Thanks again for your consistent feedback too - it's highly appreciated.

Okay, so it might be a good idea to answer your questions and then pull back a bit; I've over-reached and so it's a good point to receded.

Let's begin with the questions:

I think a little clarification is needed here. If reason is not a necessary factor in knowledge, how do we separate knowledge from mere belief? We are crafting the definition of knowledge as we go, do you think there is a way to know without reason? — Philosophim

It appears that we have demonstrated that reason is a common factor in all knowledge that is sought, but I'm not sure if the application of reason is required for all knowledge. The main thing that I have in mind is experience. You may refer to my discussion with "Chattering Monkey" above but the idea is that we can know the direct contents of experience merely by experiencing it (if there is an experience of pain I know that there is an experience of pain). What we can then doubt and require our reason to discern (actively) is whether that pain is connected to anything beyond the experience itself and is "real" or not, etc. It might be that reason is required for us to have experience as-such (with a Kantian epistemology for example) but that isn't demonstrated at this juncture. And so, it seems plausible that we can have some passive knowledge without the use of reason.

Can you also clarify what you mean by "maximal set of goals"? What if I have a very simple goal in science, but a very complex set of goals in my religion? Further, what about the importance of goals to myself? "What could be a more important goal than serving God?" for example? Finally, what about a person who has many complex goals versus thousands of people who have simple goals, but gain complexity in how they work among themselves? — Philosophim

There is a difference between one's belief about what is true/ their knowledge allowing a set of goals and demanding it. Perhaps the answer would be that whether a Muslim farmer and a Christian farmer were both living their simple lives with few questions, it would be the one who's beliefs that allows the more complex life to be lived that would be the most indicative of the truth. This is so because this would be the belief system which is more applicable to reality and allows the most goals to be realised (as opposed to merely posited or pursued). We might contend that if both Christians and Muslims are having their goals served by their beliefs, this demonstrates that they both possess knowledge of the truth - and this is the case, to a point. However, if the question that you, and I and the farmers could pose is: which one is actually/ultimately true? We might reflect that the farmers do not have knowledge of the answer to this question, but simply have faith in it.

In addition, consider how complex an apparently "simple" goal might be...
"to serve God" seems simple. Yet, if we consider all that this entails, this might require nothing less than trying to understand Him to the best of our ability (the most complex thing of all) and live in accordance with His will as well as His world.

What do you mean by relativism in this case? Do you mean the ability to relatively define one's context, or relatively apply this context to reality? — Philosophim

No, I think definitions can be "relative" (although, recall how they are bounded). It's the relativism that holds that truth is non-absolute; being merely relative to the subjective perspective or even relative to culture. Now, of course we can account for the differences in conclusions that appear to be indicative of this non-absolute truth, especially when we judge our knowledge against our goals but, of course, the "bounding" effect that we have been discussing makes all of the difference. In this sense, our individual enquiries appear to reveal different and unique areas on the same absolute map (although, being unique we might take this different areas to prove relativism). Whereas, relativism would posit that there is a truly unique map for each person - this does not appear to be so.

This is a nice thought, but people do not work this way. If both people have different definitions and goals in the beginning, not to mention different sensing capabilities (blind versus sight) they can both use reason within these definitions and goals, and obtain different conclusions... — Philosophim

I'm going to hold-off on my claims about this for a bit.

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Now for the pull-back...

You appear convinced of my case for the search of knowledge from a "self-subjective" viewpoint which is a good start, but I must contend with it because it appears that we can demonstrate that if the foundation is correct, there must be a bridge beyond this.

Therefore, consider this progression:
1. If one seeks knowledge they must use their reason and their goals as the basic measure for this knowledge (if it is to be a search and is to be comprehensible, this must be so. This is what the foundation of the heuristic demonstrates).

2. If another seeks knowledge the same must, by necessity, apply to them.

3. Therefore, if two come to seek knowledge and hold this basic goal in common, their methodology must overlap.

My aim at this point is to double-check whether you think that all stages of this argument are necessary and if not, why not... from there, perhaps we can attempt to build up.

Also, I'm re-considering the idea of making the argument about a search for "Truth" as opposed to "Knowledge". I'm beginning to find "Knowledge" just as confusing as "Truth" because the latter appears to entail the former. For example, "Knowledge" may be defined as "Understanding what is True" - we imply it with that quality of being "right" which entails truthfulness. And "Truth" may be defined as "That which is the case"; "That which is so" or, at least, "That which is not-false"...

The earlier confusion might have come from the notion that my argument or the tools of reason and goals dictate what the truth is, instead of simply being those tools that allow us to discover what we can of it if we search for it - with the idea of the search being vital to the role of the defition of Truth within the overall argument.

What are your thoughts?

It appears that we have demonstrated that reason is a common factor in all knowledge that is sought, but I'm not sure if the application of reason is required for all knowledge. — TVCL

I think for this section, we'll need a good definition between knowledge, and belief. If I have a belief that happens to align with the truth, is it knowledge in your heuristic? And if we are talking about knowledge, we must be very careful to avoid, "maybe's". That way lies the death of all epistemological theories. Once you enter into the realm of not being sure about something, we should try to be find sureness in it, or table it for now.

I think you're close with the idea that "experience" is something we can know. But can you explain why? Can it be explained without reason?

There is a difference between one's belief about what is true/ their knowledge allowing a set of goals and demanding it. — TVCL

Whereas, relativism would posit that there is a truly unique map for each person - this does not appear to be so — TVCL

What if my goal is to find the best color in the world? I find it is red. Another person has that same goal, and finds that it is blue. This seems like a unique map. This also seems to confuse belief and knowledge. Can yo puzzle this out? Again, I think a clear definition of a belief versus knowledge would be helpful here.

These are fairly advanced topics btw. For lack of a better term, the analytic/synthetic distinction has tripped a lot of philosophers up. Further, untangling relativism with knowledge is also another mess. So there is no need to answer my questions just now if you want to come back later. They are just things to think about.

Also, I'm re-considering the idea of making the argument about a search for "Truth" as opposed to "Knowledge". I'm beginning to find "Knowledge" just as confusing as "Truth" because the latter appears to entail the former. — TVCL

I definitely understand that you are transitioning out of a previous mindset, and that makes it difficult. Science is the act of taking definitions of reality, combining them, and hoping to find something new. Philosophy is about taking what we innately suspect about reality, and finding words that are logical, and can then be applied to reality. And its not easy. =) I don't want to tell you "not" to use truth (thought I really do), because you need to understand why you will not be able to. I don't want to stymie your thinking, or lead you down a path I think is correct, but perhaps is not.

But what I feel comfortable in saying is to take some time and rethink your definitions. Think about what truth, knowledge, and belief entail. Then see if you can come up with some clearer definitions to start again with. Epistemology must have a strong foundation, and if we don't have those three terms strongly defined, it is difficult to build a stable theory on them.

These are all important questions to consider and so, please, don't take my not answering them as a dismissal. Instead, please, understand that I would like to take a moment to reign things right back and "catch my breath" so to speak... I've probably over-reached myself with the implications.

Firstly, let me just take a detour to mention some of the other conclusions that I'm working with. One thing worth mentioning is that I don't actually think that epistemology can be a matter of certainties or sureness. I agree that we should take great care, but that even with the greatest care knowledge or "truth" is [almost] never a question of sureness and certainties but a question of likelihoods and best guesses; I regard faith as a philosophical constant (as is doubt). Another thing worth mentioning is that I'm a Witggenstinian when it comes to definitions and regard them as Pragmatic and so I'm cautious about the idea of nailing them down. The relevance of that isn't entirely clear yet but it seems worth mentioning.

Anyway, let's table that just for a moment... What I would like to do just for now is is ask for your patience and re-state the progression above in order to get yours exact views on it:

Working definition: Truth = "That which is the case"

1. If one seeks to find truth must use their reason and their goals as the basic measure for this knowledge (if it is to be a search and is to be comprehensible, this must be so. This is what the foundation of the heuristic demonstrates).

2. If another seeks to find truth it follows that the same must, by necessity, apply to them.

3. Therefore, if two come to seek truth and hold this basic goal in common, their methodology must overlap.

What do you think?

No worry TVCL, I understand completely. When I start my own explorations into ideas, I quickly branch out into the end. You have a similar thought process as myself, where I think you can see the big picture, and how it all links together. I often see that first, then build my way there, so I understand fully.

Lets start with your definition of truth, as every solid structure needs a stable foundation.

Truth = "That which is the case" — TVCL

What is the case? This is not meant as a nitpick or an attempt to be clever. What is "that"? Let me explain.

Is that which is the case my view of reality? Is it another person's view of reality? Is it my beliefs? Is it an objective reality apart from my beliefs?

One problem I see if you don't have this down, is it undermines your first rule. If "that which is the case" is my beliefs, then my goals and "reason" are my beliefs. Which means my beliefs are just as good as anyone elses. This will be a problem come step 3. If truth is an objective reality, how did we come to this conclusion? Now of course you stated that reason is at minimum, "What is not a contradiction". But how do we know that is true? Is it because we believe it to be true? You have to find some foundation that is incontrovertible and build from there, otherwise it won't hold. Not that we can't start with some stabs in the dark by the way!

