The example here was about disabled children, not children in general. You were implying that disability was a harm which it would be immoral to cause with foreknowledge. — Isaac

So is life. That's what antinatalism means.

this is offensive to disabled people because many feel that their disability is a harm because of society's failure to accommodate them, not the circumstances of their birth — Isaac

And everyone has occassionally felt that half the harm they're going through is due to society's failure to accomodate them. Antinatalism does not treat giving birth to a disabled person any differently from giving birth to an abled person.

What I was actually looking for in asking this question was the grounds on which you'd claim the premises of antinatalism were not 'completely ridiculous', — Isaac

Letting go of them invidividually causes problems. Example: We shouldn't do something to harm people in the future even if the affected party doesn't exist in the present. NOT believing this will mean malicious genetic engineering is fine. Etc. Each premise leads to some unintuitive conclusions when not believed.

Otherwise what distinguishes antinatalism from just 'not wanting to have children'? — Isaac

That you can not want to have children but not think it's wrong to have them.

As I said before, I think you've misunderstood moral relativism. A moral claim is a claim about how others should act, not a claim about one's personal prefernces. — Isaac

And the "relativism" bit means that there is no moral claim that applies to everyone. So why do you care what I think you should or shouldn't do if I don't try to enforce it (which I won't because I recognize that my view isn't objective)

But if there's no compelling argument (other than just "well that's what my unusual premises lead to") — Isaac

Again, how can you have a MORE compelling argument than this? It is impossible to have an argument that says anything meaningful if the premises are all indisputable. Whatever moral theory you believe in I know that the most compelling argument for it is "That's what my premises lead to". That's by definition the mort compelling argument for anything. That's as compelling as it gets.

then I can't see any good reason why someone would repeatedly say something so unpleasant. — Isaac

Again for the 100th time. Shope didn't make this abount antinatalism you did. Using your analogy that's like if someone tells you "Hey did you know the salad they serve here is excellent" and you replied with "So you think I'm fat and ugly huh?"

You've missed the point. You asked about examples of situations where consent is not asked of non-existent persons for actions which may harm them. Finding no shelter from the rain where there might have been shelter definitely harms a future person. I did not ask their consent before removing that shelter. The specifics don't matter. the point is absolutely everything I do has the potential to harm future people by the absence of some resource which I've used that they might have benefited from. I do not ask their consent. Every structural alteration I make to the world might harm a future person who so much as trips over it. I don not ask their consent before doing so. — Isaac

No offence, but I'm tired of repeating myself. I don't think I'll respond anymore because you seem to me like you're going around in circles and I don't even know what you're trying to achieve anymore. Once again, not all harm done is your responsibilty. This argument would work if the persons in question had some right to the resource that you're taking. Since they didn't you don't need consent. I'll say it again, not all harm done is your responsibility.

So what is the difference then, you haven't answered the question, only shown that social or biological obligations are not sufficient. — Isaac

For something to be a moral judgement it has to be reasoned about. For most people I've met the "reasoning" doesn't go beyond "Can I afford it" and "Do I want another child".

What I was actually looking for in asking this question was the grounds on which you'd claim the premises of antinatalism were not 'completely ridiculous', — Isaac


Letting go of them invidividually causes problems. Example: We shouldn't do something to harm people in the future even if the affected party doesn't exist in the present. NOT believing this will mean malicious genetic engineering is fine. Etc. Each premise leads to some unintuitive conclusions when not believed. — khaled

But if believing them leads to antinatalism then each premise leads to counter intuitive conclusions if believed too. You haven't removed the counter intuitive conclusions by believing them. The only way to remove the counter intuitive conclusions is to accept the fact that moral imperatives are not simple rules which can be universally applied but rather are complex multi-faceted guides which must be carefully interpreted in each case.

And the "relativism" bit means that there is no moral claim that applies to everyone. So why do you care what I think you should or shouldn't do if I don't try to enforce it (which I won't because I recognize that my view isn't objective) — khaled

Ah. Then we have different ideas of what moral relativism means. That explains it. I'm not a moral relativist in the terms you're using. I don't think that my morals don't apply to you, I think my morals do apply to you. I just recognise that you will have different morals that you (might) think apply to me and that there's no objective means of determining who's right. I don't really understand this conception of morality that you're describing, it sounds indistinguishable from just doing whatever you feel like and letting others do the same? If so I don't understand...

For something to be a moral judgement it has to be reasoned about. — khaled

But maybe a discussion of your moral framework is too much of an aside here. Point is It's not like mine. If I interpret your saying something is immoral as just meaning that you personally wouldn't do it but you don't care if I do then I'm certainly much less offended by your defence of antinatalism but then you weren't really the target of my inquiry...

But if there's no compelling argument (other than just "well that's what my unusual premises lead to") — Isaac


Again, how can you have a MORE compelling argument than this? — khaled

By using premises which are not so odd, then your argument will apply to the people reading it. "If all unicorns are white then my pet unicorn is white" is a compelling argument, but of absolutely no philosophical interest whatsoever

Again for the 100th time. Shope didn't make this abount antinatalism you did. — khaled

I've already demonstrated that he did, and others reading the thread got that impression too. One only need look at previous threads to see the same trend. I'm not tilting at windmills here, this is a real trend.

Once again, not all harm done is your responsibilty. — khaled

We weren't talking about responsibility. You asked about consent-seeking. The two are not at all the same. If you're claiming that your premise is actually that we should seek consent from those potentially harmed by our action where we have a legal responsibility to do so, or some legal right may be infringed, then your premise no longer leads to antinatalism.

-

There seems to be a general trend, which that last issue picked up on, but earlier ones have too. Some moral imperative is announced "Do not harm others" and then extreme cases of this are examined to see if they lead to counter-intuitive consequences. When they do, the imperative is modified. When applying "Do no harm" we found that would prevent us from defending our own lives, we add the caveat "...unless in self-defence". When applying this new rule we find it would prevent us from carrying out life saving surgery we add the caveat "...unless it's for their own good and you can reasonably assume they would consent", and so on until we end up with "Do not do harm to others... unless it is for their own good, and they can consent to it or would consent if they could but have no choice to not be put there in the first place, and don't have any legal rights which contravene the harm, and not more people will be harmed if you don't and and you're not defending yourself, and...".

