Fascinating, isn’t it? That there is a distinction, opposed to whether there should even be one at all, both equally contained in multiple iterations of exactly the same kind of thing......us.

Multitudinous us.

I am not so sure it is an opposition, though a failed understanding think it so. So much is a matter of parallax. We never see all of anything, and no two of us sees the same thing. How then do we establish any commonality? What is the bridge from radical difference (any difference at all, being not the same, is radically not the same) to common understanding? It can only be reason (wishful thinking doesn't count). And reason seeks and in practice finds, to the needed degree of precision, that on which we can both agree.

Two forest rangers through their field glasses spot a single burning tree on a ridge a mile distant. They don't see the same tree. How do they establish that it's the same tree they both see? They can agree they both see only one tree burning, and they can agree the theodolite yields exactly the same reading when both use it. And this, it seems to me, is just Kant, two inches deep.

A post from above seems pertinent here:

Way too many folks on (& off) this forum don't grok this, and I don't understand why. — 180 Proof

I am not so sure it is an opposition, — tim wood

Opposition meaning for this epistemological theory as to how things seem, there is that epistemological theory for how things are. It is by the latter I understand you to mean Kant two inches deep.

Did I....er....grok....you right?

I agree with him. That's what I was referrring to. Many of the arguments in this and other threads are based on the conviction that science delivers just such a view. — Wayfarer

But it doesn't. From memory, examples have been posted in some of these threads. Say, Lorentz transformations tell you about what other observers might see.

A view from wherever. (Or anywhere.)

A somewhat typical idealist move (ironically perhaps), is to all out hypostatize. To replace the modeled with the model, the world with our ideas about the world, ...

But sure, we might say that the block-verse is a view from nowhere, like a visualized model. Which is what some do with some scientific models, that might be informative in some ways and less so in others.

Opposition meaning for this epistemological theory as to how things seem, there is that epistemological theory for how things are. It is by the latter I understand you to mean Kant two inches deep.

Did I....er....grok....you right? — Mww

No doubt, but can there can be a theory of knowledge for how things seem to be - not be be confused with knowing the seeming itself? Opposition, at least in logical terms, implies contradiction or contrary. It does not seem to me that how it seems and how it is fit in the same square, and thus cannot be opposed (although certainly distinguished from each other).

That is, subject to correction, the whole subjective/objective discussion is based on a failure to understand, or at least adequately define, the matters under discussion.

Ahhh...ok. Got it. Thanks.

Sure, but all this says is that our understandings of events, or anything, are never knowably final or infallible. So, yes, all science is fallible, but it's all we have.

So, yes, all science is fallible, but it's all we have. — Janus

No it isn't all we have, that's the fallacy of scientism, and the point where I entered this discussion in the first place. When the subject of study is consciousness, we have the first person perspective, which gives us something that science does not give us. To begin with I described the insight into the active role of intention, which we get from the first person perspective, not from science.

Sure, the so-called "first person perspective" gives us phenomenology, which is different than science. But what is found by each individual's phenomenological investigations must be parsed through comparisons with the investigations of others in order to have any inter-subjective relevance.

Corroboration in this context consists in saying "it seems like this to me" and others saying "yes, it seems like that to me as well" or "no, it doesn't seem like that to me".

All of this while remembering that how things seem to us, how we interpret that seeming, is in large part culturally determined.

Sure, the so-called "first person perspective" gives us phenomenology, which is different than science. But what is found by each individual's phenomenological investigations must be parsed through comparisons with the investigations of others in order to have any inter-subjective relevance. — Janus

But the issue being discussed was whether science could fully understand consciousness. The cultural determinations you refer to, which form the basis of agreement, are better represented as features of morality rather than science. So there is a very large aspect of consciousness which is the subject of moral philosophy, rather than science. Trying to make morality and its various subjects into a discipline of science is a mistake because science, being empirical, has no real approach to intention. And science itself, being an intent driven activity, and a discipline, ought to be considered as a moral feature instead.

We have already agreed that "full understanding" is impossible, or at least that it would be impossible to know whether any understanding we have is "full". Maybe we have no reason to think the idea of 'full understanding' is even coherent.

So, I have been arguing that it is possible for science to understand consciousness from a so-called 'third person" perspective but not from a so-called "first person" perspective (because "objective" science just is the deliberate attempt to take the latter out of consideration).

That said science can develop understandings or theories about how it would be possible for the first person perspective to arise within physical existence.

In moral philosophy we are always dealing with our moral sensibilities or feelings, so of course the "first person" perspective cannot be totally eliminated in that context, although we might be able to generalize to the inter-subjective commonality of moral intuitions or feelings. So the investigation would be more phenomenological than it would be determinately scientific.

That said science can develop understandings or theories about how it would be possible for the first person perspective to arise within physical existence. — Janus

This is the faulty assumption which idealism demonstrates as false. There is no such thing as physical existence without a perspective. So the perspective is necessarily prior to physical existence. You might qualify "perspective" with "first person", and insist that the "first person perspective" arises from physical existence, but this is to ignore the importance of the point that physical existence can only be a product of a perspective. So insisting that physical existence is prior to the human perspective only pushes the idealist to posit God, because a perspective is still necessarily prior to physical existence. Whether that perspective is properly called "first person", "first", "God", or whatever is not really relevant.

