I don’t think this is right (even though I conceded to Michael earlier that it was). I find the sentence to be absurd whether the speaker is lying or not. Also, it’s not much of a lie. — Luke

I would concur, and add the following...

To lie is to deliberately misrepresent one's own thought and belief. All lies share this common feature/trait/denominator. When one lies about whether or not it is raining, they do not say both, that it is raining, and that they do not believe it is raining.

"It's raining, but I do not believe it" is not a lie. It's just plain old textbook self-contradiction.

One cannot believe it is raining when they do not believe it is raining. — creativesoul

Yes, but under traditional correspondence theory, that has no relevance. The first part has its truthmaker in the state of the world, the second in the state of my mind.

Put it like this. Is there any problem with me saying

"It's raining" is true, but "I believe it's raining " is not true

According to correspondence theory there should be nothing wrong with me saying that. The judgement of the truth value of "it's raining" depends on the state of the world, the judgement of the truth value of "I believe it's raining" depends on the state of my mind. If the state of the world can be judged independently to the state of my mind, then there should be no problem with me making the statement quoted above.

But there is a problem, or at least it seems there is. Hence correspondence theory has to go.

One cannot believe it is raining when they do not believe it is raining.
— creativesoul


Yes, but under traditional correspondence theory, that has no relevance. — Isaac

I've no idea what relevance that has to what I've offered here. From what I remember, I'm no traditional correspondence theorist. There's much to argue with concerning the rest of that post, but it is all equally beside the point. I'm just showing that Moore's 'puzzle' is a result of not having a clue of what belief is and how it works.

This is a better rendering... the nail in the coffin, as it were...

One cannot believe that "It's raining" is true when they do not believe it is raining.

We all know that much.

One cannot believe that "It's raining" is true when they do not believe it is raining. — creativesoul

Of course we all know that. The problem is when we try to explain why. Ramsey's solution is simple, it's because 'I believe that P', 'P is true' and 'P' all amount to the same thing in ordinary use, just asserting P.

Holding that 'P is true' means something of another class to 'I believe P' is where the problem starts.

Unfortunately we can only gather very little of Moore's meaning from that one letter which is why I quoted from PI. — Isaac

Marie Mcginn's article (PDF) is worth a read. She offers this account of Moore's paradox and his solution:

The paradox concerns the first-person present indicative use of the verb ‘to believe’. Moore observes that although it may, for example, be true that it is raining and I do not believe that it is raining, it is absurd for me to say ‘It is raining but I do not believe that it is’. For Moore, the paradox arises insofar as there may be truths about me which I cannot, without absurdity, assert. How is this to be explained? Moore’s own suggestion for how to resolve the paradox is to recognize that we need to distinguish between what someone asserts and what he implies in asserting it. Thus, someone who asserts ‘It is raining’ does not thereby assert that he believes that it is raining, but his asserting it does indeed imply that he believes it. It is, according to Moore, because someone who asserts that it is raining implies that he believes that it is, that it is absurd for him to go on and assert that he does not believe it. — Marie McGinn

This is pretty much what many people here, including myself, have suggested: that it is simply absurd for a speaker both to assert P and to assert he does not believe it.

Ramsey's solution is simple, it's because 'I believe that P', 'P is true' and 'P' all amount to the same thing in ordinary use, just asserting P. — Isaac

I am not familiar with Ramsey's solution, but - assuming your account is correct - this is what sparks Wittgenstein's interest: 'P' (or 'P is true') and 'I believe that P' are not equivalent in all contexts. Moore's paradox reveals something interesting about the grammar of the word 'believe'. If these were equivalent, then you would expect that tense would not alter their equivalence. However, as you have already quoted (from Wittgenstein):

The statement “I believe it’s going to rain” has a meaning like, that is to say a use like, “It’s going to rain”, but the meaning of “I believed then that it was going to rain”, is not like that of “It did rain then”. (PI, p.190)

If 'P' and 'I believe that P' "amount to" the same assertion, then their meanings should not change with tense.

