I think a little clarification is needed here. If reason is not a necessary factor in knowledge, how do we separate knowledge from mere belief? We are crafting the definition of knowledge as we go, do you think there is a way to know without reason? — Philosophim
Can you also clarify what you mean by "maximal set of goals"? What if I have a very simple goal in science, but a very complex set of goals in my religion? Further, what about the importance of goals to myself? "What could be a more important goal than serving God?" for example? Finally, what about a person who has many complex goals versus thousands of people who have simple goals, but gain complexity in how they work among themselves? — Philosophim
What do you mean by relativism in this case? Do you mean the ability to relatively define one's context, or relatively apply this context to reality? — Philosophim
This is a nice thought, but people do not work this way. If both people have different definitions and goals in the beginning, not to mention different sensing capabilities (blind versus sight) they can both use reason within these definitions and goals, and obtain different conclusions... — Philosophim
It appears that we have demonstrated that reason is a common factor in all knowledge that is sought, but I'm not sure if the application of reason is required for all knowledge. — TVCL
There is a difference between one's belief about what is true/ their knowledge allowing a set of goals and demanding it. — TVCL
Whereas, relativism would posit that there is a truly unique map for each person - this does not appear to be so — TVCL
Also, I'm re-considering the idea of making the argument about a search for "Truth" as opposed to "Knowledge". I'm beginning to find "Knowledge" just as confusing as "Truth" because the latter appears to entail the former. — TVCL
Truth = "That which is the case" — TVCL
Yes, I will do. Now that we have reached this point it is a good time to get a handle on your arguments. However, I won't be able to do so tonight and so before I turn in for this evening, let me share some thoughts about this last post...Scour them for weaknesses, and then wonder whether your respect of the argument increases or decreases. — Philosophim
First; we seem to agree that knowledge is a tool. Perhaps we agree that theories of knowledge are tools too. Perhaps, is there a distinction between a "perfect" tool that is never prone to failure and a tool that is as good as it can be but that we must accept will eventually break down? — TVCL
There are some bumps in it and so, as you requested, I thought I'd bring them to your attention.
The first one was your definition of Reality as "What results independently of a belief" - I'm inclined to agree but the counter occurred: "This presumes that belief cannot dictate reality. Why not?" It seems that you can answer this within your framework but it may be worth pressing you to do so explicitly. — TVCL
And then, there was a question about what you mean by a "Will" or "Sureness" when you define Belief. — TVCL
One note: if knowledge is belief in something which is co-existent with reality and requires that the belief is not contradicted, it would appear that knowledge is provisional. That is, we have knowledge up to the point that the knowledge we have is contradicted. — TVCL
Now, admittedly, by the end of your first piece I got off of the boat. Moreover, it begins to raise far more questions far too quickly to keep pace with. — TVCL
5a. The attempt to make epistemology "airtight" is potentially endless/unattainable.
5b. Likewise, the attempt to define epistemological terms and make them "airtight" is potentially endless/unattainable — TVCL
The problem here is that the discussion thus far holds the effect of the belief as being limited (only that the effects are), not that the belief itself is limited. To extend this argument to beliefs, we would have to conclude that beliefs are their effects. — TVCL
Do I know that I believe there is a red ball in front of me? — Philosophim
a belief can or cannot be put into effect. To me that means you are applying your belief to reality. — Philosophim
1. A goal initiates the inquiry because the search for truth is a goal.
2. Goals parameterise our enquiry because they determine the point at which a given endeavour can be deemed to be satisfactorily achieved and the criteria by which this point is to be reached.