In moral philosophy we are always dealing with our moral sensibilities or feelings, so of course the "first person" perspective cannot be totally eliminated in that context, although we might be able to generalize to the inter-subjective commonality of moral intuitions or feelings. So the investigation would be more phenomenological than it would be determinately scientific. — Janus

The issue is that the "perspective" cannot be eliminated in any context. So the idea that science can get away from the perspective, and give us a perspective-free, "objective", approach to anything, is nonsense. On the other hand, moral philosophy considers the perspective as an unavoidable, real, and important aspect of reality.

Since the subject of study here, is the perspective itself, consciousness, we are far better off to approach this subject from the precepts of moral philosophy which accept the perspective as a true, important, and fundamental aspect of reality, than we are from the precepts of a science which pretends to remove the perspective, to see how a perspective might emerge from the self-contradicting perspective of no perspective.

all science is fallible — Janus

All?

There is no such thing as physical existence without a perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

Eh? Another MUism? What do you mean, MU?

There is no such thing as physical existence without a perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

How do you know that?

Well, I guess it doesn't make sense to say that observation or experiment are infallible, does it? Then how much less infallible would theories to explain what is observed be?

Yours was categorical. All S is P. Now we have to look at "fallible."
Definition of fallible
1: liable to be erroneous
a fallible generalization
2: capable of making a mistake
we're all fallible.

I'd say yours was a fallible generalization. I think my point is made. Do you want to continue on this sub-topic? Or would you like to invest some effort in some rigor. For example, when you wrote, "all science is fallible," did you mean what you wrote, or did you mean something else? I.e., how is science fallible?

We both know what 'fallible' means, so no need for the didactic condescension. Are you claiming that all science is infallible or that some science is infallible?

That science as science is science. In what way is science fallible? And I wasn't being condescending. I very often look-up words, and often find I did not know what they mean. I thought I know what fallible meant, but didn't. I was close, but this isn't horseshoes.

What's needed here is at least some expansion/qualification of your original statement - or make your case.

Maybe an easier approaching kind of question - that can if desired be ignored. Is grade-school arithmetic fallible?

OK, I'm referring to empirical science when I say that science is fallible, not mathematics. Obviously 2+2+4 cannot be wrong, since it is correct by definition.

empirical science when I say that science is fallible — Janus

But how? Keep in mind I'm holding you to science itself as it is in itself. If you want to tell me that some scientists make - can make - mistakes, no disagreement, but that's not the question, nor what you wrote. If that's what you meant, then all that we have done is clarify a point. On the other hand, if you hold that science itself is fallible, I ask again, how?

What do you mean by "science itself"? Science is science as practiced by humans. Scientific knowledge, any kind of human empirical knowledge, is fallible, or fallibilistic, if you prefer, because it is falsifiable.

My point was not that we wouldn't share commonalities with other beings. My point is that how the world is perceived and understood depends not just on the characteristics of the thing being perceived but also on the characteristics of the perceiver.
— Andrew M

I'd say that how the world is perceived and understood depends entirely on the perceiver/understander. — tim wood

I'm not sure I understand you. Suppose Alice sees a bird fly by and land on a branch. She perceived the bird flying and then perceived it landing. The difference in those two cases is with the thing perceived (the bird) not the perceiver (Alice).

So that is an example where how the world is perceived and understood depends at least in part on the thing being perceived.

That conviction [re 'the view from nowhere'-] is wrong — Andrew M

Sorry but I'm with Nagel. :-) I've just shelled out for the actual book on Google Play and I think he's right on the money (I'd only read excerpts previously).

It's not 'the framing' that is the problem - well, except for the fact of scientific philosophy adopting the mantle of authority in matters well outside its scope. One conspicous example, to my mind, is the conviction that 'humans are animals' (usually implicitly 'just' or 'only'). While h. sapiens can be categorised with the other primates from a biological perspective, this is then extrapolated to serve as the basis for arguments on ethics, where I think it is completely unsuitable. Humans are in an existential situation, or plight, at the very least, which is completely different from that of animals. But that objection is usually dismissed with an extra helping of scorn. (Good opinion piece on that from a Heideggerian scholar here.)

As for Cartesian dualism - I'm well aware of the problems with it, but I also like to think I'm pretty aware of some of their solutions.

I think it's too much of a stretch to say that reality is constructed by the brain; more plausible to say that reality is interpreted by the organism, and in the case of language-users, it is interpreted in common by various cohorts of culturally connected organisms. — Janus

Again, biologism - as if by adopting a biological perspective, you can see past the very faculty which enables your perspective.

The point about the Vox piece I linked to is that it claims neuroscience can help us see through illusions, although it also shows how that is actually impossible in some cases:



Even though I know the two lettered squares are the same color, I literally cannot see it like that.

