Not everything that matters can be expressed with words; some experiences are hard to convey through that sort of code we call a language. — Olivier5

Sure. I've oft argued the very same point. Such things are shown, not said; they are found in what we do, not in what we preach.

But this essence stuff - what does it do that is not done by being able to make use of a word? What does it explain?

And here: it is to be the meaning of a word, and yet also a piece of something in one's mind. But what is in your mind is unknowable to me, and what is in my mind unknowable to you. SO what you mean and what I mean are utterly estranged.

You might reply that we share a world, and so can approximately match the concept with the meaning by looking to the use of the word. But if you are going to do that, why not just talk about the use of the word?

If what we are to do is match my use against yours, the conceptual beetle drops out of the equation.

It was cluttering the post with useless points.

You are forcing language to fit your theoretical preconception of what it must be like, rather than sitting back and looking at what we do with it. — Banno

I have no preconceptions on the matter. I saw a problem - the idea of language games, Wittgenstein's, it's implication that some words are undefiniable because their extensions are missing a common, unifying motif - and analyzed it objectively (to the best of my abilities).

Wittgenstein's theory of language games depends on one crucial assumption - that, to use his own example "game", the the extension of the word "game" is not, in any way, a product of erroneous usage. Only if that's the case can Wittgenstein have a basis for his theory of language games. The language game theory basically asserts that some, all, words lack an essence - the objects in the extensions of such words share attributes alright but no single or set of attributes are common to all these objects.

After that, Wittgenstein takes it a step further - some philosophical words like "good" for example, because they exhibit the same kind of behavior, are devoid of an essence - there are many cases where the word "good" is applied but when we try to look for a unifying attribute in them, none can be found. This leads Wittgenstein to think that philosophical problems having to do with "good" are pseudo-problems; after all, by his logic, there's no such thing as "good" - no essence can be extracted from the extension of the word "good.

As I briefly mentioned earlier, Wittgenstein's language game theory works only if it's true that the word "game" has been correctly applied to all objects in its extension.

Why?

The missing essence is a function of the objects in the extension. How did the objects get there (in the extension) in the first place? By referring to them with the word "game". They only way for objects to be included in the extension of the word "game" is if we accept that the word "game" has been used correctly (to refer to them).

At this point, the idea of word misuse needs to be introduced. In the simplest sense, word misuse occurs when, in our discussion, the word "game" is used to refer to an object that doesn't satisfy the word's intensional definition. If the intensional definition is strictly adhered to it would effectively prevent the inclusion of certain objects in the extension of the word "game", objects that eventually introduce enough chaos in the extension to cause the disapperance of what we're all seeking - the common thread, the essence, in the objects that make up the extension of the word "game".

In summary, if the idea of word misuse is accepted, it precludes the possibility that all instances of the word "game" being used are correct and if that's the case Wittgenstein's theory of language games, implying the absence of essences to words, is incorrect.

Sure. Ignoring my explanation and repeating your misguided argument does not make for interesting conversation. So I will just refer you back to @Srap Tasmaner's first post here, and leave you to your musings.

But I'm having a hard time working out what you think. — Banno

:chin:

But we do call such things chairs, and more besides. Further, despite these being on your account misuses of the word chair, they can be quite successful. Indeed it seems overwhelmingly probable that the number of misuses of the word "chair" far exceeds the number of correct uses.

So pointing out that it is a misuse seems somehow trivial and irrelevant.

What should we make of a theory of language that would label nearly all of our word use as misuse?

What to make of a theory that calls any novel use of a word a misuse?

Why pay it any attention? — Banno

Sorry, if I didn't pay due attention to this but it looks like you're committing the same mistake as Wittgenstein, taking all usages of a word as correct. What then is incorrect usage? If I call an elephant a chair, you'll be among the first to call me out on it but if I call a stool a chair you'll let it slide. Granted that there's a gradation in the error - calling an elephant a chair is more erroneous than call a stool a chair - but they're both errors, right?

it looks like you're committing the same mistake as Wittgenstein, taking all usages of a word as correct. — TheMadFool

Did you notice this...

