What if the person has no preference? How can she possibly chose then?

But for me it doesn't have to be an all or nothing, as I believe that compatibilism is possible. — A Ree Zen

Compatibilism is bait and switch applied to moral philosophy. The bait is that you can have your moral cake (responsibility stemming from free-will) and Humean-Kantian causality (time sequence by rule) too. The switch is that the kind of "free will" that is compatible with time sequence by rule does not support human responsibility.

To be responsible for an act, one must be the origin of that act. If the act was already predetermined before we were born, clearly it does not originate in anything we did. So, compatibilism is fraud.

But, you may ask, if free will is incompatible with strict determinism, and determinism is a consequence of causality, then surely we cannot be the cause of our acts. Hence, either way, we cannot be responsible for our acts and there is no free will in a sense that would make us responsible.

This argument is fallacious, resting on an equivocal use of "cause." Clearly, if we are the cause of, and so responsible for, our free acts, we cannot be using "cause" in the sense of time-sequence by rule. What other sense is there?

The problem is that most moderns are too lazy to study the history to philosophy. When you do, you find that for over a thousand years, philosophers distinguished two kinds of efficient causality: accidental (Humean-Kantian time sequence by rule) and essential (the actualization of potency).

We all know that if you plant tomato seeds, you are the cause of the tomato plants that subsequently sprout and that there is a rule linking the first event (planting of a certain type of seed) to the second event (the subsequent sprouting of the corresponding plant). This is an example of accidental causality. If you think about it, or if you have read Hume, you also know that there is no necessity linking the first event to the second. Since we have two separate events, there is always the possibility that something may intervene between them to disrupt the expected sequence.

Because accidental causality has no intrinsic necessity, it is a strange basis for arguing that whatever we choose, we choose of necessity, i.e. that we have no free will that would be the basis for moral responsibility.

Those who have done their homework/due diligence know that in his Metaphysics Aristotle distinguished a second kind of causality, which is the kind that makes us responsible for our considered acts. This is essential causality. Aristotle's paradigm case is a builder building a house. Of course, the cause of the building is the builder, and the effect is the house being built. He notes that the builder building the house is identically the house being build by the builder. (These are identical because they are merely different ways of describing the same event.)

Since there is only one event, and not two as in time sequence by rule, there is no possibility of disruption by an intervening event. Since the cause and effect are linked by the identity of the event, this kind of causality acts by its own (and not a prior) necessity. -- The prior physical state of (a pile of building materials) does not necessitate the form of the finished house.

If we think about Aristotle's example, we see that it is simply an instance of a potential (of the materials to become a house) being actualized by an agent (the builder). So, any actualization of a potency by an agent is an instance of essential causality.

We can now see that free choices are not uncaused choices. They are the actualization of one of several possible courses of action by the moral agent. So, causality and free will are compatible, just not the kind of causality modern philosophers think of.

What if the person has no preference? How can she possibly chose then? — Olivier5

Well then we would indeed need to add some other mechanism of choice to our model. I just just don't see that we need to, or even ought to. Is the evidence that such circumstances exist really that compelling? Literally no preference at all.

Nothing else developed an allergy to peanuts. Nothing else developed a fear of spiders. So what, then, is responsible?

I understand the need to define parts of the body for the sake of understanding. But no matter what part of the body we can point to we are still pointing to the body. Though I am able to fathom why a being who cannot see the back of his own head may come to believe he is not the whole, and may identify with some part or other, further examination proves otherwise.

It's an old thought experiment. What would happen to a donkey (Buridan's ass) asked to chose between two equally desirable options, such as two equal bags of barley? If your theory is correct, it should be unable to chose and die of hunger, but anyone familiar with donkeys know that this will never happen. The donkey would just make a random choice, because it doesn't matter which bag it choses so it will just chose one of them. Any one. Likewise, a guy with no preference between green and red is perfectly capable of chosing between a red and a green button...

