That is a bit of a tautology. It makes more sense to say "Correlation is existentially dependent upon a creature capable of distinction of determinate forms." — Merkwurdichliebe

I do not mind working from a statement/premiss that is so obviously true. Distinguishing between things seems to me to require quite a bit more than just drawing a correlation between things. The former takes note of and/or sets out the differences between things, whereas the latter does not.

Seems to me that you're conflating causal physical systems/interactions with correlations, or more directly, conflating causality and meaning. The former is not existentially dependent upon a mind. To quite the contrary, minds are existentially dependent upon causality. — creativesoul

Causal physical systems/interactions ARE correlations. It seems to me that you’re conflating correlation and meaning.

Fire causes pain when touched. The pain is the result of physical interactions between fire and body. It is not the result of correlations. When a creature draws correlations between it's own behaviour(touching fire) and the ensuing pain, it has rightly attributed and/or recognized causality. The experience of touching fire becomes meaningful to the creature as a result of those correlations. The creature will no longer touch fire as a result of drawing correlations between the behaviour and the pain, and that holds good regardless of whether or it it is capable of taking it's own experience into account. Contrary to Hume and those who hold his problem of induction so dear, such recognition/attribution of causality does not require repeated experience. Once is enough. — creativesoul

Pain is the result of correlation between fire and the body’s pain receptors, and between these pain receptors and the interoceptive network, which locates the pain in the body and the body in proximity to other sensory information, and enables the system to develop correlations between this pain and the body’s relative proximity to fire, regardless of whether or not it is aware of its own behaviour as such. Proximity to fire (as a sensory information pattern) develops a negative value for the creature as a result of those correlations, but the creature need not be aware of either meaning nor experience.

All attribution of meaning requires a mind capable of drawing correlations between different things. Purely physical causal relationships do not. All meaning is existentially dependent upon a plurality of things and a creature capable of drawing correlations between them. So, minds are existentially dependent upon both physical and non physical things. — creativesoul

I agree with your first sentence, in the sense that ‘meaning’ is distinct from value/potential, action/change, substance, shape and distance. But purely ‘physical causal’ relationships DO correlate within their limited capacity to interact - they’re just not capable of doing much with it, except to manifest the correlation. Correlations between different structures, however, are not dependent upon a mind capable of extrapolating their potential existence - only a plurality of structures capable of correlation.

I want to be clear that I am not arguing for the existence of ‘mind’ in animate matter, only for the existence of correlation, as a proto-conscious aspect of existence.

Phenomenal consciousness is defined in opposition to that kind of process. Nothing that the ordinary mechanical properties of matter can build up to, including the full complex and nuanced behavior of a human being, can constitute phenomenal consciousness by itself, as it is defined by the people who came up with the idea. — Pfhorrest

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question?wprov=sfla1

Obvs.

Distinguishing between things seems to me to require quite a bit more than just drawing a correlation between things. The former takes note of and/or sets out the differences between things, whereas the latter does not. — creativesoul

Correlation is dependent on distinction. Before we can draw any correlation between one thing and another, we must distinguish one thing from another, otherwise there would be no content to correlate.

Seems you're using the term "correlation" as a synonym for any and all connections, including physical causal chains(causality) whereas I'm not. I do not think we're too far apart, but it's hard to tell. I cannot perform substitution without difficulty.

I'm gathering that correlation is not the result of a creature's drawing correlations on your view.

Correlation is dependent on distinction. Before we can draw any correlation between one thing and another, we must distinguish one thing from another, otherwise there would be no content to correlate. — Merkwurdichliebe

It's said that an unborn child becomes familiar with the sound of it's own mother's voice. That familiarity is the result of correlations draw between it's own contentment/discontentment and the mother's voice. I see no reason to say that that unborn child has distinguished between it's own physiological and biological processes and the sound of it's mother's voice.

That said...

A plurality of things presupposes spatiotemporal distinction. Perceiving different things is not the same as perceiving them as different things. I'm not sure the latter is required for all correlation between different things. I would say that it's not, at least not at a basic level.

It's said that an unborn child becomes familiar with the sound of it's own mother's voice. That familiarity is the result of correlations draw between it's own contentment/discontentment and the mother's voice. I see no reason to say that that unborn child has distinguished between it's own physiological and biological processes and the sound of it's mother's voice. — creativesoul

You see, you've proven my point. You are incapable of even speaking of any correlation between things without first making a distinction: viz. child and mother. The child may not be able to articulate it, but he definitely feels himself as distinct and separate from his mother. The correlations might (arguably) occur coincidentally with distinction, but they definitely do not precede it.

Perceiving different things is not the same as perceiving them as different things. — creativesoul

How is it possible to perceive different things without perceiving those different things as different things?

if you make something with that function, it will both exhibit that behavior, and undergo that experience. — Pfhorrest

That is clearly not true: it fails the zombie test. A zombie could respond to pain as we do: noting damage, seeking remediation, future avoidance, shouting "ouch" but this omits the feeling.