To me this just points to the naturalism of morality - we already know what's right and we just try to make maxims to fit it. But I accept that to others we're refining some set of rules to get at 'the truth' or whatever. That's neither here nor there. The point is that everyone does this. Except antinatalists. Antinatalists do it to a point but then seem to reach "end the human race" as a conclusion and instead of adding another caveat to avoid such an obviously wrong conclusion, they just accept it. We didn't do that with any previous counter-intuitive conclusions, why this one?

Antinatalists do it to a point but then seem to reach "end the human race" as a conclusion and instead of adding another caveat to avoid such an obviously wrong conclusion, they just accept it. We didn't do that with any previous counter-intuitive conclusions, why this one? — Isaac

This assumption isn't a conclusion that needs to be there. It's not obvious. It's exasperated Isaac desperately trying to say so.. It's the Village Green Preservation Society trying to clutch its pearls and scream of the indeceny. LITERALLY screaming.."But what about the children!".

So what's up with that? — Srap Tasmaner

This was my full response..

And again, not disputing accountability, just that suffering from bad decisions, when looking at the bigger picture, is a part of the overall suffering and can lead to bad consequences. As far as being a part of the whole suffering ecology, it is just one more facet that humans face. Suffering can be brought about from contingent external forces or our own detrimental decisions. The origin of the suffering doesn't negate the suffering and certainly doesn't make one more justified. Again, not saying people aren't responsible for their moral actions, just that if those actions lead to detrimental outcomes, it is bad in the same way as other bads. It's just one more negative part of life that humans face.

It's like if I threw you in a game and you didn't ask to play it, can't escape, and aren't particularly good at it. In fact, you have a defect that can prevent you from playing well in many ways. Then I say, "Well, it's justified that you are suffering based on your poor ability to play this game". Yeah, no. — schopenhauer1

So we were talking about accountability in regards to decision-making:
I was trying to get at:
1) Though I recognize that the locus of accountability is at the individual level
1a) Decision-making itself is part of the ecology of harm, similar to natural disasters in that it is part of the human experience. It's a call to be more empathetic to this fact.. We all make bad decisions, and it is part of being a deliberative animal... much more deliberative than other animals. Bad decisions for other animals are more instinctual "If/then" responses (not saying that is all it is, but more akin to that). We have pathologies, habits of mind, bad information, etc..

just wondering schop, but I’ve seen glimpses of your many long comment chains on this forum regarding AN. Out of everyone you’ve debated, do you think anyone here has ever presented a compelling challenge against your beliefs ? These threads always seem to collapse into people attacking you so I never really know how you feel after — Albero

That's a good question. Honestly, I can't recall, but I am sure I have had some pretty good debates that I actually enjoyed, and wasn't like pulling teeth.. I'd have to get back to you on that one. I will say, I enjoy posters like @Bitter Crank.. I don't mean to impugn him in the more respectable circles of PF who wouldn't not want him associated with me. His style is humor, and even in disagreement has some fun things to say which make the dialogue interesting. There are also people like @Badenand @Benkei who I've debated or discussed with, which I totally think had respectable styles and some interesting ideas that made me think and analyze my position for more. So yes, I think there have been respectable and interesting interlocutors here.

Thanks. I can't remember being respectable, but I'll take your word for it. :starstruck:

This assumption isn't a conclusion that needs to be there. — schopenhauer1

How do you judge which conclusions 'need' to be there?

It's the Village Green Preservation Society trying to clutch its pearls and scream of the indeceny. — schopenhauer1

If you thought Ray was only holding up the VGPS to ridicule, you could not have more totally missed the point of that record. I take umbrage, sir! On Ray's behalf.

Terribly odd that you invoke the Kinks because when @khaled first mentioned genetic engineering I had the same two thoughts I always have on that subject: Gattaca and "God's Children", Ray's great anthem against such things from just a few years after Village Green, and yesterday I listened to "God's Children" for the umpteenth time, one of the most beautiful recordings ever made.

And everyone knows @Baden is a well respected man about town, doing the best things so conservatively.

So we were talking about accountability in regards to decision-making:
I was trying to get at:
1) Though I recognize that the locus of accountability is at the individual level
1a) Decision-making itself is part of the ecology of harm, similar to natural disasters in that it is part of the human experience. — schopenhauer1

But you'll recall I challenged you on bringing up "being born" because no one thinks this is the free choice of the then non-existent person, so for the purposes of the OP even if being born is a harm, our only interest would be to classify it as external, or as an external source of suffering. There is no need in this thread to consider the choices of others who might be responsible for that putative harm.

You made a post I believe I never responded to which included this:

Yes you created some ridiculous scenarios, but that's not how these things usually go. — schopenhauer1

Considering some of @khaled's thought experiments, this is priceless.

I made a post neither of you responded to which included this:

Even granting, and I see no reason not to, that everyone makes poor decisions, does it make any sense to say that being alive caused those decisions? — Srap Tasmaner

See how I'm still talking about the OP?

As it turns out, @khaled sort of responded, but to you not me, and I think I missed it:

I would say that it's not fair to put ALL of your suffering on being forced to play the game. Birth is the first cause of all suffering but not the only cause. Currently people don't count suffering they inflict on themselves as suffering at all but I don't think it's fair to go from that to counting all suffering as a direct result of being born. — khaled

Only he doesn't address my very first claim in this thread, that it's just not true that "people don't count suffering they inflict on themselves as suffering at all". It's patently false. Of course people think suffering is suffering even if they brought it on themselves. The distinction people are making, I submit, is between harm to themselves they feel responsible for and harm they don't; and people make the same distinction about others, that indeed those other people are suffering but either brought it on themselves or didn't deserve it. Neither of you have ever substantiated the claim that anyone thinks it doesn't count, or it's not "really" suffering, or whatever. The premise of the OP was never actually defended by anyone apparently. (And note how @khaled is talking here about the first-person perspective, whether the person suffering counts it as suffering, but at the end of that post says this part isn't even philosophy just "attitudes toward life".)

What both of you did want to talk about -- not with each other but with the rest of us -- is that there is someone else who is responsible for that harm, someone who is motivated to deny that this suffering is suffering because otherwise they'd have to admit that they are the cause of it, someone who has to argue that it doesn't count if you brought it on yourself long after I brought you into existence.

So it turns out the OP was being defended, but the OP was in fact always about a single group of people in one particular sense: parents.

