Holy shit Isaac! Just read through a bit of the Naming and Necessity thread and after going through just one of our exchanges, I'm left with a very poor impression of myself...

My apologies!

:yikes:

It's not that I think I was wrong, mind you. But I was certainly being a dick... Jeez.

RussellA - The main difference as I see it is that both conventions internal and external to an utterance have the potential to be studied and codified, whereas prior and passing theories haven't.

The present article seeks to show that theories based on convention are doomed to be incomplete, because they will necessarily be unable to deal with novel and eccentric uses — Banno

It is true that theories based on convention are doomed to be incomplete, but, pragmatically, no-one needs conventions to be 100% complete. I probably only understand less than 10% of the conventions around me, but that is more than enough for me to have managed to have got through life. Most of what people experience in the world is novel to them, the trick is to keep those conventions that allow one to cope with novel situations and discard those conventions that cannot. In life, conventions are always being undermined to be replaced by new ones, but as long as one group of people follow the same convention at the same time, then conventions serve their purpose. Conventions are more guidelines than algorithms.

I take it that you think convention can be saved — Banno

As regards internal conventions, syntax and semantics, they are saved in books and articles on linguistics. As regards external conventions, that Goodman Ace was a humourist, people smile whan making a joke, they are saved in society - in personal memories, books, magazines, television shows, films, stories, etc

Are internal and external conventions immune to malapropisms? — Banno

It is not so much that internal conventions are immune to malapropisms, as internal conventions include within its framework the possibility of an expression being a malapropism. Internal conventions of syntax and semantics establishes a framework within which an expression, such as "cross my eyes and hope to die" (p. 251) has a set of possible meanings - malapropism, irony, pun, hyperbole, lie, etc. To know which particular meaning, one then has to consider the external conventions.

It is not so much that external conventions are immune to malapropisms, as external conventions include the knowledge within its framework that humourists use malapropisms. External conventions within society establishes a framework within which we know that humourists such as Goodman Ace use a wide variety of linguistic tools, including malapropisms, irony, etc. Using our Shelockian proficiency of observation, deduction, forensic science, and logical reasoning, we investigate the physical context around Goodman Ace's utterance, such as prior sentences, speed of pronunciation, tone of voice, pitch of voice, audience reaction, etc and determine from our knowledge of the conventions of the world that he has most likely used a malapropism rather than a pun, for example.

The main difference as I see it is that both conventions internal and external to an utterance have the potential to be studied and codified, whereas prior and passing theories haven't. — RussellA

Well, I don't agree with this. It seems to me implicit that prior and passing theories are to be understood as able to be codified; and that the point of introducing malapropisms is to show that any such codification would be inadequate.

Further, that inadequacy seems to me to apply ot what you have called internal and external conventions - after all, if they are conventions, they can be made explicit - that is, they can be codified.

And once codified, a suitably erudite speaker will be able to produce a counter-instance.

Davidson wrote:

Because a speaker necessarily intends first meaning to be grasped by his audience, and it is grasped if communication succeeds, we lose nothing in the investigation of first meaning if we concentrate on the knowledge or ability a hearer must have if he is to interpret a speaker. What the speaker knows must correspond to something the interpreter knows if the speaker is to be understood, since if the speaker is understood he has been interpreted as he intended to be interpreted. The abilities of the speaker that go beyond what is required of an interpreter—invention and motor control—do not concern me here. Nothing said so far limits first meaning to language; what has been characterised is (roughly) Grice’s non-natural meaning, which applies to any sign or signal with an intended interpretation. What should be added if we want to restrict first meaning to linguistic meaning? The usual answer would, I think, be that in the case of language the hearer shares a complex system or theory with the speaker, a system which makes possible the articulation of logical relations between utterances, and explains the ability to interpret novel utterances in an organized way.