My advice is to take every single word of step 1, and define it:
Truth, reason, goal, comprehensible, knowledge, and measure of that knowledge. After you define them, see if you can combine them into a step one which leaves no questions within the statement itself. Also try to define them as separate identities that don't bleed or cross into one another. We've been talking at a high level so far, but now its time to go low level and really make sure all the parts of your heuristic are pristine!

See, it's so tricky because on the one hand we can recognise how important your questions are and on the other, despair of answering them. I'm sceptical of whether your approach to epistemology should be taken. Allow me to explain why...

You advise that all parts of the foundational argument be 'pristine'; incontrovertible and that we get our definitions nice and secure before we proceed, but we might wonder whether this can be done...

If the definition of any word is given, that definition can be challenged. Even if the definition appeals to its component parts, those parts can be challenged too. For example, we might try to clarify that truth is "accordance with reality" But! what do "accordance" and "reality" mean? (and, indeed how do we know?). If the game of definitions is a game of words supporting other words we hit a meandering regress. As some point, when you or I or any combination of people are in discussion, we simply have to trust or assume that we know what we are talking about, aware that misunderstanding, as much as doubt, is potentially constant.

What's more, the questions raised present a particularly interesting challenge in the definition game because when we ask:

"If truth is that which is that case, what is the case?" the question that follows is: "Isn't that what we are trying to discover?"

Maybe we can still work with this...
"Truth is that which is the case..."

"Is that which is the case my view of reality?"

"It might be the case that you have your view of reality, but is this the same as saying that the contents of your view of reality reflects that which is the case?; it might be the case that you have your view, but it might not be the case that the contents of that view are indicative of that which is the case."

"What is the case?"

"Good question."

And so, that might be a way to do it, Other alternatives for the definition of truth are "accordance with reality" or "that which is not false." Maybe a better one is "The reality that is the case independently of belief, which a belief may or may not align with" naturally, these aren't perfect.

What are your thoughts? and
Do you have any suggestions for a definition of truth?

Certainly, its is a very difficult endeavor. But consider this, the study of epistemology has been going on for thousands of years with no conclusive determination. In my study, a common thread is always that their foundation of knowledge has a hole. It cannot "know its own theory". And the reason is because induction and assumptions often enter into their theories that later bite them down the road.

If you do not wish to solidify your definitions, it is understandable. It is difficult and can practically twist your brain into knots. But I would be certain that if you do not do that work for your own definitions, anything you build upon it it too will meet the same fate as all the other epistemological theories out there.

My answer to truth is close to as you claimed, "The reality that is the case independently of belief, which a belief may or may not align with". Basically reality is what happens despite what we will. If you wish, go back to my first link on the knowledge theory. It is not to say I am correct, but this time read with a mind to examine how I construct my definitions. I attempt to start with the most basic premise, then slowly build on top of each. I'll admit I could do a better job in parts, especially part 2, but those definitions carry onward throughout the entire argument. Scour them for weaknesses, and then wonder whether your respect of the argument increases or decreases.

A => B is much more stable then A => (B v C). Even if you cannot get a A => B, it helps immensely if you can at least narrow it down.

Scour them for weaknesses, and then wonder whether your respect of the argument increases or decreases. — Philosophim

Yes, I will do. Now that we have reached this point it is a good time to get a handle on your arguments. However, I won't be able to do so tonight and so before I turn in for this evening, let me share some thoughts about this last post...

I think you're right about the "hole" and perhaps we should have addressed it sooner (although, now may even be the perfect time) - it appears that you and I have both discovered something similar about epistemology which we are wrestling with. Epistemology has been attempted for (at least) thousands of years and it is true that none of the approaches are "airtight"; even if we just examine their foundations. In fact, this common error in philosophy ripples out to all philosophical systems and, as I'm sure that you've found... there's always a hole.

[note: the closest I've ever come to something "airtight" is an appeal to logic/consistency, but even this is not beyond question]

It's in light of this that I would like to present a couple of considerations...
First; we seem to agree that knowledge is a tool. Perhaps we agree that theories of knowledge are tools too. Perhaps, is there a distinction between a "perfect" tool that is never prone to failure and a tool that is as good as it can be but that we must accept will eventually break down?

Secondly; if epistemology has had an open wound after thousands of years after some of the greatest minds in history, is it worth attempting to tackle it in the same way or to achieve the same results, or to try a different approach?

Thirdly; can the very fact that attempts at foundational epistemology continues to fail, and perhaps will always fail, tell us something about the character or makeup of epistemology? Another way of framing this question is that: if we consider the problems of doing epistemology, and blast away a number of our options, are there some parts that we are left with that something can be built out of?

I have my own answers to these questions but it would be good to get yours too and then perhaps we can compare notes. As mentioned, I will try to give your pieces to but can't promise that I will have the time or attention give them a proper reading for a day or two - just so that you're aware of any apparent delay.

As a final question - how far are you happy to carry this conversation on for? I understand that we appear to have been orbiting the centre for some time and haven't done as much "travelling" as we might have liked yet, but there appears to be a LOT more to say. Personally, I'm having a blast with this discussion but it may be a slow burn and so do let me know your thoughts.

First; we seem to agree that knowledge is a tool. Perhaps we agree that theories of knowledge are tools too. Perhaps, is there a distinction between a "perfect" tool that is never prone to failure and a tool that is as good as it can be but that we must accept will eventually break down? — TVCL

I agree entirely with this. No person has ever built a tool that cannot be improved upon over time. Science is considered one of the best methodologies of understanding the world, and even it is still debated and tweaked with improvements to this day. One thing that usually repeats in historic use of tools, is that the next tool offers something the previous one's did not. If a new theory of epistemology is to offer something new to the world, it must differentiate itself from its competitors. To me, that is to make a foundation of epistemology so strong, that it is taken seriously as a branch of study, and less as philosophy.

This also bleeds into your second and third points. Innovator's take two options. Refinement, or advancement. Refinement is a polish or improvement on the old ways to produce something better. This works in many ways. Advancement is much more difficult, because it requires a new approach, and is riskier to pull off.

In either case, I think using the lessons of the tools before us as information to think about is invaluable. But this information must not be enshrined. Polishing keeps the fundamentals while advancement understands that the fundamentals have reached their limit, and it is time for something new. I believe a little of both is in order.

I am of the opinion that epistemology suffers from a few flawed fundamentals, one being its assumptions and allowance of uncertainty within its fundamentals. Yet they are also built upon a few fundamentals that are nearly timeless in epistemological history. To me, these shaky errors manifest after the spring board from the "I think therefore I am" type conclusion that I believe all epistemology reaches as an agreed upon start. I believe there is also some merit in the analytic/synthetic type of arguments as well. When i say "type", I mean the fundamental core of the argument. It is their specifics that I find may not quite nail the issue, and lead to failure down the road. But perhaps I am wrong there as well, which is why I think we both understand we have to present and listen to each other's viewpoints. If two people are looking for the truth, then as you have stated, I believe our viewpoints should point out contradictions or show alignment.

Please take all the time that you need. I have visited a number of philosophy boards over the years, and all of them have been dissapointments. I'm not sure what made this one work, but it seems to be full of people who genuinely like to think on philosophy. I do not mind continuing the discussion for as long as it takes, and I have also been having a blast!. Philosophy and epistemology have long been a passion of mine; it won't burn out any time soon.

Right, so, I've got a jumble of things to present to you today...

First of all, your work is a treat to read - especially now that we've had a bit of a discussion. High quality thinking - very well done.

There are some bumps in it and so, as you requested, I thought I'd bring them to your attention.
The first one was your definition of Reality as "What results independently of a belief" - I'm inclined to agree but the counter occurred: "This presumes that belief cannot dictate reality. Why not?" It seems that you can answer this within your framework but it may be worth pressing you to do so explicitly.

And then, there was a question about what you mean by a "Will" or "Sureness" when you define Belief. This can be nit picky, but as it goes, I get your drift anyway.

Other than that, the whole foundation that you lay and connections you draw between Belief, Reality and Knowledge were tight and cogent.
One note: if knowledge is belief in something which is co-existent with reality and requires that the belief is not contradicted, it would appear that knowledge is provisional. That is, we have knowledge up to the point that the knowledge we have is contradicted.

Now, admittedly, by the end of your first piece I got off of the boat. You began to make a number of appeals to the subjective function of one's psyche. These were lucid in places, but it began to drift over into psychology enough for it to feel as if the tread and relevance of our more direct concerns were being lost. Moreover, it begins to raise far more questions far too quickly to keep pace with.

And so, that being said, the work is great. What I'd like to do is take it away from a week (or two) and think it over, in an attempt to try and splice it with my own. it appears that we're drawing two halves of the same foundation and so it would be good to draw them together and see what that allows us to stand on. How does that sound to you?

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Switching gears now,

It occurred to me that in light of what we have discussed; the attempts that we can make in epistemology and our limits, we may have a number of puzzle pieces that might allude to what we can or will eventually achieve. Here are some of these puzzle pieces:

1. Contradictions are nonsensical.

2. Our goals shape our enquiries.

3. Attempts at epistemology always leave a "hole" in the theory.

4. Definitions cannot be incontrovertible.

5a. The attempt to make epistemology "airtight" is potentially endless/unattainable.

5b. Likewise, the attempt to define epistemological terms and make them "airtight" is potentially endless/unattainable

Conclusion (a): we cannot create a foundation for epistemology that is so solid that it is beyond doubt or misunderstanding.

