The main point for an objectivist (and I hope and think most of us are objectivists) is that nothing is ever right just because someone thinks it is right. — Congau
The point here being to complete your argument, so pick the one that makes your argument least complete.What do you actually mean by “A is right for Joe”? ... The first position is relativist, — Congau
Correct; from the link in the OP (i.e., the wiki page):Objectivism is not about reaching a common agreement. — Congau
Moral universalism (also called moral objectivism) is the meta-ethical position that some system of ethics, or a universal ethic, applies universally, that is, for "all similarly situated individuals" — Moral_universalism
Okay, but we can still devise a moral meta-ethic where some things are objectively wrong and others are relatively wrong, and such would avoid the issue by your metric of not being a moral system but can still hold that some things are indeed right just because someone thinks it right. What I'm really interested in is your argument against those positions.The main point for an objectivist (and I hope and think most of us are objectivists) is that nothing is ever right just because someone thinks it is right. — Congau
What do you actually mean by “A is right for Joe”? Do you mean “Joe thinks A is right and therefore I think Joe should do A” or do you mean “I think Joe should do A whether or not he thinks it is right”? The first position is relativist, the second is objectivist. — Congau
I was leery about going along with "objectivist," but I thought Randianism was obscure and disreputable enough that there would be little chance of confusion. — SophistiCat
I think Pfhorrest is apt to treat moral propositions much like a physicalist would treat propositions about the physical world, and he believes that we can use something like a scientific method for discovering moral truths. In any case "objective morality" is a term of art, though I wouldn't have a use for it. — SophistiCat
I've lived in the US my entire life and associating lower-case "objectivism" with Randianism sounds very weird and parochial to my ear — Pfhorrest
FWIW, a quick Google for "moral objectivism" shows only #6 out of the top ten results having anything to do with Rand, and the rest using the more general sense that I'm using here. — Pfhorrest
This site can’t be reached, www.ucs.mun.ca took too long to respond.
Try:
Checking the connection
Checking the proxy and the firewall
ERR_CONNECTION_TIMED_OUT — Moral Relativism and Objectivism
Robust moral realism, the meta-ethical position that ethical sentences express factual propositions about robust or mind-independent features of the world, and that some such propositions are true.
Moral universalism, the meta-ethical position that some system of ethics or morality is universally valid, without any further semantic or metaphysical claim.
The ethical branch of Ayn Rand's philosophy of Objectivism (Ayn Rand). — Moral objectivism - wikipedia
Moral objectivism is the position that moral truths exist independantly from opinion.
There are several versions of moral objectivism, of varying levels of strentgth. They area, from weakest to strongest:
Moral universalism
Moral realism
Moral absolutism — Moral Objectivism -
On a side note: Don’t confuse moral objectivism with Objectivism. Objectivism is an ethical theory
proposed by Ayn Rand which is related to Ethical Egoism, a theory we will discuss later in the course. — Introduction to Ethics - Indian Hills community colledge
"My morality, the morality of reason, is contained in a single axiom: existence exists—and in a single choice: to live. The rest proceeds from these. To live, man must hold three things as the ruling values of his life: Reason—Purpose—Self-esteem. Reason, as his only tool of knowledge—Purpose, as his choice of the happiness which that tool must proceed to achieve—Self-esteem, as his inviolate certainty that his mind is competent to think and his person is worthy of happiness, which means: worthy of living. These three values imply and require all of man's virtues…"
— Ayn Rand , Atlas Shrugged .