This answer has been suggested, in one form or another, by many philosophers and linguists, and I assume it must in some sense be right. The difficulty lies in getting clear about what this sense is. The particular difficulty with which I am concerned in this paper (for there are plenty of others) can be brought out by stating three plausible principles concerning first meaning in language: we may label them by saying they require that first meaning be systematic, shared, and prepared.

(1) First meaning is systematic. A competent speaker or interpreter is able to interpret utterances, his own or those of others, on the basis of the semantic properties of the parts, or words, in the utterance, and the structure of the utterance. For this to be possible, there must be systematic relations between the meanings of utterances.

(2) First meanings are shared. For speaker and interpreter to communicate successfully and regularly, they must share a method of interpretation of the sort described in (1).

(3) First meanings are governed by learned conventions or regularities. The systematic knowledge or competence of the speaker or interpreter is learned in advance of occasions of interpretation and is conventional in character.

Enter malapropisms and novel use and the issues that arise with the inability to take them into account by virtue of using the above principles...

Davidson ended with this:

The problem we have been grappling with depends on the assumption that communication by speech requires that speaker and interpreter have learned or somehow acquired a common method or theory of interpretation—as being able to operate on the basis of shared conventions, rules, or regularities. The problem arose when we realized that no method or theory fills this bill. The solution to the problem is clear. In linguistic communication nothing corresponds to a linguistic competence as often described: that is, as summarized by principles (1)–(3). The solution is to give up the principles. Principles (1) and (2) survive when understood in rather unusual ways, but principle (3) cannot stand, and it is unclear what can take its place. I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed. There is therefore no such thing to be learned, mastered, or born with. We must give up the idea of a clearly defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then apply to cases. And we should try again to say how convention in any important sense is involved in language; or, as I think, we should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate by appeal to conventions.

I would think that if we acquired knowledge of how language use first begins(what that requires), then all these issues would be resolved.

It seems that Davidson begins with interpretation(or the account he's reporting on does). That which is being interpreted is already meaningful. I agree with Davidson's conclusions here that there is no such thing as language, if the account being critiqued is what counts as such. Basically that conventional account is found lacking. I'm not sure that it's entirely wrong though. I further think that it's lacking as a result of not being basic enough.

The attribution of meaning and all that that requires happens prior to interpretation and language. Though, even here, I would argue against Grice's notions of natural meaning as well. I personally do not think any of them have gotten basic meaning right, and without doing that we cannot expect for them to get language use and/or successful communication right either... not entirely anyway.

I think the way to proceed is to be clear about what a T-sentence can do, and the role of other aspects of Davidson's semantic theory.

"Smith's murderer is insane" is true IFF P

What we put in the place of P has to be, on Davidson's account, determined by an anthropological examination of the circumstances. This process is the development of theory of the meaning of "Smith's murderer is insane". Hence, it can be interpreted as referring to Fred, Smith's murderer, who is insane:

"Smith's murderer is insane" is true IFF Fred is insane (true)

Or it might be taken as referring to Frank, Smith's murderer, who is not insane:

"Smith's murderer is insane" is true IFF Frank is insane (false)

Or it might be taken to be about Francis, who is insane but did not murder Smith, but to whom it is apparent that Jones is referring:

"Smith's murderer is insane" is true IFF Francis is insane (true)

Or it might be taken to be about Forbes, who is not insane and did not kill Jones, but to whom it i is apparent Jones is referring:

"Smith's murderer is insane" is true IFF Forbes is insane (false)

The interpreter is free to choose from any of these, and will do so on the basis of what is known about Jones, and what they think Jones believes.

That is, the T-sentence can be applied to the description "Smith's murderer" to choose the best referent available based on the evidence of Jone's behaviour and the context of the utterance.

I'm not suggesting that you disagree with any of this, but rather making it explicit so that w have a shared understanding - a passing theory - of how T-sentences function.

Can a singular, novel use, be called conventional? — StreetlightX

I'll go along with Witti and say "No"

...can a singular, novel use, establish a convention? — StreetlightX

Again, it could only do so were it a first use that came to be repeated in a community.

