It is therefore tempting to conclude that there isn't anything wrong with the propositional content of Tom's assertion. There must be something more to the evaluation of a speech act of assertion beyond the evaluation of the truth of its content. By now, that may seem to be obvious that it must be so, but there is considerable disagreement regarding the characterization of the missing ingredient. — Pierre-Normand

This is my initial take:

People can assert things that they don't believe. That's why there's nothing wrong with the sentence "it is raining and I don't believe that it is raining". The only problem is when you infer from this that the speaker believes the sentence to be true, but then the problem is with your inference, not with the sentence itself. — Michael

I don't think there's anything wrong with the propositional content of Tom's assertion. Rather I think it's the speech act itself that's the problem. Saying something like "it is raining and I don't believe that it is raining" is playing the game of language wrong. We're supposed to (in ordinary situations) infer that the speaker believes his assertions, and so an assertion from which we infer contradictory beliefs doesn't make sense (in the casual sense of the phrase).

The befuddlement of those who do not differentiate belief from truth can be quite amusing.


Here's an analysis that might remove any apparent contradictions.

Being true is a predicate of statements. "It is raining" is true iff it is raining.

Belief is a relation between an individual and a statement.

Making an assertion is an act that one can perform by speaking; it is one of a range of acts, including questioning, commanding, demanding and so on. Speech acts of this sort can be analysed in terms of the requirements that make them felicitous. See Austin and Searle.

An assertion has as its content a statement - that is, an assertion is performed using a statement.

Making an assertion that p counts as an undertaking that p is true.

An assertion will be sincere iff the person asserting p believes p.

So if Mac asserts that it is raining, we can conclude either that Mac believes that it is raining, or that Mac is being insincere.

Hence, if Mac asserts both that it is raining and also that he does not believe that it is raining, we can conclude that he is being insincere.

the speaker's intention to induce ("impress") a belief in the recipient of her language act. It replaces this intention with incurred commitments within the language game. While asserting Moore's proposition, those incurred commitments are inconsistent regardless of the speaker's hopefulness in inducing a belief in her interlocutor. — Pierre-Normand

What is a "commitment within the language game" other than the same thing as what I've termed "impression"? When you take a stance, commit yourself to that stance, on affirming or denying some statement, what exactly are you doing, other than endorsing that affirmation or denial of that statement as the thing to be done?

It's like a political bumper sticker: when you put "TRUMP 2020" on your truck, the point of that is to take a stance of support in for Trump, and in doing so, hopefully induce others to do likewise. Moore's Paradox, in that analogy, is like having both "TRUMP 2020" and "I GO FOR JOE" bumper stickers: "so... you want me to vote for Trump, even though you're voting for Biden? Huh? Why would you encourage me to vote opposite of you? Who do you actually want to win?"

Belief is a relation between an individual and a statement. — Banno

But so is assertion. Neither relation is clear enough to merit distinguishing it axiomatically from the other.

An assertion will be sincere iff the person asserting p believes p vocally also asserts p mentally. — Banno

There. That at least rests the distinction on the background mentalism.

But so is assertion. Neither relation is clear enough to merit distinguishing it axiomatically from the other. — bongo fury

Dude, an assertion is spoken. Beliefs, not always. That'll do to distinguish them.

...vocally also asserts p mentally. — bongo fury

What?

What else?

I.e. what else is belief than mental assertion, since you've agreed to distinguish assertion from belief just on its being vocal.

No, what as is "what the fuck?"

What could "asserts p mentally" possibly mean? Why twist "assert" into use in a private language? What rubbish is this?

since you've agreed to distinguish assertion from belief just on its being vocal. — bongo fury

Well, it being spoken does seem to be a pretty important part of it being a speech act.

How many other uspoken speech acts are you aware of? Or is it that you just have no fucking idea?

How many other unspoken speech acts are you aware of? — Banno

I'm not in favour of multiplying them. I'm recommending translating the mental talk into speech talk.

"Beliefs" are just assertions dressed in unhelpful mental woo. Better and sufficient to deal with,

It's raining, but I don't assert that it is. — bongo fury

I'm recommending translating the mental talk into speech talk. — bongo fury

Then I'lll not pay much further attention to your recommendations. "Mental talk" - what sort of thing could that be?

Then I'll not pay much further attention to your recommendations. — Banno

I wasn't presuming otherwise.

"Mental talk" - what sort of thing could that be? — Banno

Talk about human reference which uses theoretical terms implying mental entities such as beliefs.

