I'd taken his argument as being against those who suppose that all there is to understanding language is understanding conventions. — Banno
The problem we have been grappling with depends on the assumption that communication by speech requires that speaker and interpreter have learned or somehow acquired a common method or theory of interpretation — p. 265
It is consistent to hold of linguistic communication, that absolutely all of it is governed by conventions, rules and regularities, and that these conventions, rules, and regularities do not explain what people communicating using language are doing. — Srap Tasmaner
he's going to claim there just is no such thing as linguistic competence — Srap Tasmaner
These phenomena threaten standard descriptions of linguistic competence
Malapropisms introduce expressions not covered by prior learning, or familiar expressions which cannot be interpreted by any of the abilities so far discussed. Malapropisms fall into a different category, one that may include such things as our ability to perceive a well-formed sentence when the actual utterance was incomplete or grammatically garbled, our ability to interpret words we have never heard before, to correct slips of the tongue, or to cope with new idiolects.
These phenomena threaten standard descriptions of linguistic competence.
Think of a great game of chess: every single move is in accordance with the rules... — Srap Tasmaner
The problem we have been grappling with depends on the assumption that communication by speech requires that speaker and interpreter have learned or somehow acquired a common method or theory of interpretation
— p. 265
I read that as saying communication by speech does not require any such thing — Srap Tasmaner
the problem is this: what interpreter and speaker share, to the extent that communication succeeds, is not learned and so is not a language governed by rules or conventions known to speaker and interpreter in advance...
I'd invite you to read my reply on the bottom of page nine and let me know what you think about how it handles the odd success of malapropisms. — creativesoul
Actually there is! But these would be violations not of the pure syntax of chess, but either of its "school grammar", the received wisdom of how to play properly, or of its "real grammar", how to put moves together in a way that makes sense. — Srap Tasmaner
What's more, just "getting the gist" is maybe a little less than we expect of comprehension. — Srap Tasmaner
You seem to be saying that language is not governed entirely by rules or conventions because otherwise it would be impossible to understand malapropisms, since we would not be able to step outside of literal meanings (what Davidson calls "first meanings"). — Janus
So I am imagining a situation in which the speaker and the hearer are in the presence of a soup tureen full of soup (and not standing in a soup kitchen). Given that, what if the speaker had said " That's a nice soup whatyoumaycallit" or "that's a nice soup dog" or "that's a nice soup [blank]"? Would we not, in such a situation, understand just the same what was meant? — Janus
I'm saying that successful communication with speech is not governed entirely by rules or conventions. — creativesoul
I think we would, but...
The question is how we understand what is meant when that differs from both, what is said and what is said is not in accordance with convention. If our linguistic competence, or ability to successful communicate with speech relied upon only our learning and acting in accordance with the rules, then we could not. Thus, it takes more. — creativesoul
I'm saying that successful communication with speech is not governed entirely by rules or conventions.
— creativesoul
OK, and I agree; but isn't that the very thing that Davidson is also proposing. Isn't that, in other words, just the initial recognition of the problem? — Janus
...in the case of language the hearer shares a complex system or theory with the speaker, a system which makes possible the articulation of logical relations between utterances, and explains the ability to interpret novel utterances in an organized way.
This answer has been suggested, in one form or another, by many philosophers and linguists, and I assume it must in some sense be right.
Yes, I agree with Davidson on that point. This assumes that the three principles he proposes 'covers' conventional accounts of what successful communication(linguistic competence) requires. — creativesoul
...in the case of language the hearer shares a complex system or theory with the speaker, a system which makes possible the articulation of logical relations between utterances, and explains the ability to interpret novel utterances in an organized way.
This answer has been suggested, in one form or another, by many philosophers and linguists, and I assume it must in some sense be right.
Do you find the three principles somehow lacking in that capacity? — creativesoul
It's a thread with 400 something posts and nothing much of any cogency has been said so far — Janus
Most speakers and hearers probably don't entertain any "complex theories" at all. — Janus
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