This is science. Where's the fallibility? — tim wood

I don't usually count cooking as one of the sciences, it's a craft or a technology. In any case, it is not infallible: one aspect of its fallibility consists in the fact that you cannot bake exactly the same cake twice.

If it is a science it is not an exact (i.e. infallible) science. No science is exact perhaps mathematics, and as I said I don't count that as an empirical science. I was referring to the empirical sciences in saying "all science is fallible", which should have been obvious to a minimally charitable reader.

In any case even crafts are not exact, hence they are not infallible. Theories are not infallible because they may turn out to be wrong.

It is a sign that you understand neither your topic nor your language, and like any good eighth grader are parroting. — tim wood

I wondered why you were being so needlessly pedantic when it should have been obvious what I was saying. This ad hominem leads me to think you are just concerned about winning arguments, not in attempting to understand what others are saying. I have actually read Popper, and you obviously haven't and yet you have the gall to accuse me of "parroting".

But that just confirms my claims that the measurement of time is perspective dependent, i.e. dependent on a particular now.. — Metaphysician Undercover

You claimed that physical existence is dependent on a "particular now"; now you've changed the subject to "measurement of time".

Five times I have asked you to clarify a statement of yours - the words of it being the point. And you have not done so, but have instead deflected. Why would you do that? Either you do not want to make yourself clear, or you cannot make yourself clear and are dishonest about that. Either way, I agree, the conversation is over.

It's very simple Tim. All empirical sciences are both incomplete and subject to revision hence they are not infallible. I've clarified several times that that is what I meant; and yet you continue with this lame attempt to paint me as being either incompetent or dishonest.

What you wrote is "all science is fallible." Now, I read that and ask myself, what does Janus mean by that? And the only way to find out what someone means is to ask them, and for them to answer in some clear explanatory way. But why would I ask? Because in your articulation you seem to say that science is fallible. Had you said that theories are essentially contingent, which I gather is what Popper wrote, or the results, or predictions of results, of experiments, while accurate to some degree, even a very high degree, had about them a plus/minus or margin of error and were thereby not exact and absolutely right, I would not have presumed to question, because that's close enough to my own understanding. But you said none of that.

Instead you say all science is fallible, because its fallible, because I should know a) it's fallible and b) I should understand what you mean even when I have repeated that I do not, and because Popper said so - which he apparently did not say, and I'm ignorant because I am not familiar with Popper,even though I asked you what he said that was relevant, and even though I have encountered in my travels considerable criticism of Popper. And so forth.

All of which avoided had you given civil and considered answer when asked the civil question, "What do you mean?"

And which you can still do. I'll help you along the way.

"All science is fallible" The "all" we take to mean that there is no science that is not fallible. That is what "all" in this context means.

"Science" we take to mean the methodologies, techniques, and practices - all of them - that constitute the sciences. Distributing the "all" we understand this to mean that every method, technique, and practice is fallible, and that none are not.

"Is." Does that mean that in principle some otherwise unspecified aspect, method, technique, or practice of every bit of science is wrong? Or is wrong in fact? Or only may be wrong? And by what criteria wrong? Some absolute criteria? Or practical criteria? But it never occurred to you to wonder what the "is" means.

"Fallible." I told you I had to look it up because I did not know what it meant. And I find now it has fallibilist connotations, if in fact it is not an expression of fallibilism. From wiki:

"Broadly speaking, fallibilism (from Medieval Latin: fallibilis, "liable to err") is the philosophical claim that no belief can have justification which guarantees the truth of the belief.[2] However, not all fallibilists believe that fallibilism extends to all domains of knowledge.

And what are we to make of this? Only apparently that notwithstanding any understanding you may have, you have not made any of it clear, but instead evaded my questions in such a way as to suggest that you have neither understanding nor interest. Whatever else besides your statement you understand is not within the purview of my question. I am only interested in your making clear how all science is fallible and what that means.

And have I now wasted twenty minutes?

