However, while the poem itself is an abstract entity and therefore uncreatable, concrete instances of it aren’t. When you creatively write a poem, you discover the poem itself, but you invent a concrete instance of that poem. When you remember someone else’s poem, however, you not only don’t invent the poem (this is always the case), but you don’t even invent a concrete instance of the poem. Rather, you only discover a concrete instance of the poem. — Tristan L

Which is pretty much what I wrote earlier:

OK, so the valid distinction then seems to be that possibilities are discovered and (novel) actualities are invented. I — Janus

I thought it was your position that both/neither "invention" and "discovery" are correct, but your apparent endorsement of Tristan seems to confirm my initial assessment that you are in the "discovery" camp — Luke

Tristan makes great arguments against the invention-only side. I wouldn’t say that that means ideas are discovered-only though, because the act of finding the content of an idea is also an act of creating an instance of it, which is why I don’t think the two can really be distinguished.

It seems to me that he’s not arguing against invention-only, but rather he is arguing for discovery-only. The conflation of possibilities and ideas continues...

I forgot to ask: how does two people coming up with the same idea demonstrate the existence of “abstract eternal ideas”? I get that they both came up with the same idea, but how does this prove that ideas exist independently of either (or any) person, and eternally so?

If they both invented, created, their respective ideas by the act of instantiating them, such that the idea itself and the instantiations of it are not distinguished, then Alice and Bob’s ideas are not the same, because their instantiations are not the same. If instead they merely created instantiations of the same something that in some sense or another “existed” before it was instantiated, then their instantiations can be of the same thing, but then neither of them created it, they both just found it.

It would be possible in principle to set out on a deterministic process of mechanically identifying every possible idea, though as that space of possibilities is likely infinite this process would likely never finish identifying all of them. — Pfhorrest

Each irrational number is an "idea", so this process cannot exist.

possibility of doing math involving two-dimensional quantities (which is all complex numbers are) — Pfhorrest

Complex numbers and complex variable theory are more than simply doing math in two dimensions. For example, (x,y)->(u,v), u = 3x + 4/y, v=x-y does that.

Admittedly nit-picking, but clear concise arguments need to be accurate.

In mathematics there is no strong consensus on creation vs discovery. But a practitioner may create a mathematical object and then discover its properties. It makes little to any difference in practice. I always consider it a kind of exploration.

The only sense in which those two instantiations can be called instantiations of "the same thing" is a sense in which that thing of which they are instances was not created by it being instantiated, but already existed in some sense. — Pfhorrest

So you say, but do you have any argument to support this assertion of pre-existence? Why can’t two people invent the same idea independently without that idea having pre-existed?

The invention/creation of ideas is impossible?
— Luke

In a sense that is distinct from the discovery of them, yes. — Pfhorrest

Right, so it is your position that ideas (not possibilities) exist prior to their “discovery”.

Because abstract things are just possibilities to begin with, and being the first one to do something that was always possible doesn't make it possible; but it's also not like the possibilities are lying around out there in space somewhere apart from the instances of people doing them. — Pfhorrest

But you most definitely imply that possibilities are “lying around out there in space somewhere apart from the instances of people doing them” because you keep talking in terms of their discovery. How can they be discovered unless they already exist? If they don’t already exist “in space” then where/how do they exist?

Each irrational number is an "idea", so this process cannot exist. — jgill

There is no algorithm that will eventually spit out every possible irrational number? I know they can’t be put into a linear order, but is there no way of generating them without any particulars order? I would think something like a space-filling curve would be in the ballpark for something like that.

They cannot have the same idea (in terms of content) because they are different people? Sounds like no more than a stipulation. — Luke

No, I mean if the “idea” is not its content but its instantiation, then two people who separately instantiate it, who separately invent it, have invented two, albeit very similar, things, not the same thing.

The only sense in which those two instantiations can be called instantiations of "the same thing" is a sense in which that thing of which they are instances was not created by it being instantiated, but already existed in some sense.

The invention/creation of ideas is impossible? — Luke

In a sense that is distinct from the discovery of them, yes.

With concrete things, it makes sense to ask whether someone made the thing or just found it pre-made. There is a clear way in which those are different.

With abstract things, ideas, that's not so clear. Because abstract things are just possibilities to begin with, and being the first one to do something that was always possible doesn't make it possible; but it's also not like the possibilities are lying around out there in space somewhere apart from the instances of people doing them. So neither invention nor discovery in the sense that we use them of concrete things really makes complete sense applied to abstract things, but something that's kind of like both of them at the same time does.