Can we, without bending grammar out of shape say something like: "that was a one-time convention"? — StreetlightX

No.

So I suppose I am committed to not bending "convention".

Ah.. you went back to the earlier part, and I moved on. We can do that. I just do not want to be an impediment to progress. So far as that answer goes...

Good. I have been thinking something along those lines since that longer post. In doing so, I had already arrived at believing that the T sentence may not be in as much peril as I had thought at the time I wrote that. "Good" because I am quite fond of it, and happy to know that it's use is consistent and/or amenable with my own position.

Cheers. Seems we agree that brains are not so hard-wired as some have suggested.

can a singular, novel use, establish a convention?
— StreetlightX
Again, it could only do so were it a first use that came to be repeated in a community. — Banno

I think that this is key in actually understanding the issues that malapropism raise for the three principles in question. They cannot account for this, can they?

So I suppose I am committed to not bending "convention". — Banno

It would be inconvenient if conventions could not be convened. But of course it remains the case that one cannot be the only one to attend a convention. We come together, nudge nudge wink wink. Say no more.

That which is being interpreted is already meaningful. — creativesoul

Oh, yes. It's a process of interpretation, not of getting at the move from non-meaning to meaning. Explaining the origin of meaning remains outside his remit.

I'm suggesting that that failure to understand the very basics of meaning may constitute the entirety of the problem(s). Perhaps?

...the assumption that communication by speech requires that speaker and interpreter have learned or somehow acquired a common method or theory of interpretation—as being able to operate on the basis of shared conventions, rules, or regularities.

As Davidson notes, this assumption is wrong. There is no theory or method that "fills the bill" according to Davidson. But, what if the problem is not so much that no method or theory of interpretation fills the bill, but rather that we expect it to?

Communication by speech requires shared meaning. I do not think that shared meaning requires any separate and distinct method/theory of interpretation. Successful interpretation is equivalent to shared meaning, isn't it?

Could this just be a case of unnecessarily multiplying entities?

If two people draw correlations between the same things, say "Smith's murderer" and a particular individual, then they have a common method between them which does both, attributes meaning and succeeds in communication(results in shared meaning).

(1) First meaning is systematic. A competent speaker or interpreter is able to interpret utterances, his own or those of others, on the basis of the semantic properties of the parts, or words, in the utterance, and the structure of the utterance. For this to be possible, there must be systematic relations between the meanings of utterances.

(2) First meanings are shared. For speaker and interpreter to communicate successfully and regularly, they must share a method of interpretation of the sort described in (1).

(3) First meanings are governed by learned conventions or regularities. The systematic knowledge or competence of the speaker or interpreter is learned in advance of occasions of interpretation and is conventional in character.

The comments regarding Donnellan seem pointed at the first; the process of interpreting "Smith's murderer" is not systematic, since it relies on the context of Jones' utterance. Davidson does not see this as overly problematic:

If, in the referential use, Jones refers to someone who did not murder Smith by using the description ‘Smith’s murderer’, the reference is none the less achieved by way of the normal meanings of the words. The words therefore must have their usual reference. All that is needed, if we are to accept this way of describing the situation, is a firm sense of the difference between what words mean or refer to and what speakers mean or refer to. Jones may have referred to someone else by using words that referred to Smith’s murderer; this is something he may have done in ignorance or delib- erately.

But it is the third that malapropism shows wanting.

Yes. Again, you've somehow chosen something out of the paper that I've already been carefully considered/studying. It's like you're reading my mind.

Contrary to the impression I may have left earlier, it seems that Davidson is largely in agreement with what I wrote earlier as it pertains to the referential aspects of "Smith's murderer". I think that that post set out that "firm sense" of the difference between what words mean and what a speaker means, but there still remains important differences between he and I, for it did so in a way that does not seem entirely agreeable to Davidson.

