It would have been nice if Foucault had mentioned the author or authors he was targeting with his criticism. But it is somewhat rare for famous philosophers to critically mention contemporary authors. They probably expose themselves to the discovery that they have not been seriously read them. This is often the case.

If Foucault's criticism refers only to the contextuality of meaning, it seems to me that it is not very original. I suspect that there is something else. — David Mo

It was not just about the contextuality of meaning. In "Archeology of knowledge," Foucault shows how his statements are related to speech-acts. Later, he opposes his conceptualization of performative acts to Austin's theory in "The government of self and others.”: “In a performative utterance, the given elements of the situation are such that when the utterance is made, the effect which follows is known and ordered in advance, it is codified, and this is precisely what constitutes the performative character of the utterance. In parresia, on the other hand, whatever the usual, familiar, and quasi-institutionalized character of the situation in which it is effectuated, what makes it parresia is that the introduction, the irruption of the true discourse determines an open situation, or rather opens the situation and makes possible effects which are, precisely, not known. Parresia does not produce a codified effect; it opens up an unspecified risk. And this unspecified risk is obviously a function of the elements of the situation”. Differently from the performative, parresia constitutes a rupture with the dominant significations, an irruptive event that creates a fracture. Also, to accomplish a performative utterance, the status of the subject is necessary, but just as a formal function. What makes “Excuse me” a performative is what one says. Whether one is sincere or not is of no importance. On the contrary, the parrhesiastic enunciation not only produces effects on others, but primarily affects the enunciating subject.

.

Wittgenstein would say every word is translatable from one language into any other. — Gregory

Expressible, maybe. Translatable, not.

It was not just about the contextuality of meaning. — Number2018

There is no statement that does not presuppose others; there is no statement that is not surrounded by a field of coexistences, effects of series and succession, a
distribution of functions and roles. — Number2018

I would say that these words of Foucault are equivalent to what is called in common language "context", both intralinguistic and extralinguistic. See below.

There is no mention of Austin in The Archaeology of Knowledge. You will refer to another book.

I have fouund a mention in La verdad y las formas jurídicas (Barcelona, 1984, p. 154), a book I know a little better, in which he mentions Wittgenstein and Austin:

What seems to me a little limited in the analysis of Strawson, Searle, etc. [Wittgenstein, Austin], is that they are strategy analyses of a discourse that is made around a cup of tea, in an Oxford salon, which are interesting strategy games, but which seem to me to be profoundly limited. The problem would be if you can't study strategy in a more real context, within practices that are different from salon conversations. Personal translation from the Spanish edition.

I would point out two things:
On the one hand, Foucault himself uses the word context to refer to the "field" of statements that forms a discourse. We are indeed talking about a problem of context.
Secondly, the difference between his theory and that of "Anglo-Saxon philosophers" does not seem to be one of theoretical principles, but rather of the backgrounds to which they apply, according Foucault himself. For my part, it seems to me that reducing Wittgenstein's context to the realm of "salon discussions" is a frivolity. Wittgenstein's writings on aesthetics and ethics, to cite one example, are something else.

There is a certain proximity in more than one point between Foucault's initial statements and some of the Wittgenstein's anthropological statements, which allows for a reading in which Wittgenstein's positions on life forms as the basis from which language acquires meaning and Foucault's theory are approached.

In fact, the differences between Searle and Foucault became narrower during the course of the epistolary exchange that both maintained. Finally, Foucault acknowledges : "As for the analysis of the acts of speech, I totally agree with your precisions. I was wrong to say that statements were not acts of speech, but in saying this I wanted to underline the fact that I consider them from a different angle than yours". (Letter from Foucault to Searle, 15 May 1979). Quoted by Maite Larrauri: Verdad y racionalidad en Michel Foucault, doctoral thesis, Universitat de València, Academic Year 1989-1990, p. 35

NOTE: I apologize for using Spanish bibliography. It is the one I usually use.