There is no algorithm that will eventually spit out every possible irrational number? — Pfhorrest

Wouldn't that be tantamount to counting them? A Turing machine algorithm?

No, I mean if the “idea” is not its content but its instantiation, then two people who separately instantiate it, who separately invent it, have invented two, albeit very similar, things, not the same thing. — Pfhorrest

Yes, I understand, but you’ve simply repeated your stipulation that two people cannot invent the same idea (content) just because they are different people.

The only sense in which those two instantiations can be called instantiations of "the same thing" is a sense in which that thing of which they are instances was not created by it being instantiated, but already existed in some sense. — Pfhorrest

So you say, but do you have any argument for this supposed pre-existence of ideas? Why is it not possible for two people to come up with the same idea (content) independently without that idea pre-existing?

The invention/creation of ideas is impossible?
— Luke

In a sense that is distinct from the discovery of them, yes. — Pfhorrest

Right, so it is your position that ideas (not possibilities) pre-exist their “discovery”.

With abstract things, ideas, that's not so clear. Because abstract things are just possibilities to begin with, and being the first one to do something that was always possible doesn't make it possible; but it's also not like the possibilities are lying around out there in space somewhere apart from the instances of people doing them. — Pfhorrest

You definitely imply that possibilities/ideas “are lying around out there in space somewhere apart from the instances of people doing them” because you keep talking in terms of their “discovery”. If they don’t exist “out there in space somewhere”, then where/how do they exist?

I hold that there really isn't a clear distinction between invention and discovery of ideas: — Pfhorrest

There's a clear distinction in meaning as @Luke pointed out but perhaps you wish to say it's distinction without a difference. Well, if whatever is being invented were impossible then it can't be invented. The "possible space" you mention must have inventions as a potential and in that sense they pre-exist, rendering Luke's view on the distinguishing characteristic between the two meaningless.

Yes, I understand, but you’ve simply repeated your stipulation that two people cannot invent the same idea (content) just because they are different people. — Luke

It's not because they're different people, it's because they have made two different instantiations, so if the instantiation is the idea, as you seem to put forth, then that's two different ideas, not the same idea instantiated twice.

So you say, but do you have any argument for this supposed pre-existence of ideas? Why is it not possible for two people to come up with the same idea (content) independently without that idea pre-existing? — Luke

See above. If coming up with an idea creates it, in the same way that building a chair creates that chair, and two people independently come up with something, those are two separate acts of creation, and so two separate creations, not the same thing. If two people build identical chairs, they haven't built the same (singular numerically identical) chair. But if two people think up the same design for a chair, independently, then they've "come up with the same idea", even though their thoughts are separate events and they build separate chairs, which indicates that the "idea" we're talking about in the phrase "came up with the same idea" isn't the event of them thinking it or the fixing of that thought in a material object, but some abstract thing that's separate from the thought event or the chair object, and wasn't created by the thought event, otherwise the second person to independently come up with it couldn't have created it since the first person already had.

Right, so it is your position that ideas (not possibilities) pre-exist their “discovery”. — Luke

In the sense that discovering doesn't make them come into being, sure. Complex numbers "existed", in whatever sense that can be said to "exist", before anybody thought that maybe taking the square root of a negative wasn't simply impossible.

You definitely imply that possibilities “are lying around out there in space somewhere apart from the instances of people doing them” because you keep talking in terms of their “discovery”. If they don’t exist “out there in space somewhere”, then where/how do they exist? — Luke

I'm not taking any stance here on what the sense in which they "exist" (presently or pre-discovery/invention) is. I'm just saying that in whatever sense we can say two people "came up with the same idea", the thing that they're "coming up with" is in some way or another independent of them having come up with it, otherwise what you'd be saying is that one numerically singular concrete thing (the instantiation of some idea) simultaneously exists in two places (in the minds, i.e. brain-states or whatever, of two different people).

And I'm not (at least trying not, maybe I've slipped up somewhere) talking about their "discovery" simpliciter, specifically because that seems to have implications that they were just... out there somewhere, waiting to be found, in the same way that concrete things are. I don't think abstract things, ideas, exist in the same sense as concrete things, and so the sense of "discovery" that we use of concrete things doesn't apply to them. And neither does "invention". "Coming up with" an idea is both invention-like and discovery-like in different ways. (This is kinda like wave-particle duality. Is a photon a particle or a wave? Yes. Yes it is.)

