I'd taken his argument as being against those who suppose that all there is to understanding language is understanding conventions. — Banno

Two points:

1.) I don't know what you're talking about here. It is consistent to hold of linguistic communication, that absolutely all of it is governed by conventions, rules and regularities, and that these conventions, rules, and regularities do not explain what people communicating using language are doing. I think a similar claim is true of chess, to me obviously true. I would say further that the rules of chess, again in a way I find obvious, don't just allow the feats of creativity we observe but enable them; and I could claim the same for language use.

1.a.) None of this is about other competencies a language user must have, how a linguistic agent is embedded in culture or society, etc., not directly anyway, but about the nature of rule-governed creativity.

1.b.) To hold such a position, I'd need an account of malapropisms as either unsuccessful or successful because of some particular convention, etc.

2.) I just don't see your Gödel reading in the text.

The problem we have been grappling with depends on the assumption that communication by speech requires that speaker and interpreter have learned or somehow acquired a common method or theory of interpretation — p. 265

I read that as saying communication by speech does not require any such thing. He's not about to claim, just a sentence or two hence, that linguistic competence is just not quite enough to explain linguistic communication -- maybe we need just a smidge of something else; no, he's going to claim there just is no such thing as linguistic competence, and though he describes it with his three principles, he really seems to intend them to be broad enough to take in anyone you can think of.

It is consistent to hold of linguistic communication, that absolutely all of it is governed by conventions, rules and regularities, and that these conventions, rules, and regularities do not explain what people communicating using language are doing. — Srap Tasmaner

I don't know what you're talking about here.

I suppose that what you have written might make sense if you divorce "governed by conventions" from "interpreted by conventions"; but Davidson is talking about interpretation, and shows that there are utterances that cannot be interpreted using conventions, because they actually deny those conventions - like Godel's "this proposition is not provable in this language" denies that it is provable and yet is true...

Think of a great game of chess: every single move is in accordance with the rules, but if you asked me to explain what happened and why, I wouldn't just hand you a copy of the rulebook. The rules don't explain what happens in a game of chess, even though all of it is rule-governed and could not exist without this system of rules.

Am I still not quite making the idea clear? It's very intuitive to me, so I could be missing the mark.

he's going to claim there just is no such thing as linguistic competence — Srap Tasmaner

That looks like a misunderstanding to me...

These phenomena threaten standard descriptions of linguistic competence

That does not deny linguistic competence. It does not say that there is no such thing as linguistic competence. It just places the conventional notions/accounting practices into question.

But a malapropism is more like a game of chess in which one player moves a pawn backwards... despite the rule saying they must move forwards!

No they aren't. The substituted word is almost always the same part of speech, even the same number of syllables with the same prosody, and the resulting expression is grammatical.

The analogy in chess would be a move that, while legal, "doesn't make sense" according to some view of chess, but works for some specific reason.

Davidson wrote..

Malapropisms introduce expressions not covered by prior learning, or familiar expressions which cannot be interpreted by any of the abilities so far discussed. Malapropisms fall into a different category, one that may include such things as our ability to perceive a well-formed sentence when the actual utterance was incomplete or grammatically garbled, our ability to interpret words we have never heard before, to correct slips of the tongue, or to cope with new idiolects.

These phenomena threaten standard descriptions of linguistic competence.

The question is, do the three principles forwarded by Davidson take proper account of the standard descriptions? If they do, then Davidson's argument in the paper seems to show a flaw in the standard description of linguistic competence.

Think of a great game of chess: every single move is in accordance with the rules... — Srap Tasmaner

Malapropisms are not in accordance with the rules.

The problem we have been grappling with depends on the assumption that communication by speech requires that speaker and interpreter have learned or somehow acquired a common method or theory of interpretation
— p. 265

I read that as saying communication by speech does not require any such thing — Srap Tasmaner

Whereas, I read that as saying the problem is the assumption that communication by speech requires a common method or theory of interpretation that is in accordance with convention - as being able to operate on the basis of shared conventions, rules, or regularities. Hence, the problem dissolves if we can successfully describe communication by speech in a way that does not make that assumption. All it would take would be to add something else to that method that is not in accordance with convention. It doesn't necessarily require rejecting all conventional understanding on the matter.

That would also change the conventional understanding of linguistic competence, not deny that there is such a thing.

the problem is this: what interpreter and speaker share, to the extent that communication succeeds, is not learned and so is not a language governed by rules or conventions known to speaker and interpreter in advance...

What's shared, to the extent that communication succeeds, that is not learned or governed by rules or conventions, is the very ability(which could be characterized as a method) to attribute meaning.

