Of course they’re different, but their differences have nothing to do with evidence.

Rationality: the use of reason according to principles, the judgements of which are logically consistent necessarily, from which cognitions follow and its objects are given;
Faith: the condition under which judgements are contingent on mere persuasion, the principles be what they may, from which its cognitions do not necessarily follow and the possibility of its objects are not necessarily given.

In the event I don’t know what I’m talking about, or, which is equally the case, in the event what I’m talking about is too systematically evolved to be properly understood by the lesser equipped......

Rationality: the natural inclination for the discovery and use of reason;
Faith: superficial, and possibly but not necessarily unwarranted, confidence in that for which reason is used.
————— — Mww

You're just playing with words. It's fun to do. :smile:

No -Mww is making a distinction. Faith as 'confidence in that for which reason is used' applies perfectly well to currency and to insurance contracts, among many other things, and nobody wouldn't even quibble about that. What is at issue in this discussion of what is worthy of faith.

No -Mww is making a distinction. Faith as 'confidence in that for which reason is used' applies perfectly well to currency and to insurance contracts, among many other things, and nobody wouldn't even quibble about that. What is at issue in this discussion of what is worthy of faith. — Wayfarer

So, what, to you, is worthy of faith? :chin:

Well, currency, and insurance contracts, among other things.But the point I was simply reinforcing was that made by Mww, about the general meaning of the term 'faith', as distinct from the narrower meaning of 'religious belief'.

Kant's philosophy is described as 'transcendental idealism', what it is transcendental in respect of — Wayfarer

Nutshell: the Kantian transcendental is that which is purely a priori. Anything purely a priori is an object created by the conscious thinking subject, hence the idealism. That which is purely a priori is that which is thought, without regard for sensibility.

Transcendental in respect of experience.
—————

Kant never claims to know what anything actually is. — Wayfarer

Anything empirical, yes; all we can ever know of the empirical is its appearance, its representation as phenomenon. Nevertheless, we must be able to know something with absolute certainty, otherwise the concept is empty. Epistemology ultimately reduces to certain knowledge only for that which is thought, because the negation of thought by contradiction is impossible. It is impossible to not know of what objects you think. But that still leaves the objects of which you think, to relate to what is the case or not in physical reality, which is an empirical judgement of truth, from which follows the instantiation and/or extension of meaning in common language.
—————

the general meaning of the term 'faith', as distinct from the narrower meaning of 'religious belief'. — Wayfarer

What I said can be reinforced by what you said, certainly, but I personally go further and distinguish the general meaning of the one, re: faith in.... in juxtaposition to the general meaning of its complement, re: knowledge that...... Faith and belief are much too similar in subjective validity to be distinguishable from each other, and practical knowledge literally flushes both right down the figurative existential crapper.

In addition, again personally.....

what is worthy of faith. — Wayfarer

.....is a perfectly subjective condition, standing for that which one cares enough to think about, but for which knowledge is not provided. Something like that. Or not...

Ideas are certainly real. But not real in any material sense. — tim wood

Agreed. You can’t blast an idea over the centerfield wall. And you can’t call a thing round without the antecedent idea of what a “round” thing must be.

You're just playing with words. — TheMadFool

Aren’t we all?

...no exceptions taken, good stuff guys. I kinda like how this thread evolved into reason and belief… .

:up:

If you reduce reality to what is material, you've got a big problem. Sez I. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sez you. Let's check definitions, or at least understandings. I understand reality to comprise all that is each in itself.This noun related to but not the same as the adjective real. Things in reality are real, but not all real things are in reality. Examples: ideas, seven, the meanings of words. The qualification for reality, it seems to me, is materiality, or haecceity: the "this one here", its thisness, distinguished from what it is or what it is for.

Collective nouns, wind, rain, rope, galaxy, seem ambiguously in reality. For present purpose, usage decides.

If your "reality" differs, then we're apples and oranges. Fruit salad?

Thanks for your interpretations on Kant. I agree with them, and hold similar views and interpretations.

Also, it's worth parsing (and this is by no means an exhaustive attempt) the concept of synthetic a priori knowledge (that so-called awareness which separates us from lower life forms). It seems that our consciousness allows for certain intrinsic or innate wonders about the causes of things, that exist all around us, including ourselves.

