We — Paul Edwards

Who is this "we" and what gives you a duty or even a right to "construct" the world we all share in your image of justice? Idealism is great, however after not much uncovering you may find your "responsibility to protect others" is derived from little more than to protect oneself from public backlash or war crimes. Which I find the term an ironic hypocrisy as it implies large-scale killing of peoples is permitted "so long as you do it quickly and without too much suffering" ... seriously who on Earth comes up with this crap?

state-slavery — Paul Edwards

Without mutually agreed upon rules and codes of conduct (and they were by your ancestors, just they didn't have their minds and souls rotted by mind numbing television, convenience, and social media), and those rules and codes being enforced in an open and free medium with real repercussion when not followed, people enslave each other just fine. If you mean the modern first-world we live in where a wheelchair-bound man can work a dignified job and be just as successful as someone perfectly gifted in physique and health, is 'state-slavery' then *whip sound* back to work.

we could simply nuke all the slave states — Paul Edwards

Lol. Again with this we business. If the majority human populace, not during the enlightened period but the ignorant periods of the past and today (which have so much in common it's eerie) had their way and controlled the armed forces this rock we live on would've been a smouldering, fiery crater devoid of all life a long time ago. Let us be thankful that's not the case. I guess.

Just keep using your top of the line iPhone manufactured by drearily underpaid workers and eat your fresh produce picked by the same while continuing to demonize and fix a noose for these imaginary slavers that seem to exist everywhere and anywhere but in the mirror.

Who is this "we" and what gives you a duty or even a right to "construct" the world we all share in your image of justice?

"We" is the free world. And yes, it is a stated assumption that we want a just world, instead of dismissing this world as some sort of purgatory that we just need to accept.

imaginary slavers that seem to exist everywhere and anywhere but in the mirror

Ok, there is another assumption I have that dictators are enslavers while ordinary citizens like myself are not. Would you like to see video of Saddam's goons cutting out someone's tongue? Can you not see a difference between that and using an iphone?

US involvement in WW2 and the Korean war resulted in tremendous victories for world liberation, also their support in NATO has been crucial for establishing and protecting democracies. Germany, Japan, S. Korea, a handful of countries in Eastern Europe and in the Balkans would all likely not be democracies without US intervention, the threat of it or guarantees of independence. The Korean is the last major war where the US seems to clearly be on the right side, with a clear purpose that any modern Westerner should be able to get behind. That is not to say the US has only supported liberty through war and that they did nothing good past this point but it's harder to see the other wars in the same way as WW2 and the Korean war.

I can get behind the idea that the free world should not tolerate dictatorships and tyranny, even if not all the democracies are where they need to be within the West. However, the Iraq war was a mess, the plan changed several times and the US answers to establishing a democracy seem to be flawed. Countries which could easily be made into a democracy have been, the rest, there are serious obstacles to success. What country are you hoping will be the next target and what is it you'd like to see the "free world" doing?

However, the Iraq war was a mess

In my opinion, it was conducted near-perfectly, given what was known at the time. There were a lot of people who said it was impossible for Arab Muslims to have democracy, so the US really did pull a rabbit out of the hat there. If you have any specific complaint about US action, I am happy to explain why I think it was the exact right thing to do. Including the pullback in Fallujah which infuriated the US soldiers who were ordered to do that.

What country are you hoping will be the next target and what is it you'd like to see the "free world" doing?

Iran is my preferred target. We can use the excuse that the government has an official philosophy of "Death to the US" and has a nuclear program. So we don't spook the other dictators who will follow, as we just want "one more war". I believe that the majority of the Iranian people will welcome liberation, and we don't need to do any nation-building. Just quick in an out. Basically help them with their revolutions that they try now and again and get mowed down by automatic weapons. Make the next revolution a success with the aid of US air power.

The Iraq war was misbegotten from the beginning. The justification (that they were working on nuclear weapons) was a lie told to the American people, and everybody else. Worse, the US did not display insight into how to remove a mostly hated dictator without collapsing the whole society into chaos from which they have still not recovered. It was an altogether inhumane AND incompetent operation.

Let's turn to Iran, your preferred target. True, they were (probably still are) working on nuclear weapons and a rocket program with which to deliver them, but the US is not their target, as far as I know. A more likely target would be Israel or Saudi Arabia. Of the two, Saudi Arabia may have an edge in preferment.

The Iranian people will have to work out their own liberation -- not because nobody cares about them, but because it seems highly unlikely that the US, or any other power, can confer liberation upon them. We contributed a great deal to the Iranian people's previous suffering under the Shah. Let's not repeat the gift.

The Iraq war was misbegotten from the beginning. The justification (that they were working on nuclear weapons) was a lie told to the American people, and everybody else.

There were multiple reasons given, not just one. It was better for the US to focus on that one thing so as to not spook allied dictators.

Worse, the US did not display insight into how to remove a mostly hated dictator without collapsing the whole society into chaos from which they have still not recovered. It was an altogether inhumane AND incompetent operation.