I find McGinn's presentation of Wittgenstein's solution to be somewhat nuanced, but at its base is the familiar motif of his later philosophy:

Wittgenstein believes [...] the central mistake of Moore’s approach [is] it treats ‘I believe …’ as a description of my own mental state [...] His aim is to show that this is not how the expression ‘I believe’ is used.

What I consider to be the important points of (McGinn's interpretation of) Wittgenstein's solution:

if we are inclined to hold that ‘I believe’ ascribes a mental state—the same state whether it is used in the first-person present indicative, in the past tense, or in the context ‘Suppose …’, or in the third-person—then we want to see ‘a different development of the verb’, one on which ‘I believe …’ is never equivalent to the assertion ‘It is the case that …’. [...]

On the ‘different development of the verb’, I am to be understood as ascribing a certain disposition to myself, the disposition which the state of belief is held to consist in. On this view, ‘I believe …’ is not equivalent to the assertion ‘It is the case that …’, although conclusions about my state of mind may be drawn on the basis of both. The expression ‘I believe that p’ is equivalent to the assertion that I am in a certain dispositional state. But now the question arises: ‘how do I myself recognize my own disposition?’ Surely, ‘it will have been necessary for me to take notice of myself as others do, to listen to myself talking, to be able to draw conclusions from what I say!’ (PI, p. 192). The absurdity of this suggestion—expressed through the presence of an exclamation mark—shows, Wittgenstein believes, that the words ‘I believe’ are not used to ascribe a disposition to myself. [...]

The idea that in using the words ‘I believe …’ I ascribe a disposition to myself misrepresents the way we are taught to operate with these words. It misrepresents what is an act of making or expressing a judgement about the world as a description of the state of a particular person. Wittgenstein acknowledges that there are circumstances in which it does make sense to say “Judging from what I say, this is what I believe”. These are circumstances in which I stand back from my normal state of engagement and try to take an objective view of myself: I try to see myself as others see me. In these circumstances, saying ‘I believe …’ is no longer equivalent to asserting ‘It is the case that …’ and, Wittgenstein observes, it would be possible for me to say “It seems to me that my ego believes this, but it isn’t true” (PI, p. 192). In these circumstances, it is as if two people—the one on whom I reflect and the one doing the reflecting—speak through my mouth. However, this is not the normal use of ‘I believe …’, and it is a use, Wittgenstein wants to insists, which presupposes the normal use.

Absolutely everyone agrees to all of this. — Srap Tasmaner

If that's the case, then it seems to me that debating, or perhaps more properly discussing, this "paradox" at length is nothing more than an effort to explain what nobody would ask to be explained in the first place.

@Ciceronianus the White When "philosophy" stoops to this level it's no wonder folks marvel at the lack of common sense and real Logic of academia.

A statement is made regarding the weather by X. Then, X says he doesn't believe the statement he just made regarding the weather. When people say they don't believe what they just said is the case, that strikes me as indicative of a problem with the sentence, and possibly a much greater problem with the speaker. — Ciceronianus the White

If that's the case, then it seems to me that debating, or perhaps more properly discussing, this "paradox" at length is nothing more than an effort to explain what nobody would ask to be explained in the first place. — Ciceronianus the White

For Moore, the paradox arises insofar as there may be truths about me which I cannot, without absurdity, assert. — Marie McGinn

Like all paradoxes the solution was found in a re-wording of the issue. Resolving this paradox resulted fairly directly in the logic of speech acts, which was not a bad thing.

Like all paradoxes the solution was found in a re-wording of the issue. Resolving this paradox resulted fairly directly in the logic of speech acts, which was not a bad thing. — Banno

You see, I'd have hoped that would result without the need for this contrivance. Ah well. But what on earth is Marie McGinn speaking about? Surely (I know I shouldn't call you that) she means "there are truths about me which I cannot assert without appearing absurd"?

There's all sorts of statements that are both true about us, and yet sound utterly absurd if we are the ones saying so. That fact ought not be a surprise to anyone.

Each and every time we hold some false belief or another; each and every time we are in the process of being mistaken about the way things are, someone else could state something true about our being mistaken, about our holding false belief, and there would be no issue whatsoever.