Part of what TheMadFool misses is that word use (what he might call meaning) changes over time. Any judgement that this is the right meaning will inevitably be arbitrary, and most likely become anachronistic with the movement of the linguistic landscape. Noticing the fraught nature of the notion of correct and incorrect use, he might have simply stoped making that distinction; but instead he wrongly accuses Wittgenstein of thinking that all uses are correct. — Banno

Perhaps it will help.

Part of what TheMadFool misses is that word use (what he might call meaning) changes over time. Any judgement that this is the right meaning will inevitably be arbitrary, and most likely become anachronistic with the movement of the linguistic landscape. Noticing the fraught nature of the notion of correct and incorrect use, he might have simply stoped making that distinction; but instead he wrongly accuses Wittgenstein of thinking that all uses are correct — Banno

Firstly, I agree that the meaning of words change with time but I disagree that the right meaning will be arbitrary. The first time a word is used is the exact moment its true intensional meaning is made public for use by the general populace. I believe this happens a lot in philosophy - coining new words for new ideas is part of the [philosophical] game. This happens in science too but that's something you already know.

Secondly, on the matter of words changing in meaning, this can happen in only two senses: changes in 1. intensional meaning and 2. changes in extensional meaning. Alteration of the intensional meaning occurs routinely I believe as is evidenced by poylsemy and stipulative definitions. Coming to the question of modification in extensional meaning, the usual way this happens is if the intensional meaning has been altered in some way, resulting in a new population of objects in a word's extension. As a rule, the intensional definition has priority over the extensional definition - think of the intensional meaning as a criterion that determines which objects can be included in the extension.

Wittgenstein's observation is that the objects in, I'll stick to his example of the word "game", the extension of the word "game" are not united by a common theme i.e. the word "game" lacks an essence. but, as I've already shown you, the inclusion of objects in the extension of the word "game" is fully determined by the intensional meaning of the word "game". In other words, Wittgenstein's failure to find an attribute common to all objects in the extension of the word "game" is because different intensional meanings of the word "game" have been employed by people.

Now, here's the interesting bit. Take the word "pussy". It has two meanings: 1) vagina and 2) cat. What's the difference between 1 and 2? Intensional meaning, which results in different objects being included in the extension of the word "pussy". How is this different from the situation we find ourselves in with the word "game"? They're completely identical. In both cases, the extension of the word has been altered by changes in the intensional meaning and my question is this: what reasons are there to think that the wide variety of objects, missing an essence, in the extension of the word "game" is NOT exactly identical to the situation where a vagina and cat, completely different objects, are in the extension of the word "pussy"? Wittgenstein, in essence, is conflating polysemy with the condition of a word lacking an essence.

But this essence stuff - what does it do that is not done by being able to make use of a word? What does it explain? — Banno

It explains the existence of meaning and its elusiveness. Also the tension between what we mean (our intent) and what we say (our use). We cannot effectively express all of what we mean, sometimes. Miscommunication occurs. There’s also a loss of information in any translation between two languages, which I would find impossible to account for if language was only « use », if there was no transcendance to it in the form of a (admittedly elusive) meaning. So I find the distinction between meaning and usage important, if only to account for the occasional (frequent in fact) misalignment between them.

I've been called a cheat for moving en passent or castling; and indeed at some stage in the development of the game, this would have been true. — Banno

Does this show that chess does not have rules? No.
Does it show that at some points in history chess did not have rules? No.
Does it show that the rules of chess are not explicit? No.

I don't remember much of the history, but I believe what you would find is that there is a period when there are regional variants of chess, that in India, say, during this period, they play a version of chess that includes castling, but elsewhere do not.

Can you castle through check? No you may not, but I'll bet dimes to donuts that this was not part of the original rule allowing castling. It looks like a refinement for a situation not foreseen by the original rule.