For instance, when we utter the judgement all events must have a cause, we can simply ask ourselves, why do we even have the capacity to ask such a question (why do we ask why), and what is the purpose to the asking of why (?). Some would argue that our intuition plays some sort of role in its existence (synthetic a priori judgements). In that case, it would be something that is innate and/or something that naturally exists from within our consciousness, that seemingly is universal and intrinsic to all homo-sapiens. Something a priori, that just is. I think you alluded to that.

I can't even begin to understand the nature of such human capacity or capabilities or features associated with human consciousness; I can only wonder about such things and use it to my advantage to enhance my existence (the human condition). Ironically, this same sense of wonderment does in fact have pragmatic attributes/benefits involving quality of life issues/concerns (wondering about doing, and making things better for ourselves and others), which also leads to things like the Will to survive (another topic altogether of course).

But back to the OP, I think doubt and belief are different from emergent behavior and instinct. Birds swarming, animals migrating, animals sensing nature as in tsunamis and season changes, so on and so forth seem to all come from instinctual emergent properties, rather than any sort of higher level self-awareness and volitional existence.

https://medium.com/the-explanation/animal-instinct-and-human-intelligence-the-insurmountable-gulf-bfc95ac8e759

Also, it's worth parsing (....) the concept of synthetic a priori knowledge — 3017amen

Yeah, that’s been done, much to the chagrin of continental philosophy, by Quine** mostly, insofar as the principle of necessity has no business being in conjunction with the concept of truth, and Popper*** somewhat, insofar as the a priori is merely a genetic expectation (gasp!!!), which essentially eviscerates Kantian rational epistemology.
** “Two Dogmas....”, 1953
*** “LofSD”, 1959

Nevertheless, from an Enlightenment continent perspective, the synthetic a priori....what it is, what it does and why it’s a valid predisposition, is very much worth parsing, absolutely.
—————

our consciousness allows for certain intrinsic or innate wonders — 3017amen

I’d be real careful with that notion, for the danger arises of making consciousness a causality in itself. I’d be reluctant to pursue that line of thought, myself. But if you have ideas in support of it, I’d be interested in reading them.

As for the rest, all good.

Mww!

Thanks for your reply. I want to re-state the statement that you have or had concerns about.

"It seems that our consciousness allows for certain intrinsic or innate wonder's about the causes of things, that exist all around us, including ourselves."

That's a generic statement about having a sense of wonderment (wondering) about what things causes other things to happen. What is it about that, that cause such consternation?

Aren’t we all? — Mww

Yeah but I'd like to know in what sense do we play with words?

It seems that our consciousness allows for certain intrinsic or innate wonder's about the causes of things, that exist all around us, including ourselves."

That's a generic statement about having a sense of wonderment (wondering) about what things causes other things to happen. — 3017amen

These are two distinct propositions. The second is given; the first, because it is qualified by consciousness, is not. At least not so much.

If you’d said being conscious allows...., I’d have agreed. But being conscious is not the same as consciousness. Being conscious is a state, consciousness is the quality of that state.

A sense of wonderment is a feeling; wondering is thinking; consciousness is an idea.

Philosophy is the science of nit-picking. (Grin)

I'd like to know in what sense do we play with words? — TheMadFool

Why.....in whatever sense assuages the ego, of course.

Why.....in whatever sense assuages the ego, of course. — Mww

Perhaps I'm at fault here but you took simple concepts such as faith and rationality, the clear distinction between them and turned them into something unrecognizable. All of course if you don't agree that they are distinguished solely on the basis of the requirement of evidence.

Perhaps I'm at fault here — TheMadFool

There is no fault, there is only dialectical disagreement.

Faith and rationality are certainly not simple concepts; there is a clear distinction between them; I don’t agree the distinction is based on evidence. And unrecognizable is relative.

[Kant's transcendental idealism is] Transcendental in respect of experience. — Mww

'Experience' being the sine qua non in empiricism and arguably in naturalism also.

Things in reality are real, but not all real things are in reality. Examples: ideas, seven, the meanings of words. The qualification for reality, it seems to me, is materiality, or haecceity: the "this one here", its thisness, distinguished from what it is or what it is for. — tim wood

What is real, and what exists, are not necessarily synonymous. Mathematical Platonists (which include such luminaries as Penrose and Godel) believe that mathematical objects are real. But the sense in which they're 'existent' remains moot. Nevertheless, much of the success of modern science relies on the 'unreasonable efficacy of mathematics in the natural sciences'.