3. Therefore, if goals set the beginning and the end of the enquiry, they set the parameters for how or when our understanding of the truth is satisfactory. — TVCL
This is because the argument itself requires the use of logic to progress and progress in necessary relation to an aim — TVCL
e) Applying these criteria, we are left with:
i) beliefs that cannot be regarded as knowledge.
ii) beliefs that have the potential to be knowledge — TVCL
We cannot analyze the potential of something without first knowing what that something is. I would think that if you hold a goal, a hypothesized belief, and cannot contradict it, then you have knowledge. Now this assumes that knowledge is something which could be changed at a later time if new information arises that contradicts your claims. That is fine, but that would be knowledge itself, not provisional. What you might be doing here is thinking that knowledge needs to be truth. In doing so, you run into the problems that truth brings to epistemology. It is fine if you decide to go this route, but you'll have to address those problems as they rise up.As such, what comes to be regarded as knowledge is not "That which has been demonstrated to accord with reality" but "That which has been demonstrated to not be contradicted by reality." — TVCL
Of course, I have not addressed your arguments about discrete experience in here and this is because they were not needed to get the argument to this point. However, if you think that they can intersect with the argument above/are required for it or can build off from it, please do say. — TVCL
When you speak about goals, you imply that it is how we approach the goal which is just as important. If I want to fly by using my arms, then it would be silly to approach that goal without using my arms. — Philosophim
Now this assumes that knowledge is something which could be changed at a later time if new information arises that contradicts your claims. That is fine, but that would be knowledge itself, not provisional. — Philosophim
If we do not have this restriction, then someone could introduce a non-falsifiable belief, and state because it is not contradicted by reality, it is therefore provisional knowledge per your definition. — Philosophim
Hopefully this explains why I will take your advice and use the term "hypothesis" but I will use this to refer to the approach, but not the goal itself. — TVCL
This is not a criticism of a single argument that you have presented — TVCL
My only concern is that you will be critiqued by a lot more than them in this particular instance. And this is what I truly meant by airtight. If you fight to make it airtight, you will likely fail, but your failure will be difficult to identify, and arguably irrelevent. If you do not make it airtight, you will assume you can let things slide, but you will misjudge on this and leave yourself open to holes you never thought of. — Philosophim
What will your theory serve? Who will it save? Just something to consider. — Philosophim
How is provisional knowledge separate from just a belief? — Philosophim
They are separate becau — TVCL
"What will your theory serve?" Those who seek knowledge. — TVCL
They are separate because belief is potential knowledge and knowledge accords with reality. Beliefs are excluded when they are inconsistent or inapplicable. All that remains is [provisional] knowledge. — TVCL
One of the main differences is that I have not yet made one appeal to data/empiricism/observation to support the argument. — TVCL
To clarify, what you are saying is that a belief that has not been contradicted is 'potential knowledge'. A belief that has been contradicted is a 'belief'. But if knowledge is what has not been contradicted, and potential knowledge is what has not been contradicted, is there a difference? — Philosophim
technically, this is only "provisional" because we have no means of knowing whether reality will not contradict a given piece of knowledge later (as of yet). And so, we could either consider if "provisional knowledge" or say that "all knowledge that we have is technically provisional". — TVCL
The problem with this example is the word "walk" is defined as using feet. You aren't confirming that using your feet allows you to walk, because that's part of the definition of walk. — Philosophim
At this point, we've said, 2+2=4 because there are a set of definitions that tell us 2+2=4. That really doesn't prove anything except that a bunch of definitions say certain conclusions should happen — Philosophim
Thus you could know the definition that 2+2 = 4, but you won't know if that belief is knowledge within your mind/empiricism/etc. until you apply it for yourself within the scope of the potential application. — Philosophim
If it is contradicted when it is applied, then we know the belief is false. If it is not contradicted, then it is "knowledge". This should also answer your final question, that 2+2=4 is a falsifiable belief if one applies it. — Philosophim
This should also answer your final question, that 2+2=4 is a falsifiable belief if one applies it. — Philosophim
If we considered the alternative and found that we could not in fact walk with our feet but must do so with our hands — TVCL
Moreover, to stress the point, reality must be posited if there is to be a search because the lack on omniscience requires us to posit a standard external to mere belief by which its potential for knowledge can be judged. — TVCL
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