You said to @Albero:

Its not meant to blame parents per se — schopenhauer1

because he also immediately saw the point of the OP and said so:

Personally, it seems a little too reductionistic for my tastes. To me, it may imply that if something terrible happens the event can all be traced back to your parents for being responsible since they brought you here in the first place. — Albero

But when you responded to me with this

They are claiming that if you just made better decisions you wouldnt be so bad. — schopenhauer1

it turns out there's only one group that's a plausible candidate for being "they" and it's parents.

It was an anti-natalism thread from the OP.

And everyone knows Baden is a well respected man about town, doing the best things so conservatively. — Srap Tasmaner

No, I'm a trouble-maker really, always drinking arsehole's milkshakes, which is why respectable conservatives should never vote for me for President. :razz:

(Damn, which thread am I in??).

(Damn, which thread am I in??). — Baden

There is only one thread. The manyness of threads is an illusion created by the PlushForums software.

Cooooooool... :sparkle:

What both of you did want to talk about -- not with each other but with the rest of us -- is that there is someone else who is responsible for that harm — Srap Tasmaner

That claim wouldn't have been made if the topic of the thread hadn't drifted to antinatalism. And I never made that claim. I never said that if your child bangs his head against a wall despite you warning him of the consequences that you were responsible for that.

I think my morals do apply to you. I just recognise that you will have different morals that you (might) think apply to me and that there's no objective means of determining who's right. — Isaac

When I said "applies to everyone" I meant "that everyone believes in".

and letting others do the same? — Isaac

This bit is not necessary but I don't have the "zealotry" required to try to change others' morals without having an objective criteria by which to convince them because then it's just a "vanilla or chocolate" debate

But if believing them leads to antinatalism then each premise leads to counter intuitive conclusions if believed too. You haven't removed the counter intuitive conclusions by believing them. — Isaac

Correct. I am not here to say that antinatalism leads to intuitive conclusions. I was saying that not believing in its premises also has consequences so that is the justification for why you would believe them. It then becomes a matter of which is the least counterintuitive which is of course subjective. But I would also add that the premises of antinatalism are not unpopular individually.

If you're claiming that your premise is actually that we should seek consent from those potentially harmed by our action where we have a legal responsibility to do so, or some legal right may be infringed, — Isaac

I didn't say legal. But I think we'd both agree that regardless of whatever criteria I use to determine whether or not consent is required that requiring consent when you're about to harm someone is pretty reasonable no?

The point is that everyone does this. Except antinatalists. Antinatalists do it to a point but then seem to reach "end the human race" as a conclusion and instead of adding another caveat to avoid such an obviously wrong conclusion, they just accept it — Isaac

Because it seems the least wrong to them. Usually because they don't value the good of "the human race" (as if it is some entity that can be benefited or harmed) nearly as highly as the wellbeing of a real person. But I wouldn't call that a minority belief. Many are disgusted by "The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas" for example and the example of the roman colosseum is a famous argument against classical utilitarianism through absurdity.

That claim wouldn't have been made if the topic of the thread hadn't drifted to antinatalism. — khaled

It's pretty clear I don't believe it drifted anywhere.

And I never made that claim. I never said that if your child bangs his head against a wall despite you warning him of the consequences that you were responsible for that. — khaled

I know. I quoted you.

What is your claim anyway? You must consider parents responsible for something, or you'd have nothing to say. I could guess, but you could just say what that is.

What is your claim anyway? You must consider parents responsible for something, or you'd have nothing to say. I could guess, but you could just say what that is. — Srap Tasmaner

That antinatalism an in internally consistent system that doesn't rely on premises that are too unpopular.

As to what parents are reponsible for, they are partially responsible for every kind of suffering their child experiences except in the case where the child willingly brings harm to himself despite being warned by them that that would happen. If the child is harmed in any way that he didn't bring upon himself fully they are partially responsible.

I am not here to say that antinatalism leads to intuitive conclusions. I was saying that not believing in its premises also has consequences so that is the justification for why you would believe them. It then becomes a matter of which is the least counterintuitive which is of course subjective. — khaled

Yes, but this is part of the main point I'm trying to make. You seem to have this sharp line between a moral intuition used as a premise and a moral intuition used to reject (or choose between) counter-intuitive conclusions. I can't see any justification for such a divide, they're all just moral intuitions.

I think we'd both agree that regardless of whatever criteria I use to determine whether or not consent is required that requiring consent when you're about to harm someone is pretty reasonable no? — khaled

No, not in the least bit. Self-defence, emergency surgery, corporal punishment, vaccinations... And that's just physical harm, which doesn't cover the definition of 'harm' used in antinatalist arguments. If we extend 'harm' to any discomfort there's punishment of criminals, all laws affecting under 18s, all laws affecting anarchists, any use of shared resources, walking in the same space someone else wanted to walk in... The number of situations where we 'harm' others without their consent vastly outnumbers the situations where we ask for consent. As I said earlier, none of these maxims are applied in their simple form, every single one has a huge list of caveats and addendum. Treating them as simple is what leads to odd conclusions.

That antinatalism an in internally consistent system that doesn't rely on premises that are too unpopular. — khaled

It isn't. It relies on premises (moral intuitions) taken without the usual caveats which is not at all popular.

Yes, but this is part of the main point I'm trying to make. You seem to have this sharp line between a moral intuition used as a premise and a moral intuition used to reject (or choose between) counter-intuitive conclusions. I can't see any justification for such a divide, they're all just moral intuitions. — Isaac

I honestly have no clue what you're talking about or how you got that relates to the quote. You just pick the intuitions that have the most intuitive conclusions. And for antinatalists, antinatalism IS the most intuitive conclusion.

No, not in the least bit. — Isaac

Fine fine. Let me limit harm to "Psychological or Physical damage done to an innocent party (not self defence) that is not done with the intention of helping that party (not surgery, vaccines, etc)". Resonable? If so, and assuming giving birth to someone is harming them, that harm is done on an innocent party and is not done to help them (because they didn't exist to want help) so is not permissable.

It isn't. It relies on premises (moral intuitions) taken without the usual caveats which is not at all popular. — Isaac

It uses all the same caveats except "Ending the human race is to be avoided at all costs". Actually, what caveats would YOU put on "You should ask for consent before harming someone". I'd rather you answer that first even if you don't reply to anything else.

you just pick the intuitions that have the most intuitive conclusions — khaled

What's the difference between an intuition and an intuitive conclusion?

