What do you think about this? — Judaka

I don't think brute facts exist. I think the idea of a brute fact is one which does not depend in any way on the capacities of an agent in perceiving/representing/interpreting/explaining/articulating it. I don't believe it's possible for an agent to relate to any type of fact without compromising its brute-ness; as a brute fact is necessarily an unperceived, unrepresented, uninterpreted, unexplained and unarticulated one.

Insofar as the means of apprehension of a fact are theory-ladened, the resultant fact from that means of apprehension are not brute.

I think you have a three stage process in mind.

(A) There are brute facts.
(B) Brute facts are arranged discursively (with narrativisation, emphasis...).
(C) The discursive arrangement is evaluated normatively (morally, cost/benefit etc.).

The status of some facts as brute is what the process rests on.

Then with "social facts" for instance, we can see that although evidence alone is not sufficient for verification, to call it a matter of taste is simply unreasonable. Because someone born into an environment where this social fact exists is going to have a really tough time doing anything except accepting it although exceptions may apply. I suppose that other categories help to signify the nature of the claim and how it is NOT merely a matter of taste. It is just a very helpful framing which really embodies what I see as the correct way to see things. — Judaka

If this is social fact in the Durkheimian sense, I don't think it relates to bruteness at all. Bruteness is an epistemic/semantic issue regarding facts, social facts are facts about social structures (societies, cultures, institutions...). The only way I see of relating one to another is through this (largely unarticulated) intuition of agent dependence; if social facts are dependent upon the (possibly interpretive) practices of agents for their occurrence and apprehension, they are not independent of agents and therefore cannot be brute. But be careful with that - as it would be possible to erroneously infer that aspects of social structure are matters of taste ( if not brute = agent dependent = dependent upon an agent's interpretation = like "I like coffee")! Or indeed that whether arbitrary social events happen depends upon how they are interpreted.

be careful with that - as it would be possible to erroneously infer that aspects of social structure are matters of taste ( if not brute = agent dependent = dependent upon an agent's interpretation = like "I like coffee")! Or indeed that whether arbitrary social events happen depends upon how they are interpreted. — fdrake

This is really important (here, but also for any understanding of frameworks which deny brute facts). Mere taste is a model of my own mental state. "I like ice-cream" is an explaination for the endocrinological response I get from eating ice-cream. "The police are all corrupt" may well be infused with preference, ideology and interpretation, but none of that makes it no longer a model of 'the police', some institution in reality, not my own mind.

I just wanted to emphasise it because it often gets lost and denials of brute fact get lumped in with mere taste as if those were the only two options.

My interest in the subjective/objective framing is to distinguish between what Number2018 has called "brute facts" and pretty much everything else. — Judaka

When I wrote about Searle’s distinction between brute facts and social facts, I have already noted that any brute facts have resulted from social construction. It is possible show that brute facts do not exist. Yet, epistemically, didactically, and phenomenologically this concept is entirely justified. Likely, social actors live lives as if it is firmly grounded on brute facts, without noting their socially constructed organization. A set of stable conventional facts (brute facts) is necessary for maintaining individuals’ social routine, social order, and the development of various models and theories of truth. When a relative balance between apparently stable facts and socially constructed is disturbed, we experience that 'the time is out of joint'. Models of truth collapse, individuals lose any common ground to debate the contemporary issues (for example, in the US right now). That is why Deleuze writes that the narration becomes fundamentally falsifying.

I think you have a three stage process in mind.

(A) There are brute facts.
(B) Brute facts are arranged discursively (with narrativisation, emphasis...).
(C) The discursive arrangement is evaluated normatively (morally, cost/benefit etc.). — fdrake

Honestly, I see that there are many possible ways to distinguish between different kinds of truths. All I am interested in is how the truth gains a distinct privilege in how it is not to be challenged on any basis but validity. That the truth is what it is irrespective of what you think about it. It is possible that this problem is due to how I've approached the truth and so, you have a hard time seeing it.

(A) could be brute facts, it could be objective truth or whatever. It doesn't matter. So (A) is just "things one takes as true". It's very hard for me to think of a way of defining truth that invalidates any of the points made in my OP.

Then (B) happens as a natural consequence of intelligence, you discriminate against true pieces of information for a variety of reasons. All the things I said in my OP.

Then (C) is just, recognising that the arrangement (not the conclusion) has no truth value because we don't give truth value to choices and how you've arranged your truths was a choice.