I’m nonplussed. No wonder the article appears trivial to you.

More anon.

He does try to make his case against conventions, rules, and regularities quite broad -- going beyond malapropisms to include not only all successful speech errors, but also throwing in "Jabberwocky", about which he comments, as I recall, that most of it can be understood on a first reading.

Of course "Jabberwocky" isn't all made-up words, and the made-up words obey English phonology, and it's grammatical.

What's more, just "getting the gist" is maybe a little less than we expect of comprehension.

And still more, it's not like he can point to a large body of speech as odd as "Jabberwocky".

Some natural questions then: (1) Which conventions, rules, and regularities are we keeping? (2) If people can talk this way all the time and get along perfectly fine, why don't they? Why don't we all encounter dozens or hundreds of words each day made up on the spot? (We do, I've read, average perhaps dozens of speech errors per day.)

So my resistance here is not just based on malapropisms, anymore than Davidson takes the case he's made only to apply to them.

For instance, where he says "or born with" referring to the linguistic competence that doesn't exist, that can't be a reference to anyone but Chomsky can it? And Chomsky's original claims for an inborn facility are all to do with syntax. Did Davidson really try to just throw in a denial of our inborn capacity for syntactic speech on the strength of his analysis of semantic speech errors? Yeah I think he did.

I'd invite you to read my reply on the bottom of page nine and let me know what you think about how it handles the odd success of malapropisms. — creativesoul

You seem to be saying that language is not governed entirely by rules or conventions because otherwise it would be impossible to understand malapropisms, since we would not be able to step outside of literal meanings (what Davidson calls "first meanings").

I agree with that much, but I was not able to see any explanation of how we are able to understand malapropisms there. I don't think the explanation is any big mystery, as I've already explained, but the explanation cannot be precisely set out as some procedure, because procedures involves rule, conventions, protocols, methodologies or whatever you want to call them, and they are the very things being denied as constituting explanation.

So I can say we simply get (when we do!) malapropisms. Or I can say we are able to get them by association, imitation of familiar word plays (rhyming fro example) and so on. Or Banno can say it is just a matter of action (whatever that means). None of these are explanation, though, in the sense that laying out a set of procedures would be.

I don't know what more can be said about it. It's a thread with 400 something posts and nothing much of any cogency has been said so far, and nothing much seems to be in the article the thread is about either.

Actually there is! But these would be violations not of the pure syntax of chess, but either of its "school grammar", the received wisdom of how to play properly, or of its "real grammar", how to put moves together in a way that makes sense. — Srap Tasmaner

Now here's something more interesting!

I have been thinking that no move in chess which involves the pieces moving in the conventional ways would be analagous to a malapropism, because the latter break with the convention of using the correct term for the context. "Soup latrine" is obviously not the correct word to use when referring to a soup tureen (or a soup kitchen), and I have been seeing this as analogous to making an illegitimate, as opposed to your example of merely an unconventional, move in chess.

So then, do you want to say that a malapropism is merely "unconventional" and not a trangression against any actual rule?

I don't think your mixture of metaphors here is helping. Well, I guess I should only speak for myself: it's not helping me.

Hey!

That's too bad that you're losing interest. I'm gaining understanding the more I read here and back to the paper...

Your notion of association, as you know, is commensurate with my own position on how meaning works.

The part of that post that sets out how we understand malapropisms is the bottom half basically. Perhaps a re-read may help you to understand what I'm saying about the attribution of meaning. I've also said much since; that may be of help.

What's more, just "getting the gist" is maybe a little less than we expect of comprehension. — Srap Tasmaner

This is a good point. We don't have any precise understanding of the meaning of Jabberwocky, and there are many poems included in the "Canon" that may elude any literal meaning (not to mention a fair bit of modern philosophy). When we understand "that's a nice soup latrine" as meaning " that's a nice soup tureen" what exactly are we understanding correctly? What would a correct understanding depend upon? Upon the speaker meaning "soup tureen"? What if she meant "soup kitchen"?

So I am imagining a situation in which the speaker and the hearer are in the presence of a soup tureen full of soup (and not standing in a soup kitchen). Given that, what if the speaker had said " That's a nice soup whatyoumaycallit" or "that's a nice soup dog" or "that's a nice soup [blank]"? Would we not, in such a situation, understand just the same what was meant?