But you appear to deny the existence of the thing described, which existence is usually called physical existence, and the fact of that usually called reality. — tim wood

You don't seem to understand. "Physical existence" is a description. Do you recognize the difference between pointing to a thing also giving it a name perhaps, and describing a named thing? If you do, then you should see that "physical existence" is a descriptive phrase, not a named thing. For example, if x is a named thing, x might or might not have physical existence. But what sense does it make to claim that physical existence is a thing, which may or may not have physical existence, unless by "thing" you mean a concept? But then you would not be talking about "the thing described" you'd be talking about the descriptive phrase as if it represented a thing, a concept.

You claimed that physical existence is dependent on a "particular now"; now you've changed the subject to "measurement of time". — Janus

There's no change. "Physical existence" depends on measurement of time, which depends on "now". Therefore "physical existence" depends on "now". When I first said that "physical existence" depends on "now", I thought you would understand, and that there would be no need to explain that this dependence is through the means of measuring time. There must be a "now" in order for us to measure time, and there must be measurements of time in order for there to be "physical existence".

I'm actually surprised that you didn't give the usual physicalist reply, that time is not something which is measured, it is only something which we use as a measuring device. But that just digs the physicalist into a deeper hole of denying the obvious.

Had you said that theories are essentially contingent, which I gather is what Popper wrote, or the results, or predictions of results, of experiments, while accurate to some degree, even a very high degree, had about them a plus/minus or margin of error and were thereby not exact and absolutely right, I would not have presumed to question, because that's close enough to my own understanding. But you said none of that. — tim wood

Fer fuck's sake! This was my very first answer to you Tim:

Well, I guess it doesn't make sense to say that observation or experiment are infallible, does it? Then how much less infallible would theories to explain what is observed be? — Janus

If you've wasted time it's only on account of your apparently poor reading/ comprehension, lack of charity and pedantry. Have we exhausted the topic now? :roll:

You must have worked hard to evade this question:

So which reality are you denying? — tim wood

Simple question, yet in true MU style you ran away from it. Try answering it instead.

"Physical existence" is a description. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes I guess "physical existence", may be thought of as a description, or a term of designation, but physical existence is not a description. Are you familiar with the distinction between use and mention?

You still don't get it, You do not distinguish between the activity qua activity and the result/product of that activity. I suppose, subject to correction, that yours is a colossal category error - if not that then some other kind. Two more things: I think we've backed into all the mutual understanding we've got, and I actually could not make out what you meant in your first reply.

You still don't get it, You do not distinguish between the activity qua activity and the result/product of that activity. — tim wood

No, I haven't made a category error. Science is an activity, and a body of knowledge and theory derived from the activity. Neither are infallible.

Perhaps you are one of those who are uncomfortable with uncertainty, and simply refuse to accept it?

Yes I guess "physical existence", may be thought of as a description, or a term of designation, but physical existence is not a description. Are you familiar with the distinction between use and mention? — Janus

I don't know of any particular thing or type of thing called "physical existence". And, for the purpose of referring to a thing, is clearly not how the phrase is being used here. I believe I introduced it, and defined it here:

Simply try to imagine the universe without a temporal perspective. The way things are, what we call "physical existence", is completely dependent on one's temporal perspective. — Metaphysician Undercover

You can see that it is clearly defined as "the way things are", which does not indicate a thing, but a description.

Tim went on to question my definition, asking what does "the way things are" have to do with physical existence, and so I proceeded in an attempt to justify the definition.

At no time in my discussion with you or Tim, has it been indicated that "physical existence" refers to a thing, or a type of thing. here is an example of your use.

. According to Special Relativity Theory, physical (spatio-temporal) existence has no general "now", so forget about a "now" being required for physical existence; it is is not even possible! — Janus

Clearly your use is consistent with my definition, "the way things are". If your claim now, is that "physical existence" refers to some thing, or type of thing, then you need to give me some indication as to how I can identify this thing. Either point to this thing which you are calling physical existence, or provide me with some descriptive terms so that we can determine whether you are talking about a real thing, or a fictitious thing. If you have in mind, some fictitious thing, which you have named "physical existence", all for the sake of misleading me in this discussion, I'd like to expose that attempt at deception. If there is some real thing, or type of thing which you are calling "physical existence", then you ought to be able to describe this thing in some way. In this way I could understand that you are actually using "physical existence" to refer to some thing, and not as I defined it "the way things are", and you are not simply acting in deception.