's an old thought experiment. What would happen to a donkey (Buridan's ass) asked to chose between two equally desirable options, such as two equal bags of barley? If your theory is correct, it should be unable to chose and die of hunger — Olivier5

No. If my theory is correct it would be impossible to set up. It would be impossible to create two bags of barley so equal in every way that there would not exist even the most miniscule preference for one over the other (not to mention the donkey so astonishingly attuned that it could correctly judge that the two bags were miraculously equal in every way, rather than mistakenly judge one to have some advantage over the other).

The point is, even if it was possible, the donkey would chose immediately with no hesitation whatsoever.

No donkey in this world will ever let itself die of hunger because it is faced with two equally attractive bags of barley. It would just go straight to whatever bag. Trust me on this.

What you are saying would work with a machine, though. I mean, a poorly programmed one. If the coder has not envisage a situation of equal desirability of two options, then the program will not be able to chose. So a good programmer would include a routine to chose haphazardly if all the options are weighted the same.

No donkey in this world will ever let itself die of hunger because it is faced with two equally attractive bags of barley. It would just go straight to whatever bag. Trust me on this. — Olivier5

Quality argument. I'll bear the technique in mind for next time.

1. Restate assertion.
2. Add "Trust me on this".

Opening posts' question: Do People Have Free Will?

Some people do, some people don't.

You must not have spent much time with donkeys in your life.. Any donkey out there is able to chose between two equivalent options in a nanosecond, especially when hungry. They won’t let themselves die of hunger because of a trivial philosophical problem. They are smarter than that.

You're welcome to try the experience by yourself if you don't believe me. Don’t use donkeys — you don’t understand them. Put two dozen people in as many booths with a red and a green button in front of them and ask them to chose and press one button every 10 seconds for a few minutes. You will see that even the people who like green more than red press red once in a while. It’s not like all of them will chose to press their favorite color for the entire damn test. Since they are explicitly given the latitude to chose, and since there’s zero consequence, they will chose their less favorite color quite often. People are not automatons.

Why is it so hard for you to envisage a mental coin flip?

You must not have spent much time with donkeys in your life. — Olivier5

( note to self: the Buridan’s ass paradox is only understandable by people who have some familiarity with actual donkeys and with how they behave, eg how strong-willed and earnest they can be)

You must not have spent much time with donkeys in your life. — Olivier5

The donkey is irrelevant. It's the circumstances you're placing it in that I'm claiming is impossible. If your not going to respond to what I actually write then there's little point in discussion.

Any donkey out there is able to chose between two equivalent options in a nanosecond — Olivier5

How would you know a) that the options are exactly equivalent in every way, and b) that the donkey correctly perceives that they are?

even the people who like green more than red press red once in a while. It’s not like all of them will chose to press their favorite color for the entire damn test. — Olivier5

Why would we be presuming colour preference was the only like/dislike in consideration?

It's the circumstances you're placing it in that I'm claiming is impossible. — Isaac

How would you know a) that the options are exactly equivalent in every way, and b) that the donkey correctly perceives that they are? — Isaac

Whether or not the donkey is correct in its appreciations of its options is not the point.

The point is that in life, one frequently encounters a certain type of situation, where one needs to make a choice in a limited amount of time (e.g. one doesn't want another donkey to eat one's barley), and yet the options appears equally valuable (correctly or not). In such situations, one has to step back from the assessment and make the following choice: does one 1) continue to assess the situation further in order to improve its precision, knowing this will require time and energy and may not change the assessment of both options by a significant margin; or 2) just go for any of those options, randomly chosen, which may save you time and energy for more important things.

People chose stuff at random all the time. Donkeys too. You cannot survive without this ability; your mind would go in a state of metastable stasis everytime you need to chose between a light grey and a slightly darker grey pair of pants, of anytime you have to chose which of two similar plums to eat.