Conclusion (b): we cannot conclude that "anything goes" when it comes to our enquires. For example, we cannot make contradictory claims if we want them to make sense.

And so, I wanted to get your thoughts on these pieces - do you agree or not? Otherwise, are there any that you would like to add?

Looking forward to reading your thoughts.

There are some bumps in it and so, as you requested, I thought I'd bring them to your attention.
The first one was your definition of Reality as "What results independently of a belief" - I'm inclined to agree but the counter occurred: "This presumes that belief cannot dictate reality. Why not?" It seems that you can answer this within your framework but it may be worth pressing you to do so explicitly. — TVCL

First, thank you for the compliment! And absolutely, question even the slightest issue you find. It is the only way to the truth, and I never take offense or slight to it.

First, when I wrote this theory I thought to myself, "A knowledge theory must be able to know itself". The way I have written the work is as a newborn discovering things for the first time. I take what I can glean at the moment, and build upon it from there. However, that does not mean I cannot return to it after. Indeed, at this moment of claim it could be drawn that belief cannot dictate reality, but I also make no claim one way or the other.

The key comes after I demonstrate what "discrete experiences" are. Once you realize that a belief is a discrete experience, you also realize that belief is concurrent with reality, because a discrete experience cannot be contradicted. To streamline the theory for first time readers, I have removed a lot of going back to the beginning. But feel free to take any future conclusions I make, go back to the beginning, and see if a contradiction is found, or a question you had now answered.

And to clarify, the belief itself is reality. A belief's claim, such as, "I believe Tim is waiting just around the corner" is not necessarily confirmed by reality. A belief's claim is an application of our discrete experiences to reality, which is covered in part 2.

And then, there was a question about what you mean by a "Will" or "Sureness" when you define Belief. — TVCL

In essence belief is a desire. A claim that you are sure reality is X, even if it might be Y. I use belief as a precursor to action in its introduction, but it can also be a claim about reality without any action. "The sun is made of hydrogen" for example. Whether I believed this, or that it was made out of helium has no recourse in the actions I will take as a random belief simply appearing in my mind, then quickly disappearing. This is where the "Sureness" comes from.

But an excellent point on noting that it is not well explained. I had to cut quite a bit to get it down to a manageable read, and explaining belief in further detail seemed like something I could let slide a bit. It seems I may need to cover it again.

One note: if knowledge is belief in something which is co-existent with reality and requires that the belief is not contradicted, it would appear that knowledge is provisional. That is, we have knowledge up to the point that the knowledge we have is contradicted. — TVCL

This is correct. Part two covers how we can handle these contradictions. Sometimes, what might appear to be a contradiction, may not be at all depending on our definitions.

Now, admittedly, by the end of your first piece I got off of the boat. Moreover, it begins to raise far more questions far too quickly to keep pace with. — TVCL

A very fair assessment. As I mentioned earlier, once a foundation type of, "I think therefore I am" has been established, the true complexity starts. Originally, this was a MUCH larger read. I covered so many branches and different considerations. The problem in doing so is that ultimately loses the reader. What I tried to do was cut it down to the necessary fundamentals that allow the building blocks to answer all of the branching questions within section 2. But I feel it may be good to table section 2 for now. I am more interested in how you will construct your fundamentals, and where you will build from independently of mine. Without your own strong conclusion on the "I think therefore I am" section of epistemology, going further would not be productive.

5a. The attempt to make epistemology "airtight" is potentially endless/unattainable.

5b. Likewise, the attempt to define epistemological terms and make them "airtight" is potentially endless/unattainable — TVCL

That is only half the story! The attempt to make epistemology "airtight" is potentially obtainable. The attempt to define epistemological terms and make them "airtight" is potentially obtainable.

Let us combine this with, "A common thread of all epistemological theories is their lack of "airtightness".
Therefore perhaps creating an airtight epistemology would lead to a success.

Also one other thing, we are assuming "knowledge" before knowledge has been figured out. What is "airtight"? What is "unobtainable/obtainable" in regards to knowledge? What is potential? If the questions themselves have questions, that tells me there is something underlying we still do not understand yet, and we should work on that first.

Take as long as you want to think, I'll be here when you're ready.

Right Sarge, reporting from the front.

Still working on processing the arguments but his a milestone and thought I would share some of the findings...

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We begin with posting a search for knowledge - this sets our aim. In relation to this goal, we find that we must define our terms, not least the term "knowledge". This prompts the three definitions of belief, reality and knowledge as you have addressed them. What's more, the logic for why these three definitions are required can be justified in relation to the goal, as follows:

To posit a search for knowledge, one must distinguish between three things:
a) a position that has the potential to be knowledge (here called "belief");
b) a standard that provides the measure for knowledge, independent of a position that may or may not accord with with this standard (here called "reality); and
c) the status of the potential position when it is in accordance with the independent standard (here called "knowledge")

The distinction between all three definitions is required (and, therefore, all three definitions are required) because if we only had the first two; if we only had "belief" and "reality" there would be no need to search for knowledge. One's position would have no potential to be in line with the independent standard that measures it, one's position would be in accordance with that standard by default. In plain speaking, one's belief could never be wrong or right - it would only even be right if one's beliefs always reflected reality. In this sense, one would only ever possess knowledge and, in effect, all three definitions would blur into one; there would be no difference between the position one takes and between what is the case and, therefore, belief, reality and knowledge would be one and the same.

To assume such a position requires an assumption of omniscience which a search for knowledge denies. This is because if belief and reality are one and the same, one's belief is never potentially false, it is always right (knowledge). This presumes omniscience because one must assume that there can never be anything that demonstrates that their belief is false. To know that nothing could ever falsify one's belief, one would have to know all things because only then could they be sure that nothing could or would contradict their current belief.

Therefore a match between belief and reality requires omniscience.
Therefore, if one does not presume that they are omniscient, they must make a distinction between belief that matches reality and belief that might not.
Therefore, to separate them for the purpose of the enquiry, we call the latter 'belief' and the former 'knowledge'
All three terms must be distinguished if the search for knowledge is to occur, because omniscience nullifies the search for knowledge.

Moreover, to stress the point, reality must be posited if there is to be a search because the lack on omniscience requires us to posit a standard external to mere belief by which its potential for knowledge can be judged.

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On Definitions...
The previous discussion justified the three distinctions, but it did not justify the given definitions. For example, it did not justify why "reality" is the term that we know means "the independent standard" or such like.

[in response] we do not, in fact, strictly know the definition of "reality" at this point (for example). All that we know is that we have a need for the three definitions in order to pursue our task and have opted for "reality" in order to serve this purpose. However, it might turn out that there is a better/('truer'?) definition that serves the purpose. The hope is that, whilst a perfect term is lacking, "reality" associates closely enough with the understanding of the common reader well enough to convey the augmented definition in order to convey the argument that it may be repurposed such (assuming that a word is ever really "repurposed" or taken away from a truer position).

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At this juncture, we have established that we must presume a lack of omniscience and posit three things:
a) a position that has the potential to be knowledge (here called "belief");
b) a standard that provides the measure for knowledge, independent of a position that may or may not accord with with this standard (here called "reality); and
c) the status of the potential position when it is in accordance with the independent standard (here called "knowledge")

Therefore, in order to pursue the aim, we must determine the standards by which we judge whether a given belief accords with reality and is therefore knowledge.

Of course, this brings us back to the heuristic.
The basic standards that we use to determine knowledge are consistency (being how far beliefs adhere to knowledge) and applicability (being how far beliefs allow the pursuit of goals).

Note: we should not assume "perfect" accord between belief and reality at this point.

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Final note...
It occurred to me that if this work was fully-fashioned, it could be split into 4 main sections, each of which inter-relate to one-another and either one of which could be taken as the starting point as it may not in fact be the case that any one of these were "primary". My thoughts on this are not set, but taken from a leap of intuition. These four sections would be:

"Knowledge"

"Definitions"

"Logic"

"Goals"

Here is an example of how a given section is inter-related:
"Logic" relates to...
"Definitions" because contradictory definitions are useless; we assume logic when we use definitions.
"Knowledge" because non-contradiction becomes a requisite of knowledge
"Goals" because our goals are a necessary requirement for the adoption of logic AND because contradictory goals cannot be pursued.

This is a fantastic start! With regards to defining reality, it is fine to start with a loose but accurate definition. You make an interesting point about showing the difference between belief and omniscience. I've never seen it before, well done.

Right, now I've hit a bit of a speed-bump and would like to get your thoughts/assistance on it.
Allow me to back-track the line of thought first...

[This does not follow on directly from the discussion above but comes shortly after]

Note: 'Reality' need only be 'external' to the belief

Q: is there a way that we can determine whether a belief accords with a standard that is external to that belief?

An external standard is a constraint because if no constraint existed, a belief could be anything.

Yet, a belief can be anything. In the respect that can believe anything. The question is whether any belief can be knowledge...

But we cannot believe anything, can we?
For example, can we believe that food is poison?
Answer:
a) if one simply wants to hold this belief as an idea in their head (possibly); but
b) not if one seeks to put this belief into effect - to act upon this belief and satisfy their hunger without dying.

Therefore one's aims constrain what beliefs one can or cannot hold.