There is no mention of Austin in The Archaeology of Knowledge. — David Mo

In "Archeology of knowledge," Foucault shows how his statements are related to speech-acts. — Number2018

"Can one not say that there is a statement wherever one can recognize and isolate
an act of formulation - something like the speech act referred to by the
English analysts? This term does not, of course, refer to the material act of
speaking (aloud or to oneself) or of writing (by hand or typewriter); nor
does it refer to the intention of the individual who is speaking (the fact
that he wants to convince someone else, to be obeyed, to discover the
solution to a problem, or to communicate information); nor does it refer
to the possible result of what he has said (whether he has convinced someone
or aroused his suspicion; whether he was listened to and whether his
orders were carried out; whether his prayer was heard); what one is
referring to is the operation that has been carried out by the formula
itself, in its emergence: promise, order, decree, contract, agreement,
observation. The speech act is not what took place just prior to the moment
when the statement was made (in the author's thought or intentions) ;
it is not what might have happened, after the event itself, in its wake, and
the consequences that it gave rise to; it is what occurred by the very fact
that a statement was made - and precisely this statement (and no other) in
specific circumstances. Presumably, therefore, one individualization of
statements refers to the same criteria as the location of acts of formulation:
each act is embodied in a statement and each statement contains one of those
acts. They exist through one another in an exact reciprocal relationship.
Yet such a correlation does not stand up to examination. For one thing,
more than a statement is often required to effect a speech act: an oath, a
prayer, a contract, a promise, or a demonstration usually require a certain
number of distinct formulas or separate sentences”(Ibid, pg 83)

the difference between his theory and that of "Anglo-Saxon philosophers" does not seem to be one of theoretical principles, but rather of the backgrounds to which they apply, — David Mo

Foucault proposes that the statement exists as a primordial generative function that does not depend on external factors. The founding principle of fundamental redundancy distinguish a statement from a non-statement. So, a series of letters which one might write down at random would become a statement. "The keyboard of a typewriter is not a statement; but the same series of letters, A,Z,E,R, T, listed in a typewriting manual, is the statement".

a primordial generative function that does not depend on external factors. — Number2018

Domain of material objects possessing a certain number of observable physical properties, a domain of fictitious objects , a domain of spatial and geographical localizations, a domain of symbolic appartenances and secret kinships;e a domain of objects that exist at the same moment and on the same time-scale as the statement is formulated, a domain of objects that belongs to a quite different present -
that indicated and constituted by the statement itself, laws of possibility, rules of existence.

These are Foucault's exact expressions in The Archaeology of Knowledge which constitute the domain of the enunciative value. Do they not refer to the context of the enunciation? Space, time, location are not external factors?

The concept of the generative function of language does not appear in The Archaeology of Knowledge,. Are you not applying alien concepts in your interpretation of Foucault? What do you mean with "generative function"?

Domain of material objects possessing a certain number of observable physical properties, a domain of fictitious objects , a domain of spatial and geographical localizations, a domain of symbolic appartenances and secret kinships;e a domain of objects that exist at the same moment and on the same time-scale as the statement is formulated, a domain of objects that belongs to a quite different present -
that indicated and constituted by the statement itself, laws of possibility, rules of existence.

These are Foucault's exact expressions in The Archaeology of Knowledge which constitute the domain of the enunciative value. Do they not refer to the context of the enunciation? Space, time, location are not external factors? — David Mo

Foucault asserts that "A series of signs will become a statement on condition that it possesses 'something else'(which may be strangely similar to it, and almost identical as in the
example chosen), a specific relation that concerns itself- and not its cause,
or its elements". If so, the relations of a statement with 'external factors' are the derivatives
of the essential enunciative function. The statement is essentially self-sufficient and autonomous.