No, this is being wise after the fact. If the US had done it any differently, and it had failed, you would instead be on here saying it was "obvious" that democracy wouldn't work with the approach taken. The societal collapse was a facet of Iraqi culture in the absence of an oppressive force. With the information available at the time, it was necessary to remove that oppressive force so that the Iraqis would genuinely believe that they were free. As a result, 300+ political parties started up, and there were long lines to join the new Iraqi security forces, despite the fact that the country was still under US occupation. It could have been very different if neither of those things had happened, and democracy failed.

The Iranian people will have to work out their own liberation -- not because nobody cares about them, but because it seems highly unlikely that the US, or any other power, can confer liberation upon them.

This is actually part of the reason why it's so important to go into Iran. Until we actually get in there and do it, you won't believe it is technically possible. We don't have enough liberations under our belt to prove that it is possible. I would expect a result like Panama. I trust the majority of Iranians to manage their affairs. But you won't believe it until you see it.

We contributed a great deal to the Iranian people's previous suffering under the Shah. Let's not repeat the gift.

If you think the US is responsible, partly or fully, for the predicament that the Iranians find themselves in, then that's even MORE reason for the US to fix the problem. The Iranian people yearn for freedom, but they have no way to defeat automatic weapons. The same thing that stopped the Iraqis succeeding in their 1991 uprising. The same thing that stopped the Chinese in 1989.

"We" is the free world. And yes, it is a stated assumption that we want a just world — Paul Edwards

What is free? Free to be drunk all day and rot our insides and become a burden on our society? Free to be the vilest person one can be (within confines of the law) and viciously insult, degrade, and belittle those who may be going through more than you could imagine or perhaps even handle if the tides were to change and drive them to depression, suicide, or even acting out on others? Or just making society and public an all-around shitty place to be? Free to subvert the nuclear family or natural family unit into a haphazard partnership leaving children to grow up socially-malformed with no sense of right or wrong beyond what little lessons, morals, or values they were exposed to? Free to worship the darkest of forces (all while refusing to acknowledge they exist) that not only encourage but demand humanity be the worst they can be toward one another (tactfully and within the law). Newsflash. At this rate, the idea of what is 'just' or proper/"normal" is rapidly declining and without external guidelines may continue its downward spiral.

instead of dismissing this world as some sort of purgatory that we just need to accept. — Paul Edwards

And what if it is? Not to just "accept" but to rise above and beyond. Which calls for leaders to "speak softly and carry a big stick" .. in hopes of guiding all toward a higher morality.

Ok, there is another assumption I have that dictators are enslavers while ordinary citizens like myself are not. Would you like to see video of Saddam's goons cutting out someone's tongue? Can you not see a difference between that and using an iphone? — Paul Edwards

Sure, that's a sovereign leader (again, an individual, one bad apple) committing human rights abuses which should be punished swiftly and appropriately. I mean, and I understand, that act you describe was probably for a non-heinous "crime" ie. speaking out against the government/blasphemy/something of the sort, and that is shocking. However, if it wasn't, what difference is that between putting someone in the electric chair, injecting them with lethal poisons that kill them, or otherwise incarcerating them or like it was back then hanging them.

Indifference is the gateway sin, the root cause of all suffering men experience in this world. Sure, the average man, shoot maybe he's even an exemplary man who goes above and beyond his social commitments/contract, that's great. Is pushing a button that kills a person in another room that's labeled "free hugs" much different in terms of concrete real world effect from someone who presses the same button if it were properly labeled?

(for the record I'm more or less- I think- on your side as far as the arguments you claim to represent. Just, anything based on substance can be refuted wholeheartedly and convincingly so I'm just playing a sort of devil's advocate here.)

What is free?

Ok, that's another assumption. People have different definitions of "freedom". Mine is "living under a rational, humanist, non-subjugating (in that order) government".

Sure, that's a sovereign leader (again, an individual, one bad apple) committing human rights abuses which should be punished swiftly and appropriately.

Well, it took 23 years to punish him. By rights you should be complaining we were too slow to bring him to justice, not that we shouldn't be doing it, because it's no worse than using an iphone.

And maybe there's another assumption at play here, which I can't name (maybe you can help me?) but I don't equate a dictator ordering tongues to be chopped out for exercise of freedom of speech, with a democracy choosing to use capital punishment on criminals.

Are you familiar with the Just War Theory? The UN Charter and the Geneva Conventions also deal with this subject. Did you read them?

Are you familiar with the Just War Theory?

I am familiar with the term, and I have read the Wikipedia article on it. I suspect that all I am doing is trying to get the 2003 Iraq war agreed to as part of Just War Theory.

Well, the 2003 Iraq war fails on a few levels to be considered a just war based on what has been written on the subject. Quite obviously so to be honest.

From reading your posts, you seem to have a pre-conceived conclusion and are trying to collect information to strengthen your case. Which is fine because many people do that but it doesn't make for interesting discussions. All I'll leave you with is to suggest Walzer's book "Just War Theory". That's not perfect either, particulary his Combatant Equality doesn't make a lot of sense, but it's pretty good. The Stanford Encyclopedia entry on War is interesting too. I'll post an overview I wrote years ago about the historic development of just war theory as well.