Computers have this problem of having to make decisions in time. "Metastability" is what happens to a computer when it cannot do so. The thing freezes. You have to switch it off and on again. Does you mind ever freeze when you have to chose between two similar plums? No? That would indicate that you are a lot smarter than a computer and at least as smart as a donkey. You can make decisions based on nothing. It's a feature.

is that in life, one frequently encounters a certain type of situation, where one needs to make a choice in a limited amount of time (e.g. one doesn't want another donkey to eat one's barley), and yet the options appears equally valuable — Olivier5

People chose stuff at random all the time. Donkeys too. — Olivier5

You've still not provided any argument that either of these things are the case, only that you believe them to be (which I'm already well aware of). The question I originally asked was why anyone might be compelled to accept such a position, what sorts of arguments there might be in favour of it.

Intuitively, I don't think one could ever present me with two options identical in every way, and intuitively I experience a wide range of preferences all at once (aesthetics, novelty, ease, satiation, privation, excitement, calm...). So I don't see any reason at all why I would ever have trouble choosing between two options when it seems so easy to find some minor aspect of difference satisfying one of my many competing preferences.

Even not having to bother moving my head to check out the other option is a preference for the first one.

Intuitively, I don't think one could ever present me with two options identical in every way, — Isaac

When asked to 'have one' from a basket of plums, people often choose one without looking closely at them (doing so is considered impolite for a number of reasons) and they often do so by reaching out to the basket and choosing one at random. They all look the same so there's no point in doing otherwise. Like one would pick a card at random... This is something that does demonstrably happen.

Otherwise how would they chose a plum, do you think? Is it your contention that their predispositions to certain hues, certain smells, certain shapes would always predetermine their choice? If we are absolutely predetermined in that way, then has the plum I will choose tomorrow from a basket been predetermined of all eternity, written somewhere in the grand book of the universe right after the Big Bang or something? Is that your theory?

Because mine is much much simpler: we just pick plums at random.

This is something that does demonstrably happen. — Olivier5

How does it 'demonstrably' happen? We're talking about the mental processes preceding a choice, how do you propose to demonstrate them?

Otherwise how would they chose a plum, do you think? — Olivier5

Nearest to their hand is one option. How is not wanting to appear impolite not a preference? If it is, then the nearest plum to hand might be chosen because it's proximity best satisfies the preference for not appearing impolite by choosing any other.

mine is much much simpler: we just pick plums at random. — Olivier5

I don't see how that's simpler. You have to now commit yourself to the existence of a mental mechanism for initiating random action, the alternative uses mechanisms we already know exist.

Nearest to their hand is one option. — Isaac

We've seen that already with Buridan's ass: sometimes one cannot determine which option is nearest, it's impractical or impossible.

Two plums at the same distance from one's hand, never stopped anyone from picking and eating a plum.

How is not wanting to appear impolite not a preference? — Isaac

Of course it's a preference, one that in the circumstances says something like: "I must not appear picky or distrustful by looking at all the plums closely or by hesitating. Given the circumstances, choosing at random is my best option."

You have to now commit yourself to the existence of a mental mechanism for initiating random action, the alternative uses mechanisms we already know exist. — Isaac

You're afraid to commit? To what? The idea of randomness?

You know what I find hard to commit to? The idea that the plum I will choose tomorrow has been in fact chosen for me in all eternity, a split second after the big bang... The idea of a totally closed universe, decided once and for all (by whom?), static, in which time means nothing, and in which we’re not the captains of our own souls on the choppy waters of life, but rather some kind of deluded automatic pilots quite likely to crash when offered something as trivial as two identical and equidistant plums.

You're afraid to commit? To what? The idea of randomness? — Olivier5

I can't at all see how you got from rejecting certain theoretical neurological mechanisms by which we make choices to rejecting the entire idea of randomness, nor can I see where being 'afraid' would enter into it.