The concept of the generative function of language does not appear in The Archaeology of Knowledge,. Are you not applying alien concepts in your interpretation of Foucault? What do you mean with "generative function"? — David Mo

“The statement is not therefore a structure (that is, a group of relations between
variable elements, thus authorizing a possibly infinite number of concrete
models); it is a function of existence that properly belongs to signs and on
the basis of which one may then decide, through analysis or intuition,
whether or not they 'make sense', according to what rule they follow one
another or are juxtaposed, of what they are the sign, and what sort of act
A series of signs will become a statement on condition that it possesses 'something else'(which may be strangely similar to it, and almost identical as in the
example chosen), a specific relation that concerns itself- and not its cause,
or its elements. The subject of the statement should not be regarded as identical with the author of the formulation - either in substance, or in function. He is
not in fact the cause, origin, or starting point of the phenomenon of the
written or spoken articulation of a sentence; nor is it that meaningful intention
which, silently anticipating words, orders them like the visible
body of its intuition; it is not the constant, motionless, unchanging focus
of a series of operations that are manifested, in turn, on the surface of discourse
through the statements. It is a particular, vacant place that may in
fact be filled by different individuals; but, instead of being defined once
and for all, and maintaining itself as such throughout a text, a book, or an
oeuvre, this place varies - or rather it is variable enough to be able either to
persevere, unchanging, through several sentences, or to alter with each
one. It is a dimension that characterizes a whole formulation qua statement.
It is one of the characteristics proper to the enunciative function and
enables one to describe it.”
Foucault applies here terms of “a function of existence,” and of “the enunciative function.” He asserts that the statement is different from a logical proposition,
a meaningful phrase, or a speech-act. It is a general function of a few variables.
A statement entertains a few links with affiliated spaces of a discursive formation,
subjective positions, concepts, and material elements. His prominent example is AZERT. The meaningless group of letters, listed in a typewriting manual, becomes a statement of alphabetical order adopted by French typewriters. What makes it a statement is the repetition due to the power
that cannot be attributed to external causes or conditions. A statement defines itself
by establishing a specific link with ‘something else’ that lies on the same level as itself. A hidden repetition animates the statement. It is surprising that formally Foucault’s definition of the statement as the enunciating essential function is similar to what Derrida proposed as the fundamental iterability: “The iterability of an element divides its own identity a priory…It is because this iterability is differential, within each individual ‘element’ as well as between the ‘elements’, because it splits each element while constituting it, because it marks it with an articulatory break, it is a differential structure escaping the logic of presence”.
(Derrida, Limited Inc).
As well as differance, a statement is in itself a repetition, even if what it repeats is ’something else.’ Is there a fundamental difference? AZERT refers to the focal point of contemporary power relations, effectuating the typist’s fingers.

I think that your answer doesn't match my question.
See this:

Generally speaking, one can say that a sentence or a
proposition - even when isolated, even divorced from the natural context
that could throw light on to its meaning, even freed or cut off from all the
elements to which, implicitly or not, it refers - always remains a sentence
or a proposition and can always be recognized as such .
On the other hand, the enunciative function - and this shows that it is
not simply a construction of previously existing elements - cannot
operate on a sentence or proposition in isolation. It is not enough to say a
sentence, it is not even enough to say it in a particular relation to a field of
objects or in a particular relation to a subject, for a statement to exist: it
must be related to a whole adjacent field . (AoK: 97)

Warn this: even when isolated, even divorced from the natural context that could throw light on to its meaning (!)

Here there is an implicit recognition (?) that context (could?) change the meaning of a statement. How can it be said that a statement can be recognized without an external context?

I have the impression that the same context of Foucault's oeuvre (sorry!) guided his speech. His confrontation with Marxism led him to reject the identification of the subject of the statement as psychologically (author) and socially (class) conditioned. Therefore, the discourse appears as a (relatively) autonomous entity. I say "relatively" because in some accidental statements these extralinguistic contexts appear as submarines and reflect an ambiguous and untenable position.


Moreover, in his historical writings - which I know better - these contexts, emphatically rejected on a theoretical level, emerge with force. For example, the discourse of the human sciences is reviewed in Discipline and Punish in the context of the struggle against marginalized groups in modernity. Without social marginality and power strategies linked to productivity, this scientific discourse would have a different enunciative sense. And these are relevant contexts.