However, this discussion above established the need to determine whether a held belief does or does not accord with reality and is therefore knowledge, not that we need to determine whether a belief can be "held" or not in the first place. Otherwise, we may conclude that "all beliefs that can be held are knowledge."

To try an pull this back...
We know that a belief is not in accord with an external standard (reality) if that belief cannot be put into effect because it reveals that something beyond the belief itself constrains the belief such that the effect of the belief is limited.

However, consider the question: "What if I believe that my beliefs are limitless?"

The problem here is that the discussion thus far holds the effect of the belief as being limited (only that the effects are), not that the belief itself is limited. To extend this argument to beliefs, we would have to conclude that beliefs are their effects.

Do you see the issue?
We can determine that the effects of a belief hit an external standard but not that the belief is subject to an external standard, but positing that a belief hits an external standard is required to bridge the gap between belief and knowledge because the argument above requires that we recognise when a belief is either confirmed or constrained. How do we bridge this gap whilst keeping the logical flow of the argument?

What are your thoughts?

This is the issue that all theories of knowledge struggle with. This is the analytic/synthetic section of the problem. Some might argue this is THE problem of epistemology.

For a general strategy, you need to find a basic and solid answer, and build from there. I think most philosophers conclude that beliefs can be anything, but how they arrive at that sets up the next step.

It may be time to analyze what I wrote in part two now. The strategy I took was to use the same methodology that I used to determine discrete experiences are knowledge, in applying those discrete experiences to reality. Thus there should be no gap, at least in logical consistency.
But maybe you will see a flaw and that will spark a better solution.

Hi TVCL, I know you are busy. I've had time to think if I answered you question adequately last time, and I feel I did not.

The problem here is that the discussion thus far holds the effect of the belief as being limited (only that the effects are), not that the belief itself is limited. To extend this argument to beliefs, we would have to conclude that beliefs are their effects. — TVCL

Lets first clarify what "effects" means. You stated a belief can or cannot be put into effect. To me that means you are applying your belief to reality. As an example, I believe that there is a red ball in front of me. Somehow we need a standard to confirm that it is a red ball. If we figure that out, we figure out the synthetic part of knowledge.

But what about the belief itself? Do I know that I believe there is a red ball in front of me? Yes. If we can figure out how we know that we are experiencing the belief of a red ball in front of us, then perhaps we could apply the same trick in applying that belief we do know, to the reality we don't yet know. In other words, we are creating an external standard to our knowledge that we have beliefs. For your purposes, you have started with the law of non-contradiction. For my purposes, I did the same. I concluded that we absolutely must have discrete experiences, as to not have discrete experiences, is a contradiction. I then build into basic beliefs.

While we can be unlimited in our beliefs, we are limited in our application of those beliefs to reality. So for yourself, I would questing if you can know that you hold beliefs. How can you conclude this? And if you can create this, try applying it to the "synthetic" (used as a broad term, not any one defined interpretation) aspect of beliefs.

Good timing. I just got the last part of my argument down last night with the view of writing it up today. It took some revision but I'll copy my final thought progression up verbatim. Some points are not explained in their entirety but this omission is made under the assumption that the underlying arguments are already understood. Please tell me if this is not the case...

[Beginning]
Once we begin the search for knowledge a number of axiomatic criteria come into being:

• The distinction between the 3 definitions,
• Goals as criteria
• Logic as criteria
• Faith that knowledge/(truth?) must exist or can be pursued
• One's lack of omniscience/the existence of doubt

a) Once we accept that we lack omniscience and search for knowledge, the 3 definitions follow.

b1) In establishing the 3 definitions and commencing the search, goals and logic as criteria for what we regard as knowledge are implied.
b2) Goals and logic are implied as criteria for determining whether a belief is in accord with a standard beyond itself such that it will or will not be regarded as knowledge. This is because the argument itself requires the use of logic to progress and progress in necessary relation to an aim (the search itself). Likewise, goals are required for logic and logic is required for goals (see the discussion vis-a-vis the heuristic). Therefore, if we do not assume logic and goals to be criteria by which we determine whether beliefs accord with reality such that they are knowledge, the entire endeavour becomes void.

c) After the 3 definitions are established, the question is: how do we determine whether a belief accords with reality such that it becomes knowledge?

d) We already have logic and goals to serve as basic criteria for determining what reality is because they reveal how beliefs are or are not limited in their capacity to relate to our aims (including their ability to relate to other beliefs, depending on the goal). This does not allow us to say what knowledge or reality are (positively), but it does allow us to exclude what we must not regard as knowledge or reality; logic and goals do not tell us what we know, only what we cannot know.

e) Applying these criteria, we are left with:
i) beliefs that cannot be regarded as knowledge.
ii) beliefs that have the potential to be knowledge.

f) We might use additional criteria to logic and goals to determine reality, but these criteria cannot contradict these two basic criteria and must build upon them (this may be the task of in-depth epistemology proper).

g) Once a belief accords with logic and one's goals, it has not been demonstrated that it does, in fact, accord with reality but it has been demonstrated that it does not contradict reality, such that reality allows it.

h) At such a point when reality contradicts a belief once a belief is either illogical or ineffective, that belief must be regarded as not knowledge. Therefore, all beliefs that have the potential to be knowledge (allowed by reality) can be regarded as provisional knowledge until they are contradicted.

i) In relation to (g) and (h):
Knowledge yet to be contradicted by reality can only be regarded as provisional because no argument has been made to state what reality is, only what it does not allow. As such, and lacking direct knowledge of reality, we cannot say that a given piece of knowledge will never be contradicted by reality. As such, what comes to be regarded as knowledge is not "That which has been demonstrated to accord with reality" but "That which has been demonstrated to not be contradicted by reality."

Extra:
- A belief is defined as a position that has the potential to be knowledge. Does this not match the description above?

- No. The description above describes knowledge (provisional) as "That which has the potential to accord with reality". This is one step forward in the progression of the argument in relation to belief.

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In response to your most recent post...

Do I know that I believe there is a red ball in front of me? — Philosophim

Firstly, this introduces experience as an element which informs beliefs. That experience informs beliefs cannot be demonstrated, but if this is rejected we are to assume that we hold no beliefs (positions) that are informed by experience. Therefore, to allow for this contingency, that experience informs beliefs is adopted as an additional axiom.

What's more is that to know that I hold the belief must mean that the belief that I hold the belief itself must accord with reality. From the discussion above, we conclude that we are able to treat a belief as provisional knowledge when reality is not contradicted such that reality allows it. Therefore, if the mere holding of the belief is allowed we can know that we have the belief.
(In addition, the knowledge that I have X experience follows the same logic. If I experience pink elephants I must know that I am having the experience. What is merely belief and not knowledge at such a juncture is the belief about what the experience is indicative of; for example, I know that I experience pink elephants but merely believe that they can be interacted with in a physical manner).

And then:

a belief can or cannot be put into effect. To me that means you are applying your belief to reality. — Philosophim

[see the discussion above]: Once logic is applied, we discard all contradictory beliefs and non-knowledge. Once goals are related to, we discard all beliefs that are ineffective as non-knowledge. what remains are consistent, effective beliefs which are regarded as provisional knowledge because they have not been excluded and accord with reality such that they are allowed by it. These beliefs are only provisional knowledge because it is not demonstrated that reality will never contradict them. This is essentially the conclusion to this section of the argument.

--------------

In response to your argument...

Of course, I have not addressed your arguments about discrete experience in here and this is because they were not needed to get the argument to this point. However, if you think that they can intersect with the argument above/are required for it or can build off from it, please do say.

--------------

In any case, that's all for now. Do let me know your thoughts on anything or everything that has been addressed.

All the best.

Excellent post! I had to reread what "goals" were again to make sure I had everything right. Back then I was not criticizing word choices, because we weren't to that level yet. However, now that we're at the point that the basic definitions are so important, I think a better term instead of goals would be to separate the word goals, and your approach to solving goals as a "Hypothesis".

A repost:

1. A goal initiates the inquiry because the search for truth is a goal.

2. Goals parameterise our enquiry because they determine the point at which a given endeavour can be deemed to be satisfactorily achieved and the criteria by which this point is to be reached.

3. Therefore, if goals set the beginning and the end of the enquiry, they set the parameters for how or when our understanding of the truth is satisfactory. — TVCL

This is due to a few factors. A goal is seen in common vernacular as "the end". Something like, "I want to find out if this apple is edible." How we approach pursuing a goal is not the same as arriving at the goal itself.

When you speak about goals, you imply that it is how we approach the goal which is just as important. If I want to fly by using my arms, then it would be silly to approach that goal without using my arms. Further, we wish to use logic, like the law of non-contradiction in our goals. That requires that our equation to discover Y must be falsifiable in some way. If we do not have this restriction, then someone could introduce a non-falsifiable belief, and state because it is not contradicted by reality, it is therefore provisional knowledge per your definition.

This is because the argument itself requires the use of logic to progress and progress in necessary relation to an aim — TVCL

Without defining our approach to obtaining goals as necessarily being falsifiable, your above claim will not hold. If we split your goal an end result, and the approach to that goal as a hypothesis, I think your approach is communicated with greater clarity, and security in its definition. If you disagree with the inclusion of a "hypothesis", this is fine. But your definition of "goal" as I understand it currently makes some assumptions that are not proven such as point 2.

e) Applying these criteria, we are left with:
i) beliefs that cannot be regarded as knowledge.
ii) beliefs that have the potential to be knowledge — TVCL

One problem here is the exclusion of knowledge itself as a viable definition. If we are to say there is a potential for knowledge, we must be able to show what knowledge is first. You even state this at the end.