Talk about human reference which uses theoretical terms implying mental entities such as beliefs. — bongo fury

What? Talk about human reference? As in, "Peter", "Jane"?

Do you suppose that beliefs sit in your mind like you sit in your comfy chair?

'cause talk like that will go a long way to explaining why Moor looked paradoxical.

What is a "commitment within the language game" other than the same thing as what I've termed "impression"? When you take a stance, commit yourself to that stance, on affirming or denying some statement, what exactly are you doing, other than endorsing that affirmation or denial of that statement as the thing to be done? — Pfhorrest

Brandom's pragmatist account of language (together with his inferentialist semantics), which I am not fully endorsing, only expounding a little, here) is developed in the footsteps of Wilfrid Sellars who viewed language primarily as a game of giving and asking for reasons. A reason offered for believing (or expressing a commitment to) some proposition P may be another proposition Q that your interlocutor is committed to and that P logically is entailed by. You are generally entitled to propositions that aren't logically incompatible with any other propositions that you already had expressed a commitment to (by, for instance, asserting it). Likewise, by asserting P, and thereby incurring a commitment to P, you are losing entitlement to claims incompatible with P.

What you had termed "expression" is similar to the act of incurring a commitment by making an assertion. But your idea of an "impression" is not entailed by the idea of a commitments as just characterized. You interlocutor only must commit herself to propositions that you offer her reasons to endorse on the basis of premises that she already is committed to. Even if she remains unconvinced by your assertion (justifiably, by her own lights) you still incur the exact same commitments to the content of your assertion and to its logical consequences (as well as losing entitlement to incompatible claims) and she can hold you on account for failure to acknowledge some of them.

Saying something like "it is raining and I don't believe that it is raining" is playing the game of language wrong. — Michael

I agree.

What? Talk about human reference? As in, "Peter", "Jane"? — Banno

No, I just meant study of meaningful discourse and communication. "Mental talk" meant mentalist talk: study which is of that subject matter and is of a mentalistic bent, tending to imply mental entities.

Do you suppose that beliefs sit in your mind like you sit in your comfy chair? — Banno

I'm not a believer: in minds, or beliefs, as such. So I was recommending translating that kind of picture into one making do with representing speech acts, and so on. Glossing beliefs as mental assertions seemed a plausible enough first step, although I'm not especially surprised if that gloss would outrage some people's, er, beliefs.

What you had termed "expression" is similar to the act of incurring a commitment by making an assertion. — Pierre-Normand

I meant (and thought I said) for impression to be the speech-act equivalent to ordinary full assertions, and expression to be something less than that. On this account you’re describing, what is the practical difference between saying “X” and saying “I think that X”?

On my account, the former is an ordinary assertion that X, which impresses an opinion, pushes it at others in a way that isn’t welcoming of disagreement; while the latter is merely expressing the speaker’s opinion, showing us what they think without any pressure to agree.

If we assume a speaker is honest, we assume the ordinary assertion with its impressive force to also imply an expression of the speaker’s own mind. But just that expressing function doesn’t seem to capture the usual function of assertions, which seem to do more than just show us what their speakers think, they seem to tell us what to think. Which is what makes “I think that X” a more timid, less forceful thing to say than just plain “X”: you’re withdrawing the impressive force that would come with an ordinary full assertion.

We cannot believe both at the same time.

Done.

Some people.

I can totally believe that X is true but that you don't believe X.

That's the whole thing that makes this a paradox. There's nothing inconsistent about you disbelieving something true. But it sure somehow sounds inconsistent for you to say that that is the case.

I can totally believe that X is true but that you don't believe X. — Pfhorrest

Yes. That's been established and is not at issue as far as I'm concerned. Those do not directly contradict one another. That basically is Moore's first example. He compared that to another though, and that is where the problems show themselves. A report of another's thought and belief, and a report of one's own thought and belief are drastically different.

You cannot believe both, that "X" is true, and that you don't believe it.

That's the difference.

You can totally believe X is true and that another doesn't. You do. They do not. The same cannot be said about ourselves, unless we're talking about past events. Then, if one follows the rules of grammar, the verb tense changes to past tense. Moore's example used present tense. That's suspect language use(misuse) and that also adds to the oddity.

We're supposed to (in ordinary situations) infer that the speaker believes his assertions, and so an assertion from which we infer contradictory beliefs doesn't make sense (in the casual sense of the phrase). — Michael

What else could 'infer' possibly mean other than 'form a belief that...'?