So we need to scrutinise over whether we couldn't or shouldn't introduce new truths, new interpretations, emphasise different points to get to a different outcome and then determine when we should aim to do this and when we shouldn't. I think how truths are arranged might challenge our understanding of what is true and what it means is a separate conversation from whether we do arrange truths and whether the way we do that is a choice.

I don't think brute facts exist. I think the idea of a brute fact is one which does not depend in any way on the capacities of an agent in perceiving/representing/inter
preting/explaining/articulating it. I don't believe it's possible for an agent to relate to any type of fact without compromising its brute-ness; as a brute fact is necessarily an unperceived, unrepresented, uninterpreted, unexplained and unarticulated one. — fdrake

I agree that the brute fact is separate from how it is used in language and thought. Is that what you're saying? I do at times use the terms fact and truth interchangeably but when it comes to analysing the terms, I don't think they're the same thing. A fact is determined by a ruleset, it's an assertion based off rules for determining what is or is not in accordance with reality, whereas the truth is just that which is in accordance with reality.

So, for me, a brute "fact", yes, it's kind of contradicting. Besides what's practical, epistemology sucks.

Yet I need to distinguish between that which is asserted to be in accordance with reality (and could be correct) and that which is asserted to be in accordance with reality (and couldn't be correct). As the assertion is dependent on institutions of thought which can only exist as assertions. This represents to me, the flexibility for me to evaluate outcomes.

When I wrote about Searle’s distinction between brute facts and social facts, I have already noted that any brute facts have resulted from social construction. It is possible show that brute facts do not exist. Yet, epistemically, didactically, and phenomenologically this concept is entirely justified. Likely, social actors live lives as if it is firmly grounded on brute facts, without noting their socially constructed organization. A set of stable conventional facts (brute facts) is necessary for maintaining individuals’ social routine, social order, and the development of various models and theories of truth. — Number2018

You are suggesting the brute fact is a useful category because it signifies a particular role in an individual's understanding of their environment? Without which we enter into some kind of epistemological nihilism? I am still not totally confident on the term, I plan to read Searle's construction of reality since I'm interested but haven't yet.

All I am interested in is how the truth gains a distinct privilege in how it is not to be challenged on any basis but validity. — Judaka

we need to scrutinise over whether we couldn't or shouldn't introduce new truths, new interpretations, emphasise different points to get to a different outcome and then determine when we should aim to do this and when we shouldn't. I think how truths are arranged might challenge our understanding of what is true — Judaka

Probably, what you describe is a kind of an idealized, abstract model of truth. In our contemporary socio-political reality, this model does not work. For example, let's consider the two latest debates about systemic racism and white privilege. Both strive to define US society as a whole, and the discussions' outcomes can become vital for our future. Are the debates managed according to your model? Do participants start from some basic facts (objective, mere, bare facts, etc.)
and further arrange and evaluate them in particular ways, so that final truth is obtained? No, it does not look like this. And, it is not about selecting a set of suitable facts to get a preferred outcome. Most often, people start the debates having the ready final answer. They are not looking for the unknown truth; they are trying to defend what they already have in mind and shape it as the objectively obtained truth. It is the typical setting for all our public socio-political debates. Therefore, when one tries to organize the arguments in the best possible way, it almost does not matter anymore. The truth is still important, but it plays a secondary, subordinate role in many domains today. Arrangement of truth is not the constitution of the final, binding truth. It is the way of transforming the semblance of truth into what we finally could accept as the conventional factual truth.

Are the debates managed according to your model? Do participants start from some basic facts (objective, mere, bare facts, etc.)
and further arrange and evaluate them in particular ways, so that final truth is obtained? No, it does not look like this. And, it is not about selecting a set of suitable facts to get a preferred outcome. Most often, people start the debates having the final answer ready. — Number2018

Yeah, I spoke that quote within the context of evaluating the arrangement and what doing that means for the truth. Humans are complex and as I said earlier, we do not input information and output opinion, a lot goes into it. Personality, experience, psychology, motives and the list goes on forever. I consider OP a niche angle and it doesn't describe all approaches to a topic as complex as a debate about white privilege and etc.

I think OP pertains to white privilege only for people who think white privilege accurately describes reality when really it does more than that.

Yet I need to distinguish between that which is asserted to be in accordance with reality (and could be correct) and that which is asserted to be in accordance with reality (and couldn't be correct). — Judaka

What kind of idea is incapable of being accurate or inaccurate? Can you give some examples?

