yeah I think that's basically what I'm attempting to say

you're misconstruing the difference between my reality (the one I am experiencing, which is tangible in so far as I am capable of experiencing it)
and base reality (the ultimate building block for all of existence, reality number one, first edition)

this doesnt prove that it went to far. You have only proven the Cogito to be true.

As for the necessity of my proposal, it is to shed light unto the concept that reality is tangible.
Because if reality is tangible, the argument cannot be made that existence is meaningless because it means that what I am experiencing is not nothingness, but something, and so it retains the justification for being respected as such.

your reality would be from the perspective of a brain... in a vat. Aha

you're misconstruing the difference between my reality (the one I am experiencing, which is tangible in so far as I am capable of experiencing it) and base reality (the ultimate building block for all of existence, reality number one, first edition) — Lif3r

I think you may have misconstrued the point I was making : that your subjective "tangible" reality is different in essence from Objective or Ultimate Reality? But your feelings are indeed your reality, even though they are merely symbolic analogs of "Base Reality". Our Subjective sensory perceptions are the cause of tangible bodily experiences, but those feelings & experiences are mental constructs in the individual brain, not direct links to Ultimate Reality. So, I think we are in agreement about "reality number one" : that we are capable of experiencing it only indirectly, via non-sensory philosophical imagination.

Our physical senses are not capable of detecting Ultimate reality, yet for all practical purposes, they don't need to. Hoffman's interface theory of perception explains the difference by analogy with the icons we interact with on a computer screen, and the actual operations going on the computer processor. That's why I said that your Subjective reality is real for you, but it may not be the same as other people's perceived reality, because the "base reality" is extra-sensory, as in Idealism. Ultimate Reality is a philosophical concept, not a personal percept. Click on the link below, if you want to understand what I'm saying. :smile:

The Case Against Reality : http://bothandblog6.enformationism.info/page21.html

you are presenting a connotation of the original text, not refuting mine. — Lif3r

Descartes' cogito ergo sum begins by negating exactly that which you're trying to affirm - your (our) reality. I don't know how someone could begin a line of inquiry by negating something and come to a conclusion that affirms that same thing. It's a contradiction.

Lif3r said: I think, therefore I am, and I am, therefore my reality is as well.

how do you know that those thoughts are yours?


Kaarlo Tuomi

doesnt matter where they originate, they are experienced regardless

I dont think it does negate our reality. I think it proves the experience of the self, affirming that one can be sure of one's existence on the pretenses of being capable of thinking, or experiencing the existence. My interpretation of the Cogito's intention is to seek proof for anything, and it attempts to strip the entire experience of existence to the bare minimum. I believe Descartes would say along the lines of "we cannot doubt of our existence while we doubt." Perhaps we have a different interpretation.

This is the reality I am experiencing, and so I can conclude it exists in so far as I am capable of thought.

I think, therefore I am, and I am, therefore my reality is as well.
Has the extension gone too far, or is it reasonable? — Lif3r

"my reality" can't legitimately be inferred to be anything extra to what is certainly revealed by cogito ergo sum.

A modern interpretation is often generalized as "there is thought now" - I ascribe to this view.

sure it can, because not only does it cover the self, it also extends to anything experienced by the self, and to the reader it prosed the question of whether my reality and your reality take place on the same tangible plane of existence, if they are similar or vastly different (does my blue appear the same as your blue?) and it prosed the question of the driving force of the human experience (whether anything outside of my own experience is more than a projection taking place in my own experience)

Descartes is saying "I am something"
I am saying "my experience is something as well"

sure it can, because not only does it cover the self, it also extends to anything experienced by the self, — Lif3r

Right, which is the cogito....I know you are saying my experience is something as well. To me, it is a tautology, because you are just calling the cogito something else.

God's teeth. Does anyone really think that Descartes "doubted" in any serious sense his own existence or that of the rest of the world? That, while pissing for example, he doubted that he really pissed? Why bother treating the response to this indulgence in faux doubt as significant in any way? It seems an oddly futile thing to do, ruminating on the efforts made by a person to establish that what he never really doubted is the case is, indeed, the case.

Why bother treating the response to this indulgence in faux doubt as significant in any way? — Ciceronianus the White

I don't thing there is any doubt that Descartes did not feel he was indulging in "faux doubt".....

I don't thing there is any doubt that Descartes did not feel he was indulging in "faux doubt"..... — Pantagruel

How do you know, though? How, or what, would he doubt in order to truly doubt? Something more would be required than the mere statement "I doubt." One has to doubt something. Have you ever tried to doubt you were taking a piss while doing so? When you continued pissing, was your doubt resolved--in which case we must ask why continuing to piss was persuasive--or did you continue to doubt despite continuing to piss--in which case we must ask what would be required in order to convince you that you were pissing?

in which case we must ask what would be required in order to convince you that you were pissing? — Ciceronianus the White

And here is the real problem with Cartesian doubt. Sure, you always might just be dreaming that you’re pissing, but if you always assume that it’s probably just that until proven otherwise, then you will continue to assume that forever, because it could not be proven otherwise, since every proof might just be part of the dream too.

That reduces to absurdity the notion of doubting everything that can possibly be doubted just because it can be, and only believing things where doubt is impossible. In its stead, we are left with believing in whatever so long as it’s a possibility, and only doubting it when belief in it becomes untenable.