I am interested in how one can even begin the process of legitimate metaphysics? — Shawn

Look at Karl Popper's concept of the "metaphysical research programme". Whereby legitimate metaphysical theories can be used to "steer" scientific research in a self-correcting loop.

As I think @Janus was getting at, science is about the "elimination of error" (Popper). Metaphysics is about intuitive apprehension that transcends the limits of current science. The two work together.

I'm not sure I understand you. Suppose Alice sees a bird fly by and land on a branch. She perceived the bird flying and then perceived it landing. The difference in those two cases is with the thing perceived (the bird) not the perceiver (Alice).

So that is an example where how the world is perceived and understood depends at least in part on the thing being perceived.
— Andrew M

Eh? All I get from this is that there is a bird and the bird is not Alice. If you mean only that there must be something (usually) that is perceived that is itself not the perceiver, ok. But the perception itself as a perception - which is what I'm thinking we're talking about, depends on the perceiver. Whatever it is that Alice perceives is the product of her mind.

One way to make it clearer about the bird - although less clear about the phenomenon itself - is to remind yourself that "sees the bird" is simply language of convenience, and that of the bird itself or the branch or anything else, Alice actually is seeing zero.

What Alice is working with is her own mind's production. Inputs? Sure. And as a purely practical matter we all agree she "sees" the bird, and that there is a bird and a branch. - Here, another way. That which is in Alice's perception, is that the bird and the branch? Of course not. — tim wood

In ordinary use, perceptual terms are usually understood to refer to independent things like birds and branches, not the products of minds. So I disagree that "sees the bird" is simply language of convenience and that "Alice actually is seeing zero".

This may just be a terminological disagreement or a more substantive disagreement about sense data but, either way, I don't see any reason not to take ordinary use seriously there.

In ordinary use, perceptual terms are usually understood to refer to independent things like birds and branches, not the products of minds. So I disagree that "sees the bird" is simply language of convenience and that "Alice actually is seeing zero".

This may just be a terminological disagreement or a more substantive disagreement about sense data but, either way, I don't see any reason not to take ordinary use seriously there. — Andrew M

As a practical matter, absolutely. But I infer you understand perfectly well the objection and thereby can make the distinction between how it is and how it seems on those occasions that require it.

This is your original comment:

My point is that how the world is perceived and understood depends not just on the characteristics of the thing being perceived but also on the characteristics of the perceiver. — Andrew M

The object is presumably going to set limits on what is perceived. If it's a brick on the ground, your seeing a horse should be problematic. But the perception itself, that's the perceiver. Another way: incident on the perceiver is whatever it is that is the matter that's being received by the percieiver: e.g., light, changes in air pressure understood as sound, heat, chemicals in the air - whatever. But whatever they are, they are not the perception. That is the entire production of the mind. One kind of evidence is that perception can be wrong. I think that's uncle Jake; oops, it's actually aunt Betty.

As a practical matter, absolutely. But I infer you understand perfectly well the objection and thereby can make the distinction between how it is and how it seems on those occasions that require it. — tim wood

Yes, we make the distinction between how something is and how it seems when required. But your claim was that we never see something as it is ("Alice actually is seeing zero"). I'm not sure whether that also carries over to knowledge, for you (i.e., that we never know something as it is).

That is the entire production of the mind. One kind of evidence is that perception can be wrong. I think that's uncle Jake; oops, it's actually aunt Betty. — tim wood

You didn't see uncle Jake, you just thought you did. But the broader point is that even if you "saw" uncle Jake on your usage, it doesn't follow that seeing aunt Betty is a production of your mind. That you seem to think of it in that way suggests that you're positing sense data.

Give it a bit of thought. What, exactly, do you receive that your mind makes sense of? Aunt Betty or Uncle Jake? Certainly not! What you receive - is incident on you - is waves of some or another kind. If you think that what you see is the tree or a person or anything else, please give an exact account - or as best you can - as to how that happens, how it works.