I noticed that I posted two different responses to your previous post. I thought I'd lost the first one to the ether and then tried to recreate it from memory. Oh well.

It's not because they're different people, it's because they have made two different instantiations, so if the instantiation is the idea, as you seem to put forth, then that's two different ideas, not the same idea instantiated twice. — Pfhorrest

I cannot take any credit for your argument because I've never claimed that the "instantiation is the idea". When I speak of someone coming up with an idea, I don't mean an idea devoid of any content, obviously. I mean what you mean: the same idea instantiated twice. I still don't follow why this requires the pre-existence of the idea.

If coming up with an idea creates it, in the same way that building a chair creates that chair, and two people independently come up with something, those are two separate acts of creation, and so two separate creations, not the same thing. If two people build identical chairs, they haven't built the same (singular numerically identical) chair. But if two people think up the same design for a chair, independently, then they've "come up with the same idea", even though their thoughts are separate events and they build separate chairs, — Pfhorrest

Right, this (above) is what I mean by two people coming up with the same idea independently. Why is this not possible?

which indicates that the "idea" we're talking about in the phrase "came up with the same idea" isn't the event of them thinking it — Pfhorrest

How is "coming up with the idea" different to "thinking it (up)"?

or the fixing of that thought in a material object — Pfhorrest

Right, that's the instantiation of the idea.

but some abstract thing that's separate from the thought event or the chair object, and wasn't created by the thought event, otherwise the second person to independently come up with it couldn't have created it since the first person already had. — Pfhorrest

The "abstract thing" is the idea itself. The "thought event" is (equivalent to) "coming up with the idea". Why shouldn't two people be able to have separate "thought events" and come up with the same idea? Why does that idea need to pre-exist each of their "thought events"? How can it?

Right, this (above) is what I mean by two people coming up with the same idea independently. Why is this not possible? — Luke

If you mean the "same chair design" scenario, that is totally possible, and I never said otherwise. What I mean is that that doesn't constitute two separate acts of "creating an idea", but two separate acts of instantiating an idea, and that if it were two separate acts of "creating an idea", then that would result in two separate (but identical) ideas (because there were two separate acts of creation, each of which must have its own product), which is absurd.

How is "coming up with the idea" different to "thinking it (up)"? — Luke

It's not, but the idea itself is separate from the event of thinking it up.

Why shouldn't two people be able to have separate "thought events" and come up with the same idea? — Luke

They can. The absurd conclusion that they can't is the consequence of the position you're taking, and I'm bringing it up only to show that that position has to be wrong.

Why does that idea need to pre-exist each of their "thought events"? — Luke

Because if the thought-event was identical to the idea, or at least created the idea, then separate thought-events would be identical to, or create, separate ideas. Say Alice from 1900 came up with an obscure idea, it was lost to history, and then Bob in 2000 came up with the same idea, independently, without knowing about Alice at all. How could Bob's thoughts create an idea that Alice's thoughts had already created a hundred years before? If Alice's thoughts created the idea, then it already existed by the time Bob thought of it; and if thoughts create ideas, then Bob's thoughts must have been a different idea, not identical to the one Alice had. But if Bob and Alice did have the same idea, which is how we'd normally talk about it and I think that's the right way to talk about it, then Alice's thoughts and Bob's thoughts can't be identical to, or have created, the ideas that they're about. So in whatever sense those ideas "exist" after having been thought up, since thinking them up can't have brought them into "existence", they must have already "existed", in whatever way they do now.

if it were two separate acts of "creating an idea", then that would result in two separate (but identical) ideas (because there were two separate acts of creation, each of which must have its own product), which is absurd. — Pfhorrest

How is it absurd?

It's not, but the idea itself is separate from the event of thinking it up. — Pfhorrest

Yes, I said that in my post.

Why shouldn't two people be able to have separate "thought events" and come up with the same idea?
— Luke

They can. — Pfhorrest

Didn't you say this was absurd?