In fact, Foucault does not reject contextual analysis. He only defends his concept of enunciative discourse as a prior analysis. A totally philosophical position. Very debatable.

See this:

Generally speaking, one can say that a sentence or a
proposition - even when isolated, even divorced from the natural context
that could throw light on to its meaning, even freed or cut off from all the
elements to which, implicitly or not, it refers - always remains a sentence
or a proposition and can always be recognized as such .
On the other hand, the enunciative function - and this shows that it is
not simply a construction of previously existing elements - cannot
operate on a sentence or proposition in isolation. It is not enough to say a
sentence, it is not even enough to say it in a particular relation to a field of
objects or in a particular relation to a subject, for a statement to exist: it
must be related to a whole adjacent field . (AoK: 97)

Warn this: even when isolated, even divorced from the natural context that could throw light on to its meaning (!)

Here there is an implicit recognition (?) that context (could?) change the meaning of a statement. How can it be said that a statement can be recognized without an external context? — David Mo

I disagree.
"Generally speaking, one can say that a sentence or a
proposition - even when isolated, even divorced from the natural context
that could throw light on to its meaning, even freed or cut off from all the
elements to which, implicitly or not, it refers - always remains a sentence
or a proposition and can always be recognized as such ."
This 'means’ that we should avoid doing this: for Foucault, there is no ‘natural context’ that could ‘throw light on to statement’s meaning.’
"On the other hand, the enunciative function - and this shows that it is
not simply a construction of previously existing elements - cannot
operate on a sentence or proposition in isolation. It is not enough to say a
sentence, it is not even enough to say it in a particular relation to a field of
objects or in a particular relation to a subject, for a statement to exist: it
must be related to a whole adjacent field."
All right, for a statement to exist, the enunciative function relates the statement to a whole adjacent field. Yet, this relation, this link is not provided by the evident contextual circumstances. It is the essence of Foucault’s archeology: “the statement is neither visible nor hidden.” Therefore, the statement has to be disclosed, found out under the covering phrases and prepositions, behind their ‘natural’ meaning and logic. The surface, the ‘plinth,’ where the statements appear, must be discovered, polished, and even fashioned or invented. So, 'an external context' is primarily determined and chosen by the statement's formation, by its enunciative function. Foucault’s seemingly meaningless statement AZERT indicates his political and philosophical aim not to consider too meaningful, understandable, and recognizable texts and examples.

This 'means’ that we should avoid doing this: for Foucault, there is no ‘natural context’ that could ‘throw light on to statement’s meaning.’ — Number2018

This seems to contradict this:

Lastly, what we have called 'discursive practice' can now be defined
more precisely. (...)it is a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined
in the time and space that have defined a given period, and for a given
social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area, the conditions of
operation of the enunciative function. (AoK, III, 3: 117)

“Determined in time and space” in “a given period” and for “social, economic”, etc. "area", is what is usually understand as context.
Is it a real contradiction in Foucault or in your interpretation?

the statement is neither visible nor hidden. — Number2018

The paragraph you quote (AoK:108-9) only says that a statement is not an isolate linguistic fact with an "autonomous" existence. That it is "neither visible nor hidden" is a paradox that needs to be explained or it will remain confuse. In common language hidden and visible are an exclusive alternative.
As Foucault himself says, it is a "difficult to sustain" thesis. And so much so. I don't think it is possible unless it is specified that the statement is not visible in one sense and hidden in another.
In fact, Foucault recognizes that a statement can have different -even antagonistic- meanings. Are they not the "hidden" part of an apparent statement? No, according Foucault, because the statement is the same "in itself". In itself? What is the "itself" of a statement?

"It is the modality of existence of the verbal performance as it has taken place". (Ibid: 110).