It is a common trope of astronomy that when you see a star in the night sky, that star is not where you see it, and the star might not even exist, because the light by which you see the star has been en route for thousands, millions, even billions of years (if your telescope is powerful enough). No one claims in the face of that, that they actually see the star. We usually say we see starlight, or the light from the star. Of course there is the language of convenience when it's easiest to say we're looking at a star.

So there are two issues: one is the medium itself: you're hit by waves and your mind creates some sense of them - and of course, no mind, no sense. And the issue that what you perceive no longer is, your perception being of what was. Obviously in some macro-sense things endure; your chair is still your chair, but not quite. Your perception is of the past.

Against all of this is what I called the language of convenience, which certainly gets the world's work done, and no complaints. You an even call it language based on perception. But on rare occasions it's best to acknowledge and attempt to understand that perception and underlying reality are not the same thing.

As I think Janus was getting at, science is about the "elimination of error" (Popper). Metaphysics is about intuitive apprehension that transcends the limits of current science. The two work together. — Pantagruel

Yes, exactly. Popper distinguished between scientific theories and metaphysical speculation, saying that the former are falsifiable and the latter are not. But he also acknowledged that metaphysical speculation can drive the creative imagination that may lead to novel hypotheses that do provide testable predictions. So, there is some practical use, apart from the merely poetic or aesthetic, for metaphysical imaginings after all!

Physical existence is the existence that can be measured and modeled: it is the subject of the natural sciences.

So as I said, physical existence is a description, not any particular thing or type of thing. Physicists, and other scientists make models to represent what is described in observation, and in a very general sense, this might be called "physical existence". That's what I called "the way things are". They measure the different described parameters of things, length, height, weight, temporal duration etc.. Perhaps you might even say that they measure the physical existence of a thing, if there was some consensus as to which parameters constitute the physical existence of a thing, so that they could actually claim to be measuring the physical existence of a thing. So what are you having a problem with?

Give it a bit of thought. What, exactly, do you receive that your mind makes sense of? Aunt Betty or Uncle Jake? Certainly not! What you receive - is incident on you - is waves of some or another kind. If you think that what you see is the tree or a person or anything else, please give an exact account - or as best you can - as to how that happens, how it works. — tim wood

Sure. For your earlier example, there is an interaction between two physical systems - you and Aunt Betty. That interaction is a physical process involving light reflecting from Aunt Betty to your eyes and subsequent brain processing.

Now suppose by the end of that process you have formed the (mistaken) belief that Uncle Jake is there. In conventional use, the word "see" is an achievement verb [*], but in this case the achievement criterion has not been met, i.e., that Uncle Jake is actually there. So you have not seen Uncle Jake, you only think you have. When you subsequently notice that it's actually Aunt Betty, the achievement criterion has been met. So you have seen Aunt Betty because she is actually there.

Against all of this is what I called the language of convenience, which certainly gets the world's work done, and no complaints. You an even call it language based on perception. But on rare occasions it's best to acknowledge and attempt to understand that perception and underlying reality are not the same thing. — tim wood

Yes, we might sometimes meaningfully contrast what is seen in some sense (given signal travel times and reference points) with what is measured. But even here, what is being perceived is the world, not a Cartesian theater or something similarly mind-dependent.

--

[*] In ordinary use, terms like "see" and "find" are achievement verbs, as contrasted with task (or try) verbs such as "look" and "search". As Gilbert Ryle notes:

One big difference between the logical force of a task verb and that of a corresponding achievement verb is that in applying an achievement verb we are asserting that some state of affairs obtains over and above that which consists in the performance, if any, of the subservient task activity.
..
Merely saying ‘I see a hawk’ does not entail that there is a hawk there, though saying truly ‘I see a hawk’ does entail this. — Gilbert Ryle - The Concept of Mind, p131-p135

That interaction is a physical process involving light reflecting from Aunt Betty to your eyes and subsequent brain processing. — Andrew M

And thus it is completely clear that whatever "see" means informally or practically, the expression, "I see Aunt Betty," in some senses is completely misleading in the sense that Aunt Betty is never, ever, seen.