I understand the current orthodoxy - : that ideas exist in minds, that minds are dependent on brains, that brains are an evolved organ, and that this provides a way that the mind can be understood through the perspective of naturalism. Many people take that for granted, but I question it, on the basis that once the mind has evolved to the point of being able to reason mathematically, then has escaped the bounds of biology. (This is *not* a creationist argument.)

Perhaps I'm at fault here but you took simple concepts such as faith and rationality, the clear distinction between them and turned them into something unrecognizable. All of course if you don't agree that they are distinguished solely on the basis of the requirement of evidence. — TheMadFool

Here's quite a good summary of key elements of the scientific method:

Modern science emerged in the seventeenth century with two fundamental ideas: planned experiments (Francis Bacon) and the mathematical representation of relations among phenomena (Galileo). This basic experimental-mathematical epistemology evolved until, in the first half of the twentieth century, it took a stringent form involving (1) a mathematical theory constituting scientific knowledge, (2) a formal operational correspondence between the theory and quantitative empirical measurements, and (3) predictions of future measurements based on the theory. The “truth” (validity) of the theory is judged based on the concordance between the predictions and the observations. While the epistemological details are subtle and require expertise relating to experimental protocol, mathematical modeling, and statistical analysis, the general notion of scientific knowledge is expressed in these three requirements.

Science is neither rationalism nor empiricism. It includes both in a particular way. In demanding quantitative predictions of future experience, science requires formulation of mathematical models whose relations can be tested against future observations. Prediction is a product of reason, but reason grounded in the empirical. Hans Reichenbach summarizes the connection: “Observation informs us about the past and the present, reason foretells the future.” — Edward Dougherty

'Evidence' has to fall within the scope of that methodology to be considered scientific. But scientific method itself operates within conditions, and those conditions by their very constitution limit what is considered 'evidence' to what is measurable according to this method. To say that is not to criticize science, but simply to draw something out that is often left unstated.

sense of wonderment is a feeling; wondering is thinking; consciousness is an idea. — Mww

What do all of them have in common?

I understand the current orthodoxy - : that ideas exist in minds, — Wayfarer

Don't you have a problem with how ideas get into minds, if they're not there to begin with? Obviously on your account a fellow cannot just "have" an idea.

Oh hell...I dunno. Humanity? Intellect? Rationality? All of the above?

I understand reality to comprise all that is each in itself. — tim wood

All that is "each in itself"? What the heck does that mean?

Things in reality are real, but not all real things are in reality. — tim wood

OK, so "real things" names a bigger category than "things in reality". If therefore, there are real things, which are not part of reality, what are they a part of? Where do they exist, and by what premise do you say that they are real things?

Examples: ideas, seven, the meanings of words. — tim wood

Let's take a look at some of these things then, to see where they exist if they're not part of reality. It appears like you are talking about things which are in minds. If these things exist within minds, yet they are not in reality, am I correct to conclude that you believe that minds are not part of reality? What is a mind a part of, if it is not a part of reality? Do you think it is some sort of falsity, or fiction to say that people have minds, and minds have ideas, because all these things are not in reality?

Don't you have a problem with how ideas get into minds, if they're not there to begin with? Obviously on your account a fellow cannot just "have" an idea. — tim wood

I don't see how this follows from what I've said. I think, if it helps, that progress in mathematics and logic comprises at least in part in the discovery of ideas. (What's that saying? 'God created the integers, all else is the work of Man' ~ some dude.)

I understand reality to comprise all that is each in itself.
— tim wood
All that is "each in itself"? What the heck does that mean? — Metaphysician Undercover

Not too difficult. a brick is a thing in reality. It is, though it knows nothing about being. I call it a brick, but no matter; what corresponds to my arbitrary naming is a this thing here - or that thing there.

Things in reality are real, but not all real things are in reality.
— tim wood
So, bricks, ideas. Both real, but only the brick in what I call (material) reality.
— Metaphysician Undercover

am I correct to conclude that you believe that minds are not part of reality? — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you are, near as I can tell. Real enough, but not material. It appears to me that for clarity I should start to explicitly refer to the materiality that I hold is the key to admission to reality, as I think most folks do most of the time.