A theoretical process was earlier postulated whereby choices were made on some basis other than preference. Evidence that such a process need exist would only come from demonstrating someone making a choice between (what they judge to be) two absolutely identical options. Since you've not provided such evidence (and I've no reason to believe it even possible for you to do so), I've no reason to commit to the idea of this process existing, have I?

You know what I find hard to commit to?... — Olivier5

Yes, I'd find that hard to commit to too, that I can't make any sense of it being the primary reason.

I've no reason to commit to the idea of this process existing, have I? — Isaac

Of course not. If this simple and mechanistic view of yourself suffice to account for your experience, you're more than welcome to hold on to it.

I experience, personally, a capacity to choose options at random. I can also think about randomness and even compute probabilities. Therefore the concept of randomness is ubiquitous in our thoughts. It's no stranger to us and to who we are: the product of a haphazard evolution.

I see life (biologically speaking) as robust, heuristic, extremely complex, risk-taking, adaptative, creative and opportunistic. Within this view, it would be simplistic in the extreme to assume that we have one single procedure for making choices, one single logical process that works under every and all circumstances.

Life is much more messy than that but also much more robust than that, in my well informed opinion on the matter.

Surviving system failure is essentially what life is about, and any system may fail. Redundancy in mechanisms is a pretty general phenomenon in biology for this reason. There are by-pass, duplicate veins all over you, because one may fail. Likewise any mental process may fail under certain circumstances.

That would be why we rely on several tools from our mental tool box to make certain decisions, and not just on one tool. At least in my experience.

I experience, personally, a capacity to choose options at random. — Olivier5

So do you universally trust your experience to give you an accurate account of your neurological processes, or is it just in this matter that you do? Do you deny the existence of sub-conscious processing entirely, or is that you feel you can just identify it's presence (or lack thereof)?

Within this view, it would be simplistic in the extreme to assume that we have one single procedure for making choices, one single logical process that works under every and all circumstances. — Olivier5

I can't see why prima facie. We have only one process for delivering oxygen to the brain, and that's far more important. We have only one mechanism for processing tons of things. One carefully targeted probe and I could remove your ability to see noses. You don't have a backup.

Notwithstanding this occasional lack of redundancy, I never suggested that the processes were simple or even singular, only that we need not impute any other factors than preference when looking to their initiation.

So do you universally trust your experience to give you an accurate account of your neurological processes, — Isaac

More precisely, I expect my theories about my neurological processes to give an accurate account of my experience. If a theory doesn’t fit with the facts, it must be rejected or improved upon.

We have only one process for delivering oxygen to the brain, — Isaac

There are fours arteries entering the brain, two carotides and two cervical, all connected inside the brain so they work with and even up one another.

we need not impute any other factors than preference when looking to their initiation. — Isaac

Initiation? You mean explaining mechanism? Because you also need a process of comparing preferences with one another.

And as any process, this comparison can fail to provide usable information... HENCE it stands to reason that it needs a backup.

One interesting way to look at (biological) life — the only interesting way I could come up with to think about life — is in systemic terms. And in system theory there is this concept of resilience or survivability, as the capacity of a system to take shocks and yet survive and thrive. It’s really central to the systemic outlook I think, this capacity of living systems to absorb shocks and keep going. A simple system cannot do that. Resilience requires redundancies, self-monitoring and self-repairing loops, a whole machinery of behaviors and ultracomplex mechanisms that constantly maintains and repairs the system while the system is constantly failing here or there.

Like an economic system can absorb shocks and even sometimes make the best of them, a living organism (or species, or ecosystem) is able to take some hits, and repair itself. And even sometimes learn something and improve upon itself under adversity, by experience or darwinian evolution.

A mechanical clock for instance cannot absorb much shocks. It’s a system obviously, but one far too simple to survive in the jungle, because it cannot repair itself. And you can hit a clock on the head as many time as you want (in the morning usually), it won’t start to avoid you as a risk-mitigation strategy. But living systems do.