As such, what comes to be regarded as knowledge is not "That which has been demonstrated to accord with reality" but "That which has been demonstrated to not be contradicted by reality." — TVCL

We cannot analyze the potential of something without first knowing what that something is. I would think that if you hold a goal, a hypothesized belief, and cannot contradict it, then you have knowledge. Now this assumes that knowledge is something which could be changed at a later time if new information arises that contradicts your claims. That is fine, but that would be knowledge itself, not provisional. What you might be doing here is thinking that knowledge needs to be truth. In doing so, you run into the problems that truth brings to epistemology. It is fine if you decide to go this route, but you'll have to address those problems as they rise up.

Of course, I have not addressed your arguments about discrete experience in here and this is because they were not needed to get the argument to this point. However, if you think that they can intersect with the argument above/are required for it or can build off from it, please do say. — TVCL

This is fine. The arguments I proposed were only used to give you a basis of how to approach the idea of knowledge from a foundational level. I am more eager to see your own approach. The only lesson to be drawn from my approach is to see how to make as few assumptions as possible in constructing an argument. Our arguments are also serving two different approaches. My argument comes from a fundamental construction of epistemology like Descartes, which admittedly is unnecessary for many people. Your epistemology is more a logical approach based on assumed precepts which few would nave need to question. We are not questioning what the "I" is, proving that thought is knowable, or other such concepts. Your goal is an applicable epistemology within our normative understanding of reality, which is useful and easy to grasp for daily use. And I think its going very well so far!

Feel free to confirm or deny any points I've made. If we are in general agreement with this base, then we can continue with the further branches from this I'm sure you're ready to get to!

... and a great response. Thank you, there is some helpful stuff here.

To begin my response I will start by stating that I understand where you are coming from when you suggest the distinction between the goal and its hypothesis. On the one hand, I agree that the distinction will be useful in clarifying my approach and use this when re-writing the argument. On the other, it appears that your rationale for suggesting the distinction may misunderstand the argument and so allow me to address this...

When you speak about goals, you imply that it is how we approach the goal which is just as important. If I want to fly by using my arms, then it would be silly to approach that goal without using my arms. — Philosophim

I'm not sure where this implication came from (not that it wasn't present), but in response to it, allow me to make my position on goals clear...

In the scheme of epistemology, the goal is defined as "the end" as this is primary because it lays out the criteria by which a given enquiry (including the search for knowledge itself) will be satisfied. If this were not the case we would have to posit a search for knowledge that does not reference a goal which appears to be impossible because the search itself is a goal. This would be so even if the parameters of the goal are yet to be explicit. Indeed, it appears that much of the work of the last few posts has been to say "Okay, we know that there must be a goal and that it sets parameters, but what exactly is the goal and, therefore, what are these parameters?"

The approach to the goal is secondary. The approach is a question of testing what works within the parameters. This is why I would contend with the arms example. There is nothing in my approach that determines how this goal should be approached. We presume the use of arms but the reasons for this remain un-demonstrated. Instead, once the goal is set we have multiple options for the approach. E.g. "I want to fly by using my arms..."

We [can] test what works in relation to this goal by:
a) ... by using my feet
b) ... by using my nose
c) ... by using my arms

As odd as it sounds, there is nothing in the argument itself to say that one cannot fly by using their arms by using their feet. This is absurd, but the reason that we find it to be absurd is that we find that we cannot put this approach into practice for the achievement of the goal. If we could achieve the goal by using our feet it would, in fact, not be absurd. Of course, this is a special case because the various approaches appear to present a contradiction, which reveals the place of logic in the scheme more than it does the importance of the approach... if the goal is meant exactly how it is stated with no room for contradiction, then we can exclude all approaches that are illogical because we are unable to posit them, let alone put them into effect.

Hopefully this explains why I will take your advice and use the term "hypothesis" but I will use this to refer to the approach, but not the goal itself. Goals hold a primary position in the epistemology precisely because they set "the end" of the endeavour (and all of its component parts).

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Now this assumes that knowledge is something which could be changed at a later time if new information arises that contradicts your claims. That is fine, but that would be knowledge itself, not provisional. — Philosophim

A point well made and taken. You're right - this is what the approach entails. Perhaps when I come to clarify this work I will make a point of stating that the knowledge gleaned by the point is "knowledge" but is uncertain or open to future revision or possibly not Truth etc.

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If we do not have this restriction, then someone could introduce a non-falsifiable belief, and state because it is not contradicted by reality, it is therefore provisional knowledge per your definition. — Philosophim

I'm fine with this, and this may actually speak to the difference between our approaches too. Let me explain...

One could claim that about an unfalsifiable belief, but to what extent? If a belief is divorced from its effects and the belief is unfalsifiable, it is [provisional] knowledge.
However, any belief that has an effect is falsifiable because the test for the belief the relation of the effect to an aim and we see this once the effect comes up against reality.

Sophists can pick us up on this point, but I don't mind. One thing that I would like to do with my approach is is this: instead of fighting the sophists, I would like to leave them to it. If they do not follow the argument or want to slip out of it, they can. But in so doing it would seem that they are left with islands of knowledge which are entirely within their own heads.

Consider this discussion:

Sophist: "Due to your argument, I am a Marxist; true Marxism has never been proven not to work. Therefore, I provisionally know that Marxism works."

Response: "Provisional indeed. Until such such a time that it is put into effect... so long as it remains a mere idea in your head, it remains unfalsifiable and is provisional knowledge. However, at the point when it is put into effect, or a component part can be, we will discover what reality does or does not allow and it will become falsifiable."

The takeaway is that all kinds of beliefs can be unfalsifiable if we divorce beliefs from their effects. In relation to this, there may be two kinds of philosophers: those who do philosophy with a kind of solipsism such that their ideas are always divorced from their applications and decisions, and those who do it with sophistry such that they can always find a loop-hole or clause that allows them to slip through an argument. Such people could treat the argument like so:

Me: "If we search for knowledge, all else follows..."

Sophist: "Ah! But what if we don't search?"

Me: "This word is defined like so..."

Sophist: "Ah! But how do we know that the word is so defined? Because you define it with other words? What about them?"

Me: "Beliefs not contradicted by reality are provisional knowledge."

Sophist: "Ah! And so I have removed my beliefs from their effects and made them unfalsifiable, and I have provisional knowledge."

My overall strategy in dealing with these people or approaches is not to fight them; not to guarantee, beyond doubt that such-and-such must be accepted. Instead, it is to recognise that contingencies are always left open. I make necessary deductions and arguments but hopefully this explains why I use so many contingencies in my work before moving to necessities (and, in all fairness, this is not merely a preference - this appears to be how we have to approach epistemology). Incorporating the contingencies into the structure appear to be required to give it enough "flex" to stand the storms of madness... other approaches that attempt to do away with all contingency and have only necessity appear to be more airtight and rigid, but also more brittle. Doing epistemology is like holding a bar of soap; if held with too firm a grip, it slips away... and so, perhaps it is best to make that grip firm, whilst allowing for the gaps around the edges...

This is not a criticism of a single argument that you have presented . Your observations about definitions are a case in point; the choice of words and approach to how we understand them really is important for developing an argument. The difference would be between yourself, who understands that there is a reasonable point at which the demand for definitions ceases and one who would push that demand in order to break the argument. You approach this in a spirit of constructive criticism.

Likewise, you're doing your own thing with your approach. I understand that we have our different approach to different ends, but if my discussion here would say anything to you I might use it as a word of caution against seeking knowledge structures that are perfectly "airtight". Within my own schema, this might be revealed as a "false goal" depending upon how you seek to pursue it.

Hopefully this explains why I will take your advice and use the term "hypothesis" but I will use this to refer to the approach, but not the goal itself. — TVCL

Great, I am in full agreement. I did not mean to imply they should be joined, just that you needed something to explain the process that we arrive at the goal. I'm think I fully understand now, I appreciate you re-explaining. =)

It is more than Sophists you will have to worry about. Your base theory is very close to science at this point, but science does not allow non-falsifiable claims. If you allow non-falsifiable claims into the realm of knowledge, we are also back again to what you mean by provisional knowledge. How is provisional knowledge separate from just a belief? Further, if you do not address non-falsifiable claims, how will you convince someone to use falsifiable claims? Let me give you an example.

Early on in America, there was the idea that taking an anti-malaria drug, hydroxychloriquine would be a good fight against Corona. After all, they seemed to hit what was needed, and a few people who took it had better results. There was no need to try to prove these things false for these people, and many accepted it. It turns out upon more scientific study in which falsification was applied, the medication did not have appreciable effects, and could potentially kill you.

In only preaching to reasonable people, you are only preaching to the choir. And in that case, why would reasonable people not just use science? If you are to create a new theory of epistemology you must ask yourself who is going to use, and what are the alternatives for other people to use?

This brings me back to a couple of points I made earlier. People are not always rational. If you let them escape a rational argument, they will. If you don't fight them from a place of intellectual certainty and clarity, they will think they are right. They will take that with them to the world, and knowledge becomes a thing of relativity and who is more forceful in their beliefs. On the flip side, rational people aren't going to learn or use a method of epistemology that has easily identifiable holes in it.