You seem to be saying that language is not governed entirely by rules or conventions because otherwise it would be impossible to understand malapropisms, since we would not be able to step outside of literal meanings (what Davidson calls "first meanings"). — Janus

It may not matter, but I'd say that that is not quite what I'm saying. There's a little more nuance than that suggests. Not much, but a little. I'm saying that successful communication with speech is not governed entirely by rules or conventions.

My interest was rekindled so I edited the post. :smile: I did read that long paragraph at the bottom of page nine, and I'm not saying I don't agree with you, I'm just saying that I don't think it constitutes an explanation in the sense that seems to be being sought any more than my "association, imitation, etc." or Banno's "action" does.

So, I have suggested that an explanation set out as a procedural following of rules is impossible, since it is the explanatory (or fully explanatory) capacity of rules that is the very thing being denied.

So I am imagining a situation in which the speaker and the hearer are in the presence of a soup tureen full of soup (and not standing in a soup kitchen). Given that, what if the speaker had said " That's a nice soup whatyoumaycallit" or "that's a nice soup dog" or "that's a nice soup [blank]"? Would we not, in such a situation, understand just the same what was meant? — Janus

I think we would, but...

The question is how we understand what is meant when that differs from what is said and what is said is not in accordance with convention. If our linguistic competence, or ability to successful communicate with speech relied upon only our learning and acting in accordance with the rules, then we could not. Thus, successful communication and/or linguistic competence takes more, and the standard description is found lacking or wanting.

I'm saying that successful communication with speech is not governed entirely by rules or conventions. — creativesoul

OK, and I agree; but isn't that the very thing that Davidson is also proposing. Isn't that, in other words, just the initial recognition of the problem?

I think we would, but...

The question is how we understand what is meant when that differs from both, what is said and what is said is not in accordance with convention. If our linguistic competence, or ability to successful communicate with speech relied upon only our learning and acting in accordance with the rules, then we could not. Thus, it takes more. — creativesoul

Again right, but I think we all agree that there is more. The problem is that no one seems to be able to spell out exactly how that "more" works. And again I will repeat that I think that is inevitable because any precise setting out would consist in a bunch of rules or procedures.

I'm saying that successful communication with speech is not governed entirely by rules or conventions.
— creativesoul

OK, and I agree; but isn't that the very thing that Davidson is also proposing. Isn't that, in other words, just the initial recognition of the problem? — Janus

Yes, I agree with Davidson on that point. This assumes that the three principles he proposes 'covers' conventional accounts(standard descriptions) of what successful communication(linguistic competence) requires.

...in the case of language the hearer shares a complex system or theory with the speaker, a system which makes possible the articulation of logical relations between utterances, and explains the ability to interpret novel utterances in an organized way.

This answer has been suggested, in one form or another, by many philosophers and linguists, and I assume it must in some sense be right.

The above is Davidson's report of the conventional understanding regarding what successful communication with speech requires. The three principles set that out in a bit more detail.

Yes, I agree with Davidson on that point. This assumes that the three principles he proposes 'covers' conventional accounts of what successful communication(linguistic competence) requires. — creativesoul

Yes, and I'm not sure I would agree that the three principles do "cover" all "conventional accounts". It is a huge generalization that depends on what you have in mind by "conventional accounts". Maybe he just meant 'conventional AP accounts', because that seems to be the bubble that Davidson sees himself as working within. Is he interested in phenomenological, embodied, enactive or semiotic accounts, for instance?

I'm not sure. Do you find the three principles somehow lacking in that capacity?

...in the case of language the hearer shares a complex system or theory with the speaker, a system which makes possible the articulation of logical relations between utterances, and explains the ability to interpret novel utterances in an organized way.

This answer has been suggested, in one form or another, by many philosophers and linguists, and I assume it must in some sense be right.

Most speakers and hearers probably don't entertain any "complex theories" at all. A complex theory may be able to be formulated after the fact based on analysis of practice, but it is malapropism (among many other phenomena of language) that I would say could not be fit into any theory. Poetry is a great example; many poems have no one privileged meaning, and there are no sets of rules (as opposed to open-ended associative interpretive practices) governing literary interpretation.

Do you find the three principles somehow lacking in that capacity? — creativesoul

Sorry not sure what you mean; lacking in what capacity?

It's a thread with 400 something posts and nothing much of any cogency has been said so far — Janus

Hey! I resemble that remark!

I did spray "nutting munch" not "nutting". Your dissemblance is knotted howover.

Most speakers and hearers probably don't entertain any "complex theories" at all. — Janus

Davidson agrees, and actually talks about that in a little bit of detail. It's not that the speaker and/or audience is aware of how they successfully communicate, it's rather that they can and do. He speaks at length about his use of "theory".