and Actual Hell is the last choice. The reason why a False Heaven is preferred over a False Hell is also a no-brainer - if it's not real, might as well have some fun.

We can see the following are true of list B

1b. Actual Heaven = Real and pleasurable (1a)
2b. False Heaven = Not real and pleasurable (3a)
3b. False Hell = Not real and not pleasurable (4a)
4b. Actual Hell = Real and not pleasurable (2a)

It's absolutely true that there is no controversy about list B. If so, list A is wrong. In other words, pleasure is the key determinant in making a decision regarding what kind of a world we want live in as shown by list B. Nozick is wrong.

Echarmion

↪Wheatley

I am not sure the thought experiment actually demonstrates anything about whether things apart from pleasure have intrinsic value. What it does demonstrate is that a lot of people treat other things as having intrinsic value. Whether or not the latter has a bearing on the former depends on what you think "intrinsic" value even is.

↪Pfhorrest

The follow-up question that comes to mind is whether you'd be fine with a machine that basically just induces a single moment of ecstasy and then you die. The machine won't necessarily kill you, you just won't notice the passage of time since you'd experience unchanging maximum pleasure. We'll assume that the rest of the universe is taken care of.

Narasimha

If anything this experiment proves that it is not pleasure or happiness or experience that we desire but power. Now create a machine that guarantees us that it will increase our power over everything in the world and no one will not want to be hooked up to it.

Kaarlo Tuomi

TheMadFool said:Only childlike naivety can explain someone believing that people have things other than raw, unbridled pleasure on their minds.

I subscribe to the charity principle, which has two forms:

1. do not attribute to malice that which can be attributed to ignorance.
2. if you cannot believe that a person would be so silly as to believe a proposition, it is safer to assume lack of understanding on your part rather than lack of anything on theirs.

Kaarlo Tuomi

Pfhorrest

The follow-up question that comes to mind is whether you'd be fine with a machine that basically just induces a single moment of ecstasy and then you die. The machine won't necessarily kill you, you just won't notice the passage of time since you'd experience unchanging maximum pleasure. We'll assume that the rest of the universe is taken care of. — Echarmion

My intuition is that I would rather have a machine that gives me an unending variety of different pleasurable experiences, rather than just one big one forever, but I have pondered a lot about what life in an infinite artificial heaven would be like, and eventually transcending into an eternal timeless bliss is one happy ending I’ve imagined. An even better one, though, would be to induce a state of mi d where I find everything fascinating and wonderful like I’m a child seeing it for the first time, and full of joy at the experience, at any experience; and then have an unending variety (even if it events has to loop) of such joy and wonder forever.

David Mo

I'm not sure what Nozick's point is.
Is it a psychological issue? That is, what do men really do?
Is it a moral issue? That is, what should people do?

Is he opposing the virtual good to the real good? That is to say, the problem of evasion of reality.
Does he criticize extreme hedonism or any kind of hedonism?

If we cross these questions we find at least four different themes. Which one are we talking about?

David Mo

My intuition is that I would rather have a machine that gives me an unending variety of different pleasurable experiences, — Pfhorrest

What is the point of talking about science fiction instead of the real world? Does the imaginary assumption of the infinite pleasure machine clarify anything about real life? Or is it metaphysical speculation?
In real life any imaginary good has its time limit and when man comes to himself he finds the real world as it is. Is it useful to seek a perpetual escape that does not exist or is it better to face reality with all possible lucidity even if we do not like it?

I don't have any doubts. Artificial paradises end in disaster.

TheMadFool

TheMadFool said:Only childlike naivety can explain someone believing that people have things other than raw, unbridled pleasure on their minds.

I subscribe to the charity principle, which has two forms:

1. do not attribute to malice that which can be attributed to ignorance.
2. if you cannot believe that a person would be so silly as to believe a proposition, it is safer to assume lack of understanding on your part rather than lack of anything on theirs. — Kaarlo Tuomi

So you think people have non-hedonic values? What might they be? I'm dying to know.