Edit: I guess what I'd really like is:

(1) A bunch of ("brute") facts
(2) An "arrangement" of them.

And labels for which bits of the account can be accurate and which can't be.

Or doesn't it break down like that? Can there be "arrangementless" facts?

A worked example would be really good.

As I said in my OP, that we characterise, prioritise, emphasise and interpret facts is inevitable.

It might be easier if we work backwards, let's first distinguish between types of conclusions. If I say that a rock weighs 1kg then the rock either weighs 1kg or it does not, there's a truth value to my assertion whereas if I say the rock is beautiful then there is no truth value, it is according to beauty standards. So if you ask me to prove the rock weighs 1kg.

(1) I bought 2 different, working scales (true)
(2) Each of them weighed the rock at 1 kg (true)
(3) Therefore the rock weighs 1kg (true)

The "arrangement" here is a logical one, I only did what any reasonable person would expect me to do to prove my assertion. Earlier I accused you of conflating truth with logic, reasonableness, rules of justification etc. An arrangement can be all of those things, also the conclusion (the rock weighs 1kg) is in accordance with reality, is true. The arrangement is good because it is logical, effective and led me towards the truth.

(1) The rock is shiny (fact)
(2) The rock is multicoloured (fact)
(3) This really appeals to me (characterisation)
(3) Therefore the rock is beautiful (no truth value)

The conclusion has no truth value but my reasons for believing that the rock is beautiful are true, there's clearly a lot missing from this picture though. Standards of beauty, for example, however, once again, forgetting that, if we say that the rules for the characterisation are fair then the arrangement is coherent, logical, reasonable and the conclusion is valid.

In the first example, clearly we have discriminated against true pieces of information, we only included the relevant information but we did that because we are following an effective method for discovering the truth (the conclusion). Hence, I would not argue that the rock doesn't weigh 1kg just because you made a choice about what information is relevant. The arrangement itself should be looked at as follows:

(1) true but is not responsible for the truth of the conclusion
(2) ""
(3) is true because it is in accordance with reality

Without the rules of justification, without seeing the arrangement as an effective way for demonstrating the validity of the conclusion and proving it is true, the arrangement doesn't make sense. To challenge the arrangement, I wouldn't challenge that it isn't "true" I would challenge that it wasn't effective.

(1) The rock weighs 1kg (irrelevant)
(2) The rock is multicoloured (important)
(3) The rock is shiny (important)
(4) This really appeals to me (important)
(5) The rock is beautiful (no truth value)

I could challenge this arrangement by saying it doesn't matter that the rock weighs 1kg. If the first example happened as a result of you asking me to prove the rock is beautiful, you could counter the arrangement by saying it is not relevant to the beauty of the rock.

or

Person A : What do you think about this rock?
Person B: It is very beautiful
Person A: I was talking about using the rock for my slingshot, whether it's beautiful or not is totally irrelevant

Your choice to talk about specific truths due to a perceived relevance, implication, importance to your point or argument can't have a truth value, your choosing of things to talk about is done at your discretion. What implications that has is a separate debate.

I cannot truly engage here formatively except to say that I am guilty of using robust meanings heaped upon the word truth itself and I fully understand the usage in a lax droppage. Isn't it interesting however, that your meaning rings loud and true laid exposed for analyzing? It is just common knowledge that a word itself has a plethora of senses and transforms due to bearing in the relativity of context in its proximity. I'd have it no other way. As it creates far more versatility, and hey, if you're understood, where is the problem to be had truly? On the other hand, I understand having strict rigidly agreed-upon definitions allows building blocks for creation. However, if we may not destroy we are denied a wealth of creation itself. I'd like to insert some of the things I've written here on the subject, they might fit in nicely. I'll begin with my old writing, a lot of it doesn't need to be said in a forum of such caliber, and the other half is cliche understandings, yet I still feel the urge to share.