However...

Because we cannot recognize our own mistakes; because we cannot make a mistake on purpose; because we cannot knowingly believe a falsehood; we cannot say some things that are true about ourselves despite the fact that others have no problem at all stating such things.

No need for some elaborate explanations. Isn't that exactly what peer review is all about? The fact that we cannot recognize our own mistakes?

Moore's example describes a person who knowingly holds false belief.

:brow:

"I do not believe it's raining outside, but I'm wrong" describes the exact same situation as "It's raining outside, but I do not believe it".

Bewitchment... indeed.

But what on earth is Marie McGinn speaking about? Surely (I know I shouldn't call you that) she means "there are truths about me which I cannot assert without appearing absurd"? — Ciceronianus the White

If she means that, then she's absolutely correct. They are virtually innumerable such true statements(if that's what you mean by "truths") about one that they cannot assert about themselves without sounding 'absurd'.

Interesting article, thanks.

someone who asserts ‘It is raining’ does not thereby assert that he believes that it is raining, but his asserting it does indeed imply that he believes it. — Marie McGinn

Is it anywhere explained why? I've read the article, but not with any great depth. I can't find an explanation for this assertion. It seems on the face of it rather an odd thing to say. If the thing that someone asserts (the matter the sentence is about) can be about something which is outside of their mind, then why does saying it imply they believe it? I agree that saying it implies they believe it, but I get there via the fact that the assertion can be about nothing else but the belief (not the fact of their belief, the content of it). I'm not clear if McGinn is disagreeing with this, but the context you raised it in seems to suggest so, yet I can't see how to get to such an implicature without this content substitution.

The statement “I believe it’s going to rain” has a meaning like, that is to say a use like, “It’s going to rain”, but the meaning of “I believed then that it was going to rain”, is not like that of “It did rain then”. (PI, p.190)


If 'P' and 'I believe that P' "amount to" the same assertion, then their meanings should not change with tense. — Luke

I don't think this is the case because beliefs change, so "I believed then that it was raining" is about a past belief (where the state of one's mind becomes the object), and "It did then rain" is a current belief (about the historical fact). One doesn't, admittedly, escape from the the issue of needing to see it as impossible for one to have a belief about one's current beliefs (where one can have a belief about one's past beliefs). But this 'psychological' issue is present as an assumption in all solutions so I don't see it as a blocking point to Ramsey's. This is pretty much what Wittgenstein says later, as you quote.

Wittgenstein believes [...] the central mistake of Moore’s approach [is] it treats ‘I believe …’ as a description of my own mental state [...] His aim is to show that this is not how the expression ‘I believe’ is used. — Luke

...ie, we can't have a belief about our mental states. Consider, in this light though "I believed..." which is used exactly that way - a description of one's mental state. So either way we have the meaning changing with the tense. We don't seem to be able to escape that.

Other than that, I'm inclined to agree with much of the remaining assessment of the variations in the use of "I believe..." as it progresses over tenses.

...someone who asserts ‘It is raining’ does not thereby assert that he believes that it is raining, but his asserting it does indeed imply that he believes it.
— Marie McGinn

Is it anywhere explained why? I've read the article, but not with any great depth. I can't find an explanation for this assertion. — Isaac

My take...

Why is it the case that someone who asserts "It is raining" does not thereby assert that they believe it is raining? Well, because "I believe it is raining" contains different words than "It is raining".

Why does asserting "X" imply that one believes "X'? Well, because that's what happens when a listener does not doubt the sincerity of the speaker.

someone who asserts ‘It is raining’ does not thereby assert that he believes that it is raining, but his asserting it does indeed imply that he believes it.
— Marie McGinn

Is it anywhere explained why? I've read the article, but not with any great depth. I can't find an explanation for this assertion. It seems on the face of it rather an odd thing to say. If the thing that someone asserts (the matter the sentence is about) can be about something which is outside of their mind, then why does saying it imply they believe it? — Isaac

I would guess that 'It is raining' is about the weather, whereas 'I believe it is raining' is about one's belief. The belief may be implied by the former statement, but it is not asserted. Perhaps your views are different to Moore's.