For thousands of years, people have been taught that goodness consists in serving others. "Love your brother as yourself" teach the Christian scriptures. "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need" preach the Marxists. Even the liberal Utilitarian philosophers, many of whom defended free market capitalism, taught that one should act always to attain "the greatest good for the greatest number." The result of this code has been a bloody trail of wars and revolutions to enforce self-sacrifice, and an endless struggle in society to achieve equality among people. — What is the Objectivist Position in Morality (Ethics)? - Atlas society
"Objectivism" denotes the thesis that morality is objective. Subjectivism holds that morality is subjective. Relativism holds that morality is relative. In the sequel, I am interested in distinguishing moral objectivism from its denial; therefore, I assume that "relative" and "subjective" both mean "non-objective". If they do not already mean this, then I stipulate that meaning hereby. There are a number of people who believe moral relativism so defined. — Moral Objectivism by Michael Huemer - This is an undergraduate paper from circa 1992
Conclusion:
Equating "objective" with "reasonable" is a Randian invention — boethius
The following responds to "The Objectivist Ethics" by Ayn Rand. I assume the reader is familiar with it. I begin with a general overview of what is wrong with it. I follow this with a set of more detailed comments, which make a paragraph-by-paragraph examination of her statements in the essay. The latter also elaborates further some of the points made in the overview. — Critique of The Objectivist Ethics - Michael Huemer
I don't know why you make so much of this. — SophistiCat
I mean only what's also called "moral universalism" — Pfhorrest
I mean only what's also called "moral universalism", which is just the claim that, for any particular event, in its full context, there is some moral evaluation of that event in that context that it is correct for everyone to make, i.e. that the correct moral evaluation doesn't change depending on who is making it. — Pfhorrest
I mean only what's also called "moral universalism", which is just the claim that, for any particular event, in its full context, there is some moral evaluation of that event in that context that it is correct for everyone to make, i.e. that the correct moral evaluation doesn't change depending on who is making it. — Pfhorrest
Consider the account linked below and point out its shortcomings:I have never seen a good account for how to determine what is objectively moral ... — ChatteringMonkey
A précis on (an) 'objective (i.e. subject/pov-invariant) morality':
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/355166 — 180 Proof
Besides, while what makes people happy varies from person to person and from day to day for each of us, what makes people miserable, or suffer, is the same for everyone (i.e. not "subjective" in the least): — 180 Proof
Of course, if we view "objective" as only a process or a quality that can be said of objects, measurable things, then we avoid all such confusions. If we're not using "objective" in anyway apart from saying "it's true" then it's just a confusing extra emblem that contains no meaning, as it then takes time to determine that nothing is meant more than "it's true"; but then, of course, everyone will claim to be objective in this way, including moral relativist (they are just "being objective" that no moral truths are universally true; i.e. everyone is objectivist). — boethius
For the moral constructivist there also is a correct answer, if we are to take the "full context" into account... because full context also implies moral conventions and personal obligations that may apply in that particular situation. If we are to take the full context into account there doesn't seem to be a whole lot left of what one would consider universal. — ChatteringMonkey
The difference of import here is whether a particular event, the same event, can be simultaneously good and bad to two different observers, both of whom are correct in that judgement. — Pfhorrest
Edit: You can critique certain moral conventions of other cultures which you find atrocious. — ChatteringMonkey
#0
This site can’t be reached, www.ucs.mun.ca took too long to respond. — boethius
2. Moral Objectivism: The view that what is right or wrong doesn’t depend on what anyone thinks is right or wrong. That is, the view that the 'moral facts' are like 'physical' facts in that what the facts are does not depend on what anyone thinks they are. Objectivist theories tend to come in two sorts:
(i) Duty Based Theories (or Deontological Theories): Theories that claim that what determines whether an act is morally right or wrong is the kind of act it is.
E.g., Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) thought that all acts should be judged according to a rule he called the Categorical Imperative: "Act only according to that maxim [i.e., rule] whereby you can at the same time will that it become a universal law." That is, he thought the only kind of act one should ever commit is one that could be willed to be a universal law.
(ii) Consequentialist Theories (or Teleological Theories): Theories that claim that what determines whether an act is right or wrong are its consequences.
Utilitarianism is the best known sort of Consequentialism. Its best known defender is John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Essentially, utilitarianism tells us that, in any situation, the right thing to do is whatever is likely to produce the most happiness overall. (The wrong thing to do is anything else.)
