The is of thermodynamics will be unable to tell us what we ought do. — Banno

Yeah, nah. The whole is-ought issue is what I seek to bypass.

Thermodynamics enshrines a probabilistic approach to ontology. So all one can say about reality is that there are constraints on the freedom to act. It is not a prescriptive approach where outcomes are either determined or - as the alternative - fundamentally free. Neither necessity nor chance apply in some absolute fashion.

Hence that tension between is and ought is bypassed for a more constructive view. We get to make choices insofar the possibilities haven’t been constrained.

Suppose we do the calculations, and they show that we will indeed vote for Trump. Now that we have this analysis, what is it that rules out our going against it? Can't we take that into consideration, and then vote for against Trump — Banno

Yes of course. To the degree the universe is indifferent about what we do, we are free to choose otherwise. If we are unconstrained. We could toss a coin if we like.

What I have argued is that humanity is in fact entrained to thermodynamics as an imperative. And blindly entrained. If we don’t make different choices, it is because we haven’t realised how much we have become caught up in nature’s own entropic flow.

The calculation only arises to the degree that one might think to resist that historically embedded imperative.

Should one suddenly decide to return oneself - and why not one’s whole community - to a hunter-gatherer lifestyle? “Hah! Take that, Second Law, you ugly meaningless bastard!”

So the ethics derivable here are rather permissive. All I am saying is that certain collective flows emerge naturally to organise reality. That is the character of nature. It is what it is. And also what ought to be in the sense blind nature has no other choice.

Then humans emerged as fully natural phenomena. We reflect the embedded flow principles. Human history is explained as steps of increasingly more powerful entropy production.

Constraint did its work. Our response has been to blindly go along with the flow. And why not? Was there ever a good reason to resist?

The burden of argument is thus flipped. We don’t need to give a positive reason to support every action. Our behaviour only has to be on average aligned with the entropic flow - so that we can continue to exist as part of nature. And if we choose otherwise, then we suffer the full indifference of nature.

Life and mind arose as systems with purpose. — apokrisis

I think my main issue with this line of reasoning is that "purpose" is a construct of rational minds, whereas it's perfectly reasonable to imagine the universe without any rational minds, and therefore with no "purpose". Not that things wouldn't be happening, but that there would be no verbal or metaphysical baggage.

The wise long run behaviour would be to price in the cost of the environmental sink needed to dispose of the resulting waste. Plus the issue of what replaces the coal and oil as the supply peaks. — apokrisis

It seems to me that the nature of all life is to be a consumer. Certainly, some (if not all) life produces some byproducts that could perhaps be consumed again, but eventually, the entropy you're talking about will lead us to equilibrium where the energy of the universe is no longer in any consumable or usable form (at least that's one theory based on our current understandings). In the short term, we can monitor our effects on the environment, and perhaps maximize conservation of energy for later days, but I tend to agree with the Keynesian thesis: "In the long run we're all dead."

Well, no; that's a question, not a statement. — Banno

Sure. Doesn't change the point. What makes you think an ethical dimension applies to the possible unraveling of nations?

Remember the supposition is that the calculation will tell us what we will indeed do, regardless of what we ought do. — Banno

All of this to say, it is not at all clear that we could replace ethical considerations with thermodynamic calculations. — Banno

I don't think the question is about replacement, to me it seems that thermodynamics gives us further context and insight into understanding what ethics truly is. To the true nature of ethics. I could form an ethical judgement even about Laplace's demon, I could find it beautiful or ugly. But what it would mean to find something "beautiful" or "ugly" in the context of Laplace's demon, would change exactly what was referred to when I uttered those words.

Even if every action is fully deterministic, that doesn't mean ethics no longer has meaning, it would just change the meaning from what is typically assumed under the assumption of a non-deterministic framework. Of course, if the universe (and everything in it) is deterministic then this has likely always been true, and we simply haven't realized it. Every murder in the history of humanity has been inevitable under this model, but from a pragmatic perspective, we can still view murders as undesirable, and work to prevent them. It's just more of a futile gesture at that point... a futile gesture which we are destined to continue... and so forth along the lines of your argument. The same concept applies to the rising and falling of nations, or to individual votes, murder is just usually a clearer example when talking about traditional ethics because traditional ethics (pretty much across the board, but not universally) finds murder unpalatable.

This is where I tend to agree with apokrisis's pragmatism. That what happens need not be thought of as "oughts" at all, but merely as necessary effects of pragmatic, necessary truths. If the universe is deterministic, then perhaps those truths are ultimately thermodynamic after all, and if the universe is not (wholly) deterministic, then perhaps those truths are ultimately personal (and therefore ethics as we currently describe it re-enters the fray). Or perhaps it's somewhere in between. Either way, it seems to me that there's probably no way to know for sure at the present moment.

I think my main issue with this line of reasoning is that "purpose" is a construct of rational minds, — Voyeur

That’s fine. The natural philosophy view does seek to include all four Aristotlean causes including finality. But it also isn’t claiming anything mystical. It is usual to recognise ascending grades of finality.