Do you think it is some sort of falsity, or fiction to say that people have minds, and minds have ideas, because all these things are not in reality? — Metaphysician Undercover

Did you miss what I wrote above?

I understand reality to comprise all that is each in itself.This noun related to but not the same as the adjective real. Things in reality are real, but not all real things are in reality. Examples: ideas, seven, the meanings of words. The qualification for reality, it seems to me, is materiality, or haecceity: the "this one here", its thisness, distinguished from what it is or what it is for.

Collective nouns, wind, rain, rope, galaxy, seem ambiguously in reality. For present purpose, usage decides.

If your "reality" differs, then we're apples and oranges. Fruit salad? — tim wood

Minds, ideas, real, but not material, and on my understanding of reality, which calls for some materiality, not in that reality.

Many people take that for granted, but I question it, — Wayfarer

I don't see how this follows from what I've said. — Wayfarer

The problem: "Don't you have a problem with how ideas get into minds, if they're not there to begin with? Obviously on your account a fellow cannot just "have" an idea."

You question what "many people take for granted."

I understand the current orthodoxy - : that ideas exist in minds, that minds are dependent on brains, that brains are an evolved organ, and that this provides a way that the mind can be understood — Wayfarer

So here it is. I say ideas are products of mind, originate there, and dwell there and nowhere else. I gather you question that, which I take to mean you have some different idea of how it all works. If ideas are not constructs of mind and don't live in minds, then where do they come from and where do they live?

I say ideas are products of mind, originate there, and dwell there and nowhere else. I gather you question that, which I take to mean you have some different idea of how it all works. If ideas are not constructs of mind and don't live in minds, then where do they come from and where do they live? — tim wood

There is a saying of a certain class of facts that they must be 'true in all possible worlds'. It's a very broad principle. So take for example, the law of identity, or of the excluded middle, or primitive arithmetical truths, like the Pythagorean theorem. These are, I say, discovered, not invented by the mind; were another species to evolve on another world, then they too would discover such principles.

This is part of a larger argument: is mathematics discovered or invented? Modern opinion generally supports the latter. Mathematical Platonism suggests the former. So, platonism (small p) argues that such rational principles are real, but they can only be grasped by a mind. Ergo, that they're real ideas; not dependent on your or my mind, but only graspable by a mind.

Whereas most people nowadays - I've seen it stated here many times recently - assume that ideas can be understood in terms of being 'correlated' with neural activity or in some sense as an output of the physical brain. So the mainstream view, which I'm questioning, is that the mind is a product of the brain, that mind depends on or supervenes on the brain, and the brain is the product of evolution. The efficacy of ideas can be judged by their usefulness for survival; we know when ideas are valid, because they correspond with what is 'out there'. That in a nutshell is what philosopher Thomas Nagel describes as 'neo-Darwinian materialism'.

So, regarding the real 'ideas' - they don't 'come from' anywhere, and they don't 'live' anywhere. They're not situated in 'some place'. They're real in the sense that the domain of real numbers is real. It's only figuratively 'a domain' - but it's nevertheless real, as 2 is part of it, but the square root of 2 is not.

I don't expect that to be understood, but it's the best I've got at this moment.

It appears to me that for clarity I should start to explicitly refer to the materiality that I hold is the key to admission to reality, as I think most folks do most of the time. — tim wood

I don't think most folks would agree with you. I think that most folks believe that what other people are thinking, their intentions and such, are part of reality. Are you solipsist? How do you defend yourself against deception and abuse from others, if the intentions of others are not part of reality in your belief?

Did you miss what I wrote above? — tim wood

No, I didn't miss it, but as I said, I didn't understand what you meant by "all that is each in itself". A brick is in the world, an image of a brick is in a mind. A mind is in the world. Nothing is "in itself". A molecule is in a brick. Do you think that a molecule is not part of reality because it is in something which is in the world, like an idea is in something which is in the world?

What grounds your notion of materiality? Is a wavefunction material? Is it in reality? If not then where is the material particle when its position is not being measured? I don't think you have a very practical division between what is in reality and not in reality

Minds, ideas, real, but not material, and on my understanding of reality, which calls for some materiality, not in that reality. — tim wood

This is what I question. Why does reality call for materiality in your belief? Are intentions not part of reality? Surely they have a real affect in the world, and many are external to you. But clearly intentions are not material. How can you not see that defining "reality" with "materiality" is a big mistake?