At least some(perhaps the bulk) of the disagreement involved the conclusion about saying something true by using a false statement. I found that that statement was not false, for all the reasons set out heretofore, and it seems that you've since shown that the T sentence is amenable to that account as well.

And yes...

The third principle is what Davidson is finding to be wanting when it comes to malapropisms. I would agree, mainly because of the "learned in advance" part. Those interpretations, that shared meaning, happens at the time.

I think that this is key in actually understanding the issues that malapropism raise — creativesoul

My simple question is, how much time should I spend on this? How important is it? Are there other things that warrant a better use of my time?

Communication by speech requires shared meaning. — creativesoul

A casual phrase, into which I might be reading too much, but I think this puts the cart before the horse, and os perhaps at the core of the difference between our approaches.

There's a bunch of posters - @Harry Hindu, @TheMadFool, @Olivier5 for starters - who take the view, contra Wittgenstein and most of philosophy of language since - that meaning is made inside one's head and then transported to another head by putting it into words. That meaning precedes communication.

This leads to the reification of meaning, and all sorts of odd attitudes.

Isn't it rather that we do things with words - things that are embedded in our everyday comings and goings?

The notion of meaning is added, post hoc, as a lie-to-children that wrongly explains what we did - "Oh, I meant the other plate", and so on.

Communication by speech does not require shared meaning. Communicating by speech is just doing things with words. Meaning only enters into it when be become self-conscious of what it is we are doing.

That's not well expressed, but it'll do while I get some more coffee.

how much time should I spend on this? How important is it? Are the other things that warrant a better use of my time? — JerseyFlight

Well, the answer depends on what you want.

Well, the answer depends on what you want. — Banno

Not so. That's pure subjectivity, you might as well be a hedonist. It depends on what's important!

I could go on about this, but I won't do it in this thread because it would derail your idealistic chess game. I just wanted to make a swift point that was being blinded out of the analysis. There are questions that are more important than the ones you are asking here.

That all depends upon you. You are the only one that can decide that much. Not me.

Personally, given my meticulous nature and fondness for complex systems and methodology(I'm an artist, inventor, engineer, manufacturer, etc.) I find that it does me a whole lot of good, on a personal level, and on a public level.

On a pragmatic level, understanding this paper's underlying subject matter(meaning), is crucial to understanding some of the everyday events that I find myself in. Since I've been doing philosophy(and I'm fond of the analytical approach, but not at all devoted so to speak I do not place logic itself upon a pedestal) I've been able to effectively communicate with(and actually understand) a much wider variety of people than before. Common ground seems to be much easier to find when we understand thought, belief, meaning, and truth and how they work and/or operate in our lives.

Well, the answer depends on what you want.
— Banno

Not so. That's pure subjectivity, you might as well be a hedonists. It depends on what's important! — JerseyFlight

There's a whole lot packed into that reply, which if I unpack for you will leave you calling me a pedant. And yet if you want a proper answer, the unpacking must occur.

So, for starters, the "No" should have been a "Yes", and your answer, that you want what is important. The stuff about hedonism - well, isn't hedonism getting what you want? And yes, asking what you should do is asking a subjective question, hence, it's somewhat superfluous to point that out.

All of which will be apparent to one who has studied philosophical analysis - from Socrates onward.

So if what you want is doing stuff that is important, shouldn't you spend a bit of time working out what is important?

SO, in oder to answer your question, you should first tell us what you think is important.

Communication by speech requires shared meaning.
— creativesoul

A casual phrase, into which I might be reading too much, but I think this puts the cart before the horse, and is perhaps at the core of the difference between our approaches. — Banno

It very well may be. Our approaches and positions seem to me at least to be very much alike. Given I've adopted a number of your approaches to certain subject matters, I'm probably more like you than you are like me.

:wink:

There's a bunch of posters - Harry Hindu, @TheMadFool, @Olivier5 for starters - who take the view, contra Wittgenstein and most of philosophy of language since - that meaning is made inside one's head and then transported to another head by putting it into words. That meaning precedes communication.