And for antinatalists, antinatalism IS the most intuitive conclusion. — khaled

Well then it relies on intuitions which are very uncommon. I fail to see how whether the intuitions it relies on relate to the premises or the conclusion makes any difference to its philosophical interest. Either way, no one with a relatively normal set of intuitions is going to be in the least bit interested in the argument because it has nothing to do with them. The only people you're addressing here are those who already agree.

Let me limit harm to "Psychological or Physical damage done to an innocent party (not self defence) that is not done with the intention of helping that party (not surgery, vaccines, etc)" — khaled

Why are you adding that particular set of limits and not some other common constraints such as harm done in the pursuit of wider social objectives (like punishment for crime), or harm done where the harm is considered 'character building', or harm done where a greater harm would befall if not done... All common caveats to the definition of 'harm' in this context, many of which could be used to mitigate the harm of conceptions, all of which you conveniently leave off your addendum.

Resonable? If so, and assuming giving birth to someone is harming them, that harm is done on an innocent party and is not done to help them (because they didn't exist to want help) so is not permissable. — khaled

No. I know antinatalists have this weird idea that you can't do anything for a person who doesn't yet exist, but tell that to the parent who's saving up children's toys for their as yet un-conceived grandchildren, or planting a woodland, or putting money into a trust fund. Who are they imagining will enjoy these things? Of course you can do things to help people who don't yet exist. The idea that you can't is ludicrous, you do so on exactly the same grounds as the surgery. As @Srap Tasmaner has already highlighted, the emergency surgery we might perform on an unconscious victim of a car accident is done with exactly the assumption that they probably would like to be kept alive. We might, perfectly reasonably, have a child on the grounds that they'd probably like to enjoy some of what life has to offer. Neither can actually consent to this (one is unconscious, the other doesn't exist yet), but in neither case do we have any trouble imagining what their feelings might be, as and when they have any. I'm not going to re-hash the arguments Srap has already made, but it comes down to a very convoluted treatment of not-yet-existence which is neither intuitive nor useful so one is left again wondering why the antinatalist would create such an edifice.

It uses all the same caveats except "Ending the human race is to be avoided at all costs". — khaled

Yes but why, is the question. Once you accept caveats to your overarching principle, why select out one of those and discard it? (Oh and it's not "...at all costs" - this superfluity is the real problem here. It's like absolutely every other moral feeling - complex and full of caveats. I'm sure if, somehow, the entire human race became infected with an awful disease passed on to the next generation which rendered life unbearable and all agreed it was so, then ending the human race would become a viable moral option).

what caveats would YOU put on "You should ask for consent before harming someone". I'd rather you answer that first even if you don't reply to anything else. — khaled

1. That the person exists, is conscious, is able to respond, and is judged to be of their right mind - absent of either you have to guess what they might want done (where the harm might be weighed against benefits).
2. That no wider important social objective is undermined by avoiding that harm, if so a balance might need to be made - we're a social species, not just a bunch of unrelated individuals.
3. That you don't have good reason to believe you already have consent - I add this one because the 'before' bit is ambiguous - how much before, to what specificity?

As to what parents are reponsible for, they are partially responsible for every kind of suffering their child experiences except in the case where the child willingly brings harm to himself despite being warned by them that that would happen. If the child is harmed in any way that he didn't bring upon himself fully they are partially responsible. — khaled

Suppose while I was at the store you finished building a model of the Eiffel Tower out of popsicle sticks, and left it sitting on the kitchen table so that I would see it when I got back. I come in with bags of groceries and put them on the kitchen table as always, in the process knocking your model, which I hadn't noticed, to the floor; it will need considerable repair.

You might get mad at me for knocking over your model, and I might defend myself by saying you shouldn't have put it there in the first place. You say it's my fault; I say it's yours. One way people resolve this sort of dispute is for both sides to admit they were "partly responsible".

What's going on here? Is there a fact of the matter about who is responsible?

We can analyse what happened, in the old-fashioned sense of splitting up the sequence of events that led to the model's injury: it's clearly only on the table because you put it there and you could have done otherwise, so that's on you; it only fell to the floor because I knocked it over and I could have done otherwise, so that's on me. Neither of us intended the final event in the chain to happen, and the final event in the chain would not have happened if we had not both done things we accept responsibility for.

Is that a proof that we each bear "partial responsibility"? Are we both logically compelled to accept this answer? I think no, and no. Either of us could dig in and argue that it's "really" the fault of the other. (I'll spare you the arguments, and assume you can fill them in yourself, though I find them pretty interesting.) I think both accepting some "share" of the blame is just a way of saying we've decided not to argue about whose fault it "really" is.

But is there a fact of the matter about whose fault it really is? If so, is it something we could discover? (Maybe we abandon the search not because there's no answer but because we know it's probably out of reach.)

If a drunk driver kills somebody, is the bartender who served them partly responsible? What about the dealer that sold him the car? If a man shoots some people at a nightclub for some idiosyncratic reason, is the gun dealer who sold him the weapon partly responsible? What about the company that manufactured the weapon? If I'm prone to take your books without asking, and you know this, and you leave a book you know I want in the living room, are you partly responsible for me taking it? I'll bet most people who read such questions have a gut reaction of yes or no to each, but that they're not all the same, and some people would think they need more information before they can judge. There are so many "variables", and your judgment of responsibility can swing back and forth with each detail I could add to a story; why is that?

It seems to me you feel compelled by logic to say that parents are partly to blame for any suffering their child experiences because the child could not experience that suffering if they hadn't been born -- though you also carve out a really precise exception to that. (And exactly the same argument could apply to any joy that child experiences, any harm that child does to others, any good that child does for others, and so on.) Are you compelled by logic to specify that exception? @schopenhauer1 isn't. Is one of you right? What about the grandparents? Partly to blame? I think you'll say no, but schop will say yes. Same for the grandkids. And so on. Whose fault is everything really?

I think you have it in mind that genuine responsibility can be assessed, though in practice it might sometimes be impossible, through a careful analysis of causes. And you're willing to make distinctions: people are only responsible for a subset of what they cause -- namely the subset that nothing else would have caused if they hadn't. And you'll keep going like this, making finer distinctions if necessary.

