I don't know how to argue for or against the will in terms of metaphysical reality. I do use the likes of Hume and Mill to drive the point that agency includes rationality as well as the five senses or empirical observation.

read into the Frankfurt style cases,
basically imagine this,
"there are three people, Black, White, and Jane, Black and Jane both hate White and want to kill him,
so Black installs a chip in Jane's brain that basically determines, that if Jane is given the chance to kill White she has two options, one, she kills him from her will, thus the chip does not intervene, two, Jane is hesitant and doesn't want to kill White, then the chip will intervene and control her brain to kill White"

this story presents a very interesting case which kind of is based on intent and defeats the principal of alternate possibilities, Jane can do only one thing, and that is kill White, but she either can kill him out of intent or out of control.
if she kills him out of intent, then we would morally blame her, but why is that different from control? she still has no choice?
that's a basic summary

This is a really broad question but I will keep it short. I have recently finished reading Spinoza's Ethics and one of the things he tried to push is the idea that free will is just an illusion. I have heard of this idea many times before from different philosophers and I generally agree with it by now. I have for now settled with the argument that we cannot control our desires which guide our decisions, thus we are not really free. Now my question is what does the absence of freedom mean for ethics and how can our actions be judged if we cannot really control them. — Leiton Baynes

Perhaps you would want to ask what could be true of reality?

1) We are in a dream or a simulation, which does not allow us to have free will. However, if we were outside the dream or a simulation, we would have free will.

2) We are in a dream or a simulation, which does not allow us to have free will. However, if we were outside the dream or a simulation, we would have free will. Nonetheless, at times, a higher being like God (or creator of the simulation) interferes, and allows us to have free will.

3) We are in a dream or a simulation, which does not allow us to have free will. However, if we were outside the dream or a simulation, we would have partial free will, due to a presence of a higher being, like God, who partially controls our free will.

4) We are in a dream or a simulation, which does not allow us to have free will. However, if we were outside the dream or a simulation, we would still have no free will, due to a presence of a higher being, like God, who completely controls our free will.

5) Regardless of whether or not we are in a simulation, we have complete free will (but maybe we could think that we don't because we don't realize the minds full potential), and there could or could not be a higher being, nonetheless, if there were one, it would give us complete free will.

6) Regardless of whether or not we are in a simulation, in either case, we have no free will due to our desires.

7) Regardless of whether or not we are in a simulation, we have partial free will and perhaps there are things we can and cannot control due to our desires.

8) Regardless of whether or not we are in a simulation, we are born with partial free will, however, we are able to control our free will by further realizing the minds potential.

And other possibilities, like a combination of these or something new.

Isn't it possible Spinoza was a compatabilist? He did have learning in Scholasticism

Scholasticism was the work of the Catholic "schoolmen" who were usually Thomists. Aquinas and Augustine were both compatabilists

if she kills him out of intent, then we would morally blame her, but why is that different from control? she still has no choice? — Augustusea

I see the point you're trying to make. But this scenario is not the reality we are questioning here. However, if this had been actual event, Jane was put in a predicament where her will was compromised. And yes, she could choose to not kill White, period. She has nothing to do with the chip being in her brain if she didn't agree to it. She could choose not to have the chip in her brain.

6) Regardless of whether or not we are in a simulation, in either case, we have no free will due to our desires. — telex

How about this -- there is something else that controls our desires. Rationality has been the center of this human ability to go against our desires.

How about this -- there is something else that controls our desires. Rationality has been the center of this human ability to go against our desires. — Caldwell

:up:

I think I disagree with the idea that free will presupposes ethics; in any given moment, confronted with a situation that allows a "choice", there is only one course of action that is most moral from the point of view of consequentialism, for example - the one that achieves the most desirable consequences. So one really has no choice if they want to be as moral as possible. One could, however, argue that from the point of view of a law or rule based morality that what must be done in a certain situation is apply a law, and, while there may be different degrees to which the law is applied and different ways of applying it, the law is ultimately applied, so, once again, there is only a superficial amount of choice.