The statement “I believe it’s going to rain” has a meaning like, that is to say a use like, “It’s going to rain”, but the meaning of “I believed then that it was going to rain”, is not like that of “It did rain then”. (PI, p.190)

If 'P' and 'I believe that P' "amount to" the same assertion, then their meanings should not change with tense.
— Luke

I don't think this is the case because beliefs change, — Isaac

This misses the point. In the present tense, 'P' and 'I believe that P' have the same meaning, as Ramsey contends. However, Wittgenstein's example demonstrates that these two statements each have a different meaning in the past tense. Since 'P' and 'I believe that P' do not have the same meaning in the past tense, then Ramsey is incorrect to make the unqualified assertion that they both have the same meaning/use.

"It did then rain" is a current belief (about the historical fact). — Isaac

I consider this a unique view of the matter. This would imply that all assertions are about beliefs rather than, e.g., about the world.

Surely there are at least some cases in which we know for certain whether it did in fact rain, like the time I got drenched walking home without an umbrella.

But this 'psychological' issue is present as an assumption in all solutions so I don't see it as a blocking point to Ramsey's. This is pretty much what Wittgenstein says later, as you quote.

Wittgenstein believes [...] the central mistake of Moore’s approach [is] it treats ‘I believe …’ as a description of my own mental state [...] His aim is to show that this is not how the expression ‘I believe’ is used.
— Luke

...ie, we can't have a belief about our mental states. — Isaac

I don't follow your logic here. If Wittgenstein's aim is to show that 'I believe...' is not a description of my own mental state, or that this is not how the expression 'I believe...' is used, then how is Wittgenstein making it a psychological issue? He is trying to avoid viewing it as a psychological issue. This is what Wittgenstein finds problematic about Moore's solution, according to McGinn.

Consider, in this light though "I believed..." which is used exactly that way - a description of one's mental state. So either way we have the meaning changing with the tense. We don't seem to be able to escape that. — Isaac

As the article states: "The paradox concerns the first-person present indicative use of the verb ‘to believe’". It is not paradoxical in the third-person use, or in the first-person use in past or future tenses. It is distinctively paradoxical only in the first-person present indicative use of the verb.

Wittgenstein's solution is to break the assumption (shared by Moore) that 'I believe...' is a description of one's own mental state. To quote from the article again:

If the words ‘I believe’ describe my internal, representational state, then, Wittgenstein suggests, it ought to make sense for me to ask whether my belief is a reliable guide to what the facts are. If I read off facts about the world from a photograph, I must also be in a position to say that the photograph is a good one, that it is a trustworthy representation of what is the case. And similarly, it ought to make sense to say: ‘ “I believe it’s raining and my belief is reliable, so I have confidence in it” ’ (PI, p. 190). ‘In that case,’ he remarks, ‘my belief would be a kind of sense impression’ (PI, p. 190). But this is not how the words ‘I believe’ are actually used, for ‘[o]ne can mistrust one’s own senses, but not one’s own belief ’ (PI, p. 190). Saying ‘I believe that p’ is equivalent to asserting that p is the case, and is not a means of telling that p is the case, which I might trust or mistrust. This is shown, Wittgenstein suggests, in the fact that if ‘there were a verb meaning ‘to believe falsely’, it would not have any significant first person present indicative’ (PI, p. 190). — Marie McGinn

...we can't have a belief about our mental states. — Isaac

Yes, we can have belief about our own belief, and they not only can be, but must be true belief. The alternative is confusion, lunacy, and/or insanity(not knowing what to believe or why). What we cannot have is false belief about what we believe.

...

"I believe" can be both, a description of one's mental state, and an assurance of subsequent sincerity about something completely different than one's own mental state.

"I believe that some philosophical positions are better than others" is of the latter variety. "I believe that that's correct, but I'm uncertain" is of the former. — creativesoul

Why is one of these a description of one's mental state but the other is not?

"I believe that that's correct, but I'm uncertain" is about the speaker's doubt or uncertainty regarding that(whatever that may be).