So what's wrong with that? Don't we have to analyse causes to assess responsibility?

Broadly, yes, but it's nowhere near all we do, and we certainly don't think we can just derive our moral positions from a completed analysis of causes, not in the way you expect to be able to. How we go about analysing causes is shaped from the beginning by our moral intuitions, and this is clear in the disagreement I posited, accurately or not, between you and schop over your exception to the rule. Why that exception? Why in that form? You've clearly iterated here to add the "parents explicitly warning against" bit. Are you sure you're done? Couldn't we parse that further? Couldn't I still be partly responsible if I warn you not to do something but I'm not certain you understood me? What if I give you a blanket warning to do nothing that might lead to you suffering, is that okay? Am I now absolved of all responsibility for you?

On top of that, our moral intuitions are themselves part of the story of what we do and why we do it. But not on your approach; you intend to complete the analysis of causes first and let the chips fall where they may. Neither you nor schop are willing to consider our intentions. Sure that's a minefield for ethics, and some people choose just to go around it, but from a strictly causal point of view you could take into account beliefs and where they come from. If I tell you something and you believe it and act on it, why am I not partly responsible for what you do? Or am I? Oh wait! We've already been here, because this is precisely the territory of your exception.

If you need further proof that there is more to moral judgment than a moral principle (do no harm) and an objective analysis of causes, consider anti-natalism. It's a dead simple argument that almost no one accepts. Your explanation is, I believe, that people just don't think about it. (And if your mood or personality is especially pessimistic, you might explain that by their selfishness or stupidity or laziness when it comes to thinking about anything. Or not.) But you know for a fact that's false, because hardly anyone you've ever presented the argument to accepted it, right? So now you need to claim that they're not logical, maybe not even capable of being logical (again, some extra pessimism), or that they're capable of it but engaging in motivated reasoning that blocks the inference they really should make.

As far as you're concerned, the only option available for rejecting anti-natalism is denying the principle that is applied after the causal analysis is done: if someone wants to say, yeah I'm down with causing unjustified suffering, you pack up your argument and leave. They can fail morally, fail intellectually or they can agree with you. But you're wrong. It's a stupid argument, and that's the reaction you're getting from almost everyone you present it to. It is literally stupid, in the sense of not knowing or pretending not to know something everyone knows, that if you're going to talk about who caused what to happen you're already swimming in moral seas.

Why are you adding that particular set of limits and not some other common constraints such as harm done in the pursuit of wider social objectives (like punishment for crime), or harm done where the harm is considered 'character building', or harm done where a greater harm would befall if not done — Isaac

I could ask you the same question. This is a vanilla vs chocolate argument.

All common caveats to the definition of 'harm' in this context, many of which could be used to mitigate the harm of conceptions, all of which you conveniently leave off your addendum. — Isaac

Because I think those caveats are BS in other words, very unintuitive.

No. I know antinatalists have this weird idea that you can't do anything for a person who doesn't yet exist, but tell that to the parent who's saving up children's toys for their as yet un-conceived grandchildren, or planting a woodland, or putting money into a trust fund. Who are they imagining will enjoy these things? — Isaac

It would still be wrong to say that they are doing them for "Non existing children". Did you read that sentence? It makes zero sense. You can say they are doing it for the benefit of people will exist but definitely not for the benefit of literal nothingness.

In which case I'd say: I'm sorry but are you trolling? The whole basis of the argument of antinatalism is that the actions you do have moral weight even if the person they affect doesn't exist yet and on the basis of THAT you shouldn't have children because it will result in them being harmed in the future. This is a central belief to antinatalism so it baffles me that you think every antinatalist doesn't believe in it. I suggest you educate yourself on the argument because you keep ciminally misinterpreting it.

We might, perfectly reasonably, have a child on the grounds that they'd probably like to enjoy some of what life has to offer. — Isaac

Not really reasonably. If you admit that an act has moral weight even if the affected party doesn't exist yet then what do you do about the fact that the child would be harmed as well. I could now argue "It is perfectly reasonable to not have a child on the ground that they'd probably hate some of what life has to offer". You can't just ignore that aspect and only focus on the good things life offers. You are literally one step away from arguing FOR antinatalism.

and all agreed it was so, then ending the human race would become a viable moral option — Isaac

Hmmmm. It's almost as if you're saying that if everyone on earth agrees that having children is wrong then ending the human race would become a viable moral option. Let me ask you this: Why does there need to be a disease AND everyone agree that ending the human race was preferable for ending the human race to become moral? What is the use of the first statement behind and? Why does the disease get a say in what is moral? Does a volacanic eruption count? What about a meteor? Wait, what if the entire human race agreed that life is bad enough that ending the human race is fine (no catastrophe involved)? Because that is the exact situation under which antinatalism would ever amount to ending the human race and here you admit that with everyone's agreement, even ending the human race is a viable moral option. This really undermines your premise that "Anything that ends the human race is bad and should never even be considered" as it shows even you don't believe in it. You seem to believe in the much more common premise that "Anything that ends the human race AGAINST ITS MEMBERS' WISHES is bad and should never be considered"

Oh and it's not "...at all costs" — Isaac

And here you confirm this. So what exactly is your problem if everyone tomorrow became an antinatalist and jointly decided that the human race should end. Because you've raised this issue from post one, implying that "ending the human race" is an unacceptable conclusion a jillion times but here you add the very important caveat "against its members' wishes". Antinatalism does NOT end the human race against its members' wishes so what is your issue with it now?

1. That the person exists, is conscious, is able to respond, and is judged to be of their right mind - absent of either you have to guess what they might want done (where the harm might be weighed against benefits).
2. That no wider important social objective is undermined by avoiding that harm, if so a balance might need to be made - we're a social species, not just a bunch of unrelated individuals.
3. That you don't have good reason to believe you already have consent - I add this one because the 'before' bit is ambiguous - how much before, to what specificity? — Isaac

So do you approve of malicious genetic engineering? Because it is not wrong according to caveat 1. I know you don't but the question is: How do you modify the caveats now?