Our beliefs and even our values should be tentative. Leaving space for the unknown is necessary. New information just might replace, augment, or transform what we know. It is ok to be wrong and to change our opinion upon new information. This is a sign of maturity and the lack of an inflated ego. Someone that will not admit they are wrong is infatuated with being right, not the truth. Truth should be our goal. If truth is our goal, we feel gratitude for being corrected. We should practice intellectual groundlessness for the most part. A narrow view and the assertion of understanding without an ever-present driving force that is the search for truth is stagnation. The question itself; is the fiber of truth. When we stop asking and assessing, it’s because we feel that we have found an answer, maybe the answer. The practice of the search, that is what the essence of what truth actually is. This is never-ending. When we stop that search, we wouldn’t recognize the truth if it smacked us in the face. The question is the fiber of truth, because even if the question is tangential, it is always leading, and leading in the generally same direction toward truth itself if our analytics and ear for the ring of truth are adequate; because the very question was generated by our desire to accurately understand in the first place. I’m not saying it’s not alright to assert what we believe. As long as we have this understanding and drive, rendering our strongly held beliefs, values, and information tentative, even as they are presently held in that firm grasp by certain agreement. Because we all must start where we are, ever-present. Admitting how firmly our beliefs are held helps us to see exactly where we are, and continue to assess honestly with less bias. Because we then feel the force of that clinginess, and we can then analyze the merit of the clutching. Of course, if you can practice non-attachment with most all beliefs, values, and information, this groundless approach which is conducive to truth-seeking is more readily practiced. Not that an edifice -a foundation of seemingly certain knowledge cannot help but take form in the pursuit. The point is to not give up the quest and always start anew from where you are, looking back for flaws in those chains of belief. When new information, values, or beliefs are assimilated as veritable or demonstrably evident, that means we have to look back and contrast the new knowledge with what we already valued and agreed upon. Roots or core knowledge must be held dearly for this reason. We need to remember the cause of our adherence. Because our foundation might easily become an ugly mess if our understandings aren’t congruent, as some things actually do occlude the relevance of others. What’s more, if our values contradict themselves, arresting discord arises until reconciliation. Unless of course those values are not operative, yet if we authentically adhere to the veracity of value it can’t help but be operative in your conduct and perspective.

The next part is the desultory and extricated excerpts of some of my writing. I am sorry if I'm so selfishly myopic and I seek to hijack the conversation, feel free to ignore me, I'll take no offense. I call the thing Didactic Wanderings, and I hope you're tangentially wandering enough to enjoy it.

Whimsical Belief: The problem as I see it, Lost Hunt, are belief systems themselves. A belief may destroy an individual, a family, a culture, or even a nation… from riot to self-immolation, the perspective belief engenders wholly transforms our perception and is operative in our conduct. In my belief, it is responsible for the emergent motive.
Biological Shame: Belief might explain emergent motive while not speaking of the desires and needs of the body which drive us.
Radical Mystery Acceptance: It’s funny Whimsical Belief should point that out. I’ve been wondering what the position of “no belief” might be. How it would transform ourselves.
Pragmatic Reason: So, just strictly observable and demonstrable then? Nothing extra held?
Radical Mystery Acceptance: It would extract much of this chaos that Lost is worried about. If it’s not known as positive, it’s suspect, and then likely not so operative in behavior.
Gestalt Glean: This would do away with the concept itself would it not? Doing away with belief. Language itself. Nearly all conveyance is contrivances.
Whimsical Belief: It’s not just language itself; It’s persuasiveness, the ring of truth. The ring of truth enthralling our sensibility. If we were to do away with belief, we wouldn’t be able to tentatively position ourselves in alien positions to analyze for merit correctly. I’m not saying we could no longer consider things, but that our incredulous position would create rigid stigmatism therein. If we’re not willing to believe anything that isn’t known for certain, we wouldn’t be available to assimilate the tentative and follow tangents to discovery adequately. The truth is only as we define it, and if we aren’t mutable in our consideration and in the least slightly impressionable, our development is stunted in progression to grave stagnation.
Creative Truth: Truth is true whether we define it or not. Whether we believe it or not as well. It may only be as we define in that’s all we know of it, but what is unknown still has an effect. Real and present cause, the observation of which just might lead to more definition.
Aesthetic Nurturance: Ah but doing away with belief would strike delusion along with it. There would be much less senselessness in actors. Striking belief would give a base of truth itself, what is, more apparent and unsullied.
Fantastical Reconciliation: So, since we in the least seem to agree to the position of no belief would be interesting, how might it be accomplished.
Tenuous Comprehension: We are inundated with propositions for belief constantly. Incessantly being proffered with opinion and worldview. We are steeped in a market of persuasive language. Would no belief be a stubborn oppositional defiance disorder? Or mere denial?
Radical Mystery Acceptance: I believe it would take the form of a lack of investment. Belief -well, some belief, has a clingy nature. So, non-attachment with its sticky action. If we simply aren’t concerned with what isn’t known as positive, it wouldn’t enthrall us into a state of persuasion. If we remain pragmatic with an eye only for concrete understanding alone, we would sidestep exposure for acceptance in the first place.
Peaceful Oblivion: This might be done with a meditative state. The practice of taming your mind.