A Brief History of The Just War Tradition (1 of 3)

Since Antiquity, the manifest and physical conflict between groups organised towards that end we call war, seems to be a fact of human nature or at least a fact of human society. The causes for war are numerous and of differing nature and vary, among others, according to time, place and culture. Many subjective and objective factors lead to wars. We can differentiate between those factors situated within the individual, the group or State or its international relations and those of various economical, political, militaristic and psychological developments.
Next to this casuistic approach, wars can be differentiated by ends, motives and justifications. The ends for which wars are waged are often not identical with its intentions or motives. Where the end might well be situated in the retrieval of lost goods or lost territory – sometimes a limited area of little political or economic use – the actual reasons might well be grounded in nationalism, as the indignity suffered by the nation convinces its subjects to restore the loss of face.
Nonetheless, justification of a war has always been a necessity. A necessity, because the principle exists in many cultures and religions that the killing and maiming of fellow humans is not self-evident, but that it requires justification. The use of physical force without any form of justification remains within the realm of the insane and madmen. In general, a person applies such force with reference to higher ideals, necessity or divine dispensation. It is, however, not only this ethical dimension that requires such justification. More pragmatic considerations sometimes require that we must first convince our allies of the justice of our cause before they are willing to participate in a war. This is especially true in democracies where such justification is also necessary to mobilise civilians for the war effort. Such legitimacy is most often in accordance with the opinion of specific communities.
However, the problem of such a term as legitimacy is that its meaning is not semantically fixed. In its philosophical approach the basis on which legitimacy or illegitimacy is assumed, refers to criteria that lie outside the judging subject . The characteristics of the legitimate political system are fixed within objective, philosophical definitions. This is different when we approach legitimacy from a sociological perspective. Here the criteria by which legitimacy or illegitimacy is assumed, exists in the minds of its judging subjects. This might imply that a political system, or at least a part or an aspect – e.g. war – of it, can be considered legitimate whereas it should be considered illegitimate by more objective standards of right and wrong. What is of paramount importance to the sociological approach is that a majority of the relevant community experiences the political system or an aspect of it as right. Nevertheless, in legitimising a justification for war, convincing the subjects of the political system often requires an appeal to the characteristics of objective legitimacy. However, this is not a requirement. It is important to note that these approaches exist next to each other. One does not exclude the other and I will make use of both of them.
The Just War tradition is the designation for a diverse collection of literature on the morality of war and its conduct, which academically is often referred to as respectively Ius ad Bellum and Ius in Bello. It aims at offering criteria by which a war is considered just and by which its conduct is considered just. The tradition as a whole does not argue against war but aims at restraining the resort to war and its conduct on a moral basis. In opposition to this, it should be noted that the Christian pacifistic movement, as part of this tradition, does argue against war. It is, however, not predominant.
The Just War tradition can be traced back to ancient Grecian philosophy when Plato and Aristotle offered their insights on war. During the Dark Age the sources for legitimising wars were the Old and New testament, the rules of law of the Romans, Greek philosophy and the Fathers of the Church of whom Saint Augustine of Hippo in the fifth century is most notable. In general, it is considered that Saint Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century was the first to approach the tradition systematically. Considering that saint Thomas Aquinas bases his work mostly on the thoughts of Augustine and Gratian, who in turn based their works on non-Christian Greek and Roman scholars, brevity on my part when considering these earlier scholars should be excused.
The Reformation in the 16th century did lead to a partial secularisation. During this time, most religious philosophers maintained that war for religion was the most just cause for the use of force. In opposition to this view stood those secular philosophers who thought about justice in war in terms of natural law.
As is apparent, the tradition is mostly Christian and Western, although a similar debate exists in Islam. Modernity also shows a greater participation by non-Western countries in the development of Just War thinking through international institutions such as the U.N. and the adoption of treaties. The prevalence of Western thinking is still obvious, which is most likely due to political, economic and social dominance of the West. The tradition’s universality can therefore be questioned but remains unchallenged, if for no other reason than the fact that the tradition has shaped the lines along which most western scholars think and they should not be disregarded by a simple act of will.