On my account zombies are not possible. That's a large motivator behind panpsychism, to eliminate the possibility of zombies.

Edit to elaborate: Take whatever the supposed difference is between a real human and a philosophical zombie. On my account, everything has that. Because the alternative is either that nothing has that, and we're all zombies; or that some magic happens such that that only we have that, and other things don't. Both of those are more absurd than admitting that there's a first-person perspective to every thing, it's just not of note for most things.

It's said that an unborn child becomes familiar with the sound of it's own mother's voice. That familiarity is the result of correlations draw between it's own contentment/discontentment and the mother's voice. I see no reason to say that that unborn child has distinguished between it's own physiological and biological processes and the sound of it's mother's voice.
— creativesoul

You see, you've proven my point. You are incapable of even speaking of any correlation between things without first making a distinction: viz. child and mother. — Merkwurdichliebe

If your point is that I must distinguish between the child and mother when talking about the child and mother, then I must say that I agree, but it's totally irrelevant to what I've been claiming here. There is an actual distinction between what my report of the unborn child's thought and belief takes(is existentially dependent upon ans/or consists of) and what the unborn child's thought and belief takes. You're now focused upon the former for some reason. The focus was on the latter.

The child may not be able to articulate it, but he definitely feels himself as distinct and separate from his mother. The correlations might (arguably) occur coincidentally with distinction, but they definitely do not precede it.

I work from the premiss that at conception, there is no thought or belief of any kind. If there is no thought or belief, there can be no mind. At conception, there is no mind. Feeling oneself as distinct seems to require a sense of self, right? I find no reason to believe that an unborn child has any notion of self; no self worth; no self wants; no self identity; no self love; no self hate; no thoughts of that kind whatsoever.

These are the contentious matters at hand, yes? I mean, when it comes to an adequate criterion for what counts as a mind, our proposed criterion - if it is to be considered acceptable - must be a basic minimalist outline amenable to evolutionary progression. The criterion must be rightly applicable to any and all minds, from the simplest to the most complex. In addition, I strongly suggest that it must be capable of explaining the emergence of minds as well.

Are we capable of acquiring knowledge of what language less creatures' minds consist of, and/or knowing how they work?

How is it possible to perceive different things without perceiving those different things as different things? — Merkwurdichliebe

My issue involves the all too common use of "perception" which conflates simple thought and belief with thought and belief that is informed by language. Perceiving a computer is not the same as perceiving a computer as a computer, and that sort of talk is to be avoided on my view. My cats perceive the ducks outside, and there are many of them, but I think it quite wrong to claim that they perceive the ducks as ducks.

Perceiving different things requires physiological sensory perception. Different things exist prior to being perceived by a capable creature. As I noted earlier, but you neglected to discuss, drawing a distinction between different things amounts to becoming aware of the differences between them. One must first perceive them prior to any comparison between them. That said, I do not think it's that important, and for the most part I probably will have no issue with granting the simultaneity of spatiotemporal distinction and perception. Both are required for minds.

The Pitcher Plant and Venus Flytrap are interesting examples. I would grant basic perception, but not the ability to draw distinctions between different things perceived. As far as I know, they'll 'behave' the same way regardless of the source of stimulus. I would not say that they have minds.

Take whatever the supposed difference is between a real human and a philosophical zombie. On my account, everything has that. Because the alternative is either that nothing has that, and we're all zombies; or that some magic happens such that that only we have that, and other things don't. — Pfhorrest

Isn’t the third alternative that only we (or things like us) have that, but without some magic happening?

Isn’t the third alternative that only we (or things like us) have that, but without some magic happening? — Luke

If it could happen without “magic”, that would mean it was something that could be built up from non-conscious processes, and so would not be whatever the supposed difference is between a philosophical zombie and a real person.

Philosophical Zombies are no different than Santa Claus.

Santa Claus is far more plausible than a philosophical zombie.

:lol:

So, where does the problem arise with them? Or.. how?

I’m arguing against the possibility of zombies, on the terms of people who are arguing for them. They construct their zombie argument whereby no matter how you build a perfect replica of a human there’s still the question of whether it has a first-person perspective (or else is just a zombie), and I answer yes of course it does, because everything does, so there can’t be zombies.

The problem with other minds is a problem born of gross misunderstanding of what minds are, what they consist of, and how they emerge. It's also based upon an all or nothing criterion. Off/on. That's not how minds have evolved. That's not how it works.

Get human thought and belief right, and it will go a long way towards clarifying the problems of other minds. That's actually a good litmus test for ones theory of mind.

Pan-psychists' being wrong about zombies doesn't make them right about pan-psychism.

