The present article seeks to show that theories based on convention are doomed to be incomplete, because they will necessarily be unable to deal with novel and eccentric uses — Banno
I take it that you think convention can be saved — Banno
Are internal and external conventions immune to malapropisms? — Banno
The main difference as I see it is that both conventions internal and external to an utterance have the potential to be studied and codified, whereas prior and passing theories haven't. — RussellA
Davidson wrote:
Because a speaker necessarily intends first meaning to be grasped by his audience, and it is grasped if communication succeeds, we lose nothing in the investigation of first meaning if we concentrate on the knowledge or ability a hearer must have if he is to interpret a speaker. What the speaker knows must correspond to something the interpreter knows if the speaker is to be understood, since if the speaker is understood he has been interpreted as he intended to be interpreted. The abilities of the speaker that go beyond what is required of an interpreter—invention and motor control—do not concern me here. Nothing said so far limits first meaning to language; what has been characterised is (roughly) Grice’s non-natural meaning, which applies to any sign or signal with an intended interpretation. What should be added if we want to restrict first meaning to linguistic meaning? The usual answer would, I think, be that in the case of language the hearer shares a complex system or theory with the speaker, a system which makes possible the articulation of logical relations between utterances, and explains the ability to interpret novel utterances in an organized way.
This answer has been suggested, in one form or another, by many philosophers and linguists, and I assume it must in some sense be right. The difficulty lies in getting clear about what this sense is. The particular difficulty with which I am concerned in this paper (for there are plenty of others) can be brought out by stating three plausible principles concerning first meaning in language: we may label them by saying they require that first meaning be systematic, shared, and prepared.
(1) First meaning is systematic. A competent speaker or interpreter is able to interpret utterances, his own or those of others, on the basis of the semantic properties of the parts, or words, in the utterance, and the structure of the utterance. For this to be possible, there must be systematic relations between the meanings of utterances.
(2) First meanings are shared. For speaker and interpreter to communicate successfully and regularly, they must share a method of interpretation of the sort described in (1).
(3) First meanings are governed by learned conventions or regularities. The systematic knowledge or competence of the speaker or interpreter is learned in advance of occasions of interpretation and is conventional in character.
Davidson ended with this:
The problem we have been grappling with depends on the assumption that communication by speech requires that speaker and interpreter have learned or somehow acquired a common method or theory of interpretation—as being able to operate on the basis of shared conventions, rules, or regularities. The problem arose when we realized that no method or theory fills this bill. The solution to the problem is clear. In linguistic communication nothing corresponds to a linguistic competence as often described: that is, as summarized by principles (1)–(3). The solution is to give up the principles. Principles (1) and (2) survive when understood in rather unusual ways, but principle (3) cannot stand, and it is unclear what can take its place. I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed. There is therefore no such thing to be learned, mastered, or born with. We must give up the idea of a clearly defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then apply to cases. And we should try again to say how convention in any important sense is involved in language; or, as I think, we should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate by appeal to conventions.
I'll go along with Witti and say "No"Can a singular, novel use, be called conventional? — StreetlightX
Again, it could only do so were it a first use that came to be repeated in a community....can a singular, novel use, establish a convention? — StreetlightX
No.Can we, without bending grammar out of shape say something like: "that was a one-time convention"? — StreetlightX
can a singular, novel use, establish a convention?
— StreetlightX
Again, it could only do so were it a first use that came to be repeated in a community. — Banno
So I suppose I am committed to not bending "convention". — Banno
That which is being interpreted is already meaningful. — creativesoul
...the assumption that communication by speech requires that speaker and interpreter have learned or somehow acquired a common method or theory of interpretation—as being able to operate on the basis of shared conventions, rules, or regularities.
(1) First meaning is systematic. A competent speaker or interpreter is able to interpret utterances, his own or those of others, on the basis of the semantic properties of the parts, or words, in the utterance, and the structure of the utterance. For this to be possible, there must be systematic relations between the meanings of utterances.
(2) First meanings are shared. For speaker and interpreter to communicate successfully and regularly, they must share a method of interpretation of the sort described in (1).