1. The Greeks & Romans

In the earliest times (750-500 BC) of Grecian history violence, plunder and sudden migrations were common in the area that is now the south and middle of Greece and the west coast of Asia Minor. Thucydides, an Athenian historian, notes that the lands that were called Hellas in his time (ca. 460-400 BC) had no permanent population in olden times. Migrations were common because the differing tribes easily left their territories under the pressures of superior forces of invaders. There was no trade between the different tribes, nor was there safe travel over land or by sea.
During Thucydides´ time things had changed to some degree. By this time stock-breeding became less important as opposed to agriculture. It was this stock-breeding that allowed for easy migrations before. As agriculture grew in importance, the leaders became aristocratic landowners who had their own retinue. They developed a system of values and rules, which they applied both in battle as well as in sports. Heralds and emissaries were spared, the dead of the enemy were returned for proper burial, they respected, if possible, the right of asylum of temples and other holy places and the substitution of wars of destruction by organised and regulated battles between champions or selected groups. The conquered population would not always be killed, but were often partially or entirely enslaved.
One of the first examples in which morality is seemingly separated from war is given in Thucydides’ History and is covered by Michael Walzer in Just and Unjust Wars as the “Melian Dialogue”. In this dialogue two Athenian generals meet with the magistrates of the island Melos. Melos was a Spartan colony and, although it rested on neutrality, refused to be subject unto the Athenians. The Athenian generals put forward that if they did not conquer what they could, they would reveal their weakness and invite attack and that it was therefore necessary to conquer what they could, which was in this case Melos. The Melian magistrates considered themselves innocent against men unjust and hoped for the assistance of Sparta. They thought of the Athenians unjust as they had no just cause to attack them. However, the Athenian generals pointed out that Sparta would do no such thing since they would only think of themselves as “they hold for honourable that which pleaseth and for just that which profiteth.”
It illustrates that one of the reasons, why the whole notion of morality in war would fail according to realists, is when those that resort to war are realists. That is to say, they consider war apart from normal life, where self-interest and necessity dictate their actions, and morality and law have no place. Nevertheless, as they consider war outside the realm of morality, they do so within the language of morality. Realists are still speaking on the subject of morality. They consider the conduct of war to be free of any moral constraints but justify this on the basis that winning a war is the highest good and that all other goods, for instance the rights of non-combatants and prisoners of war, are inferior to this goal. For war to be entirely free of morality it should be separated from the whole concept of winning and losing, as this concept in itself is normative. Yet, the object of war is to win by force that which cannot be obtained or is thought not to be obtainable by other means. So, as these realists first justify their need to wage war by pointing out that it is necessary, which in itself is a moral argument, they subsequently justify their conduct by referring to this necessity. And in all this they fail to answer vital questions; what is necessary? Is it necessary to kill civilians? And if so, when is it no longer necessary to kill civilians? Is it necessary to declare war on neutrals? Etc. Etc.
Leaving Thucydides and with him archaic Hellas behind, the Greece of Antiquity as it is generally known came into being with the development of the – incorrectly named – city-states (hereafter: "poleis"). Agriculture developed even further and gradually the poleis monopolised the use of force due to which the private wars of aristocrats and plunderers were considered illegitimate and therefore criminal. The poleis signed treaties with their neighbours in order to limit violence and this often led to a situation of peace (eirèné) between the contracting poleis. However, even after the development of the poleis, military expeditions would sometimes end up as expeditions of plunder under the direction of the general, in which neither friend nor foe was out of harm's way.
The philosopher Plato stated rules for the resort to war and the conduct of war in his Politea and Nomoi. He disapproved of expansive wars, civil wars and revolutions based on power politics or material ends and he felt that wars should only be waged as a last resort. The purpose of a war should be a new peace and the conduct should not be too harsh, especially against other Greeks, and the overbearing of women and mass slavery were wrong in his eyes. Plato also made a distinction between civil strife and war and the emerging idea of non-combatants can be inferred, at least in the case of civil strife, when he states that not the whole people of a poleis – its men, women and children – are to be regarded as enemies but only the hostile minority. Of course, this does allow for the hostile minority to be part of what we now consider non-combatants. Still, it is clear that he means to introduce some form of discrimination.
With respect to the conduct of war Aristotle agreed to a large extent with Plato and on the resort to war he said: "… for we are busy that we may have leisure, and make war that we may live in peace." That the object of war should be peace can be inferred from this. Despite this, the Greeks were thought to be superior to the barbarians, that is to say; those that were not Greek, and it was therefore their duty to subjugate and enslave them for the purpose of peace.
After the conquest of the Persian Empire (334-323) by Alexander the Great and his death, his empire fell apart in kingdoms, poleis and leagues of poleis. Between these a near constant state of conflict existed. Limited wars were fought by mercenaries, who had no interest in the annihilation of their "comrades in arms" because they might well lose the battle themselves on another day. Prisoners were released for ransom and truces were mostly upheld. In general the treatment of the conquered areas was more humane as an expression of the general humanisation of the relations between peoples from different communities.

The Roman Republic in the times of 600-300 BC shows little evidence of private wars. Perhaps this is due to the lack of sources on these times or perhaps it points to the possibility that the Roman Republic monopolised the use of force at an early age. According to Livius, a Roman historian of around 59-17 BC, the Romans had clearly defined ideas on the justification of wars from the beginning of their history and a complicated ritual for their declarations of war. As a reason for and a justification of wars the Romans identified the incursio hostilis, which is a breach of Roman territory, an attack aimed at an ally, infringement of treaty provisions, support to an enemy, not extraditing hostile persons and the molest of Roman emissaries. Nevertheless, these justification were often utilised as artificial excuses for aggressive wars. Even the expressed motivation for war was often a mere pretext, as the real reason was to acquire plunder, land and fame.
It was not until the era of Marcus Tullius Cicero (hereafter: "Cicero") that Roman thought on war and peace was established. During the times of Cicero the Roman Empire was inflicted with civil war that coincided with large military operations by Caius Julius Caesar and Cnaeus Pompeius. It was within these setting that reflections on the State, society, values for public and private life and the problem of war came into existence. Of the writers of these times Cicero is the most well known.
During the time of the Roman Empire the primary care for peace and justice rested with the government, including the emperor. This care referred to both the external peace, by protecting the border with a professional army, as well as the internal peace, by instituting courts and convicting criminals. The emperor alone was authorised and justified to use force.
According to Cicero a war was justified when negotiations with the enemy had failed, after which the enemy should be warned and finally war should be formally declared. He also considered that a new and better peace should be the aim of a war and that it should not be commenced without a valid reason. Peace to Cicero and other Romans of his time was the absence of hostilities. However, justice did not mean to Cicero what it means to us. A war for imperial glory was to him a legitimate motive for war, although he was of the opinion that such wars were to be fought with lesser intensity. As a matter of fact, justice to the Romans was mostly formalistic. Cicero did differentiate between civil wars and wars against others and separated defensive wars from aggressive wars, without condemning the latter.
In a just war the capture of civilians, the destruction of land and the plunder of cities was allowed according to Cicero. In practice, the warlords waged wars largely in the spirit of the times before Cicero. However, there was a tendency to give greater consideration to the justification of war. Caius Julius Caesar demonstrated his wars in Gaul as defensive wars and justified his ruthless treatment of certain Gaelic and Germanic tribes with rather forced reasoning in which he would depict his enemies as aggressors.