This leads to the reification of meaning, and all sorts of odd attitudes.

Isn't it rather that we do things with words - things that are embedded in our everyday comings and goings?

The notion of meaning is added, post hoc, as a lie-to-children that wrongly explains what we did - "Oh, I meant the other plate", and so on. — Banno

We're in complete agreement here aside from one notable exception. I agree that meaning can precede communication. Not always though. And perhaps most importantly, not for any of the reasons many folk hereabout offer. Meaning is not made inside one's head, not by any stretch.

A simple example...

The meaning of "tree" includes a tree. Trees are not inside of our head, nor are words.

Communication by speech does not require shared meaning. Communicating by speech is just doing things with words. Meaning only enters into it when we become self-conscious of what it is we are doing.

That's not well expressed, but it'll do while I get some more coffee. — Banno

The first and last statement are points of contention. The second one isn't a problem.

A casual phrase, into which I might be reading too much, but I think this puts the cart before the horse, and os perhaps at the core of the difference between our approaches.

There's a bunch of posters - Harry Hindu, @TheMadFool, @Olivier5 for starters - who take the view, contra Wittgenstein and most of philosophy of language since - that meaning is made inside one's head and then transported to another head by putting it into words. That meaning precedes communication.

This leads to the reification of meaning, and all sorts of odd attitudes.

Isn't it rather that we do things with words - things that are embedded in our everyday comings and goings?

The notion of meaning is added, post hoc, as a lie-to-children that wrongly explains what we did - "Oh, I meant the other plate", and so on.

Communication by speech does not require shared meaning. Communicating by speech is just doing things with words. Meaning only enters into it when be become self-conscious of what it is we are doing.

That's not well expressed, but it'll do while I get some more coffee — Banno

It appears that Wittgenstein thought that it isn't necessary to know the meaning of a word in order to use it correctly hence, meaning is use for him. But when he says "...use it correctly..." referring to a word being used, he must, as of necessity, know the "correct meaning" of that word. How is it possible to know whether we're using the word correctly without knowing what the correct meaning is? Wittgenstein is contradicting himself by first denying the existence of a correct meaning and then employing the concept of correct meaning in order to show that we correctly use words.

Are you making the french press or what?

:wink:

Not sure if you wanted to continue the recent bit, or revise those two contentious claims. I'd like to try to keep this relevant to the topic as well, so I appreciate your efforts towards that thus far. My turn to get coffee...

:point:

How is it possible to know whether we're using the word correctly without knowing what the correct meaning is? — TheMadFool

That is a very good question.

Pick a word, any word, and present its correct meaning. Let's see where that leads.

It appears that Wittgenstein thought that it isn't necessary to know the meaning of a word in order to use it correctly hence, meaning is use for him. — TheMadFool

Or perhaps that using it correctly shows that one knows what it means.

When someone goes to a store and asks for five red apples, receives five red apples, and goes on their way, it seems that that person knows how to use the words. Ask such a person what the meaning of "five red apples" is, and they may or may not know how to answer.

Are you making the french press or what? — creativesoul

Turkish. I did spend some time wondering why "That's not well expressed, but it'll do while I get some more coffee" was a point of contention... :brow:

I'd like to try to keep this relevant to the topic as well, so I appreciate your efforts towards that. — creativesoul

I poked the ants nest again. Couldn't help myself. I've read myself into a state of amorphous misunderstanding, and need some time to digest. That will involve a number of conjectures, probably ill-begotten.

I want to go back to the two books this led me to - by you and by @StreetlightX. Also, @Janus took some considerable flack but did not voice an opinion on the actual article; @tim wood dropped a quick line or two and ran; and the logicians have stayed away.

And I want to further examine the relation between this and Godel's incompleteness.

Communication by speech does not require shared meaning. Communicating by speech is just doing things with words. Meaning only enters into it when we become self-conscious of what it is we are doing. — Banno

I did spend some time wondering why "That's not well expressed, but it'll do while I get some more coffee" was a point of contention... — Banno

That was not well expressed by me. I meant in the paragraph at the top of this post.