So why are we 'inferring' from listening to speech acts, but not 'inferring' from other perceptions? You seem to want my perception of water hitting the roof to be some kind of direct transfer of world-fact into my brain, yet speech acts are inferred. I can't see why you'd make such a distinction.

So why are we 'inferring' from listening to speech acts, but not 'inferring' from other perceptions? You seem to want my perception of water hitting the roof to be some kind of direct transfer of world-fact into my brain, yet speech acts are inferred. I can't see why you'd make such a distinction. — Isaac

I don't know how you read that into anything I've said.

That's fine. I shouldn't have got back involved. There are some issues it's interesting to play around with, see what people think, there's others where it's just the same rehearsed script over again. I've had this conversation here a dozen times and it always ends the same way, it's like a zombie, you think you've killed it then up it comes a week later completely unaffected by the previous encounter. I'll leave you to it.

I fail to see the depth of this puzzle.

“Why is it absurd for me to say something true about myself?”

From MacIntosh view it's not true. It's as if Richard Dawkins would say "God exists, but I don't believe in God".

The only absurdity here is the construction of the sentence “It’s raining, but I don’t believe it is”.
And we all know you can conjure up many word-based paradoxes.

A true anecdote with most names eschewed to protect those innocent and still alive. Two respected but socially idiosyncratic Cambridge philosophers, who met at Wittgenstein's feet, ended up one day, to many of their colleagues astonishment, getting married. One of their colleagues is reported as saying: "I know X and Y just got married, I just don't believe it".
There are games in language in which "X but I don't believe X" make sense.

Hence, if Mac asserts both that it is raining and also that he does not believe that it is raining, we can conclude that he is being insincere. — Banno

Ah, but if we pretend that he wasn't, then we can keep having fun.

Why does Moore say/think it would be said? — Ciceronianus the White

Fair enough.

The thing is, Moore sentences screw with what, to a budding philosopher, might seem like natural answers to the general question, "Why do people say the stuff they do?"

There is, sad to say, a gulf between the fact that p and someone believing that p. Thus, even if people always and only said what they sincerely believe, we could not deduce p from someone asserting it, or from p that people would assert p and not assert ~p. So much we all know well enough.

We also all know that from someone asserting p we cannot conclude that they believe p. They may be insincere; they may have misspoken; they may not have meant p by saying what they said, even though we might take them to have meant p, and there are subcases of this last that are particularly noteworthy, such as irony.

But having gotten to irony, it looks like we've made a mistake.
A: "How was work?"
B: "Just peachy."
B is most likely not asserting that work was just peachy; she is asserting that work was not peachy at all by saying that it was. She is still asserting what she sincerely believes though, right?
A: "That bad, huh?"
B: "No, it was okay. Long stupid meeting this afternoon, that's all."
So B was also exaggerating, and didn't actually believe that the work day had been the opposite of peachy, although that is what she meant by what she said.

We can mostly infer what someone believes from what they say, and we probably have to, because reasons. We can even do this taking some extra steps between what they said and and what they meant by what they said. (Or "what they meant by saying what they said," if that's better.)

The connection between what someone means and what they believe is clearly not just (logical) implication, as we all know. It looks a lot of the time like what Grice called 'implicature': this is a slightly weaker connection than implication in that the audience is encouraged or expected to make an inference, but not only does the speaker not require their audience to infer their belief, the speaker might actually block that inference. Implicature is cancelable.

In the example above, we get one of each: in the first exchange, B encourages A to take her to mean work was the opposite of peachy; in the second exchange, B then cancels A's inference that B believes work was the opposite of peachy. And this is all perfectly ordinary. I've put some of Grice's terminology on it, but we all do this stuff everyday, and it seems barely even deserving the word 'theory'.

And it's also wrong. Moore sentences show that clearly, and Grice himself makes this very point. The inference of belief is not cancelable and is not implicature. I attempted a little sleight-of-hand here, which I'm guessing most readers caught: exaggeration is, like irony, a sort of insincerity, whether or not it is intended to deceive. Grice was aware of Moore's paradox. He treats irony as a violation of the maxim of quality*, and the assumption that the speaker believes what they (in the indicative mood) say as just assuming they are following the maxim. (And further, if you make an indicative mood utterance you intend that the audience think you believe what you are saying.)