I confess this definition is not evident in two senses:

First: What means the modality of existence of a statement which is independent of its different possible meanings?
Second: If this modality is not hidden, how is it not visible?

Maybe you can explain this.

I think that in order to know where Foucault is going the following two texts are interesting:

Another reason: the 'signifying' structure of language (Iangage) always
refers back to something else; objects are designated by it; meaning is in­
tended by it; the subject is referred back to it by a number of signs even if
he is not himself present in them. Language always seems to be inhabited
by the other, the elsewhere, the distant; it is hollowed by absence. Is it not
the locus in which something other than itself appears, does not its own
existence seem to be dissipated in this function? But if one wishes to des­
cribe the enunciative level, one must consider that existence itself;
question language, not in the direction to which it refers, but in the
dimension that gives it; ignore its power to designate, to name, to show, to
reveal, to be the place of meaning or truth, and, instead, turn one's
attention to the moment - which is at once solidified, caught up in the
play of the 'signifier' and the 'signified' - that determines its unique and
limited existence. In the examination of language, one must suspend, not
only the point of view of the 'signified' (we are used to this by now), but
also that of the 'signifier', and so reveal the fact that, here and there, in
relation to possible domains of objects and subjects, in relation to other
possible formulations and re-uses, there is language. (AoK:111)

A system must be understood as a set of relationships that are maintained and transformed independently of the things that link them together. It has been shown, for example, that Roman, Scandinavian and Celtic myths make very different gods and heroes appear, but that the organisation that links them, their hierarchies, their rivalries, their betrayals, their contracts, their adventures obeyed (in cultures that ignored each other) a single system. Recent discoveries in prehistoric times also show that a systematic organisation presides over the arrangement of the figures drawn on the walls of the caves. In biology, it is known that in the chromosomal material are encoded, as a coded message, all the genetic indications that will allow the development of the future being. Lacan's importance lies in the fact that he showed that it is the structures, the language system itself - and not the subject - that speak through the discourse of the patient and the symptoms of his neurosis. Before any human existence, before any human thought, there would already be a knowledge, a system that we rediscovered (Michel Foucault. Interview with Madeleine Chapsal : La Quinzaine littéraire, No. 5, 16 May 1966, pp. 14-15) Translation is mine.

I would like to comment on them if you find them interesting as well.

I suspect this thread is what happens when one's diet is solely tertiary texts.

I would like to comment on them if you find them interesting as well. — David Mo

Yes, of course.

That it is "neither visible nor hidden" is a paradox that needs to be explained or it will remain confuse. In common language hidden and visible are an exclusive alternative. — David Mo

The statement is not hidden (in Foucault's sense) if we do not need to look for a hidden meaning, to interpret it according to a founding transcendental principle. 'Not visible' means
that we should not look for an apparent logical or grammatical structure. Foucault opposes here the two principal techniques: formalization and interpretation.

according Foucault, because the statement is the same "in itself". In itself? What is the "itself" of a statement? — David Mo

‘The statement is the same in itself,’ is the essence of Foucault’s archaeology. The primary criterion for the existence of ‘the statement in itself” is the manifestation of its repetition, or, more precisely, its inherent variation. The statement repeats itself due to its ’regularity,’ its enunciative function. Does Foucault succeed in avoiding a pure metaphysical founding of the statement existence? And how his method is different from an empirical contextual analysis?Foucault always starts with a limited corpus of linguistic datum. As his later works showed, the chosen datum is operated by and exposes the enunciative function inherent to a field of particular power relations. For example, in "The will to power," the discursive formation of various verbal performances of ''sexuality'' is not hidden nor visible. The statement reflects the intensification and the function of the power relations in our society. It is disclosed, and found out under the chosen phrases and prepositions, behind their ''natural'' meaning and logic. Therefore, the 'initial' meaning becomes transformed.
That should clarify your question

What means the modality of existence of a statement which is independent of its different possible meanings? — David Mo