Hence the need for a pilot in the system. Life is not mechanical, it’s adaptative. And animals try to avoid trouble and search for food. They move around opportunistically. And every moving system needs a piloting system...

You’re the pilot. Them little cells composing your body gave you the job. What you gona do, let them down? You can quit but it hurts.

More precisely, I expect my theories about my neurological processes to give an accurate account of my experience. If a theory doesn’t fit with the facts, it must be rejected or improved upon. — Olivier5

In the first sentence you use 'experience' as the measure, in the second 'facts'. I am to take it from this that the answer to my question is 'yes'? You do deny any sub-concious processes - the 'facts' about how your mind functions are synonymous with the experience you have of it doing so?

We have only one process for delivering oxygen to the brain, — Isaac

There are fours arteries entering the brain, two carotides and two cervical, all connected inside the brain so they work with and even up one another. — Olivier5

I said 'process', not 'route'. I imagine there's more than one neurological pathway by which preferences lead to decisions too.

Initiation? You mean explaining mechanism? — Olivier5

No, not 'explaination', just the initial input to process under investigation.

you also need a process of comparing preferences with one another. — Olivier5

Why? If I put two liquids of different viscosity in a tube, the thinner will reach the end first. No where does any mechanism need to do the comparing, their arrival time is a function of their viscosity. There's no reason at all why a more pressing preference might not have neurological properties which result in it's causing some behaviour over some less pressing preference. There need not be an external arbiter.

And as any process, this comparison can fail to provide usable information... HENCE it stands to reason that it needs a backup. — Olivier5

Again, to demonstrate this model you'd have to show that each process in the brain had an alternative as a backup. You've not yet given a single example, let alone a compelling majority.

You confused me with someone who is out there to demonstrate something. I repeat: I'm perfectly happy with you keeping your model. It just doesn't work for me, for reasons that I have explained: likely to fail in case of equivalent options, unable to account for random choices. That's all.

I have in fact kept your model intact. All I said is: the model is not complete, it needs a random decision routine as an add-on in case the comparison of preferences fails to yield an actionable result. With this small add-on, the model now looks to me like something that could work, and account better for human experience.

It's a very little tweak to your model, a proposal for a simple and light improvement. I don't understand why you are reacting so defensively to it.

But once again, to each his own. If someone doesn't like his models to be tampered with, it's no skin off my nose.

Of course I have free will: I make choices! Why is this even a question?" But as we think about it longer, it becomes more clear that we decide less. — A Ree Zen

We've come a long way in not actually getting the problem of free will. No wonder some of our thread makers have lost motivation.

I experience, personally, a capacity to choose options at random. — Olivier5

Making truly random choices is notoriously difficult - ask a poker player. There are common situations in poker where random choices are considered to be an optimal strategy. Experienced players sometimes use props, such as a digital watch, to help them randomize their choices, because otherwise an opponent can pick up on a hidden bias and exploit it.

Right. "True randomness" is hard to emulate, including in computers. But my point is not that we need a truly unpredictable random number generator inside our brain to live. It is more that we need an alternative to knowledge-based decision making in case it is inapplicable or inconclusive. I believe a seemingly random process will do. I'm open to alternative ideas too.

You point out to another such pragmatic case where selection of options via preference comparison is unwise: when wanting to be unpredictable by others.

Isaac's thesis is typical of medieval thinking, in that it uses a mechanistic metaphor to try and understand our minds. It's a bit late for that. Nowadays there are better metaphors available, eg in cybernetics, system theory etc. Those metaphors are much more complex and life-like.

Is there a difference between thinking one has free will because the system is so complex we cannot perceive the factors that contribute to determinism; and actually having free will?

Is there a difference between thinking one has free will because the system is so complex we cannot perceive the factors that contribute to determinism; and actually having free will? — Roy Davies

Is actual freedom a necessary condition for the thought of freedom, in other words. Descartes thinks so. However Kant believes only the "idea of freedom" is required. I think Kant's position may involve a vicious regress, however....