...

Heuristic Certainty: Let’s not forget the weight values have on motive as well. Every motive has a goal and it is the value itself that spurs the pursuit. The attribution of worth is selected due to taste or utility. I’ve found that while I know not what to do with the role formative experience has in the development of selection, the flow of selected value may eventually have sway with the inexorable ebb of a new belief.
Indelible Memory: Nothing may be done with how we’ve found ourselves downstream in the past However, we may always start where we are with further reflection which might take radical unlike form than our previous consideration thereby shaping our present and future formative experiences in transforming light.
Only Counterpoint: I don’t see how this would make the Truth more evident. Yes, it would cut out some noise. Render our sensory relaxed without added monologue. Yet, when speaking of truth, you need a subject. Unless it is a personal memory of an event and even then, sometimes, a subject almost necessarily brings with it belief on the matter. Without a subject, truth is a latent amorphous amalgam that’s been homogenized into “what is”. So, if you desire non-duality “what is” by all means, consider nothing.
Creative Truth: It is my belief that Truth, no matter the subject is absolute. However, we’re dealing with subjectivity, and relative to that the Truth is somewhat mutable due to subject, as the deeper you delve into subjectivity Truth may become facile considering objectivity.
Peaceful Oblivion: I myself have achieved objectivity to the extent one may. Although the Only Counterpoint is critical of thinking nothing, I cannot express how fresh it makes your experience. It is a calming reprieve. This non-attachment Radical Mystery Acceptance speaks of, I’ve found, that in the moment, I am absent of any belief to consider. Only gentle acknowledgment of existence. Mindfulness is solace, yet a meditative state might fatigue after a time. While it might be said that critical thinking is a muscle to flex and build, excessive meditation might be a detriment to it. I’ve found both go hand in hand if used appropriately, however. I suggest a practice of coordinating meditation and extemporized critical thinking when problem-solving is necessary. As meditation creates space in the mind to better objectify.
Only Counterpoint: As if subjectivity were responsible for chaos on the world stage.
Delinquent Hardship: Subjectivity or the perception of a consuming organism vying for resource and prestige might very well be a listed reason for chaos. While it wouldn’t be at the top of my list, that nature of the beast that is chaos hardly lets you rule out a culprit.
Amplitudinous Examination: What might be at the top of the list Delinquent Hardship? We could identify belief in need of being struck down.
Absence Chasm: Why don’t you make your own list Amplitude?
Amplitudinous Examination: What I’d rather, is to know how Gestalt Glean believes language is struck while belief is struck.
Gestalt Glean: Meaning is contrived. A contrivance of agreement of shared concept. Language, beyond nouns, is merely a belief in the form of abstraction. If we didn’t believe in the form of concept and convinced it was shraed through recognition-response, we’d only have those nouns. The progression of recognition in conversation assures us of that sharing of form, however, language is a belief in intangible fabrication, and it is completely made up.
Amplitudinous Examination: If the concept is belief then all we know for certain is “what is” in the first place. The sensory experience. Yet, while we are feedback loops in response to our environment you might say we’re building upon our stimuli. Attributing meaning to our sensory intake. As you have said, Gestalt, language is agreed upon in recognition, I wouldn’t define it as a belief but more of a tool.
Gestalt Glean: I must admit I’m playing a bit of a troll. Yet, what do you build in an environment verbally besides a story? A narrative of which consists of meaning completely made up. Yes, not necessarily false, a story might be true or false. Yet, even down to who does the telling might merit its veracity or ostensible nature as it all comes down to perception. A concept, due to your own personal experience may- nay, likely is of an unlike conception to the next image. Our recognition is our own understanding and its more than a tool, it’s a belief that exact understanding is shared.
Spesiphically: Let me be specific. I can grant you even that much Gestalt Glean, and still, what is not lost, is the nature of the concept itself. Conveyance has an essence of form that is not only recognized, it may not be mistaken, notwithstanding how the concept shapes relative to perspective.