Your competitor with rational people is science. Your competitor for those who do not use science, is a vast variety of personal opinion, bias, and induction. What will your theory serve? Who will it save? Just something to consider.

This is not a criticism of a single argument that you have presented — TVCL

No, not a worry! And I hope my statements were not taken to be a critique of your approach either! I feel like your intention is to produce an epistemology that is rational, and can be understood by someone who is not a nit picky philosopher. This is a very good thing. To this end, I understand what you mean about not addressing the Sophists. My only concern is that you will be critiqued by a lot more than them in this particular instance. And this is what I truly meant by airtight. If you fight to make it airtight, you will likely fail, but your failure will be difficult to identify, and arguably irrelevent. If you do not make it airtight, you will assume you can let things slide, but you will misjudge on this and leave yourself open to holes you never thought of.

I would re-examine once more belief, knowledge, and potential knowledge, and see if the terms as defined are clearly different from one another, and useful to your purposes. At that point, I will accept whatever you decide, and we can move onto where you would like your theory to go from here. Again, your work and dedication to this topic are always appreciated. I know the effort it entails.

You raised 3 particularly interesting points/questions that I would like to answer in no particular order...

My only concern is that you will be critiqued by a lot more than them in this particular instance. And this is what I truly meant by airtight. If you fight to make it airtight, you will likely fail, but your failure will be difficult to identify, and arguably irrelevent. If you do not make it airtight, you will assume you can let things slide, but you will misjudge on this and leave yourself open to holes you never thought of. — Philosophim

Excellent, we are in agreement here - this is the point that I would like to strengthen the argument to. An interesting side-point is that we cannot technically judge nor have demonstrated the point at which we could say that a given criticism is irrelevant. This appears to be intuited and - surprise surprise! - this will be in relation to what we are implicitly trying to achieve (how far do we aim to take the enquiry?) which in fact brings me on to me next point...

What will your theory serve? Who will it save? Just something to consider. — Philosophim

Please note here that all that I stated in my previous post about my approach is not an accident of preference, but follows from the logic of the epistemology that I am describing. "What will your theory serve?" Those who seek knowledge. That aim is the cornerstone contingency from which all else follows. What I am trying to establish is that once the search is on, all else follows; this is why I build up from the axioms that this contingency brings into the argument. Once there is a search, there are a number of things that we have to accept and adhere to if the search is to be maintained (such as the presumption of doubt/lack of omniscience, relevance to goals, adherence to knowledge and the like) and it has yet to be demonstrated that these axioms are not necessary if the search is commenced. Now, these axioms and the argument that stem from them must be recognised if the argument is to be maintained as well as commenced. At any point, someone can stop searching for knowledge - they have that choice. My inference now and a place that this argument will eventually lead is that once this search is stopped, all else falls apart.

Allow me a brief example in the meantime...
I have [hopefully] established that once we search for knowledge we must regard knowledge in so far as it can be applicable to reality and not contradictory and so, the moment one searches they have to regard their beliefs in relation to their reason and goals. The moment they do away with the search, these criteria fall away; or vis-versa such that once one discards their use of reason or has no concern whatsoever for their goals and how they are achieved, they can no longer search for knowledge. Logically, this has to be the case. "What," you might ask "if someone is no longer rational?" to which I would reply: "Exactly! such people are no longer of relevance - they simply cannot be." Nor can those people who do not search or want to avoid the search to the best of their ability. I recognise that people have that option that they are free to take. In a sense the argument that I am presenting, indeed is appears that epistemology itself is binary; like a light-switch... whenever one searches for knowledge, the entire argument turns "on" and at any point the search, along with the argument, can be turned "off".

Now, one appeal that is actually contained within my argument is to the consequences of giving up the search for knowledge and all that this entails... if knowledge is always measured to some degree in relation to what we are trying to achieve and someone outright rejects the search, it follows that one would be much worse off in making decisions in their lives if they don't know anything.

How is provisional knowledge separate from just a belief? — Philosophim

Great question. There is actually a logical knot that is tangled up here. Let's pull it apart...

They are separate because belief is potential knowledge and knowledge accords with reality. Beliefs are excluded when they are inconsistent or inapplicable. All that remains is [provisional] knowledge.

If a belief is falsifiable it cannot be shown not to accord with reality. Therefore, we must conclude that it does accord with reality. Therefore, an un-falsifiable belief is knowledge.

From this, we have two legs of an answer:
1) Knowledge is all such beliefs that have not been shown to be either inconsistent or inapplicable. Ergo, belief and knowledge are different.
2) All beliefs that remain un-falsified (not shown to be illogical or inapplicable) are knowledge (not Truth)

As argued in the previous post, un-falsifiable beliefs would be knowledge, not belief, only in so far as they are truly un-falsified or un-falsifiable. For example, assuming that "The revolution will eventually come" is un-falsifiable such that it only remained in one's head then yes, they could be said to know it. But the moment that this belief was applied to - say - a finite time frame, it becomes falsifiable and is [provisional] knowledge until it is contradicted (now, of course, with a complex claim like this, the point at which it is "contradicted" might depend on more than the mere assertion, or even the point at which the revolution does not come, such as the integrity of the arguments underlying the claim itself).

A final point about your mention of science...
I can see the comparison that you're drawing but have to disagree. The argument that I am progressing and the method in use are closer to mathematics than to science. Indeed, I would argue that the argument is what would/does justify science (or would even justify a religion for that matter). Which is apparently analogous with science is not the base theory but the criteria that it reveals for seeking knowledge which involves testing beliefs. One of the main differences is that I have not yet made one appeal to data/empiricism/observation to support the argument. Now, these will play a role but that will be because using empirical data works for particular goals, not because all knowledge requires empirical data.

Does that make sense? If I need to clarify any points that I have made please let me know.

An additional thought occurred to me...
Remember that goals set the criteria for knowledge but that these criteria can be more precise depending on what is trying to be achieved (including the kind of knowledge). For example, if science did in fact require falsifiable claims, there is no reason why un-falsifiable claims cannot be excluded in the search for scientific knowledge. Specific branches of enquiry can have specific criteria for specific ends.

What has been argued for in the post above is what we start out with in the non-specific search for knowledge, in light of which consistency and applicability are the criteria of criteria (if you get what I mean). So long as the more specific criteria that come after them do not contradict these two basic criteria, there is no reason that these more specific criteria cannot be put to use for various ends.

They are separate becau — TVCL

"What will your theory serve?" Those who seek knowledge. — TVCL

In regards to potential knowledge versus a belief:

They are separate because belief is potential knowledge and knowledge accords with reality. Beliefs are excluded when they are inconsistent or inapplicable. All that remains is [provisional] knowledge. — TVCL

To clarify, what you are saying is that a belief that has not been contradicted is 'potential knowledge'. A belief that has been contradicted is a 'belief'. But if knowledge is what has not been contradicted, and potential knowledge is what has not been contradicted, is there a difference?

I think I see what you're trying to go for, and its a means of application to decide whether you have reached at knowledge, versus potential knowledge. If I believe that I can flap my arms and fly, but I never try it out, do we want to say that is in the same category as knowledge? I don't think that's what you're going for.

Perhaps we could say something like this. A belief which has been contradicted by reality, is a contradicted belief. A belief which has not attempted to see if reality will contradict it, is an unverified belief. I would say both of these categories are still belief, and not knowledge. And this fits within the terms you've crafted so far. You know that knowledge can only form when it cannot be contradicted, but one must try to actually contradict it for this to be. I believe this also fits in with your aims of a rational person who wishes to seek the truth.

This leads us back to falsifiability. I want to make sure we're both on the same page as to what this means. To be falsifiable means that there is a way to test if it is in accordance with reality. This is a hypothesis. It is a proposition that we can test and discover if an attempt to prove our claim as false will pass or fail. So to fit in with your example, ""The revolution will eventually come", your are correct, this is not falsifiable. It does not become falsifiable until we place restrictions on it that let us actually test it. But until it has actually been tested, it cannot be potential knowledge either. This is because we can construct a contradiction.

If I claim, "The Revolution will not eventually come", then both I and another person could have contradictory potential knowledge. If we understand however that they are both merely untested beliefs, we do not run into a contradiction. This applies whether we put a timeline to test it, or not. If we claim two contradictory beliefs are both potential knowledge, we run afoul of our core rational argument for what knowledge is: something which cannot be contradicted.

Because knowledge is something which cannot be contradicted, I do not think we cannot allow the idea of potential knowledge. The logic can be crafted as thus.

k = knowledge, p = potential knowledge

If k, then !k = false
If p, then !p = true
but p =!p is a contradiction, and knowledge cannot have a contradiction.

This is why I believe potential knowledge as you have defined it now, cannot be a fundamental part of your knowledge system, even if we do not wish to be as precise as science. Ok, I hope I didn't spend too much time on that part.

One of the main differences is that I have not yet made one appeal to data/empiricism/observation to support the argument. — TVCL

I do not think that you need to. We can hold a belief in our head that we cannot contradict with our own beliefs. But then when applying those beliefs in any way, be this empirical, data, or observation, this belief cannot be contradicted by the respective empirical, data, or observation realm.