Both have correlates in the evolution of natural languages, and both imply periods or regions in which what is correct play may be open to dispute, or to simple disagreement. But at no point and in no place do we have anyone playing chess with no rules whatsoever.

Sure, all that.

So I find the distinction between meaning and usage important, if only to account for the occasional (frequent in fact) misalignment between them. — Olivier5

But, if it is so elusive and unstateable, could it do this?

Maybe I was overly dramatic. Some concepts are easier to fathom than others. They can be pointed at, envisaged from different angles, apprehended to some degree through wit and poetry and even in philosophy, at least by philosophers not afraid to use their right brain.

I'm not sure I can think of a game without rules, not off the top of my head, or of a game with implicit rules. What are the canonical examples?

I'm not arguing that they do not have rules; nor that they cannot be stated; I'm arguing that the rules need never be explicitly stated for the game to occur.

The canonical example - well, consider the way we use the word "chair" without ever actually setting out the exact rules for that use...

It's pretty much what you said here:

There is nothing I could say about Wittgenstein or any other philosopher or any philosophical theory, and nothing anyone else could say about any of those things, that could or should carry more weight than the facts that words in natural languages mostly don't have clear definitions but can be used correctly or incorrectly. — Srap Tasmaner

Oh sure throw that back at me!

Anyway, now that I'm home from work I can sniff around Kripkenstein and see what sorts of things they reach for.

I'm going to stand by that quote there because science. I'm just kind of exploring now exactly how the "language game" concept works. (Last week I read Sellars's "Some Reflections on Language Games" but I cannot say I've really absorbed it all.)

Also this

Noticing the fraught nature of the notion of correct and incorrect use, he might have simply stoped making that distinction — Banno

is not something I can imagine saying. I hate talking this generally, or jumping to the end, but I guess what you're headed for here is roughly

"incorrect" = "not how we use that word around here" or "not how we use that word around here"

Which is just orthodox linguistics, and I get that you want to undercut there being some, I don't know, Platonic Standard of the meaning of a word, fine, but I don't see any value in suggesting that we should give up the distinction between correct and incorrect. I like the linguistics version, and I think it matches people's behavior, so you could say this is the content of "correct" -- but I'm not sure about that either, because it feels awfully far from how people conceive their own practice of judging usage.

Sorry to ramble so -- in a bit of a rush.

I'll look forward to your considered response...

As for

"incorrect" = "not how we use that word around here" or "not how we use that word around here" — Srap Tasmaner

I was thinking more of dropping correct/incorrect in favour of successful/unsuccessful or even useful/useless.

I was thinking more of dropping correct/incorrect in favour of successful/unsuccessful or even useful/useless. — Banno

I'm just not signing up for "dropping" words that non-philosophers use successfully all the time. (See what I did there?)

I could see bringing "correct" back to its original home, having a close look at what circumstances give rise to talk of correct and incorrect usage, etc. etc. (I always have that in the back of my mind in talk about definitions -- giving a definition is a specific practice with pretty narrow and comparatively rare occasions.)

There’s also a loss of information in any translation between two languages, which I would find impossible to account for if language was only « use », if there was no transcendance to it in the form of a (admittedly elusive) meaning. — Olivier5

In fact I posit that translation from one language to another cannot be explained other than by reference to the meaning of words that has to be conveyed as faithfully as possible in another language.

So meanings exist.

some philosophical words like "good" for example, because they exhibit the same kind of behavior, are devoid of an essence — TheMadFool

Yet when people say things like: ‘that’s no good’, we know what they mean, by and large. A certain threshold of efficacy hasn’t been met. When they say: ‘the best is the enemy of the good’, you and I know that they mean something that connects to notions of ‘good enough’, of ‘optimum’, to the idea that ‘good’ is relative to a project, an intention that one can fail to achieve by trying too hard.

Rest assured that the concept of ‘good’ has an intuitive meaning, and that it’s by and large the same for everyone aware of the concept.