Either of us could dig in and argue that it's "really" the fault of the other. (I'll spare you the arguments, and assume you can fill them in yourself, though I find them pretty interesting.) I think both accepting some "share" of the blame is just a way of saying we've decided not to argue about whose fault it "really" is. — Srap Tasmaner

The first statement doesn't lead to the second. Just because you didn't dig in doesn't mean that the responsibility is not partial but is solely on one side. You are not compelled by logic to accept that responsibility is only on one side either

If a drunk driver kills somebody, is the bartender who served them partly responsible? What about the dealer that sold him the car? — Srap Tasmaner

Negligably yes. Neither the bar tender nor the dealer forced or encouraged the guy to drink in the first place and neither forced or encouraged him to drive while drunk.

There are so many "variables", and your judgment of responsibility can swing back and forth with each detail I could add to a story; why is that? — Srap Tasmaner

So having a model that changes blame based on the amount of information available is weird somehow? So if I told you: Someone murdered your dad. You would think that he is wrong. Then I add "In self defence". Well now what? Don't you change your judgement? Or do you just stick with whatever you got first?

I think you'll say no, but schop will say yes. — Srap Tasmaner

I'll say yes lol. Though definitely not as much as the parents.

I think you have it in mind that genuine responsibility can be assessed — Srap Tasmaner

I don't. And as I said you are not compelled by logic to accept that a single party is responsible either, you choose to do so. So there is no reason to change my belief that responsibility is shared until you give me an actual reason to do so.

Are you sure you're done? Couldn't we parse that further? Couldn't I still be partly responsible if I warn you not to do something but I'm not certain you understood me? — Srap Tasmaner

No, Yes, Yes, but at that point we're arguing about very minor variations in responsibility that it basically doesn't matter. Sure you're partially resonsible depending on the extent to which your child understood you but as long as you tried to warn then that variation is very small in comparison to the variation of whether or not you tried to warn in the first place. Basically: An attempt at good parenting is leagues better than straight up negligence.

What if I give you a blanket warning to do nothing that might lead to you suffering, is that okay? — Srap Tasmaner

No because you've supplied literally no new information. Every CREATURE knows that.

Neither you nor schop are willing to consider our intentions. — Srap Tasmaner

Incorrect. You just haven't given an example where they are a major variable to consider. An example would be someone breaking into a house to rescue someone because from the window they look like they're having a seizure vs to rob them

But you know for a fact that's false, because hardly anyone you've ever presented the argument to accepted it, right? — Srap Tasmaner

Is that to be unexpected? Most people want children. And if someone told them "Having children is wrong" of course they'd think he's a clown. Additionally, they know the position is not popular and often associate it with pessimism, so they think I'm just about to argue out of some messed up premise like "Life is a disease"

What I can tell you for a fact though is that no one I've talked to so far has been able to show that the argument is ridiculous or not worth considering or to dismiss any of its premises as inconsequential. It's different from an argument such as "Life is a disease so we should kill everyone to spare them". It doesn't have repulsive premises, nor does it have logical inconsistencies, nor can you easily dismiss its premises without ending up with abusrd examples such as "It is fine to genetically engineer a child to be severely disabled" (resulting from the dismissal of "Acts still have moral weight even if the affected party doesn't exist yet").

So now you need to claim that they're not logical, maybe not even capable of being logical (again, some extra pessimism), or that they're capable of it but engaging in motivated reasoning that blocks the inference they really should make. — Srap Tasmaner

Or that they have different moral premises. But that is rarely the case as most discussions about AN are characterised by roundabout ad homs:

or griping about the world without actually having to bear any responsibilty for doing anything about it. — Isaac

Or severly misunderstanding it on multiple occasions:

I know antinatalists have this weird idea that you can't do anything for a person who doesn't yet exist, — Isaac

But once in a blue moon ANs are blessed with someone actually willing to listen to their argument like you.

As far as you're concerned, the only option available for rejecting anti-natalism is denying the principle that is applied after the causal analysis is done: if someone wants to say, yeah I'm down with causing unjustified suffering, you pack up your argument and leave. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes. But first off, isn't that the case for any argument? The only way of rejecting it is by rejecting its premises or critiquing its logic? This isn't an AN specific thing. And secondly usually people ADD premises rather than critiquing AN's premises. Oftentimes they have something like "Ending the human race is completely unacceptable" which I can't argue with though I think is very stupid.

I am more interested, however, in why people feel the need to reject AN. Why people cannot simply recognize that the argument makes sense and still not believe in it anyways (by using extra permises or disagreeing with the ones used, or heck just not believing it because they don't want to). Most ANs don't go after people trying to convince them but simply try to defend the belief (actually I don't have the statistics on that but it applies to me at least). In my experience though people continuously come after AN like it's the plague even if the antiantalist isn't trying to convince anyone.

They can fail morally, fail intellectually or they can agree with you. — Srap Tasmaner

In order for someone to "fail" morally that would imply some way to "succeed" morally which would imply some form of objective morality which I don't believe in. So no, no one fails morally, not even serial killers as far as I'm concerned.

It is literally stupid, in the sense of not knowing or pretending not to know something everyone knows, — Srap Tasmaner

Which is?

that if you're going to talk about who caused what to happen you're already swimming in moral seas. — Srap Tasmaner

So how do YOU assign responsibility then? Or at least what's a way of assigning responsibility that you don't think is stupid?

Why are you adding that particular set of limits and not some other common constraints such as harm done in the pursuit of wider social objectives (like punishment for crime), or harm done where the harm is considered 'character building', or harm done where a greater harm would befall if not done — Isaac


I could ask you the same question. This is a vanilla vs chocolate argument. — khaled

I add the caveats so that I'm not forced into repugnant conclusions by following the rule. we've already established that what we personally find appealing and repugnant varies and has no logical method by which it can be derived. Why are we going over this again? The question is why on earth anyone would publish their personal preferences in a public forum when those preferences are the metaphorical equivalent of saying one prefers mud-flavour. We've no cause to say you shouldn't, but it's just a really weird position with nothing in favour of it.

All common caveats to the definition of 'harm' in this context, many of which could be used to mitigate the harm of conceptions, all of which you conveniently leave off your addendum. — Isaac


Because I think those caveats are BS in other words, very unintuitive. — khaled

You're not following the thread of the argument at all. I'm not questioning your bizarre 'intuitions' at all, you raised the un-appended version as if it lead to obvious conclusions. It's antinatalists who raise these partial rules and try to claim they lead inexorably to antinatalism. If you know already that there are perfectly reasonable caveats which avoid antinatalism (just ones which you happen to find unintuitive) then there's nothing philosophically interesting here - psychologically interesting, certainly.