The surface where the statements appear is discovered and even invented. Likely, Foucault's originality lies in the way he immerses himself into the field of contemporary forces. That is why he refers to '’the foreign element”,” something else'' that lies at the same level as the statement itself. The repetition, the variation of the statement, is maintained by exterior, unrecognizable forces. The speaker may not recognize it, and she becomes ''one'', or ''non-person''. To give a place to "the statement in itself," Foucault eliminates, erases himself as the author of his text. He replaces himself with the anonymous '' murmuring'' of discourse: “Must we admit that the time of discourse is not the time of consciousness extrapolated to the dimensions of history, or the time of history present in the form of consciousness? Must I suppose that in my discourse I have no survival? In speaking I am not banishing my death, but actually establishing it; rather I am abolishing all interiority in that exterior that is so indifferent to my life, and so neutral, that it makes no distinction between my life and my death.”

The statement is not hidden (in Foucault's sense) — Number2018

For example, in "The will to power," the discursive formation of various verbal performances of ''sexuality'' is not hidden nor visible. — Number2018

Indeed, Foucault gives a very particular meaning to "visible" and "hidden". I don't think your interpretation makes much sense. Rather, you have to read this:

Although the statement cannot be hidden, it is not visible either; it is
not presented to the perception as the manifest bearer of its limits and
characteristics. It requires a certain change of viewpoint and attitude to be
recognized and examined in itself Perhaps it is like the over-familiar that
constantly eludes one; those familiar transparencies, which, although they
conceal nothing in their density, are nevertheless not entirely clear. The
enunciative level emerges in its very proximity. (AoK:110)

That is to say, we must not believe that the meaning of a discourse is something evident in the explicit sense of it, nor hidden in the sense of its secondary meanings, whether of a social or psychic order. There is not a reason to find it in class ideology -Marxism- or in the libido and its symbolism -psychoanalysis. The meaning of discourse, however, is hidden, in the common sense of the word, because it is so manifest -in the common sense of the word- that it is so visible that we do not see it. We need to adopt Foucault's (post?) structuralist method that reveals a system behind the words to recognize it. It would be enough to change our perspective to say "Come on! It was this and not that!" Too simplistic an explanation in my opinion. When we see what we didn't see because it was too familiar, we intuitively go for it. This is not the case with Foucaulian theory, which seems and is quite debatable.

The primary criterion for the existence of ‘the statement in itself” is the manifestation of its repetition, or, more precisely, its inherent variation. — Number2018

Does Foucault succeed in avoiding a pure metaphysical founding of the statement existence? — Number2018

And how his method is different from an empirical contextual analysis? — Number2018

I believe that Foucault is going directly to a post-structuralist and clearly metaphysical concept of structure ("system"). This is partly due to his gratuitous elimination of the role of the subject in the creation of discourse. This makes discourse an entity that directs me like a talking automaton, due to structural laws that do not seem to have their justification in the empirical, but in a very diffuse concept. It is enough to see the way in which he dissociates the discursive structure from the semantic and contextual content in the first text I have placed above.

He compels us to question language, in the “dimension” that gives it; turn one's attention to the “moment” that determines its unique and limited existence.To replace more or less precise concepts such as reference, meaning or truth with other nebulous ones such as moment, solidification or direction is to take us to the terrain of the typical confusion of post-rationalist metaphysics that is so comfortable in post-modernism.

The postulation of a "knowledge" prior to humanity in the amoebas and DNA already goes directly to mysticism. But I don't have time now to talk about this. I would like to do so.

I am abolishing all interiority in that exterior that is so indifferent to my life, and so neutral, that it makes no distinction between my life and my death — Number2018

It is disclosed, and found out under the chosen phrases and prepositions, behind their ''natural'' meaning and logic. Therefore, the 'initial' meaning becomes transformed. — Number2018

Are these quotes from Focuault or your interpretation?

I suspect this thread is what happens when one's diet is solely tertiary texts. — Banno

Do you have a first-hand interpretation or do you talk for talking's sake?