They're real in the sense that the domain of real numbers is real. It's only figuratively 'a domain' - but it's nevertheless real, as 2 is part of it, but the square root of 2 is not. — Wayfarer

Well, the square root of two just is the poster-child for a real number.

I suspect you can tell the difference between a brick and 2. For example, which would you prefer fall on you from a great height? That quality that a brick has is shared by a lot of things, and exactly not shared by a lot of other things. I call it material. Maybe it's just mass. What is the mass of 2?

I've attempted to be clear. If it has mass, then it's in reality. It's also real. If it's an idea, no mass, real, not in reality. I noted above that collective nouns are a problem here, but for the moment am content to let usage settle that. This is just a definition, but a serviceable one.

So, platonism (small p) argues that such rational principles are real, but they can only be grasped by a mind. Ergo, that they're real ideas; not dependent on your or my mind, but only graspable by a mind. — Wayfarer

Perhaps we close in, here. And a few questions arise. What exactly is that realness? In what does it inhere? How is it? In what way is it? You argue that rational principles are real in the sense that no mind is required for them. Somehow, then, they are not in themselves in any sense whatsoever ideas (ideas being products of mind). What stuff? And if so, then why just rational principles? Why not just principles? In fact, why just principles? In any case, is not a principle, rational or not, itself an idea? Are all ideas grounded outside of mind somehow? Or some and not others?

Will you appeal to a certain apparent order in the world? Note "apparent"? And what about disorder? Are not both creatures of mind? After all, the world in itself just is and knows nothing of order or disorder. Is perhaps the "know" the key? But that just returns it all to mind and ideas. 2+2=4, you say? Only if you say so, and you have also to affirm the 2, the =, the 4, the process, the result, and so forth. And if you don't, it isn't and doesn't.

Platonism in this sense explodes. Not only are there the things of the world, but also the ideas of them, and the ideas of the ideas, and so forth - and then the ideas themselves, and the ideas of those, and so forth again.

Ours, all of ours, is just a template set over the world. It's our template, not the world's; the world neither needs one, nor is it clear it could have one - how would that work? It's a work-in-progress and in some places works pretty well. It's made of ideas, and those created by mind.

You may define as you please, but someone like me asks you for the sense of it.

Self-awareness.

This is what I question. Why does reality call for materiality in your belief? — Metaphysician Undercover

So I can tell the difference. I asked you if we were fruit salad. It appears we are. And I think you are allowing for a careless equivocation in your usage.

I think that most folks believe that what other people are thinking, their intentions and such, are part of reality. — Metaphysician Undercover

And how would they know? Are they making any distinction between real and reality? And, "part of" reality: what part, how?

And we may well ask, what, exactly, is an idea? A brick seems to exist in the moment, and the minimal time for that moment being very, very short. Is not an idea a function of the expenditure of comparatively a much greater duration of time? So great in fact that it cannot be said to exist in itself?

Nothing is "in itself". — Metaphysician Undercover

It appears you mean "inside itself." That is not what I mean (nor, I suspect, anyone else on the planet). I merely meant that which corresponds to your act of naming and pointing. "Brick" is an idea. But a brick, the particular one named and referred to, the one having mass, is both real and (ok, here) inside of reality, in ways that "brick" is not.

What grounds your notion of materiality? Is a wavefunction material? Is it in reality? If not then where is the material particle when its position is not being measured? I don't think you have a very practical division between what is in reality and not in reality — Metaphysician Undercover

Most folks who employ these ideas warn at some point of being confused about proper arenas of application. If you cannot or will not tell the difference between, say, your desk and the profoundly empty space which it mainly is, then I'd say you were terminally confused. You sit at and write on a desk, not any wave function. And, to be sure, wave functions in any case just are ideas - methods of describing.

But ours is essentially simple. There are various ways that I might demonstrate to you the reality of a brick. And those criteria I define as being the criteria not for the real, but for reality. You're certainly free to not like my definition and to have your own. But I invite you to show me how an idea, by these criteria, is, in reality. And I will allow that my criterium, for it's an -um and not an -a, is mass.

And I wonder if you have noticed the play within the word "is," and its correlates. Your usage seems to me merely copulative. Mine on the other hand much more richly relational, as existential, predicative, veredical, durative, locative.