And I want to further examine the relation between this and Godel's incompleteness. — Banno

I found that an apt analogy. The continual need for ad hoc corrections based upon new information not yet covered by strict conventional sets of rules. That's the problem in a nutshell I think...

To expect something as fluid as natural/common language to be limited to such a fixed set of conventional rules is to neglect to consider the fluidity itself. It is to mistake our account of how language works with how language works. As always, communication and language use existed in it's entirety prior to our account of it. As such, we can get it wrong. This paper shows that we have in some important respects...

That was not well expressed by me. I meant in the paragraph at the top of this post. — creativesoul

Ah. Improved the passing theory, we did. Like what Davidson said. We dun good.

Sure. We're now both drawing correlations between the same things, after a little effort on my part to clarify which two statements I was referring to with my word use.

:wink:

"I dance the flamingo" is true IFF RussellA dances the flamenco.

...and at issue is what conventions permit the move from flamingo to flamenco.

Grice might have us do so by inferring your intent in making the utterance; but as I explained above, intent is not as clean a tool as Grice seems to suppose. — Banno

How do you get the truth condition without reference to a convention? I agree with the drive of RussellA's argument, but there's something I think is not exact:

Malapropism is exhibited in the relationship between two sentences, in that a sentence exhibits malapropism if it is different to the sentence the interpreter was expecting. — RussellA

I agree that the malapropism is exhibited in the relationship between two sentences, but I disagree that it's about what the interpreter expects, because that might be wrong, too.

"Flamingo" isn't a malapropism because the hearer expects to hear it. It's just an incompatibility in two ideolects at that stage, and that incompatibility could be resolved either way. The speaker could convince the hearer that the dance is, in fact, called the "flamingo".

Without convention, you have no malapropism, you have simply an unresolved conflict between ideolects that could - in theory - be resolved either way.

I think it follows that the term "malapropism" and the ralted concept is an utterance-external convention to keep the utterance-internal convention locked in. But a convention isn't absolute: it's dependent on lasting consensus. It may be more efficient to codify a recurring passing theory into a new prior theory than to try to convince a great number of people that they're wrong.

There are a lot of language wars around; "I couldn't care less," vs. "I could care less," for example.

When I hear "I dance the flamenco," what goes on in my head might be analysed thus:

"I dance the..." sets up the expectation that what follows is a dance. At this point, I may or may not pay enough attention to the actual utterance to hear that the other person is actually saying "I dance the flamingo," instead "I dance the flamenco." I could, on account of phonetic similarity, mishear the utterance. That is: I arrive at the correct interpretation by mistake.

If I do hear "flamingo" instead of "flamenco", my prior theory fails, but I can't yet assume why. Maybe there's a dance, the "flamingo", that I don't know? Maybe what I thought was called the flamenco is really called the "flamingo"? Maybe "flamingo" is a cutesy nickname for flamenco I'm not aware of? Maybe the speaker misspoke? Maybe the speaker has an "incorrect" prior theory?

This isn't just one "passing theory"; these are many? So why do I select the malapropism one? Common sense? A desire to be right? In any case, because word meanings are conventional there are "tie breakers" so to speak. Dictionaries, dance experts, and so on. All of that involves social conventions that have to do with language.

And I can have prior theories and passing theories, for example, about the reliability of any one dictionary, though they would not be - strictly speaking - linguistic prior theories.

Basically, with Gricean non-natural meanings, you need conventions to fix truth values, or else you have just unstructured conflict. The rest is just a question what you mean by "linguistic", and that was a question that was definitely in the air in the mid-eighties (with the creation of Langacker's "Cognitive Grammar", or Fillmore's "Construction Grammar", as opposed to hugely popular "Univeral Grammar" by Chomsky).

I'm enjoying this thread, but am a bit shy to respond because I'm not very familiar with the philosophy of language.