In our society, there are three types of judgments that we make:
1. We come to a decision or a judgment about what actually and factually occurred;
2. Based on what we decide happened, we judge a person's moral culpability;
3. We come to a decision or a judgment about what to do with a person that factually broke a law.

Only the second one above should be affected by any lack of free will. We should not comment on a person's morality if they were compelled to act the way they did. However, determinism does not mean that we need to throw away our judicial system entirely. This is true for the following two reasons:

1. The judicial system itself is based on determinism in that is predetermined that if one performs certain acts, then society will respond in certain ways;
2. If a person has performed illegal acts because the person's genes and environment compelled them to act that way, then a change in environment can prevent that person from engaging in the same antisocial acts again.

The real question regarding free will and ethics is what environmental changes are best to bring about the behavior which is favorable to society and the individual. The justice system needs reform to take determinism more into account, but determinism's existence doesn't necessarily mean we need to throw the justice system away.

I don't know how to argue for or against the will in terms of metaphysical reality. — Caldwell

Maybe we are not in a good position to connect our experience of what is caused with the pursuit of a better life. Spinoza is posing some of the question in reverse. Everything that happens is necessary. The pursuit of change is neither discounted or proved by such an observation. That isn't an argument against Aquinas and Augustine so much as a challenge to them.

Show where one thing ends and another begins.

I don't know how to argue for or against the will in terms of metaphysical reality. I do use the likes of Hume and Mill to drive the point that agency includes rationality as well as the five senses or empirical observation. — Caldwell

There are 9, I say 9 senses which are in the domain of empirical observation. The Big five, as I like to call them are what we would call Sensus Externi.

The Small four, Sensus Internus.

Why Big five? Me and you can both watch a firework together. The only way for me to gather data on what it is like to watch a firework, as you, is to use fine data analysis of internal physiological phenomena.

I can be reasonably certain you saw the firework because I saw it too. Big.

I can only be reasonably certain how it made you feel by analyzing computer data, small. I can't trust you telling me without trusting one of your small four to reliably determine what is going on across all the other 8.

That's all I wanted to chime in with. I'm trying to keep out of free will debates as I no longer know where I stand on the issue.

I can be reasonably certain you saw the firework because I saw it too. Big.

I can only be reasonably certain how it made you feel by analyzing computer data, small. I can't trust you telling me without trusting one of your small four to reliably determine what is going on across all the other 8. — MSC

Couldn't agree more. But there's always behavioral cues, Big, that you can gather from me without me being aware, small, I'm giving away my secrets, i.e. liking the fireworks.

That's all I wanted to chime in with. I'm trying to keep out of free will debates as I no longer know where I stand on the issue. — MSC

:) No prob!

Everything that happens is necessary. The pursuit of change is neither discounted or proved by such an observation. That isn't an argument against Aquinas and Augustine so much as a challenge to them. — Valentinus

Good point! I think observations such as "everything that happens is necessary" is often misconstrued as 'everything' is known, therefore, determined. Note that the observation excludes anything that hasn't happen yet -- or at least this is a fair interpretation. But we will get to the validity of that observation some other time.

Couldn't agree more. But there's always behavioral cues, Big, that you can gather from me without me being aware, small, I'm giving away my secrets, i.e. liking the fireworks. — Caldwell

Indeed, behavioural cues and what you say definitely contribute to the data set, even if they do fall short of the task of completing the data set.

I'd like to get more into the intelligibility of moral views. So, I'm gonna try to explain further using the traditional arguments we're all familiar with.

I think I disagree with the idea that free will presupposes ethics; in any given moment, confronted with a situation that allows a "choice", there is only one course of action that is most moral from the point of view of consequentialism, for example - the one that achieves the most desirable consequences. So one really has no choice if they want to be as moral as possible. One could, however, argue that from the point of view of a law or rule based morality that what must be done in a certain situation is apply a law, and, while there may be different degrees to which the law is applied and different ways of applying it, the law is ultimately applied, so, once again, there is only a superficial amount of choice. — Aleph Numbers

Moral absolutism presupposes free will. How? According to moral absolutist's view, there are universal moral principles that are accessible to all of us regardless of culture or situations. So while moral absolutism is contra relativism, it is not necessarily out to destroy it. There is an allowance given to moral relativism -- but only because universal moral principles take into consideration that individual experiences are an inescapable and necessary ingredient to becoming a moral agent.