So either talking about something we already have a word for ... or talking about Rand. — boethius
I can only help but notice the close association with Rand and that Randiasm will be taught in this "introduction to Ethics". — boethius
The main point for an objectivist (and I hope and think most of us are objectivists) is that nothing is ever right just because someone thinks it is right. — Congau
I mean only what's also called "moral universalism", which is just the claim that, for any particular event, in its full context, there is some moral evaluation of that event in that context that it is correct for everyone to make, i.e. that the correct moral evaluation doesn't change depending on who is making it. — Pfhorrest
"Objective morality" is often used interchangeably with "moral realism," but that doesn't clarify things much. As Crispin Wright quipped, "a philosopher who asserts that she is a realist about theoretical science, for example, or ethics, has probably, for most philosophical audiences, accomplished little more than to clear her throat." (But the same can be said about many philosophical terms of art.) — SophistiCat
Moral Objectivism: The view that what is right or wrong doesn’t depend on what anyone thinks is right or wrong. That is, the view that the 'moral facts' are like 'physical' facts in that what the facts are does not depend on what anyone thinks they are. Objectivist theories tend to come in two sorts:
(i) Duty Based Theories (or Deontological Theories): Theories that claim that what determines whether an act is morally right or wrong is the kind of act it is.
E.g., Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) thought that all acts should be judged according to a rule he called the Categorical Imperative: "Act only according to that maxim [i.e., rule] whereby you can at the same time will that it become a universal law." That is, he thought the only kind of act one should ever commit is one that could be willed to be a universal law.
I hadn't thought of it in this way before, but I suppose I am a theoretical Moral Objectivist, but a practical Moral Pragmatist. I assume there is universal moral Truth in the same sense that there is ultimate Mathematical Truth. My worldview requires an absolute state or principle that most people call "god". Only a transcendent omniscient Observer would have an Objective perspective on all human moral agency. This has been the traditional role of a monotheist deity : to be an "all-seeing eye" in the sky, or a Santa Claus "making a list of good little boys & girls". But I no longer think in those terms. Instead my Absolute is a logical necessity, just like Mathematical Truth. In theory, all partial real values will add-up to a final universal Evaluation : all things considered, the Moral Equation should add-up to Zero, i.e. perfect balance.there is some moral evaluation of that event in that context that it is correct for everyone to make, — Pfhorrest
Moral realism
Moral realism (in the robust sense; cf. moral universalism for the minimalist sense) holds that such propositions are about robust or mind-independent facts, that is, not facts about any person or group's subjective opinion, but about objective features of the world. Meta-ethical theories are commonly categorized as either a form of realism or as one of three forms of "anti-realism" regarding moral facts: ethical subjectivism, error theory, or non-cognitivism. Realism comes in two main varieties:
Ethical naturalism holds that there are objective moral properties and that these properties are reducible or stand in some metaphysical relation (such as supervenience) to entirely non-ethical properties. Most ethical naturalists hold that we have empirical knowledge of moral truths. Ethical naturalism was implicitly assumed by many modern ethical theorists, particularly utilitarians.
Ethical non-naturalism, as put forward by G. E. Moore, holds that there are objective and irreducible moral properties (such as the property of 'goodness'), and that we sometimes have intuitive or otherwise a priori awareness of moral properties or of moral truths. Moore's open question argument against what he considered the naturalistic fallacy was largely responsible for the birth of meta-ethical research in contemporary analytic philosophy." — Meta-ethics
this particular "term of art" sets up directly the false dichotomy with moral subjectivism — boethius
And if that culture disagrees with your critique (as they would), is at least one of you wrong in your judgement? — Pfhorrest
It's wrong in my judgement, yes — ChatteringMonkey
That's not a false dichotomy though, that's exactly what is meant by it: not "subjective" in the sense of relative to any particular subject. — Pfhorrest
Even empiricism about reality is "subjective" in that it has something to do with subjects: empiricism appeals to sensory experience, which is had by the subjects of that sensory experience. But besides radical empiricisms like subjective idealism or solipsism, it's not "subjective" in the sense that what any particular subject experiences matters more than any other; the objective empirical truth is that which is available to all subjects' sensory experience, without bias. — Pfhorrest
Also, "object" in general doesn't only have the one sense that we use of physical objects, as a "being" or "entity". It can also mean "end", "purpose", "aim", "goal", etc. (As in, "the object of this exercise is ..."). A moral object is something that something can be good for. It's basically just a good, a thing to be sought after, what to work toward. Moral objectivity implies that there is something that is actually good to strive for and work toward, rather than just whatever various subjects feel like doing; just like factual objectivity implies that there is something that is actually real to know and understand, rather than just whatever various subjects perceive. — Pfhorrest
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