To clarify, what you are saying is that a belief that has not been contradicted is 'potential knowledge'. A belief that has been contradicted is a 'belief'. But if knowledge is what has not been contradicted, and potential knowledge is what has not been contradicted, is there a difference? — Philosophim

No, "knowledge" is just "potential knowledge" I'm taking this from your advice in your previous posts... we cannot go so far as to say that we have "truth". Knowledge is belief that accords with reality and at this point in the argument we only have beliefs that accord enough with reality to not be excluded on the basis of contradiction or non-applicability. If a belief is consistent and applicable it is knowledge but, technically, this is only "provisional" because we have no means of knowing whether reality will not contradict a given piece of knowledge later (as of yet). And so, we could either consider if "provisional knowledge" or say that "all knowledge that we have is technically provisional".

Can you do me a favour? I think there is an important logical point in your post that you seem to have a better grasp of that I do. Last night, I thought through what "applicability" means which is a key concept in the argument. Being clear about it might give you a clearer take on the relevance of "testing" or "fallibility" within the argument. Your points are probably still relevant but do you mind if I present this idea first and then ask you to re-frame the questions/criticisms above in light of it?

Okay, so applicability...

We say that a belief is excluded as knowledge when it is either inconsistent(contradictory/illogical) or inapplicable.

What does applicability mean?

A belief is applicable when it can be utilised in service of a given goal.

Example 1:
a) Goal: "I want to make gold."
b) Belief: "I can make things its gold by touching them."
c) Outcome: "Touching things does not make them into gold"
d) Conclusion: The belief "I can make things into gold by touching them" is not knowledge.

Example 2:
a) Goal: "I want to walk"
b) Belief: "I can do so using my feet"
c) Outcome: "Using my feet allows me to walk"
d) Conclusion: The belief "I can walk using my feet" is knowledge.

This is how the progression works (if broken down; it may often by that more than one step may happen at once):

Goal -> Belief -> Effect -> Outcome...
Belief serves goal = belief provides knowledge.
Belief does not serve goal = belief does not provide knowledge.

Example 3: (consider the progression):

Goal
To know how 2 makes 4
->
Belief
That 2+2=4
->
Effect
Adding 2 to 2 makes 4 (assuming adherence to logic and numeracy)
->
Outcome
Belief is applicable because 2+2 can make 4
->
Verdict
The belief provides knowledge

Hopefully, the way that the process applies to the abstract further helps to clarify why it is distinct from science. The idea of things constantly being "tested" is due to the fact that we are always living. It is not so much that goals or applicability determine reality (and therefore knowledge) but that the way that we "test" or attempt to determine reality will be by seeing what beliefs are or are not congruent with it, and which beliefs these will be always depends on what goals we are trying to achieve. Reality might be the overall picture behind knowledge, but goals are always the [small] frame that we see it through (and logic stops it from being too blurry).

Let me know your thoughts.

---

Finally, I wanted to leave you with a thought/question: is 2+2=4 a falsifiable belief?

technically, this is only "provisional" because we have no means of knowing whether reality will not contradict a given piece of knowledge later (as of yet). And so, we could either consider if "provisional knowledge" or say that "all knowledge that we have is technically provisional". — TVCL

Great! Truth is the only thing that is certain. Knowledge is our best rational guess at what the truth is. As such, we can imagine that something might come around that may prove our guess wrong one day.

Ok, now we get to a potentially very technical and difficult to discuss section. I will try to break down your examples and see if I can demonstrate the applicable as I have come to understand it.

1. Make gold by touching it.
This is a perfect example of the logic you have concluded. Nothing within the sentence structure necessitates any defined link between the two. You can believe you can make things into gold by touching them. You know you have this belief. What you don't know is if you apply this belief by actually touching things whether this will turn these things into gold.

So you apply it. You take you finger, touch a rock, and it does not turn to gold. Reality has contradicted the application of your belief, not the fact that you had the belief.

2. I want to walk
The problem with this example is the word "walk" is defined as using feet. You aren't confirming that using your feet allows you to walk, because that's part of the definition of walk. If we change the structure to,

a) Goal: "I want to walk"
b) Belief: "I can walk"
c) Outcome: "I am able to walk"
d) Conclusion: Therefore I can walk.

I think this works more the way you intended. You have a belief that you can walk, then you apply that belief, by trying to walk. Reality does not contradict you. The definition of walk is subsumed in the goal, as we know what walking entails. For your purposes, we have a goal, a belief, and an attempt to confirm or deny that the belief fits the goal. Yes, I know this is technical, a subtle difference, and seems like semantics, but this is an important for part 3.

3. To know how 2+2 makes 4

While in your second example, the reliance on a definition for your conclusion was subtle, here it relies on definitions almost exclusively. At this point, we've said, 2+2=4 because there are a set of definitions that tell us 2+2=4. That really doesn't prove anything except that a bunch of definitions say certain conclusions should happen. At this point we've said, I have a belief, and it is proven because I have that belief.

Lets reshape this once again to fit what I feel you are trying to do.

Goal: I want to know if 2+2 makes 4
Belief: I believe 2+2 can make 4
Effect: I make sure I understand the definitions, then I actually add 2+2 together. I find it makes 4 without contradiction.
Outcome: I know 2+2 can make 4 by application

Now I will clarify, you do not have to do math empirically. There are many beliefs and concepts we can test within our own mind, especially if they are products of the mind itself. But it is still an application of our belief to see if it is contradicted. If I stated 2 objects + 2 objects make 4 objects, you would need to apply that with objects. You could imagine objects in your mind, but they aren't actually objects. You need the real deal. What level you need to apply your belief at is determined by your definitions. Thus you could know the definition that 2+2 = 4, but you won't know if that belief is knowledge within your mind/empiricism/etc. until you apply it for yourself within the scope of the potential application.

And yes, if this is what you are going for, this is separate from science. Science rigorously tries to disprove a hypothesis, whereas we are simply trying one application, and determining whether we are contradicted. Still, every belief that is applied is falsifiable by the fact it is being applied. If it is contradicted when it is applied, then we know the belief is false. If it is not contradicted, then it is "knowledge". This should also answer your final question, that 2+2=4 is a falsifiable belief if one applies it.

Fantastic! Great, I think that we're making progress. I've got a few responses to make which might clarify I few points...

The problem with this example is the word "walk" is defined as using feet. You aren't confirming that using your feet allows you to walk, because that's part of the definition of walk. — Philosophim

No, in fairness this is kind of what the example was going for. Applicability is applicability. It might seem tautological to conclude that we walk using our feet but the idea is that we can discover that a definition is applicable to itself and this still provides knowledge (even if it is only trivial). If we considered the alternative and found that we could not in fact walk with our feet but must do so with our hands, this would challenge our knowledge about our definitions.

Consider this:
Goal: "I want to walk with my feet and by "walk" I mean use my feet to move"
Belief: "I can do this by using my hands"
Outcome: "I can do this by using my hands"

Now, if this were to be the case it would reveal something very strange about reality indeed and we might need to revise our beliefs and definitions, but the model would still apply. As it so happens, reality does not seem to allow this and so it's all good.

At this point, we've said, 2+2=4 because there are a set of definitions that tell us 2+2=4. That really doesn't prove anything except that a bunch of definitions say certain conclusions should happen — Philosophim

That's partly why I wanted to have this part of the discussion. So far, you appear to have presumed that applicability is always about proving something external to beliefs or definitions (which is understandable). This can be the case, but does not always have to be so. Applicability can also be "internal" to definitions. In the example that I have given, we find that "2" is, essentially, applicable to itself which, again, is tautological but it is still knowledge.

Thus you could know the definition that 2+2 = 4, but you won't know if that belief is knowledge within your mind/empiricism/etc. until you apply it for yourself within the scope of the potential application. — Philosophim

If it is contradicted when it is applied, then we know the belief is false. If it is not contradicted, then it is "knowledge". This should also answer your final question, that 2+2=4 is a falsifiable belief if one applies it. — Philosophim

Exactly!

Look, it's all about what a person's goals are, right?

If one is merely trying to determine whether arithmetic can be organised in particular ways in their mind, this will shape exactly what part of reality their applications are being applied to (namely, that of the mind) and so, their knowledge is that arithmetic applies to their goals whilst being kept in the mind. Thus, the "test" that 2+2=4 is simply that 2+2=4 (and that logic is adhered to).

However, once their goal is to marry arithmetic to something beyond itself such as physical reality or the relation of objects, the "test" for 2+2=4 is no longer the definition of terms, but whether 2 objects and 2 objects gives us 4 objects...

Internal tests for applicability might have different criteria to external ones and it always depends on what one is trying to acheive.

This is why when you say:

This should also answer your final question, that 2+2=4 is a falsifiable belief if one applies it. — Philosophim

We should have the answer to the issue about falsifiablility...
2+2=4 remains un-falsifiable whilst it remains internal (assuming that we adhere to logic) and this is not because it can never be "tested" per-se, but because the test for the claim is always based in its definitions, and because the definitions are always mirror-images of themselves they can never contradict each-other. Therefore, we're essentially concluding that it is un-falsifiable not because it can never be tested but because the test for applicability is so engineered that it can never be wrong. And so, one can know that 2+2=4. But as you noted, this is different from the knowledge that 2 objects and 2 objects gives 4 objects.