But if Bob and Alice did have the same idea, which is how we'd normally talk about it and I think that's the right way to talk about it, then Alice's thoughts and Bob's thoughts can't be identical to, or have created, the ideas that they're about. — Pfhorrest

I already went over this in my previous post. You are conflating the "thought event" with the idea itself; or attributing this conflation to me somehow. You are fighting a strawman. Alice's and Bob's thoughts ("thought events") are different from the idea itself; they have the thought event in order to come up with the idea. I do not claim that the thought event and the idea are identical, so I still fail to understand why the idea's pre-existence is necessary.

Didn't you say this was absurd? — Luke

No, I said the implications of your position that thinking up an idea creates that idea would make that situation absurd.

If thinking up an idea creates that idea, and there are two separate events of thinking-up, then two different ideas have been created... even if they are qualitatively identical, what we would normally call “the same idea”. That’s the absurdity, calling two separate instances of the same idea “two different ideas”.

Contrapositively, if those two thinking-up events result in the same single idea, as we usually say, then that idea can’t have been created by the second event if it was already created by the first event, so it must not have been created by either event. If it was not created by anyone thinking it up, then in whatever sense it can be said to “exist” after being thought up, it must have already “existed” in that sense before.

Tristan L claims that it has been demonstrated "at length" to be false that anybody needs to come up with ideas, yet his supposed proof of this involves two people coming up with the same idea. — Luke

That is only one of three proofs which I have given and which independently of each other show the uncreatability of ideas. The other two are the one with the possibilities and the one with the deterministic algorithm.

It systematically outputs all finite-length strings made up of the printable ASCII-characters, including spaces, letters (uppercase and lowercase), numerals, and punctuation marks. That your lifetime likely isn’t long enough to see it output many interesting ideas has no bearing on my argument. What matters is that for every expressible idea EID, without exception, the implementation of my algorithm will find EID and spit it out after a finite number of years. You originally claimed here that no such algorithm exists, but when I showed you otherwise, you didn’t concede the point, but rather tried to divert attention to something irrelevant.

It seems to me that he’s not arguing against invention-only, but rather he is arguing for discovery-only. — Luke

I think that I’ve made it clear enough that I indeed argue for discovery-only when it comes to ideas themselves, but that I also hold that in discovering ideas, one invents instances thereof, in which Pfhorrest seems to agree with me:

I wouldn’t say that that means ideas are discovered-only though, because the act of finding the content of an idea is also an act of creating an instance of it, which is why I don’t think the two can really be distinguished. — Pfhorrest

By the way, here we have a great example of two people – namely Pfhorrest and me - coming up with the same idea. Indeed, there are several ideas which we discovered independently of each other, such as

• the argument with possibilities (though there are differences in the particulars, such as Pfhorrest making the additional assumption that all abstract things are possibilities, whereas I see only an essential link between abtract things in general and corresponding possibilities), which I first wrote down more than two years ago (in which I argue not just about ideas, but about things broadly), and
  
• the idea that ideas are discovered, but instances thereof invented, which is a central pillar of my theory of intellectual property (but see my next comment; Pfhorrest may not hold that same position after all).
  

The conflation of possibilities and ideas continues... — Luke

As I’ve already said twice and will say again, I don’t think (but also don’t rule out) that ideas are possibilities. However, every idea EID is essentially linked to the possibility that someone can find EID, and since that possibility must exist from the start if anyone is ever to come up with EID, EID must also exist from the start. It’s like the existence of the fact that 5 is odd needing the existence of 5 itself. The failure to actually read what I write goes on ...

With abstract things, ideas, that's not so clear. Because abstract things are just possibilities to begin with, and being the first one to do something that was always possible doesn't make it possible; but it's also not like the possibilities are lying around out there in space somewhere apart from the instances of people doing them. So neither invention nor discovery in the sense that we use them of concrete things really makes complete sense applied to abstract things, but something that's kind of like both of them at the same time does. — Pfhorrest

Here, I actually disagree with you slightly on some (but not all) points. Firstly, I don’t think that all abstract things are possibilities, but whether that is so or not doesn’t matter for my arguments. What matters is the essential tie between abstract entities (such as an idea EID) and corresponding possibilities (such as the possibility of someone coming up with EID).

Secondly, I am quite certain that abstract entities broadly and possibilities in particular do in fact “lie around” in some abstract “space”. That is what our arguments show.

Furthermore, I think that it does actually make perfect sense to distinguish between discovery and invention, and that both of these terms are always meaningful: Ideas can only ever be discovered, and in discovering an idea, you invent an instance thereof. These two can be distinguished, but as they always happen together, they cannot be separated.