So meanings exist. — Olivier5

Here's a thumbnail sketch of an alternative approach you might find interesting. Sellars called it a kind of functionalism. The basic idea looks sound to me, but I haven't spent much time with yet. It does give a pretty natural account of translation.

Here's a thumbnail sketch of an alternative approach you might find interesting. Sellars called it a kind of functionalism. The basic idea looks sound to me, but I haven't spent much time with yet. It does give a pretty natural account of translation. — Srap Tasmaner

Sorry, too long, and judging from the conclusion, not alternative to much.

Yet when people say things like: ‘that’s no good’, we know what they mean, by and large. A certain threshold of efficacy hasn’t been met. When they say: ‘the best is the enemy of the good’, you and I know that they mean something that connects to notions of ‘good enough’, of ‘optimum’, to the idea that ‘good’ is relative to a project, an intention that one can fail to achieve by trying too hard.

Rest assured that the concept of ‘good’ has an intuitive meaning, and that it’s by and large the same for everyone aware of the concept. — Olivier5

It appears that definitions can be of two types:

1. AND definitions. An example of this type of definition is mammals. I'm going to rely on my rudimentary knowledge of biology to define a mammal as a living organism that has fur AND gives birth to live young AND provides milk to its offspring. In AND definitions, all the essential features listed in the definiens must be present in a living organism to qualify as a mammal. A cat has all the listed features of a mammal, so does a dog and therefore both are mammals.

2. OR definitions. An example of this type of definition is good. Good is when you give to charity OR believe in equal opportunity for all OR value other people's property OR value the lives of other people, etc. In OR definitions, its' not necessary that all features listed in the definiens be present. A person may give to charity but think that giving people equal opportunity is nonsense but this person still deserves to be called good. Another person may value people's lives and outright reject committing murder but still steal and this person too is good, so and so forth.

Technically, AND definitions are the type that matters in logic and so, in philosophy too. With AND definitions there's no Wittgensteinian problem of the family resemblance kind. A thing, if it is to be referred with a given word, must possess all features as listed in the definiens and that's that. An essence will always exist in AND definitions.

OR definitions are problematic in logic and philosophy because they cause the Wittgensteinian problem. Since it's not mandatory that all features listed in the definiens be present in things referred to with words that have OR definitions, it becomes possible that no feature common to all these things exists in these objects.

The definition of good is an OR definition.

In fact I posit that translation from one language to another cannot be explained other than by reference to the meaning of words that has to be conveyed as faithfully as possible in another language. — Olivier5

A transcendental argument...

A
A only if B
Hence, B.

If one does not agree that (A only if B), one is not obligated to the conclusion.

They are of use mainly in reinforcing the views of those who accept them, and have little influence on those who do not.

You seem to have rediscovered Normal Form.

Any proposition can be parsed in this form. It's not specific to definitions.

:ok:

A transcendental argument... — Banno

Not at all. I'm just saying that translation cannot be explained other than by reference to meaning. That's all. If you can describe what translation is without making reference to meaning, then please do... Otherwise my point stands.

Not at all. — Olivier5

Yes, it is. That's its logical structure.

f you can describe what translation is without making reference to meaning, then please do... — Olivier5

Suppose you have two sentences, P and P', such that "P" is true IFF P'.

Then P is a translation of P'

There, an extensional definition of translation.

The definition of good is an OR definition. — TheMadFool

I'm not talking of definitions proper, but of something much more basic: the intuitive meaning of the word.

There is a common meaning at the core of "good", which everyone gets intuitively. That's how we usually manage to understand the new usages of a word, by going back to its core meaning and trying to figure the connection with new usage.

The important (and obvious) point to remember is that usage is linked to meaning but is NOT meaning. If words had no meaning, nobody would use them....

Symbolic languages are used to convey information through symbols. If those symbols convey no information, why are you talking?

Suppose you have two sentences, P and P', such that "P" is true IFF P'.

Then P is a translation of P' — Banno

LOL. How can you even verify the truth of a proposition if that proposition has no meaning?