Do you see it differently?

Do you see it differently? — creativesoul

Could you say more about how either statement is a description of one's mental state?

"I believe that that's correct, but I'm uncertain" is about the speaker's doubt.
— creativesoul

Aren't you the speaker? — Luke

Well, here and now... not strictly speaking. It's better to note that I'm reporting upon some common language uses, as are we all...

However, I could be and have been the speaker saying such a thing, when I'm uncertain and/or doubt that(whatever that may be). I'm sure the same could be said of most anyone who regularly uses "I believe" as a means to express uncertainty about that(whatever that may be). Such use is amenable to interchangeability of "believe" and "think". Not all are.

Could you say more about how either statement is a description of one's mental state? — Luke

"I believe" can be used to indicate both uncertainty and certainty. Strictly speaking, I wouldn't call either a "description". I've borrowed that word from others here. "I believe, but I'm not certain" is about one's own mental state nevertheless, in these situations, to be clear.

"I believe, but I'm not certain" is about one's own mental state nevertheless, in these situations, to be clear. — creativesoul

I don't follow how the above statement is about one's own mental state but "I believe that some philosophical positions are better than others" is not.

One is about philosophical positions and there is no uncertainty and/or hesitation involved regarding the truth of the statement(that), while the other is about both that(whatever that may be) and one's own low confidence level(doubt, uncertainty) that that is so, is true, is the case. etc.

"I believe that some philosophical positions are better than others, but I'm not certain as to why or how" is about grading philosophical positions, and one's own uncertainty and/or doubt about what makes some better than others.

With regard to the "description of one's mental state" that you mentioned earlier, it sounds like this description concerns the level of certainty/doubt that one has about a belief rather than the belief itself. This doesn't appear to support your claim that ""I believe" can be both, a description of one's mental state, and an assurance of subsequent sincerity about something completely different than one's own mental state." You're not saying that "I believe" is a description of one's mental state; you're saying that the certainty/doubt associated with a belief is a description of one's mental state.

One's doubt about a belief is doubting the truth thereof.

...it sounds like this description concerns the level of certainty/doubt that one has about a belief rather than the belief itself. — Luke

I'm not following. Which description?

One's doubt about a belief is doubting the truth thereof. — creativesoul

But it's not the belief itself which is "a description of one's mental state" in that case; it's the doubt about the belief.

"I believe X, but I'm not certain" expresses doubt and/or uncertainty concerning the truth of the belief(X).

One's doubt about a belief is doubting the truth thereof.
— creativesoul

But it's not the belief itself which is "a description of one's mental state" in that case; it's the doubt about the belief. — Luke

I've never claimed otherwise. Sometimes "I believe" indicates doubt, particularly when someone says "I believe, but I'm not certain". Those uses are about one's own uncertainty/confidence level concerning the belief statement(s) in question(X or that).

But it's not the belief itself which is "a description of one's mental state" in that case; it's the doubt about the belief.
— Luke

I've never claimed otherwise — creativesoul

You did make this claim, in your now deleted post:

"I believe" can be both, a description of one's mental state, and an assurance of subsequent sincerity about something completely different than one's own mental state. — creativesoul

You state above: ""I believe" can be [...] a description of one's mental state". This is what I have been questioning.

"I believe" is not the belief.

I stand by everything I've written. I'm actually glad you resurrected that bit. The deletion was accidental.

"I believe" can be a description(part of one anyway) of one's confidence level. I never said "I believe" is always used that way. Hence, sometimes it is not. The example(sentence) we were discussing at the time you said this...

But it's not the belief itself which is "a description of one's mental state" in that case; it's the doubt about the belief. — creativesoul

...did not qualify as one of the uses of "I believe" that can, and does, refer to one's own certainty and/or confidence level(state of mind). So, when you said what you said, about that particular example, I answered accordingly...

I never said otherwise... about that particular example/candidate under our consideration.

Hopefully that helps to clear up any misunderstanding about that particular part of our conversation.

You state above: ""I believe" can be [...] a description of one's mental state". This is what I have been questioning — Luke

I've offered numerous examples of such usage.