However, I strongly agree with you that being the first one to do something that was always possible doesn't make it possible.

They already are in linear order, but I think you mean well-order, right? If so, then you may be pleasantly surprised: They can be put into a well-order by the Well-Ordering Theorem.

Each irrational number is an "idea", so this process cannot exist. — jgill

So it’s even better: all the irrationals exist eternally even though no algorithm can find each of them after a finite time. The set of all linguistically ideas, though, is countable, so an algorithm (an implementation of which I have given here) exists which outputs each idea after a finite time. This means that ideas are at least as eternally existing and real as irrational numbers.

Moreover, if you allow transfinite time, then all the irrationals can actually be found.

Of course it does. If something is possible, then it must always have been possible, so that possibility must have always existed. If something is impossible, then by definition, it will definitely never happen, so it won’t ever become possible. Hence, all possibilities, and with them all ideas, for each of these is essentially connected to a possibility, must have always existed, only waiting to be found.

On the point.

Wouldn't that be tantamount to counting them? — jgill

You’re the mathematician, so you’d know better than me.

It seems though that since Cantor has the diagonalization method of aways coming up with a new real number that’s not yet on any supposedly-complete list of real numbers, you could start with a list of any one real number, diagonally generate new one to add to that list, diagonally generate another new one, and so on, and mechanically spit out new real numbers without end like that.

It systematically outputs all finite-length strings made up of the printable ASCII-characters, including spaces, letters (uppercase and lowercase), numerals, and punctuation marks. That your lifetime likely isn’t long enough to see it output many interesting ideas has no bearing on my argument. What matters is that for every expressible idea EID, without exception, the implementation of my algorithm will find EID and spit it out after a finite number of years. You originally claimed here that no such algorithm exists, but when I showed you otherwise, you didn’t concede the point, but rather tried to divert attention to something irrelevant. — Tristan L

How does your algorithm give us the Mona Lisa? Or a toaster?

As I’ve already said twice and will say again, I don’t think (but also don’t rule out) that ideas are possibilities. However, every idea EID is essentially linked to the possibility that someone can find EID, and since that possibility must exist from the start if anyone is ever to come up with EID, EID must also exist from the start. It’s like the existence of the fact that 5 is odd needing the existence of 5 itself. The failure to actually read what I write goes on ... — Tristan L

Obviously if you assume that ideas have some type of pre-existence then their discovery must be possible. I challenge the assumption.

If thinking up an idea creates that idea, and there are two separate events of thinking-up, then two different ideas have been created... even if they are qualitatively identical, what we would normally call “the same idea”. That’s the absurdity, calling two separate instances of the same idea “two different ideas”. — Pfhorrest

Who's calling them "two different ideas"? I've asked you repeatedly why it's absurd or impossible for two people to create/invent the same idea independently.

Contrapositively, if those two thinking-up events result in the same single idea, as we usually say, then that idea can’t have been created by the second event if it was already created by the first event, so it must not have been created by either event. If it was not created by anyone thinking it up, then in whatever sense it can be said to “exist” after being thought up, it must have already “existed” in that sense before. — Pfhorrest

What if they both came up with it at the same time? Anyway, it is your position that neither of them can come up with the idea without it pre-existing, so why is it absurd/impossible for the first person in this scenario to come up with the idea without it pre-existing?

Who's calling them "two different ideas"? — Luke

By saying that the act of coming up with an idea creates that idea, YOU imply that two separate acts of coming up with something must result in two separate ideas. That’s absurd, so your premise that coming up with the idea creates it must be false.

I've asked you repeatedly why it's absurd or impossible for two people to create/invent the same idea independently. — Luke

And I’ve said repeatedly that THAT is not absurd, but the implications of your view of idea-creation are contrary to that, in an absurd way.

What if they both came up with it at the same time? Anyway, it is your position that neither of them can come up with the idea without it pre-existing, so why is it absurd/impossible for the first person in this scenario to come up with the idea without it pre-existing? — Luke

The point is to refute your claim that coming up with an idea is a clear act of invention. If it were the case that the first person to think something up created that idea, but the next person to independently come up with it did not also create the numerically same idea (because someone else already created it) nor created a numerically different idea (because that would be absurd, numerically two qualitatively identical ideas), then the second person would have to be merely “discovering” the idea despite the fact that they did exactly the same thing as the first person, who instead “invented” it. Thus illustrating why there isn’t a clear distinction between invention and discovery of ideas.