But this idea that a moral agent, coming out of experiences, can turn around and recognize those universal moral principles is what makes free will real. Or, what makes "will" necessarily free will. We have an awareness, through meditative analysis, if not through coaching, that there are principles that are true regardless of time, place, or culture.

So, to answer the line I quoted above from Aleph -- "..one really has no choice if they want to be as moral as possible": This is simply the opposite of the argument for moral absolutism. We are moral absolutist because we have free will. How? Overcoming our habits, our culture, or situation and recognizing that there are universal moral principles out of which we are moral agents extraordinaire is what it's all about.

Isn’t morality subjective? Doesn’t it depend on the environment, culture, society in which one finds oneself? So, my morality would be different to yours. So, I don’t see morality as being absolute. There may be common aspects of morality across cultures due to other underlying reasons. For example it is rarely moral to kill someone else because this impacts negatively on the society, though there have been societies where killing people was seen as a way to please the gods, and thus considered ‘moral’.

Isn’t morality subjective? Doesn’t it depend on the environment, culture, society in which one finds oneself? So, my morality would be different to yours. So, I don’t see morality as being absolute. There may be common aspects of morality across cultures due to other underlying reasons. For example it is rarely moral to kill someone else because this impacts negatively on the society, though there have been societies where killing people was seen as a way to please the gods, and thus considered ‘moral’. — Roy Davies

You're equating moral beliefs with moral truths, which is the very distinction being considered. Moral realists will argue that there are moral truths separate to our moral beliefs, and that our moral beliefs are only correct if they correspond to moral truths.

So it's not enough to argue that we each have our own moral beliefs; you also need to argue that our moral beliefs are also moral truths to argue that morality is subjective.

You're equating moral beliefs with moral truths, which is the very distinction being considered. Moral realists will argue that there are moral truths separate to our moral beliefs, and that our moral beliefs are only correct if they correspond to moral truths. — Michael

Does a statement of subjective preferences not correspond with the reality of one's beliefs? Is a moral belief held by a culture not a moral truth for them, even if it is subjective? Perhaps it doesn't correspond to a moral fact, but it seems to me to be a truth nonetheless. When one says "x is acceptable behavior for us", with reference to one's culture, this is a moral truth - for the culture in question this is a statement of what is permitted for that culture. This is more than just a belief. I think the term you are looking for is "moral fact", not moral truth.

Does a statement of subjective preferences not correspond with the reality of one's beliefs? Is a moral belief held by a culture not a moral truth for them, even if it is subjective? — Aleph Numbers

Not necessarily. One culture might believe that there are men living on the moon. They'd be wrong. That culture might believe that killing the sick is morally acceptable. They might be wrong.

Perhaps it doesn't correspond to a moral fact, but it seems to me to be a truth nonetheless. When one says "x is acceptable behavior for us", with reference to one's culture, this is a moral truth - for the culture in question this is a statement of what is permitted for that culture. This is more than just a belief.

That there are things permitted for that culture is not necessarily that there is nothing more to morality than what each particular culture permits. It may be that some things are (objectively) wrong even if a particular culture permits them.

I think the term you are looking for is "moral fact", not moral truth.

"Moral truth" and "moral fact" are interchangeable for me. If they mean something else to you then reconsider my previous post using "moral fact" rather than "moral truth".

"Moral truth" and "moral fact" are interchangeable for me. If they mean something else to you then reconsider my previous post using "moral fact" rather than "moral truth". — Michael

I don't mean to be pedantic, but I think it's a useful delineation. Truth can be subjective, but facts are, obviously, objective.