So we would have the three steps of {teleomaty {teleonomy {teleology}}} to cover the physical, the biological, and themindful. Or in more everyday language, {propensity {function {purpose}}}.

See: http://www.cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/189/284

So we would have the three steps of {teleomaty {teleonomy {teleology}}} to cover the physical, the biological, and themindful. Or in more everyday language, {propensity {function {purpose}}}. — apokrisis

I guess the issue would be with the idea of "intent" being the watchword for "purpose". But I'm content with the idea of decoupling purpose from any semantic baggage and using in a categorical and observational sense. Probably closer to the original Aristotelian intent in the first place! Although, now I'm back to intent and at perilous risk of going in circles!

Thank you for the link, I enjoyed it.

What makes you think an ethical dimension applies to the possible unraveling of nations? — Voyeur

Yeah. I'm nonplussed. What makes you think it doesn't?

I could find it beautiful or ugly. — Voyeur

That'd be aesthetics, not ethics.

Our behaviour only has to be on average aligned with the entropic flow — apokrisis

Just to be sure - should this be understood as "Our behaviour will be on average aligned with the entropic flow" or "Our behaviour ought be on average aligned with the entropic flow?

Just read and digest what I wrote. Stop trying to dumb it back down to fit your tired rhetorical template.

If you can point out a flaw in my constraints-based argument, get back to me. :yawn:

I just wanted to sort out an apparent ambiguity; one that looks central to your description. Suit yourself.

No. You have no interest in venturing out of your lair to explore another point of view. You accuse me of ambiguity. I have told you your Procrustean bed has no appeal. Get over it.

ELSIE: Hey! What were you going to say?

BRIAN: Nothing.

ARTHUR and FRANK: Yes, you were.

ELSIE: Yes. You were going to say something.

BRIAN: No, I wasn't. I'd finished.

ELSIE: Oh, no you weren't.

ARTHUR: Oh, come on. Tell us before you go.

BRIAN: I wasn't going to say anything. I'd finished.

ELSIE: No, you hadn't.

BLIND MAN: What won't he tell?

EDDIE: He won't say.

BLIND MAN: Is it a secret?

BRIAN: No.

BLIND MAN: Is it?

EDDIE: Must be. Otherwise, he'd tell us.

ARTHUR: Oh, tell us the secret.

BRIAN: Leave me alone.

YOUTH: What is this secret?

GIRL: Is it the secret of eternal life?

EDDIE: He won't say!

ARTHUR: Well, of course not. If I knew the secret of eternal life, I wouldn't say.

YOUTH: No.

BRIAN: Leave me alone.

GIRL: Just tell me, please.

Big sook. :joke:

Yeah. I'm nonplussed. What makes you think it doesn't? — Banno

Who said I think it doesn't?

That'd be aesthetics, not ethics. — Banno

Distinction without a difference. But, to avoid a needlessly semantic discussion, use good or bad if you like, it changes nothing about the point I'm making.

changes nothing about the point I'm making — Voyeur

Which is...?

What is the topic here? 'cause I'm lost.

You are making shit up because you don't even seem to have even a schoolboy grounding in molecular chemistry.

The first thing they teach you is why atoms form molecular arrangements that minimise their collective entropy budget. It literally explains everything. — apokrisis

I wasn't making shit up, I asked you a couple simple questions which you did not answer. Do you consider one type of molecule to be more entropific than another? If so, why?

I took chemistry in high school and they never taught us anything about a "collective entropy budget". It really seems like it's you who is making shit up.

Suppose there was a thermodynamic analysis that was able to tell us what we will in fact do. Suppose we do the calculations, and they show that we will indeed vote for Trump.

Now that we have this analysis, what is it that rules out our going against it? Can't we take that into consideration, and then vote for against Trump anyway? — Banno

That's right. Some people, when you tell them what they will do, will automatically do the opposite just to spite you. So if it happens to be the case that you come to know what a person will do, then you had better not tell that person, or they might go and do the opposite. What kind of predictive capacity is that, when you happen to know what will happen, but you cannot say it out loud because that might, or might not, cause the opposite to occur? To speak your knowledge out loud would negate its status as knowledge.

That's right. Some people, when you tell them what they will do, will automatically do the opposite just to spite you. So if it happens to be the case that you come to know what a person will do, then you had better not tell that person, or they might go and do the opposite. What kind of predictive capacity is that, when you happen to know what will happen, but you cannot say it out loud because that might, or might not, cause the opposite to occur? To speak your knowledge out loud would negate its status as knowledge. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, tentativley yes. I had hoped to make the further point, found in The Poverty of Historicism, and implicit in the discussion of causality elsewhere, that this shows an unaddressed problem in the logic of knowing what we will do. But Apo will not entertain such a discussion.

Suppose there was a thermodynamic analysis that was able to tell us what we will in fact do. Suppose we do the calculations, and they show that we will indeed vote for Trump.