Interesting on task and achievement parts of speech. We're not about that book, idea, or author; feel free to ignore this question. How does Ryle tell the difference between task and achievement words in use? That is, it would seem he has access to other criteria - that are already available. What is his purpose then in making the distinction?

not any particular thing or type of thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, rather it's everything and every type of thing. And to get back to the point; everything and every type of thing does not require a privileged "now" for it to exist. As Kant pointed out it is only perception that requires time in the sense of a present moment.

That interaction is a physical process involving light reflecting from Aunt Betty to your eyes and subsequent brain processing.
— Andrew M

And thus it is completely clear that whatever "see" means informally or practically, the expression, "I see Aunt Betty," in some senses is completely misleading in the sense that Aunt Betty is never, ever, seen. — tim wood

In conventional use, the term "see" abstracts over the physical process, the details of which are a scientific matter. People (including children) use the term proficiently without needing to understand the details at all.

So I'm not sure how you are using the term "see". That you instead see photons and infer that Aunt Betty is there? Or instead see a mental representation of Aunt Betty? Or see nothing at all?

Interesting on task and achievement parts of speech. We're not about that book, idea, or author; feel free to ignore this question. How does Ryle tell the difference between task and achievement words in use? That is, it would seem he has access to other criteria - that are already available. What is his purpose then in making the distinction? — tim wood

Ryle just noted what people were doing when described by those words and analyzed the logic of their use. For example, when Alice is searching for her car keys, she is engaged in a task, searching here, searching there. What she is wanting to do, however, is not merely search for her keys, but to find them - that is her goal and motivation for searching. When she has found them, she stops engaging in that task since she has achieved her goal. So searching is a task word (with the goal of finding something) and find is an achievement word.

Similarly Alice might be looking for a friend in a crowd and then finally she sees them. She doesn't continue to look for her. So in this case, looking is the process (a task or try word), and seeing is the logical condition that marks the end of that process (assuming it was successful - alternatively she might give up looking). So as an example of the logic of the usage here, Alice can look for her friend unsuccessfully, but she can't see her unsuccessfully.

No, rather it's everything and every type of thing. And to get back to the point; everything and every type of thing does not require a privileged "now" for it to exist. — Janus

That's a generalization, so it's not relevant unless you propose Platonic realism which allows for the non-temporal existence of universals. We're still at the same issue, you are assuming that concepts have existence independent from human minds.

As Kant pointed out it is only perception that requires time in the sense of a present moment. — Janus

This is where Kant might have gone a little off track. Conceptions are dependent on perception, so there is no such thing as a priori concepts. Aristotle made this argument against those Platonists and Pythagorean idealists who argued that position. Eternal Ideas are demonstrated as impossible.

there is no such thing as a priori concepts. — Metaphysician Undercover

The categories. First from Aristotle, then Kant.

In conventional use, the term "see" abstracts over the physical process, the details of which are a scientific matter. — Andrew M

A nice way to put it. I will keep it in mind. I meant only the distinction between the two, The, on the one hand, "great blooming, buzzing, confusion" that is input, and the coherent, consistent image we make of it.

A nice way to put it. I will keep it in mind. I meant only the distinction between the two, The, on the one hand, "great blooming, buzzing, confusion" that is input, and the coherent, consistent image we make of it. — tim wood

:up: With possible quibbles about "image". ;-)

Apparently that 'aha' moment has happened for David Chalmers, but never for Daniel Dennett, who are the two main protagonists in the debate. — Wayfarer

The "Hard Problem" is hard for those who think in terms of Materialism. But, if you think that Information is more fundamental than Matter, "aha" the problem vanishes. :smile:

When can one define metaphysics? Is it possible to define metaphysics when possible?

I am interested in how one can even begin the process of legitimate metaphysics? — Shawn

When one asks what is X, or the fundamental nature of X, that is when metaphysics starts. When X is defined, the definition comes from reasoning using the concepts other than X by applications of reason, and people know the definition is reasonable or not by reasoning too. The full process is, metaphysical process.

In that sense, I feel it was Thales who first started Metaphysics in history of Western Philosophy. When he asked what the world is made of, and came with the answer after application of his reasoning to the question - water. Water was fundamental to all lives. Without life, the world has no meaning. Later Aristotle had elaborated on Metaphysics formally.