David Mo

What is the point of talking about science fiction instead of the real world? Does the imaginary assumption of the infinite pleasure machine clarify anything about real life? Or is it metaphysical speculation? — David Mo

From what little I know about Nozick, I think it's futile speculation. He imagines an extreme hedonist who does not correspond to any philosophical hedonistic theory. The hedonistic philosopher -- not the imaginary one -- knows very well that he has to compensate for pleasures in a rational way. There is no contradiction between hedonistic philosophy and the postponement of a pleasure. Scales of values can be established according to their duration or the avoidance of subsequent pain. The case of fictitious pleasure can be taken up by a hedonist who rejects it because of its unsatisfactory quality. In other words, the hedonistic philosopher can assume Nozick's point of view while still being hedonistic. Only a fictitious hedonist in a fictitious situation would be refuted by Nozick's machine.

Summarizing: a real hedonist is not a junkie dove.

David Mo

Almost off topic: The American philosophers' mania to summarize a long-debated topic in the history of philosophy in a scandalous way that perverts the real problem gets on my nerves.
In the end everyone discusses the Problem of the Machine, the paradox of the Two Blind People or the Brain in the Vase instead of going into the depth of the problem actually involved in these little mind games.

I'm going to found the APIEP (Association for the Prohibition of Imaginary Experiments in Philosophy). I'm sure many will join.

sime

Firstly, to satisfy the hedonistic imperative the machine must offer a genuine and sustainable alternative to reality, whereby one isn't constantly reminded that they are only obtaining virtual goods. For the presence of an underlying sense of having a fraudulent experience would mean that the machine isn't by definition an optimal experience machine. So i think it should be taken for granted for purposes of discussion that the machine is optimal in this sense.

The main issue I have with an optimal experience machine in the above sense, is due to the fact that many of our most positive experiences come about through overcoming adversity, i.e. unpleasant situations. But doesn't this imply that the machine must also simulate unpleasant experiences? In which case, how do we know that reality isn't already the ultimate experience machine?

Kaarlo Tuomi

The MadFool said: So you think people have non-hedonic values? What might they be? I'm dying to know.

that isn't what I said.

I said that before considering someone's belief to be "silly" you might first consider that you misunderstood them.

Kaarlo Tuomi

Pfhorrest

↪David Mo

It’s a straightforward extrapolation of things that are already very real. We have forms of entertainment that give us pleasurable experiences.

A major reason not to just engage in that entertainment non-stop is that it can only give a limited range of experiences. So what if it wasn’t limited? Would there be any reason to ever disengage?

Well, of course, you have your physical well-being to see to, you need to eat etc. So what if something could take care of your physical needs while you were spending time in this fully immersive entertainment? Would there be any reason to ever disengage?

Well, you probably have to pay for all this, so you still have to go do work to afford to have the home and all this entertainment system equipment. So what if we lived in a fully automated utopian space communism, and you didn’t have to work for that? Would there be any reason to ever disengage?

That’s where the scifi story begins. And well, there’s concerns that something in the real world could ruin your life of luxury. There‘s moral concerns for other real people not in your entertaining system. There’s the pleasure of knowing the secrets of reality through scientific discovery etc. And so on. So what if all that could be taken care of? Would there be any reason to ever disengage?

If so, that shows that pleasure is not the sole or highest good. If not, maybe it is. And that would answer a question in moral philosophy for us. Which then applies back to the present day: is there anything morally inferior about spending all day playing video games if you’ve already done everything you need to or at least can do to maintain your health and financial security and care for others etc?

David Mo

So what if it wasn’t limited? Would there be any reason to ever disengage? — Pfhorrest

This situation is not predictable neither a short or medium term.
In our real world the evasive pleasure is counterbalanced by the reality principle.

Our actual problem is this alternative: pleasure against lucidity. Nobody can predict what would be his answer in a fantastic situation where someone feeds you meanwhile you are endlessly plugged to a pleasure machine.
We can --and we need to-- debate what are the consequences of addiction to present pleasure-machines (no need to give examples) and who is interested in them.

This is the very problem and I would like to debate it.

Congau

The reason we reject the experience machine is still about pleasure. If we lived in an unreal world, our pleasure wouldn’t be real either and so it wouldn’t be really pleasurable. It is true that we wouldn’t know that while plugged in, but we know it now and we are making our decision based on how pleasing we now find the idea.