2. Early Christians & Augustine

The official position of the early Christians with regard to war was one of non-participation. In accordance with the Christian command "Thou shalt not kill", which was a command to the individual, the refused to serve in the Roman armies. It has also been put forward that Christians did not serve as soldiers, because it automatically required them to participate in idolatrous ceremonies. The early Christians were also expecting the return of Christ who would bring a new world. To them, peace was the Messiah's peace of God's kingdom to come and as such unattainable on earth.
This was the official line of the early Christian church until the beginning of the fourth century AD. The most influential change was the conversion of the Roman Empire to Christianity as its official religion within a century after the adoption of this religion by Constantine the great in 313 AD. Christian writers mainly copied the war ethics of Plato, Aristotle and Cicero.
According to these early Christian writers war should be a means in the hands of a sovereign instituted by God, which or who alone was allowed to take life. The war should be preceded by the proper diplomatic steps and should be waged as humanely as possible and should be waged with the right intention. A better peace should be its aim and unnecessary bloodshed should be avoided.

It was Saint Augustine that first established a firm Christian doctrine. When he did so he gave little consideration to wars of defence, because he thought such wars obviously justifiable and even obligatory. Augustine´s main exposition was on just wars of aggression. He required that the supreme authority alone was allowed to declare. Only an injustice or wrong caused by the enemy was considered as a sufficient justification for war, although the direct command of God could provide justification as well. It would seem that Augustine implies a right of punishment and he certainly accepts war as a means of God to punish the just as well as the unjust. He was, however, more concerned with defending and maintaining objective justice. Augustine insisted on war to be necessary and to have as its aim the achievement of peace, despite this he did not consider the contradiction and tension between war and peace. He thus leaves objective justice for what it is and from this the importance of the criteria of right intention might be inferred as it only leaves us with the subjective justice of these intentions.

As stated above on page XXX the Roman Emperor had the sole right to resort to force. However, during the Dark Age the Roman Empire disintegrated due to the invasion of the Germanic Tribes. Every free man of these tribes was a warrior. War to the Germanic Tribes was an enterprise to obtain fame and wealth and the charge of their Kings was very different from that of the Roman Emperor. These Kings were not primarily responsible for peace and justice; on the contrary, their duty was in the first place that of warlord. In fact, war to them was the natural state of things and the annual campaign was a part of their living pattern.
Neither was the internal peace fully under the charge of the Kings. For the solution of litigation the subjects had recourse to two alternatives; they could either bring a case before the court, or they could resort to force by exercising their feud right. The feud is a condition of formal and declared hostility that can exist between two persons when one has wronged the other and is unwilling to amend that wrong. The purpose of this force is to coerce the opponent to amend the wrong. This feud right was a fundamental apart of Germanic Law.
When Charlemagne tried to live up to his Roman predecessors he once again attempted to monopolise the use of force. Especially the nobility of that time saw any restriction on their feud right as a breach of their freedom and therefore as an injustice. Here the two radically different legal systems clashed.
After the disintegration of Charlemagne´s Empire due to the struggle between his descendants, the position of the King of the Western Empire was weakened severely. The power vacuum that was created was filled by the dukes. The further this disintegration continued the less willing these local authorities were to subjugate their disputes to a higher authority. The consequence of this was that the disputes between them were again resolved through feuds, with several notable differences:
a) The nobility enforced their own jurisdiction because of which the subordinate population lost their feud rights. This right became an exclusive privilege of the ruling upper class.
b) Because of the invincibility of the strongholds the feuding parties would redirect their force against the defenceless peasantry to compel the opponent to capitulate.
c) The feud developed from a purely legal action into a political military means of coercion until it finally became war.