BUT, the bigger point is, did we have to wait for neuroscience to come along to distinguish reality and illusion? Was it not possible for anyone before, say, now, to understand how their brain 'constructs reality' and to see beyond that activity?

Lorentz transformations tell you about what other observers might see. — jorndoe

When I say 'mind', I emphatically don't mean 'your mind' or 'my mind'. I mean, the kinds of mind that we as a species/culture have. What I'm arguing is that 'the mind of the observer' is inextricably bound up with observations of even apparently mind-independent things. But as modern science begins by 'bracketing out the subjective', then it tends to block this out. Until, that is, the Measurement Problem came along and punched it in the nose. :-)

Again, biologism - as if by adopting a biological perspective, you can see past the very faculty which enables your perspective. — Wayfarer

We are undoubtedly organisms, whatever else we might be. We also think of ourselves as persons. So, if you prefer, you can change what I said by substituting 'person' for 'organism'; it won't change the point.

What do you mean, MU? — tim wood

How do you know that? — Janus

Simply try to imagine the universe without a temporal perspective. The way things are, what we call "physical existence", is completely dependent on one's temporal perspective. Without a temporal perspective there is nothing to indicate when "now" is, or how long of a time period "now" represents. The idea of something physically existing has no meaning without a particular temporal perspective. It's like when Wittgenstein says "stand roughly here", implying that the degree of precision is dependent on the application. With no perspective whatsoever though, "here" has no meaning at all because it could refer to anywhere. Likewise, without a perspective, "now" refers to the entire temporal duration of the universe. Any time we use "physical existence" there is implied necessarily a perspective which grounds the meaning, just like when we use "here" and "now", and it would be meaningless without that implied perspective.

Even though I know the two lettered squares are the same color, I literally cannot see it like that. — Wayfarer

When the two squares, A and B first come on the image you see them as the same colour. If you focus on them, and them alone, ignoring everything else which pops onto the screen, you'll continue to see them as the same colour.

You see what you want to see. If you want to see the truth, you find principles which are necessarily true, and focus on them and whatever is consistent with them as the truth. Ignore all the noise and distractions which the vast world and all its people regurgitate all around you, creating the illusion that what you know to be true is not.

Scientific knowledge, any kind of human empirical knowledge, is fallible, or fallibilistic, if you prefer, because it is falsifiable. — Janus

Knowledge is falsifiable? It's time for you to google "science" and "scientific method." Or to be a good deal clearer about what it is you're trying to say.

I'm not sure I understand you. Suppose Alice sees a bird fly by and land on a branch. She perceived the bird flying and then perceived it landing. The difference in those two cases is with the thing perceived (the bird) not the perceiver (Alice).

So that is an example where how the world is perceived and understood depends at least in part on the thing being perceived. — Andrew M

Eh? All I get from this is that there is a bird and the bird is not Alice. If you mean only that there must be something (usually) that is perceived that is itself not the perceiver, ok. But the perception itself as a perception - which is what I'm thinking we're talking about, depends on the perceiver. Whatever it is that Alice perceives is the product of her mind.

One way to make it clearer about the bird - although less clear about the phenomenon itself - is to remind yourself that "sees the bird" is simply language of convenience, and that of the bird itself or the branch or anything else, Alice actually is seeing zero.

What Alice is working with is her own mind's production. Inputs? Sure. And as a purely practical matter we all agree she "sees" the bird, and that there is a bird and a branch. - Here, another way. That which is in Alice's perception, is that the bird and the branch? Of course not.

Simply try to imagine the universe without a temporal perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why? We're talking about "physical existence" (PE), not perspective or products of imagination.

The way things are, what we call "physical existence", is completely dependent on one's temporal perspective. Without a temporal perspective there is nothing to indicate when "now" is, or how long of a time period "now" represents. — Metaphysician Undercover

What does PE have to do with the "way things are"? And why or how does PE depend on anything other than its own self? What does "now" have to do with PE? And what does PE have to do with the "idea" of PE?

The idea of something physically existing has no meaning without a particular temporal perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe as to the ideas, and maybe you can explain that, though I don't see it. It seems you simply are confused by your own words.

But you are MU, and I will not play. Make yourself clear. Stop making unsupported claims. Think about what you're writing before you write it. Develop a grounded argument. Else if I reply at all, it will be just to call you out.

How is the very nature of causation a topic that is in the purview of the empirical sciences—rather than in that of the philosophical branch termed metaphysics?

To me this is a Hume 101 question. Succinctly explained, a cause is not a percept—and so cannot be empirical (as empiricism is understood in modernity). — javra

So science cannot avoid metaphysics... according to metaphysics. I can quite easily drop balls ninety-nine times and predict that on the hundredth time the ball will fall to the floor. You can insist that, in making such a prediction, I am relying on metaphysics, e.g. assuming determinism. I respond that, on the contrary, metaphysical explanations and justifications for determinism instead rely on the empirical fact that the balls fell to the floor ninety-nine times.

In which case I have ninety-nine problems, but metaphysics is not one.