If one violated the unspoken condition that one is playing standard chess. — Dfpolis
Perhaps it would be better to say that our new knowledge of subatomic structure supplements our knowledge of what it is to be solid; it does not supplant it. Hence,if we think a table is solid, and later find that it has an atomic substructure structure, we will conclude that our initial knowledge was as nothing in it corresponds to atoms. — Dfpolis
Knowing that the table is also made mostly of space, and has a certain atomic structure, does not mean that we are wrong about the table's being solid. — Banno
When we learn that the table has an atomic structure such that it is mostly space, we do not at the same time learn that the table is not solid. We are not wrong to say that the table is solid, and yet mostly consists of the space between particles.The lesson is we shouldn't extend the meaning of "solid" beyond its experiential basis. Saying it is solid is adequate to what we want to know, — Dfpolis
In sum, philosophy can only deal with human knowledge, because, however limited, it is the only knowledge we have. It begins by accepting experience, not as infallible, but as the only raw material that we have to reflect upon. — Dfpolis
It's an interesting example, but do you want to wade into "true by convention" waters? — Srap Tasmaner
I've argued for there being no private language, and hence that knowledge cannot be built on private experience — Banno
I'm not too keen on the way "abstraction" is used here. It's not an uncommon use, but I think there may be some problems with it.You tell the students something; it leaves something out, therefore it is an abstraction, — Srap Tasmaner
Knowledge can't be built only on private experience. But of course there is private experience and of course it is a key contributor to our knowing things. — Srap Tasmaner
...explain why the PLA entails that there is no such thing as private experience. — Srap Tasmaner
It just says that they are not something we should talk about. — Banno
But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences -- his feelings, mood, and the rest -- for his private use? ---- Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language?
In what sense are my sensations private? --- Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. --- In one way this is false, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know if I’m in pain. --- Yes, but all the same, not with the certainty with which I know it myself! --- It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I’m in pain. What is it supposed to mean --- except perhaps that I am in pain?
Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour,--- for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.
The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.
Abstraction from what? — Srap Tasmaner
If the datum is raw, unconceptualized, it's going to be useless for knowledge that's supposed to be inferred from it. If it is already conceptualized, then it's not independent. — Srap Tasmaner
Remember above you did end up reaching for an infallible foundation after all — Srap Tasmaner
Is this knowledge conceptualized? — Srap Tasmaner
Is it "I'm experiencing that" or "I'm experiencing the red triangular facing surface of an object"? — Srap Tasmaner
If one violated the unspoken condition that one is playing standard chess. — Dfpolis
...in that case, the rule isn't wrong; rather the action goes against the rule. — Banno
Perhaps it would be better to say that our new knowledge of subatomic structure supplements our knowledge of what it is to be solid; it does not supplant it. — Banno
We are not wrong to say that the table is solid, and yet mostly consists of the space between particles. — Banno
we might be able to look at how the way we use words such as "solid" forms a foundation in language, and hence in science. — Banno
This is right; and to it we might add that experience here is not just the experience of the individual, but the experience of those around her... — Banno
1. How does a fluent adult speaker of a natural language perceive things as categorized in the terms of her native language, or in terms of the conceptual apparatus common perhaps not just to speakers of her native language but to many other people, or even all people? — Srap Tasmaner
2. How does a pre-linguistic child learn how to do this? — Srap Tasmaner
3. How did mankind begin doing this? — Srap Tasmaner
But then here is §246:
In what sense are my sensations private? --- Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. --- In one way this is false, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know if I’m in pain. --- Yes, but all the same, not with the certainty with which I know it myself! --- It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I’m in pain. What is it supposed to mean --- except perhaps that I am in pain?
Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour,--- for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.
The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.
I don't see any denial here that we have an inner experience of being in pain, or that this might be expressed by saying "I'm in pain". But he does want to deny that this is a cognitive experience, that that-I-am-in-pain is something I learn about myself, and something I could properly be said to know. — Srap Tasmaner
"Have you ever had a ringing in your ears that you weren't aware of until it stopped?" asked the Foolmancer (Jack, an illusionist)
...
The warlord shook his head. "No," he said, almost apologetically, "At least, I don't believe so."
Jack smiled and nodded. "I thought you might say so. I, ah, took the liberty..."
He gestured subtly, and made the ringing noise in Ansom's (the warlord) head cease. He'd been building it up there ever since coming into the room. ...
The warlord cocked his head curiously, then nodded. "I see."
Take counting and mathematical abstraction. After children count enough different kinds of things, they see that the relations of the numbers do not depend on what we count (abstraction) but on the act of counting alone. This is the basis for learning arithmetic. — Dfpolis
Not for truth. The infallibility of awareness is not propositional. It is judgements and propositions that are properly true or false. — Dfpolis
No. It is awareness without abstraction. Abstracting, which forms concepts, leaves data behind and sets the stage for misplaced concreteness. — Dfpolis
Except of course that we do. — Srap Tasmaner
Wittgenstein’s friend has had surgery. Wittgenstein asks him how he feels. “Like a dog that’s been hit by a truck”, the friend wearily groans. Wittgenstein replies angrily: “How would you know what a dog feels after being hit by a truck?"
Personally, I've had knee pain for a long time and can usually tune it out. When it goes away, I learn that I was in pain then but adjusted in a manner where I didn't feel it. But at the time before it went away, I would not have believed I was in pain. Seems like the presence of sensations very much can be inferred, but perhaps only after a transition in their intensity. — fdrake
Yes; folk do lots of things that they probably shouldn't. — Banno
Wittgenstein’s rather unsympathetic response is exactly right, while entirely missing the point. — Banno
(( I'm ignoring the rest of your post because I've actually read Wittgenstein. )) — Srap Tasmaner
It's sociopathic.( I'm ignoring the rest of your post because I've actually read Wittgenstein. ) — Srap Tasmaner
...even if you and I don't mean the very same color when we say "red" - if your red is my blue - we will both stop at the red light. — Banno
So if there are n things on the table -- I can't even set up the question neutrally! -- we say there are n things on the table, not 2n, because we don't count all the sets as things. — Srap Tasmaner
But then we're back to this not being something a child could conceivably figure out through the exercise of natural reason but only in a context where the conceptual apparatus is already in place. — Srap Tasmaner
This is why your use of "awareness", glossed as "infallible knowledge by acquaintance", troubles me. — Srap Tasmaner
However that side of the story works, a lot of the conceptualization of our experience is taking place below the level of awareness — Srap Tasmaner
The way you distinguish knowledge from judgment — Srap Tasmaner
Am I wrong in inferring that you are striving in the direction of properly basic belief? — JerseyFlight
I'm nonplussed here. It's precisely because it is conditional that it is fundamental. If you would play chess, then this is how you must move the bishop. Doing otherwise is not playing chess — Banno
So, our neural representations are identically the object's action on our neural system. — Dfpolis
It's pretty hard to refute this action view — JerseyFlight
The consequences of chess rules can't be a starting point, because the rules themselves are more basic -- the starting point from which we derive the consequences. — Dfpolis
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