Not necessarily. One culture might believe that there are men living on the moon. They'd be wrong. That culture might believe that killing the sick is morally acceptable. They might be wrong. — Michael

That there are things permitted for that culture is not necessarily that there is nothing more to morality than what each particular culture permits. It may be that some things are (objectively) wrong even if a particular culture permits them. — Michael

It seems useless to me to speculate about how any action could possibly conflict with an unknown moral fact. Maybe there is the fact: one should allow any culture to act according to their subjective morality.

You're equating moral beliefs with moral truths, which is the very distinction being considered. Moral realists will argue that there are moral truths separate to our moral beliefs, and that our moral beliefs are only correct if they correspond to moral truths.

So it's not enough to argue that we each have our own moral beliefs; you also need to argue that our moral beliefs are also moral truths to argue that morality is subjective. — Michael

One could also argue from the point of the relativist that the realist has to demonstrate the existence of moral facts. Do they exist out in the universe, or are moral claims tied to some observable entity? Where is the reasoning?

It seems useless to me to speculate about how any action could possibly conflict with an unknown moral fact. — Aleph Numbers

What makes you think that it's unknown? There are plenty of moral philosophies which seek to make moral facts known, e.g. utilitarianism or the categorical imperative.

Maybe there is the fact: one should allow any culture to act according to their subjective morality.

Why? If it is a moral fact that killing the sick is wrong and if we have a moral duty to stop others from doing wrong then we have a moral duty to prevent a culture from acting according to a subjective morality that permits killing the sick.

But even if we should allow any culture to act according to their subjective morality, it doesn't then follow that there aren't (objective) moral facts.

You're more than welcome to act as if men are living on the moon, but there aren't.

One could also argue from the point of the relativist that the realist has to demonstrate the existence of moral facts. Do they exist out in the universe, or are moral claims tied to some observable entity? Where is the reasoning? — Aleph Numbers

The realist has to demonstrate the existence of objective moral facts and the anti-realist has to demonstrate the non-existence of objective moral facts. Everyone has the burden to support their claims.

In the case of @Roy Davies he tried to argue that objective moral facts don't exist because different cultures have different moral beliefs. I simply explained that his conclusion doesn't follow.

So, I don’t see morality as being absolute. — Roy Davies

What does it even mean to say this! Absolutism claims universal moral truths -- not that you are put in shackles to follow them.

Morality is a social convenience, nothing more.

What if we lived in a harsh environment where a sick person would mean we have to spend effort on looking after them, to the extent that the entire group might perish? Which is more moral then, looking after the sick person or looking after the group? This is the kind of moral decision many herd animals make (or rather, it is probably built in). For the herd to survive, sometimes the weak and sick have to be left behind so that the predator doesn't take the fitter animals.

So, if morality is absolute, then surely it should be absolute across the board, not just for humans?

What if we lived in a harsh environment where a sick person would mean we have to spend effort on looking after them, to the extent that the entire group might perish? Which is more moral then, looking after the sick person or looking after the group? This is the kind of moral decision many herd animals make (or rather, it is probably built in). For the herd to survive, sometimes the weak and sick have to be left behind so that the predator doesn't take the fitter animals.

So, if morality is absolute, then surely it should be absolute across the board, not just for humans? — Roy Davies

It could very well be. My point is only that your remark that different cultures have different beliefs doesn't mean that morality is subjective.

Morality is a social convenience, nothing more. — Roy Davies

So, morality is optional, then?

One could also argue from the point of the relativist that the realist has to demonstrate the existence of moral facts. Do they exist out in the universe, or are moral claims tied to some observable entity? Where is the reasoning? — Aleph Numbers

The existence of moral principles is not like proving the existence of physical entities. Obviously, there is a distinction. Some truths can be understood through rational deliberation or meditation. A priori arguments can help with the understanding, and so can empirical ones. But one thing that prevents us from admitting the validity of a universal principle is the constant use of induction or anecdotal accounts of experience, especially in the first person perspective.
I gather that by "demonstrate", you mean to show it in actions or point to some empirical entities. Or do you mean through argumentation, or a question-and-answer that results in either contradiction or validity of one's moral view?