The main problem was whether feuds could fulfil the requirements of a just war. Primarily the problem revolved around who was to be considered as the right authority. Strictly along the lines of earlier thinkers only the Kings and Emperor were allowed to declare war. Obviously, the actual practice was very different. Although many attempts to banish feud rights failed, certain rules were created by which feuding parties were supposed to adhere. First of all, before resorting to force parties had to strive for a non-violent solution. They were not allowed to use force before the feud was formally and openly declared. A feud that met these requirements was considered in practice to be just.
The theory usually let both parties put forward irrefutable arguments, which allowed them to invoke the just war theory in good faith. The articulation of a just cause was based on vague distinctions such as "fault" or "wrong" that were not further defined and the idea to intend a "better peace" is unclear too. Although a fault or wrong was a thing that existed prior to the decision to declare war and as such some objective measurement was possible, the aim of a better peace was – and still is- immeasurable and solely subject to the expectations and "rational" predictions of the future. The main weaknesses of the tradition lie therefore with the classical distinctions of right authority, just cause and right intention. Especially the purpose of a right intention turns the theory into a teleological one and as war is one of the most socially complex activities of mankind its outcome is impossible to predict beforehand. This is even more true when one considers that rationality is often absent in the heat of battle. As a consequence such precognition is even less likely to be accurate. At the same time the tradition in medieval times and from then on rests on this teleological consideration of a better peace. The classical distinctions of right authority, just cause and right intention have survived to this day.

A Brief History of The Just War Tradition (2 of 3)

3. Aquinas

In the second division of the second part of the Summa Theologica (hereafter: “war articles”) Aquinas wrote on war. He discussed whether war in itself is wrong and its possible justification if it were not. He continued to deal with the questions of whether clerics should fight, whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes and whether fighting on holy days is permissible. Of these, only the question whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes is of enough significance in today’s secular world. Although Aquinas’ answer to this question points to the existence of rules of conduct the substance of these rules have changed drastically over time. As a consequence the rules of conduct are considered as part of existing international law in order to distil substantive rulings and Aquinas’ answer is not dealt with. I will further endeavour to separate the theological aspects of Aquinas’ theory only insofar as this will not distort the representation of his ideas.
To the first question whether some kind of war is lawful he raises four objections. The first two objections are quoted from Scripture and as they do not represent lines of thought that can be rationally reconstructed their consideration is one better left to theologians. The third objection states that war is contrary to the virtue of peace and the fourth objection states that since the Church forbids warlike exercises in tournaments, they must be sinful.
His answer revolves around three main criteria for a just war, which are the following classical distinctions:
- right authority
- just cause
- rightful intention

Right Authority

The idea of a right authority is not original to Aquinas, but it certainly is paramount in his thinking. Aquinas is of the opinion that no private individual is allowed to summon the people together and declare war, because he has the opportunity to seek redress from a tribunal of his superior. It is the care of the common weal that is entrusted to those in authority and it is therefore their business to watch over the common weal of a community. And as it is lawful for them to use the sword in defending this common weal against internal disturbances so too is it their business to wage war in defending the common weal against external enemies.
Quoting Augustine he says: “The natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war should lie in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority.” It is important to stress the requirement of supreme authority. It would seem that any authority that can turn to a higher authority for arbitration is not allowed to declare war.

Just Cause

On the subject of a just cause Aquinas writes “those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault.” He elaborates when quoting Augustine:

“A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly.”

Both Aquinas’ idea of a “fault” and Augustine’s “wrong” are inadequate to define a just cause, as these terms themselves are undefined. Moreover, Augustine considers wrongs inflicted by the subject of states as punishable by war. This of course begs the question what wrongs these should be, as they certainly do not include theft. For “what it has seized unjustly” refers grammatically to the nation or state and does not refer to subjects. This invites the discussion on what is considered to be an act by a state and that of a person but goes beyond the scope of this thesis. However, what wrongs, if any, these are, are for a large part unclear.
Aquinas does rule on self-defence but not in his war articles. It is closely bound to that of the rule of double effect, which he reflects on in another part of his Summa Theologica and which will be contended with below. Self-defence comes into play when the wrong suffered by the other party consists of a direct threat or attack to one’s person. Through analogy we can consider the reclamation of territory, if it has been taken, as a form of self-defence for an authority that rules over a distinguishable area. No other wrongs are further considered by Aquinas. Interestingly enough, when considering self-defence even the unjust side can claim to wage a just war on the grounds of individual self-defence. From this follows that the just war would only operate up to the first moment of attack.