Now, when we apply this to the "revolution example", whilst it remains un-falsifiable it technically amounts to the knowledge that "So long as it is knowledge that remains solely in my head, I can know that the revolution will occur (or will not occur)" - this may seem contradictory, but reality does allow it (perhaps like it allows the knowledge that "chocolate tastes nice" and "chocolate does not taste nice" to be known by two separate individuals). However, just as the external application of 2+2=4 makes it newly falsifiable, so too does our conclusions about the revolution. Therefore, our beliefs about the revolution may be falsifiable in one sense and not in another and it depends upon what is trying to be achieved. In any case, the model still appears to hold without contradiction.

This is a great point to have reached. You seem to have summarised my previous post very well. I can't be certain whether this has answered all of your concerns from your penultimate post and so please re-frame them if you still have them. But in any case, this is looking really good.

I too am excited! I think we're whittling down the remaining issues, and this is looking good. There are just a few questions and clarifications left.

If we considered the alternative and found that we could not in fact walk with our feet but must do so with our hands — TVCL

I hesistate to address this, as I don't want this to lead into certain other questions yet. We're trying to solve the questions of applicability, so lets disregard the question which will hover, "Who determines definitions?"

Instead, what I will assume so we can resolve this portion (unless you think going into that right now would help), is that we know what definitions are. This is necessary, for then we can say we know what beliefs are. So lets define walk. https://www.dictionary.com/browse/walk?s=t
"to advance or travel on foot at a moderate speed or pace"

If you move using your hands, you can say you were able to mobilize yourself using your hands, but you (under the assumptions we are working on) could not say you would walk using your hands. That is because you are introducing something that is not the definition into the definition.

Lets use another example, the old stand by of, "A bachelor is an unmarried man." If we found an unmarried woman, then called her a "bachelor" because she fit part of the definition of being unmarried, we would be violating the portion of the definition that notes it must be an unmarried man.

This would violate what we have set up so far. We cannot have a contradiction in our belief for our belief to be knowledge. If I hold that a bachelor is an unmarried man, then conclude that an unmarried woman is a bachelor, I have a contradiction. The same applies with, "Walking with your hands," Walking uses feet. If I say I can walk with my hands, and hold the definition of walking as is, I have a contradiction.

Application as mentioned does not have to happen only in realms beyond the mind. In showing that a woman cannot be a bachelor, we have used no actual woman or man, because we have determined this logic through the definitions we hold alone. The 2+2 = 4 math equation is the same. While someone could tell us the definition of 2, 4, and addition, we can apply this within our minds in regards to other definitions such as five. Thus I can, without being told, apply 2+2 in my mind and realize that 5 would not be the answer, because it would contradict the definitions of the numbers I hold.

The application in the mind can be summed as, "Applying beliefs to other beliefs without contradiction." The belief could be a definition, or a belief that has been applied without contradiction, aka., knowledge. The application outside of the mind would be a different application, though with the same rule that it cannot be contradicted in its application, and result in a different type of knowledge. I find it helpful to call this "realm or area" in which application is occurring, context. Thus we can apply beliefs within the context of our mind, or the context of empiricism and result in different contextual knowledge.

I believe this gives you the consistency that you are looking for. Further, this will let you clarify a goal by context. Thus I could have my goal be, "To learn if a woman is a bachelor in the context of my mind," and have another goal be, "To learn if a woman is a bachelor in the context of empiricism". This compartmentalizes the goals as a person wishes, and allows a way to establish the limitations one desires in their pursuit of knowledge.

If this is amenable, I believe you have the base you need to continue. The question that I tabled, "What determines definitions?" is something you may want to ask yourself next. You may find this irrelevant to your pursuits however, and feel free to ignore it if you wish. Regardless, what you have constructed so far seems like a solid foundation. Amazing work!

Good stuff.

It occurred to me that the solution to this is quite easy; you can appeal to the hierarchy of one's goals and conclude that one cannot believe in a genuine contradiction.

In my last post I think that I was trying to be clever by keeping the flow of the argument, but you're right; we cannot do with genuine contradiction. We can make an argument that we can walk with our hands if walking might not require use of our feet, but if use of our feet is entailed by the criteria of the goal, walking with anything else will not be applicable: we must walk with our feet.

Here we have an instance of when certain beliefs can be demonstrated to be inapplicable the moment that the goal is posited (which is something that you essentially said in an earlier post). If the goal is to walk we can discard all beliefs that posit not using our feet in order to achieve this goal. This is because any belief like this is tantamount to the belief that "I can use my feet without using my feet" which is illogical and must be discarded as mere belief, not knowledge. We already recognise the primacy of non-contradiction, but allow me to re-justify this by arguing that the reason for why this is explicitly justified by the overall argument is because we have goals, but these are not in isolation and form into a hierarchy, with higher priority goals being implicit in lower priority ones.

Recall that earlier on in the argument I explained that adherence to logic must be a primary goal when we search for knowledge because without it, we are simply unable to do the search; anything that comes to be known can self-destruct without adherence to logic because, basically, if A is not A, Knowledge is not Knowledge and Searching is not Searching.
Therefore, in effect, being illogical is intellectual paralysis.
Therefore, if there is to be a search at all, adherence to logic is required throughout.
Therefore, whilst we are searching for knowledge, all beliefs are judged in relation to goals and goals contain the implicit goal of adherence to logic (non-contradiction).

And so, when we re-examine the goal the matter is actually quite different...
Goal: To walk, meaning movement with my feet (which adhering to logic)
Belief: "I can walk with anything except for my feet"
Effect: Cannot be done
Outcome: Cannot be done
Verdict: The Belief is not Knowledge

To hammer home the point, the only way that it could be knowledge given the criteria of the goal is if we mean something else by "walk" but if not, this argument hopefully demonstrates argument demonstrates the point.

This has been a drawn out explanation to reach a conclusion that I think we both see, but it felt useful for the sake of clarity (my own and perhaps yours too) and useful to demonstrate what I have meant the various times that I've mentioned a "false goal"...

At times I have referred to a false goal, meaning a goal which is inherently unachievable.

"To walk, meaning movement of my feet without using my feet" is a false goal.
Indeed, all such contradictory goals are false goals.
This is because the only belief that can count as knowledge in relation to it is "The means cannot achieve the goal" or simply "This cannot be done" (which translates to "reality does not allow this"). All other beliefs about how to achieve the goal must be un-applicable by default and there be merely belief, not knowledge.

I find this interesting because the argument uses the axiom that we test knowledge in relation to our goals, but this extension seems to explain that what goals we can or cannot have in the first place also tells use something about what we can or cannot know.

Anyway, that should square the problem presented in your post. This hasn't felt like the most streamlined way of giving an answer but hopefully the argument has been made clearly. If not, let me know if you see any issues and we can do some tidying.

As for definitions, they function on the same principles as knowledge in general; a given definition is known based upon what a person or people are trying to achieve, with an implicit adherence to logic. As it goes, this is largely technical and we can skim over it for the moment. We can explore it later, but let's sort out one thing a time.

Looking forward to your response.

Moreover, to stress the point, reality must be posited if there is to be a search because the lack on omniscience requires us to posit a standard external to mere belief by which its potential for knowledge can be judged. — TVCL

Which positing can and does evolve. And these positings are sometimes more-or-less evident as presuppositions, but all built on what are called absolute presuppositions, that are not usually evident but are the foundational presuppositions. Nor questioned, because in brief to question them is to make them explicit as questions, which they are not, and the questioning destructive of the question itself.

This argument taken as whole cloth from R.G. Collingwood, An Essay on Metphysics, (Amamzon, about $15 new last time i looked.)

Wonderful! I believe we are both in agreement, and yes, this conversation was as much for my clarity as yours. It is a rare event that two philosophers come together and think with a mind for the answers to life's questions without worry about ego. I believe you have taken the seed of your idea, and grown it into a strong sapling that will not break in the wind, nor yield easily to an ax. Your focus on goals is a way to make it very relatable and simple to begin with, and the process as a whole is compact, but logically sound. I look forward to seeing where we go next, and I am hopeful a person of your intellect and hard work will be able to make something of it beyond these forum posts once this is said and done.

As for the definitions, absolutely lets table it. Depending on the goal of your epistemology theory, it may not be needed. I think we are ready for your next branches.

Fantastic. This has been an invaluable means for testing, strengthening and clarifying the core argument. You have my sincere thanks for your commitment to philosophy as a discipline and for the attention that you have given to my work specifically. I wish you all the best as you develop your approach too. I saw that you opened it up to the forum which was good to see. You have my apologies for having received so much help from you and for not returning it in equal measure; please understand that given my alternative commitments, I have a limited amount of time to dedicate to philosophy and have the need to focus almost all of it into my own work given its subject and scope.

Looking forward, my plan is to hone and a condense the argument to the point where I can present it to academia with the view of getting further constructive criticism from there, with the eventual view of putting the work into a book or extended essay. Given the conversation we've had, along with the work that was done before this, all of the fragments of the argument seem to be there. What's needed now is to bring them together and give them some polish. There is more to say about where the argument might/does go, but clarifying the core in this way seems to be the most sensible approach.

For this reason, at this stage it appears best for me to take the argument away and write it up in a structured fashion. As of tomorrow I am starting a new career with less free time in which case, I don't know whether I can work on it every day, every week or once every month... What I might ask - if your still willing - is to double-check the "chapters" of my argument as and when I complete them with the understanding that this may be over a period of some time. How does that sound to you?