It would still be wrong to say that they are doing them for "Non existing children". Did you read that sentence? It makes zero sense. You can say they are doing it for the benefit of people will exist but definitely not for the benefit of literal nothingness. — khaled

Makes perfect sense to me. I can guarantee you if you asked any of these people who they're doing it for they would answer "my grandchildren" without confusion, not "my future grandchildren who might exist but don't yet". We are capable of talking about acting for the benefit of imaginary beings, it's quite a normal part of humanity. If you wanted to say "ah but you're really benefiting them in the future when they exist", that's fine (but unnecessarily clumsy), I don't see how that changes anything.

The whole basis of the argument of antinatalism is that the actions you do have moral weight even if the person they affect doesn't exist yet and on the basis of THAT you shouldn't have children because it will result in them being harmed in the future. This is a central belief to antinatalism so it baffles me that you think every antinatalist doesn't believe in it. — khaled

Where have I suggested the antinatalist doesn't believe this?

If you admit that an act has moral weight even if the affected party doesn't exist yet then what do you do about the fact that the child would be harmed as well. — khaled

Balance that against the pleasures they might experience.

I could now argue "It is perfectly reasonable to not have a child on the ground that they'd probably hate some of what life has to offer". — khaled

Again, you're not following the argument, just reaching for knee-jerk prepared responses. I'm not laying out the complete reason to have children, I'm answering a specific point you raised. There's no call to assume I mean "...and don't include any other factors other than this one" at the end of every answer I give. I've already stated when you asked me directly about it that one need weigh the advantages against the harms when deciding something for someone not capable of giving consent. If you want me to take more care not to misrepresent your position you might lead by example.

Let me ask you this: Why does there need to be a disease AND everyone agree that ending the human race was preferable for ending the human race to become moral? — khaled

Because morality is not something decided by majority, it's decided by feelings I have, and I would allow for the possibility that everyone in the human race at the time had made a stupid mistake in their agreement to end it. Likewise, I don't trust myself to know everything with such certainty that I'm going to advocate ending the human race without widespread agreement. Hence both a reason I find plausible, and widespread agreement that such a reason is plausible are necessary.

This really undermines your premise that "Anything that ends the human race is bad and should never even be considered" — khaled

I've literally written the exact opposite of this in a comment you even reply to further down. Please read my comments carefully or not at all. I've nowhere said "...never..." and have specifically said that such absoluteness is to be avoided.

So what exactly is your problem if everyone tomorrow became an antinatalist and jointly decided that the human race should end. Because you've raised this issue from post one, implying that "ending the human race" is an unacceptable conclusion a jillion times but here you add the very important caveat "against its members' wishes". Antinatalism does NOT end the human race against its members' wishes so what is your issue with it now? — khaled

See above. Also, none of this has been about a lot of people independently arriving at the conclusions that we should end the human race. It's entirely about why anyone would want to actively persuade others not currently of that opinion to change their view.

So do you approve of malicious genetic engineering? Because it is not wrong according to caveat 1. — khaled

Yes it is. Do you even read what I write? "1. That the person exists, is conscious, is able to respond, and is judged to be of their right mind - absent of either you have to guess what they might want done (where the harm might be weighed against benefits" - in what way might someone want to be genetically engineered to have a disability?

Your whole post has just blatantly ignored most of what I've written and returned to lines of argument we've already established positions on as if we hadn't. There's little point in continuing if, no matter what I say, you're going to give me a short essay on "everything I know about antinatalism". The arguments I'm making (the only ones I've ever made) are -

- that antinatalism proceeds from, or relies on, some very uncommon moral beliefs and as such the fact that it reaches uncommon conclusions is neither surprising nor philosophically interesting.

- that upon seeing the conclusion resulting from these unusual beliefs are repugnant to many, and insulting when presented as anything like an objective moral (as they often are, but not by you), it is particularly anti-social to publish them on a philosophy forum (given the above lack of philosophical interest).

If you have any arguments against ether of those positions, I'd be glad to hear them, but so far all the lines of intuitions you've opened up have ended up admitting that these are 'vanilla vs chocolate' cases, thus supporting my first argument. The second doesn't even relate to you, but you started out defending a person to whom it does relate and then dropped that line of argument.

What I've no interest in is what strange moral intuitions you might have which lead to antinatalism. The only interest there would be if you had common intuitions which lead to antinatalism, but since one common intuition is that ending the human race would be morally bad (in all but the most extreme circumstances), that seems categorically impossible from the start.

The first statement doesn't lead to the second. — khaled

This is actually your problem, right here.

Anti-natalism is not a moral position at all. It is, as I said before, a logical paradox. It might also work as a paradox of game theory, but I'm not going to work that out.

What is morality anyway? What is it for?

There are some aspects of morality you can describe as rules, but the rules aren't much, and they are not the fundamental thing. Those are just summaries of our moral practices, maxims to quote or rules of thumb to remember or something for philosophers to misconstrue and argue about. Practice comes first, and theory after. (Thanks again @unenlightened for reminding me.)

And what is the practice?

It is us living together in communities. Morality is how we manage to do that, and how we manage to go on doing that, generation after generation. It is the web not just of choices and actions, but of expectations and obligations, of sympathies and resentments, of approbation and outrage. It is how we raise our children.

What you present as a moral idea is a bit of logic and a few words borrowed from morality, but it's clearly no part of morality. It's not about how we manage to live together and how we can go on doing that; it's about all of us dying together. There is no room for community in your theory; there is barely room for people: a couple of them get a walk on part, one stays offstage, and soon enough the curtain comes down.

It might also work as a paradox of game theory, but I'm not going to work that out. (Not in this post anyway.) — Srap Tasmaner

Please do at some point though. It would be an interesting process to follow.

This is actually your problem, right here.

Anti-natalism is not a moral position at all. It is, as I said before, a logical paradox. — Srap Tasmaner

So being logical when it comes to ethics is a problem now? If that's what you think then I don't really value your opinion much.

Morality is how we manage to do that, and how we manage to go on doing that, generation after generation — Srap Tasmaner

Why do you get to decide what morality "really is". I don't think the main purpose of a moral framework is to insure we continue the human race. That in itself is a moral premise. For me it is a result that has to come out of a description of how we should act as individuals based on moral premises.