Pan-psychists' being wrong about zombies doesn't make them right about pan-psychism. — bongo fury

I disagree. Most zombies I know ARE right about pan-psychism.

Pan-psychists' being wrong about zombies — bongo fury

Panpsychists can't believe in zombies. So if you think they're wrong about that, then you think there are zombies? (Or could be, at least).

Phenomenal consciousness is defined in opposition to that kind of process. Nothing that the ordinary mechanical properties of matter can build up to, including the full complex and nuanced behavior of a human being, can constitute phenomenal consciousness by itself, as it is defined by the people who came up with the idea. — Pfhorrest

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question?wprov=sfla1

No?

If it could happen without “magic”, that would mean it was something that could be built up from non-conscious processes, and so would not be whatever the supposed difference is between a philosophical zombie and a real person. — Pfhorrest

Edit: Yes, I see.

If it could happen without “magic”, that would mean it was something that could be built up from non-conscious processes, and so would not be whatever the supposed difference is between a philosophical zombie and a real person. — Pfhorrest

Yes, but it doesn't have to be that specious and spurious difference. It only has to be the difference between an ordinary zombie such as a smart phone and a conscious machine such as one of us.

Maybe you could try explaining to Bongo since you seem to get it now?

Seems you're using the term "correlation" as a synonym for any and all connections, including physical causal chains(causality) whereas I'm not. I do not think we're too far apart, but it's hard to tell. I cannot perform substitution without difficulty.

I'm gathering that correlation is not the result of a creature's drawing correlations on your view. — creativesoul

Your definition seems circular to me, but I understand the language difficulty. Correlation, as I see it, is the process of establishing a mutual relationship or connection between two things. That you refer to the resulting connection as a ‘correlation’ is a conceptual consolidation. The process as a structural relation exists without any resulting ‘correlation’ being manifest as such. When one is manifest, it informs the system’s most complex organisational structure, whether it’s as a causal correlation or a conceptual one.

It’s been so long since I read any philosophy of mind that I’d actually forgotten p-zombies were intended as an argument against physicalism.

Anyway, I’d almost lost sight of my original reason for wanting to post here, which was to ask you: what reason is there to attribute minds or experience to things, such as rocks, that show absolutely no signs of having minds or experience?

Anyway, I’d almost lost sight of my original reason for wanting to post here, which was to ask you: what reason is there to attribute minds or experience to things, such as rocks, that show absolutely no signs of having minds or experience? — Luke

In the ordinary sense by which rocks and such don’t seem to have minds or experience (but a philosophical zombie does at least SEEM to), I don’t say that rocks and such have them. I hold that that ordinary sense is access consciousness, and it’s entirely about function, so philosophical zombies who function like real humans have that, and rocks don’t.

But then other philosophers say “yes but what about the thing that the philosophical zombie lacks, phenomenal consciousness?”, and I say “oh, that’s trivial, everything has that, even rocks”. And I say that because either everything has it, or nothing has it (and we ourselves are all zombies), or else some things don’t have it but humans somehow do, in a way that has nothing to do with our functionality (else philosophical zombies would have it too), which would thus be like magic.

And between magic happening, us being zombies, or everything “having a mind” in some trivial way that has no bearing on their function in the real world, the last seems least absurd.

Let's discuss either your position or mine. Attempting to cover both simultaneously is asking for trouble, especially when our respective positions use the same term in remarkably different ways...

I'm a bit disappointed. I was looking forward to reading your answer to the question I posed. Now, it seems that there are more pressing issues rearing their ugly heads...

...Correlation, as I see it, is the process of establishing a mutual relationship or connection between two things... ...The process as a structural relation exists without any resulting ‘correlation’ being manifest as such. When one is manifest, it informs the system’s most complex organisational structure, whether it’s as a causal correlation or a conceptual one. — Possibility

Causal physical systems/interactions ARE correlations. — Possibility

The above doesn't work(it's incoherent, self contradictory, and/or an equivocation fallacy). It also presupposes meaning at the subatomic level of existence, or it presupposes that not all information is meaningful.

And between magic happening, us being zombies, or everything “having a mind” in some trivial way that has no bearing on their function in the real world, the last seems least absurd. — Pfhorrest

Why do you prefer panpsychism to emergentism (leaving aside the issue of weak vs strong)?

..between magic happening, us being zombies, or everything “having a mind” in some trivial way that has no bearing on their function in the real world, the last seems least absurd. — Pfhorrest

I would think that given what we already know about the evolutionary progression of life on earth, minds would slowly emerge. The manifestation of the human mind has been happening all along the timeline of human evolutionary progression.

If we want to talk in terms of a light switch, the light bulb of our mind did not suddenly go from no power to full power. Much better described with a dimmer switch, and a very long time frame between our being content, comfortable, and/or safe(r) in certain circumstances than we are in others, and our making it a common practice to talk about our own thought and belief.

Philosophical Zombies can do neither of those things.