Pointing your finger has no meaning?

Pointing your finger has no meaning? — Terrapin Station

It has meaning, but that meaning is not a statement. It's not a proposition.

What meaning does it have?

What meaning does it have? — Terrapin Station

It shows them the state of affairs they're interested to know about.

How does it show that? Not by indicating something like "There (is) . . ."?

How does it show that? Not by indicating something like "There (is) . . ."? — Terrapin Station

Yes by indicating "there it is". But even my dog understands what pointing my finger means - it means "there's the ball" - a fact, not a proposition in this case, because my dog doesn't understand language, and isn't a language using animal.

Yes by indicating "there it is". — Agustino

How is that not a proposition?

You understand that propositions are not the actual words used, right?

How is that not a proposition? — Terrapin Station

Does my dog understand propositions?

You understand that propositions are not the actual words used, right? — Terrapin Station

Can propositions exist outside of language?

I don't believe that we have a very good idea what animals like dogs' minds are like, but I think it's safe to guess that they understand many things, that they can apply meaning, etc.

Can propositions exist outside of language?

They're not language per se, they're meaning. It depends on whether you consider all meaning (like pointing a finger to say "there is is") language or not. That does have meaning, and expresses a proposition.

A proposition is not identical to the sentence "Snow is white."

It's rather the meaning expressed by the sentence "Snow is white."

They're not language per se, they're meaning. — Terrapin Station

Okay, so according to you, truth is a property of meaning right? Meanings can be true or false?

Yes, on the standard view truth-value is a property of those meanings (since that's what propositions are). On my view, the way that property obtains is by making a judgment about how propositions relate to facts, for example (on correspondence theory). It's not just any meaning, by the way. It's meanings that can be expressed by declarative sentences, for example.

So therefore, "(the truth of) everything depends on who is assessing it" - the meaning of that corresponds to the facts right?

So therefore, "everything depends on who is assessing it" — Agustino

I wouldn't say "everything," but "all truth." Not everything is truth (judgments). That's just one activity that sentient beings engage in. It's a very small percentage of all phenomena in the world. Also, this part is my idiosyncratic view. On the standard view, just how the property obtains is left unanalyzed.

I wouldn't say "everything," but "all truth." Not everything is truth (judgments). That's just one activity that sentient beings engage in. It's a very small percentage of all phenomena in the world. Also, this part is my idiosyncratic view. On the standard view, just how the property obtains is left unanalyzed. — Terrapin Station

Okay, so how does a property of meaning, truth, depend on who is assessing it? Do you mean to say that truth is assigned to meaning by the person?

You can approach this from two angles.

The first is that my philosophy of meaning has meaning as something that occurs in individuals' minds and that can't literally be made external to their minds. Assessing how a proposition relates to facts is a matter of (i) thinking about the meanings and concepts assigned to words, phrases, sentences, etc. for example, and (ii) thinking about whether those "match" facts (on correspondence theory) per how the person perceives them. (At least that's the nutshell version. A priori things the person accepts factor into it, too, for example, but we don't need to get into all of that here.)

The second is that on the standard view, there's no plausible, coherent account (and usually there's just no account period) of how propositions would relate to facts (on correspondence theory) independently of individuals thinking about this.

Truth-value is assigned to the proposition by an individual.

This analysis is nonsensical; there can no more be false truths than there can be false facts. Qualifying this I would say, though, that facts are properly equivalent only to empirical truths. The ambit of truths is larger than the ambit of facts. There are spiritual truths that are simply not determinate enough to coherently refer to as 'facts'.

This analysis is nonsensical; there can no more be false truths than there can be false facts. — John

False truths? What in the world are you even talking about?

Your analysis contends that truths and facts are different because truth and falsity are two modes of one thing. But this is nonsense because just as there can be truth and non-truth (falsity), there can be factuality and non-factuality, or actuality and non-actuality.

The ordinary sentences 'it is a fact that' and 'it is true that', at least when it comes to empirical and logical propositions, seem to be perfectly equivalent.

there can be factuality and non-factuality, — John

How would you say that non-factuality obtains ontologically, Mr. Meinong?

Did I say anything about non-factuality "obtaining ontologically"? Can you explain what 'obtaining ontologically' means?

You said "There can be non-factuality."

How can there be non-factuality, exactly?

Take something that you'd say is false. For example, "All websites are exclusively hosted on a Commodore 64." So presumably you'd say that there is a nonfactuality that's somehow all websites exclusively hosted on a Commodore 64. Well, how is there such a thing, exactly?

It is perfectly normal usage to refer to "non-factual statements'. What do you think 'counterfactual' means? It means the same as 'non-factual' or "contrary to fact'; in exactly the same way that 'false' means 'non-true' or 'contrary to truth'.

It is perfectly normal usage to refer to "non-factual statements'. — John

So you're referring to statements, or propositions? In other words, falsehood is a property of propositions?

Yes some statements or propositions, if you like, are false; which is to say that they are non-factual.

Six pages of this and no-one's mentioned Kierkegaard? Kierkegaard.

7th reply. ;)

Should I laugh or cry? Ah...this :-!