The question is why on earth anyone would publish their personal preferences in a public forum when those preferences are the metaphorical equivalent of saying one prefers mud-flavour. We've no cause to say you shouldn't, but it's just a really weird position with nothing in favour of it. — Isaac

That's a question you should ask shope not me.

If you know already that there are perfectly reasonable caveats which avoid antinatalism (just ones which you happen to find unintuitive) then there's nothing philosophically interesting here - psychologically interesting, certainly. — Isaac

Agreed. Though I said this like 6 replies ago. Which is why I thought we were done. When you replied again I thought we were now talking about the arguments themselves not why anyone would have a reason to persuade others of them or believe them. But if we're still talking about that then I wasted about 1.5 hours misreading you, sorry about that.

ah but you're really benefiting them in the future when they exist", that's fine (but unnecessarily clumsy) — Isaac

Clumsy? Maybe. Accurate? Yes.

I don't see how that changes anything. — Isaac

The problem is that you somehow thought antinatalists don't think in that way too.

Where have I suggested the antinatalist doesn't believe this? — Isaac

Here:

No. I know antinatalists have this weird idea that you can't do anything for a person who doesn't yet exist,but tell that to the parent who's saving up children's toys for their as yet un-conceived grandchildren — Isaac

Which is why I said this is a criminal misinterpretation of the argument.

Balance that against the pleasures they might experience. — Isaac

But that's not what you do irl is it? If I really really like a game and I know you would probably really like it too, it is still wrong for me to tape you to a seat and force you to play it for 5 hours. IRL we require consent in these situations which is not provided in this case. Now, you sidestep the need for consent by adding "guess what they would want" but I don't. And I'm not implying that you shouldn't by saying this.

a stupid mistake in their agreement to end it — Isaac

It wouldn't be a stupid mistake if everyone believed it because that includes you and if you believe it it is obviously not stupid from you POV :wink:

I've literally written the exact opposite of this in a comment you even reply to further down — Isaac

Sorry, I reply to a comment bit by bit I don't read the whole thing first.

Yes it is. Do you even read what I write? "1. That the person exists, is conscious, is able to respond, and is judged to be of their right mind - absent of either you have to guess what they might want done — Isaac

I have no excuse for this one. I just straight up misread. Sorry for all the trouble.


I guess we're done for real this time as I don't really have an opposition against the two points you're arguing.

Man these threads devolve fast nobody answered schop’s question lol

So being logical when it comes to ethics is a problem now? If that's what you think then I don't really value your opinion much. — khaled

In a sense, actually, yes, but not in the sense you think, because you're also confused about philosophy.

Are there genuine moral questions? Questions we might work out the answer to logically from moral premises? No. But there are things that look like that.

Being primates, humans have lived in social groups from the very beginning, millions of years ago, but no other primates live in communities counting among their fellows millions or billions. The core of social groups is always immediate kinship. (You might note here: no reproduction, no social group.) Beyond that, natural selection alone is enough to extend your group capacity to near kinship. (Enter game theory.) Beyond that?

Beyond that, it's hard to say, but it's obvious that by the time you get to communities on the scales humans handle, we must be talking about culture, Human civilization itself has had many thousands of years to evolve moral customs and institutions. We moderns have a double moral inheritance.

Genuine questions arise when we face situations never contemplated before in the long history of our living together in communities. We're talking about medicine mostly, and bio-ethics, but other situations where our forms of interaction have changed dramatically due to changes in the material conditions of our lives have a claim here too. (Thinking here of debates over social media, for instance, but that's muddled because a lot of the issues that arise there relate more broadly to human psychology. Big changes in technology often take a while for our collective psychology and morality to adjust)

When we explore such a novel problem, sometimes we feel our intuitions, derived from the double inheritance, come up short. We can, then, think through things carefully, calling on maxims and principles that summarize our moral practice in a rough and ready way ("Do unto others as you would have them do unto you," that sort of thing). But this is not really a logical exercise, and moral situations are not logic puzzles. When a thought experiment is proposed ("What if it was your daughter?") the idea is to activate our intuitions, give them something more concrete to work with.

The premises in such exercises simply do not have the sort of standing that you think of the premises in a logical argument as having. We know from the start that they are not exactly what we believe, but are a sort of rough generalization. "Don't take other people's things" is not a rule for behavior; it's something you tell a child as they're learning how our community works.

No one expects to work through the puzzle and just get an answer. The answer itself must be tested against our intuitions. If it doesn't feel right, or if several of us, or millions of us, reach different conclusions, all we can do is try some other starting points we think generally right and talk to each other.

That hasn't been enough to resolve debates over abortion, but that failure is instructive. Participants in that debate sometimes take the moral principles they reason from as actual rules, for reasons we needn't go into here, and thus take their conclusions as logical results, much like you. I suspect one unintended consequence of those debates is that many people who might not otherwise have held commitments to moral rules as absolutes come to think this is how morality normally works: you have your premise, I have mine, and we try to out-infer or out-thought-experiment or out-premise each other. But remember: we wouldn't be having this debate at all if it weren't for advances in medicine and other opportunities due to the changes in the material conditions of our lives. (Putting a child up for adoption by total strangers, who may live in another city, is not an option in hunter-gatherer societies.)

What is the question anti-natalism is offered as an answer to, and where did it come from? Is having children a new phenomenon among human beings, something our double inheritance has left us ill-equipped to deal with? Compare it, again, to end-of-life decisions, or the effects of human population growth on the planet, or the effects of the technology by which we achieved that growth, and it's clear how genuine moral questions arise. The answer in every case is about what kind of community we are, what we want to be, what we will pass on to our children. That's why it's one thing to say we should be having fewer children than we do so as not to force future generations to live in an ecological hellscape, and another thing entirely to say that humanity should make itself extinct. One is a genuinely moral position, concerned with how we live together in communities and can go on doing so; the other is either a renunciation of life or a logical toy.

nobody answered schop’s question — Albero

I thought I was answering a version of "no", but mainly pointing out that his question was based on a misunderstanding of the difference between "I brought this on myself" and "I don't deserve this".

That the question he asked was not the question he actually wanted to discuss is not my fault.

Life is capricious. Applying a concept of justice to it is humorous to me. :lol:

"There but the grace of God go I."