According to this story, I'm not inferring that you believe p when you assert p, but assuming you do. (Leaving aside whatever interpretive hoops we jump through, for the moment.) When I assert p, I don't intend you to infer that I believe p, I intend you to believe that I believe it. Just the conclusion without the inference to get you there.

But are we really done with inference? Doesn't it seem like I'm actually reasoning something like this:
IF you assert that p AND IF you are observing the maxim of quality, THEN you believe that p.
Or we might put it this way:
IF you assert that p, THEN EITHER you believe that p OR you are not observing the maxim of quality.
Sure. But we could rephrase: when you say something either you believe it or you're lying, or exaggerating, or speaking ironically, or any of the other ways of violating the maxim. It's the violations that give rise to implicature, and the default is just non-inferential belief ascription.

I think this should strike most philosophers (of an analytic bent, anyway) as a somewhat bitter pill to swallow, rather like Hume showing you can't justify your reliance on induction. I think we want to say that ascribing beliefs to others based on their indicative mood utterances is rational -- and I believe it is -- but if it is, it is not because we infer what they believe from what they say. I mean to say: it is a question of rationality, within the sphere of reasoning, evidence and so on, not that "the rational thing to do" is believe people are always honest or something. Not the conclusion, but the process.

So if we are to find a place for rationality it's going to be somewhere else, which is a little surprising because the natural hook to hang rationality on would surely have been right around here somewhere, right? Language use, propositional attitudes, belief formation -- this looks like the place.

But we need something more. Since I've more than nodded at Grice, I'd like to be able to give his answer, but I'm not sure we get one. (And I'm no Grice scholar.) The next thing he reaches for should look familiar by now:

I think that this consequence is intuitively acceptable; it is not a natural use of language to describe one who has said that p as having, for example, "implied," "indicated," or "suggested" that he believes that p; the natural thing to say is that he has expressed (or purported to express) the belief that p. He has of course committed himself, in a certain way, to its being the case that he believes that p, and while this commitment is not a case of saying that he believes that p, it is bound up, in a special way, with saying that p.

But this ends up not being much of an account, because all Grice is going to claim is that when you make an indicative mood utterance you intend the audience to think you believe it. That might get us to treating the commitments of indicative mood utterances as the same as belief reports, but nothing more. It's not an account of what those commitments are or of the sense in which the management of such commitments is a rational matter.

(No one take this as any kind of final word on Grice, please, because I think it likely he addresses these issues in stuff I haven't read. If anyone knows, speak up.)

* Try to make your contribution one that is true; do not say what you believe to be false; do not say what you do not have adequate evidence for.

I meant (and thought I said) for impression to be the speech-act equivalent to ordinary full assertions, and expression to be something less than that. — Pfhorrest

Ah! Sorry. I may not have read you carefully enough.

On this account you’re describing, what is the practical difference between saying “X” and saying “I think that X”?

On Brandom's account, the difference is pragmatic and perspectival. When one ascribes a belief to someone else (either second- or third-personally) one thereby takes them to be committed to the truth of the propositional content. (I am assuming that "X thinks that..." or "X believes that..." are equivalent). When one rather ascribes knowledge to someone else, one is likewise taking them to be committed to the truth of the propositional content but one is also thereby endorsing that content. That difference regarding first-personal endorsement vanishes in the case of first-personal ascription (or avowal) of belief or knowledge since one can't avow a personal commitment to the truth of a proposition while at the same time failing to endorse it. So, on that account, saying either one of "P", "I think/believe that P" or "I know that P" are pragmatically equivalent.

On my account, the former is an ordinary assertion that X, which impresses an opinion, pushes it at others in a way that isn’t welcoming of disagreement; while the latter is merely expressing the speaker’s opinion, showing us what they think without any pressure to agree.

Such an account, I think, would threaten to make assertions of the form: "I very strongly believe that P; I'm pretty sure you are wrong to deny it" or "I don't merely believe it strongly, I know it for sure" pragmatically defective, if not outright inconsistent. On Brandom's account, they're not problematic at all.

Such an account, I think, would threaten to make assertions of the form: "I very strongly believe that P; I'm pretty sure you are wrong to deny it" or "I don't merely believe it strongly, I know it for sure" pragmatically defective, if not outright inconsistent. On Brandom's account, they're not problematic at all. — Pierre-Normand

I don’t see any pragmatic defect on the part of those by my account. The extra bits besides just “I believe P” are adding back in (some of) the impressive force that the “I believe” took away from just “P”.

...and hence this thread.