Right Intention

Finally, Aquinas reflects on the requirement of rightful intention. The belligerents must “intend the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil.” Again he quotes Augustine and illustrates that the object of war should be securing peace, punishing evil-doers and uplifting the good. Prohibited are “the passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such like things, all these are rightly condemned in war.”
What good Aquinas speaks of is not entirely certain. When dealing with the requirement of a right authority he regards as the good, the good of the community over which the authority resides. However in his answer to the second objection he also considers the good of the enemy when he quotes Augustine to demonstrate that resistance is sometimes preferable to non-resistance. He states: “nothing is more unhappy than the happiness of sinners .” Next to these two goods a third can be distinguished, namely that of the “common good” that stands above the good of separate communities.
As he considers the good of the community and that of its enemies separately, there is no particular reason to assume a war must necessarily be fought for the “common good”. Either appears to be enough to assume a rightful intention even if it were to be to the detriment of one or the other. However, such a separation might be considered undesirable since the detrimental effect to either community could outweigh the positive effect for the other. It appears to me that if this were the result of the existence of a right intention that this cannot have been Aquinas’ meaning.
To continue, as is apparent from the answer to the second objection non-resistance is sometimes considered evil. Likewise, the horrors of war can be redeemed by a purpose of bringing peace. It appears to illustrate that when considering the “common good”, elements of the good of the different belligerents are to be considered. When declaring war these differing goods must be weighed against each other. On the other hand the good of either of the belligerents might sometimes outweigh the “common good”, as the price that must be paid is simply too grave for the goal of a better peace. None of these considerations are explicitly mentioned in Aquinas’ war articles and I would not go so far as to attribute them to him, but the arising problems are in the foreground when reading Aquinas’ war articles. It is unlikely he was unaware of them.
On the matter of double effect, that is, the problem of an act having two effects only one of which is intended, Aquinas writes:

“Accordingly the act of self-defence may have two effects, one is the saving of one’s life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore, this act, since one’s intention is to save one’s own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in being, as far as possible.”

It is therefore unlawful for an individual to intend to kill the aggressor, but a public authority may intend to do so for he will “refer this to the public good, as is the case of a soldier fighting against the foe”. Private animosity is still considered a sin when this moves the public authority to act. Further to the idea of double effect Aquinas writes:

“And yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defence, uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful; whereas if he repel force with moderation his defence will be lawful, because according to the jurists, it is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless defence.”

He so demonstrates that the use of force for an individual must be proportionate. Although Aquinas permits that a public authority is allowed to intend to kill a man in self-defence, he does not speak of allowing disproportionate force to a public authority. Aquinas’ explicitly makes the comparison between the individual and a public authority when reflecting on the intention of killing the aggressor in the case of self-defence. He does not relate the idea of proportionality for an individual to that of a public authority at all, whereas this idea is both conceptually but also textually closely linked to that of the intention to kill. It is therefore defendable that the requirement of proportionality of force is applicable to public authorities according to Aquinas as he does not explicitly allow it as he has done for the intention to kill another.
The intention to kill in public self-defence was presumably allowed because it is thought that the judgment of a sovereign is more rational and deliberate. However, it is doubtful an authority is more efficient in distributing justice than the individual. The authority in the end does little more than give approval to individuals to carry out “justice” in its name. These individuals bear the practical responsibility but they escape all moral responsibility, which Aquinas thought to be the responsibility of the sovereign, as is apparent when he again quotes Augustine:

“He slays not who owes his service to one who commands him, even as a sword is merely the instrument to him that wields it … just as a soldier slays the foe by the authority of his sovereign…”

Although the individual is not allowed to intend to kill his opponent even under threat of losing his own life, it would appear unjust for an authority to have the intention to kill for any lesser reason. Considering that Aquinas did not reflect on other wrongs than those dealt with under the rule of self-defence, it may be inferred that these wrongs – threat or attack to persons and/or territory – are the only wrongs that will serve as justification. This is a logical conclusion from the fact that no war can be fought without the intention to kill and as it would be unjust to kill for any lesser reason than self-defence, no other causes may be considered just.
Aquinas briefly reflects on an aspect of the conduct of war when he answers whether it is lawful to lay ambushes in war. He considers that the object of laying ambushes is to deceive the enemy and this can be done in two different ways. On the one hand through telling "something false or through the breaking of a promise", which is always unlawful, and on the other hand "a man can be deceived … because we do not declare our purpose or meaning to him". The first is condemned because we have the duty to preserve the rights even of our enemy. However, these rights do not include telling another everything we are going to do to him. Here, Aquinas ignores the more positive aspects of laying ambushes as he defines "ambush" as nothing more than "concealment of plans". This all he states on the matter of the conduct in war.

It can be concluded that on the criteria of Ius ad Bellum Aquinas writes that the right authority is the supreme authority, which is able to exercise power in order to defend the common weal. It does so only in self-defence as he loses the moral right to intend to kill another if his cause is other than self-defence. Since no war can be fought without the intention to kill others, the wrongs that facilitate just causes are the protection of the population over which the authority resides and the reclamation of lost territory. He must do so with the intention to advance good or avoid evil and although the supreme authority is allowed to intend to kill others, he is still bound to use force proportionate to the wrong suffered. Even though Aquinas did not explicitly consider what good the authority should intend, it was suggested that this should be the good of both warring parties. This requires some consideration towards how the war will end, for the original injustice and the situation after the war should be compared to decide whether going to war will advance good or avoid evil. Aquinas allows for the existence of double effect insofar as the authority or person is intent on bringing about the just effect. On the criteria of Ius in Bello Aquinas is brief as he only considers the laying of ambushes in a very limited sense of the "concealment of plans". Such concealment is not permissible when it is brought about by lies or the breaking of a promise.
The authority of Aquinas’ thoughts on war are not due to any original or comprehensive exposition but because his general eminence and that of the Summa Theologica. As Joan D. Tooke notes: “the subject of war had not been included in Peter Lombard’s Sentences, the accepted theological handbook for three centuries during the middle ages ...” Since the Summa Theologica replaced the Sentences Aquinas ensured that his treatment of war had a certain importance and authority.