(3) First meanings are governed by learned conventions or regularities. The systematic knowledge or competence of the speaker or interpreter is learned in advance of occasions of interpretation and is conventional in character.
If, in the referential use, Jones refers to someone who did not murder Smith by using the description ‘Smith’s murderer’, the reference is none the less achieved by way of the normal meanings of the words. The words therefore must have their usual reference. All that is needed, if we are to accept this way of describing the situation, is a firm sense of the difference between what words mean or refer to and what speakers mean or refer to. Jones may have referred to someone else by using words that referred to Smith’s murderer; this is something he may have done in ignorance or delib- erately.
I think that this is key in actually understanding the issues that malapropism raise — creativesoul
Communication by speech requires shared meaning. — creativesoul
how much time should I spend on this? How important is it? Are the other things that warrant a better use of my time? — JerseyFlight
Well, the answer depends on what you want. — Banno
Well, the answer depends on what you want.
— Banno
Not so. That's pure subjectivity, you might as well be a hedonists. It depends on what's important! — JerseyFlight
Communication by speech requires shared meaning.
— creativesoul
A casual phrase, into which I might be reading too much, but I think this puts the cart before the horse, and is perhaps at the core of the difference between our approaches. — Banno
There's a bunch of posters - Harry Hindu, @TheMadFool, @Olivier5 for starters - who take the view, contra Wittgenstein and most of philosophy of language since - that meaning is made inside one's head and then transported to another head by putting it into words. That meaning precedes communication.
This leads to the reification of meaning, and all sorts of odd attitudes.
Isn't it rather that we do things with words - things that are embedded in our everyday comings and goings?
The notion of meaning is added, post hoc, as a lie-to-children that wrongly explains what we did - "Oh, I meant the other plate", and so on. — Banno
Communication by speech does not require shared meaning. Communicating by speech is just doing things with words. Meaning only enters into it when we become self-conscious of what it is we are doing.
That's not well expressed, but it'll do while I get some more coffee. — Banno
A casual phrase, into which I might be reading too much, but I think this puts the cart before the horse, and os perhaps at the core of the difference between our approaches.
There's a bunch of posters - Harry Hindu, @TheMadFool, @Olivier5 for starters - who take the view, contra Wittgenstein and most of philosophy of language since - that meaning is made inside one's head and then transported to another head by putting it into words. That meaning precedes communication.
This leads to the reification of meaning, and all sorts of odd attitudes.
Isn't it rather that we do things with words - things that are embedded in our everyday comings and goings?
The notion of meaning is added, post hoc, as a lie-to-children that wrongly explains what we did - "Oh, I meant the other plate", and so on.
Communication by speech does not require shared meaning. Communicating by speech is just doing things with words. Meaning only enters into it when be become self-conscious of what it is we are doing.
That's not well expressed, but it'll do while I get some more coffee — Banno
How is it possible to know whether we're using the word correctly without knowing what the correct meaning is? — TheMadFool
It appears that Wittgenstein thought that it isn't necessary to know the meaning of a word in order to use it correctly hence, meaning is use for him. — TheMadFool
Are you making the french press or what? — creativesoul
I'd like to try to keep this relevant to the topic as well, so I appreciate your efforts towards that. — creativesoul
Communication by speech does not require shared meaning. Communicating by speech is just doing things with words. Meaning only enters into it when we become self-conscious of what it is we are doing. — Banno
I did spend some time wondering why "That's not well expressed, but it'll do while I get some more coffee" was a point of contention... — Banno
And I want to further examine the relation between this and Godel's incompleteness. — Banno
That was not well expressed by me. I meant in the paragraph at the top of this post. — creativesoul
"I dance the flamingo" is true IFF RussellA dances the flamenco.
...and at issue is what conventions permit the move from flamingo to flamenco.
Grice might have us do so by inferring your intent in making the utterance; but as I explained above, intent is not as clean a tool as Grice seems to suppose. — Banno
Malapropism is exhibited in the relationship between two sentences, in that a sentence exhibits malapropism if it is different to the sentence the interpreter was expecting. — RussellA
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