How do you know, though? How, or what, would he doubt in order to truly doubt? Something more would be required than the mere statement "I doubt." One has to doubt something. Have you ever tried to doubt you were taking a piss while doing so? When you continued pissing, was your doubt resolved--in which case we must ask why continuing to piss was persuasive--or did you continue to doubt despite continuing to piss--in which case we must ask what would be required in order to convince you that you were pissing? — Ciceronianus the White

Hygienics of your example aside, Descartes' conception of doubt is as radical as it gets. Radical metaphysical doubt was how our professor characterized it back in the day. So you may doubt what Rene meant by doubt, but it's a minority view.

Hygienics of your example aside, Descartes' conception of doubt is as radical as it gets. Radical metaphysical doubt was how our professor characterized it back in the day. So you may doubt what Rene meant by doubt, but it's a minority view. — Pantagruel

We doubt something when we're uncertain of it. That's not a minority view, as you'll find if you consult any dictionary. Uncertainty isn't something we generate when we're feeling philosophical, there are reasons why we are uncertain. In what sense was Descartes uncertain of his existence, and what was the reason for his uncertainty? Was he, sitting in his chair, writing, wearing clothes, etc., suddenly struck by the fact he might not exist? Was he consumed with uncertainty whether he truly was sitting in his chair, writing, wearing clothes, or think that fact he was doing so wasn't pertinent to whether he existed--although he obviously persisted in writing, etc., though he claimed he was uncertain he did?

Yes. Though I'd maintain that we readily distinguish between dreaming of doing something and doing it, and have no reason confuse one from another.

In what sense was Descartes uncertain of his existence, and what was the reason for his uncertainty? — Ciceronianus the White

I suggest you read his Meditations. It is an interesting topic to debate, but right now we are really only discussing what his opinions actually were, and they are well-documented.

I can have thoughts that are strictly about me and have nothing to do with anything external. — Pinprick

...and you can do this only because you also have thoughts that are about other stuff. That's how you worked out the difference between "me" and "anything external"; without which, not.

:up:

I suggest you read his Meditations. — Pantagruel

Actually, the Discourse on the Method might be worth considering. It makes clear that Descartes was bored, and engaging an a bit of whimsey.

I was in Germany at the time, having been called by the wars that are still going on there. I was returning to the army from the Emperor’s coronation when the onset of winter held me in one place ·until the weather should clear·. Finding no conversation to help me pass the time, and fortunately having no cares or passions to trouble me, I stayed all day shut up alone in a heated room where I was completely free to talk with myself about my own thoughts...

I dont think it does negate our reality. I think it proves the experience of the self, affirming that one can be sure of one's existence on the pretenses of being capable of thinking, or experiencing the existence. My interpretation of the Cogito's intention is to seek proof for anything, and it attempts to strip the entire experience of existence to the bare minimum. I believe Descartes would say along the lines of "we cannot doubt of our existence while we doubt." Perhaps we have a different interpretation. — Lif3r

:up: good luck

Actually, the Discourse on the Method might be worth considering. It makes clear that Descartes was bored, and engaging an a bit of whimsey.

I was in Germany at the time, having been called by the wars that are still going on there. I was returning to the army from the Emperor’s coronation when the onset of winter held me in one place ·until the weather should clear·. Finding no conversation to help me pass the time, and fortunately having no cares or passions to trouble me, I stayed all day shut up alone in a heated room where I was completely free to talk with myself about my own thoughts... — Banno

One of my all time favourites opens the Discourse:

Good sense is, of all things among men, the most equally distributed; for every one thinks himself so abundantly provided with it, that those even who are the most difficult to satisfy in everything else, do not usually desire a larger measure of this quality than they already possess. And in this it is not likely that all are mistaken the conviction is rather to be held as testifying that the power of judging aright and of distinguishing truth from error, which is properly what is called good sense or reason, is by nature equal in all men; and that the diversity of our opinions, consequently, does not arise from some being endowed with a larger share of reason than others, but solely from this, that we conduct our thoughts along different ways, and do not fix our attention on the same objects.

...and you can do this only because you also have thoughts that are about other stuff. That's how you worked out the difference between "me" and "anything external"; without which, not. — Banno

I’m not sure. Suppose I had been born entirely senseless; without vision, hearing, taste, smelling, or sense of touch. I have no way to consciously experience the external world, but I would still be aware of what is internal; my feelings, needs, etc. and could form thoughts about them. Or could I? Perhaps without sensory experience I would have no feelings, needs, etc.? Am I essentially dead even though my body, or at least my organs, is functioning properly? For some reason I want to say that I could still experience things like fear or sadness, but like I said, I’m not sure.

I have no way to consciously experience the external world, but I would still be aware of what is internal; my feelings, needs, etc. and could form thoughts about them. — Pinprick

I'm happy to be corrected on this, but so far as I am aware the evidence, from locked-in people and those not exposed to language at an early age, shows that they do not form much of what we might call thoughts, being unable to differentiate between whatever experiences they may have.

Ok. How are “thoughts” assessed? Being entirely private, it seems that thoughts would be inaccessible to someone that lacks the ability to communicate.

Being entirely private... — Pinprick

You have a private language?

That’s not what I mean. I mean that you cannot possibly know my thoughts, or lack thereof, unless I communicate them to you, and you cannot infer by my lack of communication that I also lack thought. So how can anyone say that locked-in people, or those not exposed to language, have thoughts or not?