I think you’re still interpreting me in an unnecessarily Platonic fashion. I’m not saying that, unless some idea already exists “out there” somehow, it’s not possible for someone to think of it. I’m saying that it makes no sense to talk of making or creating ideas (not merely instantiating them), so their existence status doesn’t change when someone thinks of them. They don’t come into existence or go out of existence, we can’t do things to make or destroy or change what kinds or ideas there are to be had. We can just have them, start having them, stop having them, but they themes don’t change, only what we do changes.

But what they are is nothing more than the possibilities of us doing (thinking) things, so it’s also not so clear that we’re “discovered” them like we discover concrete things. We’re just also not “creating” them like we create concrete things either.

Sure you could say someone discovers novel ideas in themselves. But that doesn't mean they were already there. — Janus

Of course it does. If something is possible, then it must always have been possible, so that possibility must have always existed. If something is impossible, then by definition, it will definitely never happen, so it won’t ever become possible. Hence, all possibilities, and with them all ideas, for each of these is essentially connected to a possibility, must have always existed, only waiting to be found. — Tristan L

You appear to be a platonist, in that you seem to be asserting the substantive existence of possibilities. There are two kinds of possibilities as I see it; logical possibilities, which are such only by virtue of not involving any contradiction, and physical possibilities; what could (but, I suppose, does not necessarily have to) come to exist given invariant natural law, and neither of these, as I see it, have any substantive existence.

It is logically possible, although perhaps not physically possible, that rainbow coloured, translucent leprechauns exist; but that doesn't entail that they really exist in any sense. Also, it may not be physically possible for them to exist. If something is logically possible, yet not physically possible would you still want to say it enjoys substantive existence of any kind?

If you don't mean to make a substantive existential claim, then to say that possibilities exist is a mere tautology, because obviously, in accordance with ordinary parlance, in that sense if they didn't exist they would not be possibilities in the first place.

you could start with a list of any one real number, diagonally generate new one to add to that list, diagonally generate another new one, and so on, and mechanically spit out new real numbers without end like that. — Pfhorrest

What is a "list of any one real number"?

What is a "list of any one real number"? — jgill

Cantor’s diagonalization starts with supposing you have a list of all real numbers (you really can’t), and then goes on to show how to make a new real number that isn’t on that list (thus showing it’s really not a complete list). I take it then that we can thus start with a list of any size, even just one item long, and continually generate new numbers that aren’t on it to add to it.

By saying that the act of coming up with an idea creates that idea, YOU imply that two separate acts of coming up with something must result in two separate ideas. That’s absurd, so your premise that coming up with the idea creates it must be false. — Pfhorrest

I’ve already demonstrated this to be a straw man argument: the “thought event” (i.e coming up with the idea) is not identical with the idea it produces. I’m sure you agree. Therefore, it does not preclude the possibility of two people having separate thought events but coming up with the same idea independently. I have never implied or stated otherwise. Since I’ve never laid any claim to your straw man argument, then you must either deny that it is absurd for two people to come up with the same idea independently, or else you still owe us an explanation of the alleged absurdity.

I’ve already demonstrated this to be a straw man argument: the “thought event” (i.e coming up with the idea) is not identical with the idea it produces. I’m sure you agree. Therefore, it does not preclude the possibility of two people having separate thought events but coming up with the same idea independently. I have never implied or stated otherwise. — Luke

The absurdity you imply doesn't stem from the thought-event and the idea being identical; that's just one possibility, and you've made it clear that's not your position.

But when we're talking about concrete objects, if I make a chair, and you make an identical chair, we've still made two chairs, not one chair.

If in coming up with an idea, I make that idea, I create it, invent it, bring it into being... and elsewhere independent of me you come up with an identical idea, in the same way that I already did unbeknownst to you... then you and I have made two different, but identical, ideas, like the two different but identical chairs.

That's absurd. I'm not saying that's what happens. I'm saying that's an implication of your position that coming up with an idea creates the idea.

Since I’ve never laid any claim to your straw man argument, then you must either deny that it is absurd for two people to come up with the same idea independently — Luke

I have, repeatedly. The absurdity is that your view logically implies that this obvious normal thing, two people independently coming up with the same idea, should not be possible, in the same way that two people can't independently build the same single chair, because you say that coming up with an idea is like building a chair: a clear act of creation.