Now that we have this analysis, what is it that rules out our going against it? Can't we take that into consideration, and then vote for against Trump anyway? — Banno

Perhaps it could only tells us what we will do if it doesn't tell us what we will do? :wink:

Perhaps it could only tells us what we will do if it doesn't tell us what we will do? :wink: — Janus

:smile:
Something like that. A sort of Heisenberg uncertainty in which the more we predict what we will do the less certain we can be that we will do it.

The cat is both inside the box and outside.

Our behaviour only has to be on average aligned with the entropic flow — apokrisis


Just to be sure - shold this be understood as "Our behaviour will be on average aligned with the entropic flow" or "Our behaviour ought be on average aligned with the entropic flow? — Banno

Just read and digest what I wrote. Stop trying to dumb it back down to fit your tired rhetorical template.

If you can point out a flaw in my constraints-based argument, get back to me. :yawn: — apokrisis

The question about that distinction seems to be a fair one to me. Despite whatever may be thought to ultimately constrain us, we are certainly capable of thinking about whether we ought to be so constrained; I mean that kind of ethical thinking is a great, if not the greatest, part of human life.

What is the topic here? 'cause I'm lost. — Banno

Clearly.

The thought seems to be that we can rid ourselves of ethical considerations, since these will reduce to thermodynamics. — Banno

...and hence while it might not tell us what we ought do, it will tell us what we in fact will do, and hence that ethics is rendered irrelevant. — Banno

To which I'll reply again:

Even if every action is fully deterministic, that doesn't mean ethics no longer has meaning — Voyeur

I thought as much. "Our behaviour will be on average aligned with the entropic flow" does not tell us what we ought do. Even if we could calculate the action that on average aligns with the entropic flow, it remains open to ask if we ought so act. Indeed, even if it were determined that we will indeed so act, there remains the open question as to if we should so act.

Even if every action is fully deterministic, that doesn't mean ethics no longer has meaning
— Voyeur — Voyeur

But you seem to think that what you said here contrasts with what I said. Indeed, you appeared to agree with Apo, who I had understood to be in direct disagreement with what you said here.

Are you now agreeing with me that thermodynamics does not tell us what we ought do?

Are you now agreeing with me that thermodynamics does not tell us what we ought do? — Banno

I am now and was then in agreement. However, that's not a point I was arguing.

I focus on the following premise:

The thought seems to be that we can rid ourselves of ethical considerations, since these will reduce to thermodynamics. — Banno

I disagree with the thought that a thermodynamically determined world precludes the relevancy of ethics.

From what has been said, a reply that is open to apokrisis is to agree that this is so, but to repeat that
'Ethics only comes into it as a backfill of decisions taken for other reasons - unfortunately perhaps.'
— apokrisis
...and hence while it might not tell us what we ought do, it will tell us what we in fact will do, and hence that ethics is rendered irrelevant. — Banno

Bold is mine. That's what doesn't follow.

You say:

All of this to say, it is not at all clear that we could replace ethical considerations with thermodynamic calculations. — Banno

I say: It doesn't matter, because we don't need to in the first place.

OK.

Indeed, even if it were determined that we will indeed so act, there remains the open question as to if we should so act. — Banno

Yes, and it certainly seems as though the asking of that question itself determines much of human behavior. For me the question as to whether we are "really" determined by thermodyanmics is more the open question (and is perhaps not even coherent when it comes to behavior as opposed to physiology).

One reply might be that the asking of the question as to what we ought to do, and any possible answer to it, is itself determined by thermodynamics, but I can't see any conceivable way in which the two could fit together. This is just another example of Sellar's conundrum of attempting to marry the "scientific" and "manifest" images; the space of causes and the space of reasons. I see the two as inherently incommensurable ways of looking at two different dimensions of human life; like Spinoza's attributes of God (that he denied were different substances, but were rather akin to modes): res cogitans and res extensa. Questions in the former context are answered in terms of reasons, and the latter in terms of causes.

Well, I'm not too keen on sweeping generalisations, unless I make them myself.

But we might agree that what is needed, if not already apparent, is some sort of stereoscopic vision. What we ought do seems less informed by science than ever in living memory; and just at a time when it is most needed.

What we ought do seems less informed by science than ever in living memory; and just at a time when it is most needed. — Banno

In regard to managing our impacts on the environment, yes, certainly. Science doesn't tell us what to do, but it informs us about the effects of what we do, although perhaps less so when it comes to people; that we may learn by careful and concernful observation and experience.

Regarding the idea of stereoscopic vision; I think that is a good idea that tells us that science should, wherever possible, inform our behavior, and that ethics should inform what is done with science; what our limited resources are to be most valuably expended upon.

But I don't think science is going to help you much with deciding how to treat your friends. And the idea that science is only dealing with the world "as it is for us", is not going to be relevant to scientific inquiry except perhaps in special cases (QM).