We don’t want to have illusions either and we don’t wish we believed in something we believe is untrue even if the idea in itself is pleasing. We see it as fake pleasure, and therefore no pleasure at all.

We don’t wish we lost our mind or were changed into a dog, even if it often seems to us that insane people and dogs are happier than we are. Since you are not a dog now, you don’t want to be a dog. Because you are human you don’t believe in the pleasure of a dog even though you would enjoy it if you were actually a dog.

We can only imagine pleasure from the perspective we now have. It’s not possible to imagine liking something we don’t like. I don’t like fish, so even if I were told that I have now magically started to like it, I wouldn’t feel tempted to eat fish.

Our prediction of pleasure is a pleasurable feeling we have in advance.

Forgottenticket

It would be useful to have actual libertarians on this forum to argue for Nozick since everyone here is arguing for a simulations rather than commenting on the philosophy of action pov he is putting forth.
Novick also contributed a lot to libertarian free will if I'm recalling correctly.
Actions are so often defined how it affects the physical world or other pople. All 3 of Nozick's reasons for not plugging seem to be defined by that.

David Mo

If we lived in an unreal world, our pleasure wouldn’t be real either and so it wouldn’t be really pleasurable. — Congau

Pleasure is a feeling and, as such, it is independent of metaphysical considerations about its object. If something gives you pleasure, it gives you pleasure, be it something imaginary or real. Another thing is that you can evaluate that pleasure according to other considerations about what has caused it or its consequences. But these considerations cannot deny that pleasure has existed.

We don’t want to have illusions either and we don’t wish we believed in something we believe is untrue even if the idea in itself is pleasing. — Congau

This is a psychological description of what men do. I'm not sure it's correct. Many people prefer to believe illusory things like Houris' Paradise or Saints' Heaven, rather than endure the harsh reality. Or shoot a daily ration of drugs to forget about it. That drug can be chemical or mental, like plugging into the TV or a console.

I believe that people who consciously or unconsciously choose to escape from reality in the name of happiness are far more than they seem. Especially if we include those who turn away or think about something else when they encounter something they don't like. There are billions of them.

Congau

I believe that people who consciously or unconsciously choose to escape from reality in the name of happiness are far more than they seem. Especially if we include those who turn away or think about something else when they encounter something they don't like. There are billions of them. — David Mo

Yes, there are billions of them, myself included. But when we do it consciously, we always make sure we still have some access to reality. People take drugs and they do it on purpose to escape from reality for a while, but they never consciously intend to leave it permanently. They need to believe they are anchored in reality to enjoy their vacation from it.

There’s a human need to be curious about their environment, even as trivial as the urge to know what one’s neighbor is doing, and consciously giving up reality would mean giving up any possibility of knowledge. It’s a pleasure for us to think that we know something, and we couldn’t do without it. Therefore we would never choose to do away with this pleasure. In the moment of choosing, it would be too painful.

Many people prefer to believe illusory things — David Mo

People don’t choose to believe in illusory things knowing they are illusory when they choose it. It’s rather a gradual process of self-deception. Otherwise they would both believe and not believe at the same time, which is logically impossible. (I’m not talking about a 50-50 belief. That wouldn’t be a belief in anything.)

If something gives you pleasure, it gives you pleasure, be it something imaginary or real — David Mo

Yes, but the moment before choosing the illusion of the machine you, or while still being aware that it is imaginary, the pleasure is not existing. Before giving in to the illusion, we can’t believe in its pleasure.

David Mo

People don’t choose to believe in illusory things knowing they are illusory when they choose it. — Congau

The answer is not simple. Sartre coined a seemingly paradoxical term that paradoxically sheds some light: conscience irreflexive . It can designate a state of semi-consciousness in which one chooses not to confront one's commitment -- to reality in this case. In common language we say that one "deceives oneself" or that one "does not want to know", to indicate that the evidence against one is so strong that it takes an effort not to accept it. I believe that whoever chooses fictional universes of consolation is usually on that case. (We are, if you want).

Wayfarer

Nozick asks us to imagine a machine that could give us whatever desirable or pleasurable experiences we could want. — Wheatley

That would describe internet pornography, would it not?

David Mo

That would describe internet pornography, would it not? — Wayfarer

This is a good comparison.

Robert Nozick's Experience Machine

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