4. Vitoria, Suarez & Grotius

The just cause of war, which Aquinas had defined as an attack on those who “deserve it on account of some fault”, was more precisely defined after his time. Defence, of which Aquinas said nothing specific in his war articles because he took its rightfulness for granted, came to be recognised as a specific cause. Recuperatio, recovering goods unjustly stolen and held or wrongly taken in a previous conflict, was another cause. A punishable injury was yet another.
It was generally accepted that in defensive war there should be not element of punishment and that it was right to recover only what was wrongly taken. No enslavement or seizure of enemy possessions was thought to be allowable. Furthermore, defence was thought to derive its authority from its intrinsic justice and it did not need a superior authority. This permissiveness reached out to friends, allies and neighbours.
Recuperatio was in some cases thought to be somewhere between defence and aggression. Recuperatio in continenti was more or less a direct reaction to an earlier conflict and as such could be regarded as an extension of defence. Thus it shared the conditions and rights of defence as opposed to recovery after some time. In general the latter was widely considered as a new act and therefore requiring right authority. Whether recuperatio after some time is considered punitive is not entirely clear. The distinction between wars of punishment and wars of recuperatio suggests that it is not punitive. Also, the practical necessity to marshal an army to recover goods or land might require time, as such it would be a strange thing to consider such action as aggression for the mere fact that no army would have been near to react to the initial conflict in the first place.
The third type of war; the punishment of an injury was directed at the moral guilt of the enemy as punishment of this guilt. Most thinkers limited the right to punish to just wars of aggression, that is those wars waged by a right authority, with a just cause and rightful intention. The capture and enslavement of persons and the confiscation of goods and property could be part of this punishment. Nevertheless, it is thought that the true justification of any defensive or aggressive war was not punishment but the maintenance of justice and the care of the common weal. Even those violations that were subjectively just of those goods would initiate an aggressive war.
New criteria came into fruition as well. Increasingly, thinkers regarded war as a last resort for maintaining or restoring justice and therefore all other means of settlement had to be tried and failed. Furthermore, the chances for success were progressively more discussed. Since the victory of the just could not be guaranteed the authority was recommended to surmise the likelihood of victory.
After Aquinas Vitoria (1480-1546) was the first to make a considerable contribution to the just war tradition. Armed defence of property, life and honour were justifiable without question, but an offensive war should fulfil the following conditions :
- it should be declared;
- by the right authority;
- having a just cause;
- as a last resort;
- having a rightful intention, and;
- the evils let loose by the war should be proportionate to the good one hopes to attain.

Vitoria thought that war was only justifiable in the absence of a court of a superior to which contending parties would be obliged to refer their dispute. In an offensive war the enemy would not be justified to defend himself as he should recognise the justice of the aggressor. Nevertheless, the guilt of the enemy was not essential for a war to be just. Recuperatio of wrongly held goods could be initiated against an enemy that acted in good faith. If defence was offered as an immediate reaction to an injustice suffered the requirement of a right authority was not needed. However, Vitoria did not allow private persons or lower authorities to recover goods after a certain time had passed. Vitoria was the first that allowed that a war may be subjectively just on both sides; it did not change his thoughts on objective justice. Only an objective injustice was a sufficient cause for war.
Suarez largely agreed with Vitoria on Ius ad Bellum but he has been criticised for the fact that he allowed a sovereign to be justified when his doubts appeared most probable . The consequence is that this might easily mean that both sides are both objectively and subjectively justified in waging war. This of course renders the concept of a just war redundant.
Both Suarez’ and Vitoria’s separation of objective justice from the subjective is laudable but, unfortunately, impractical. It would imply that objective standards are paramount. Sadly, such objective justice can for the most part not be assessed until the war is over. Only after the war can we weigh the deaths and damages of it against the original injustice. Since objective justice is further influenced by a rightful intention, which exists subjectively, and as any assessment of objective justice is made by humans, it must be presumed that a true objective judgment of the situation is impossible. Furthermore, eliminating all subjective factors such as motive and intention from our considerations of justice renders a strange situation. For then only the crime of mass murder could justify war, for no other reason could objectively justify a war in which a State will indiscriminately kill numerous soldiers.
After the rise of the large nation States any visible imperial authority had weakened and the reformed States had renounced the Pope’s authority. The concept of State sovereignty was developing and as such a need arose for international law in its modern sense. The main purpose of Grotius’ work was to create rules that all State rulers could accept and follow in order to prevent anarchy, war and unnecessary bloodshed.
Since Grotius (1583-1645) believed that God could command homicide or theft it shows that the intrinsic goodness of an act is its conformity with the will of God. This emphasises that justice cannot be merely concerned with the outward form of an act but requires more than outwardly objective standards of right and wrong. He was thus equally concerned with moral quality as with formal appearance. A rightful intention therefore only existed when it was in accordance with God’s will, which could be known through reason.
In approaching war Grotius’ main concern was to limit warfare. He made a distinction between private and public war of which the former was only occasionally permissible in the event of immediate threat. A public war was war waged by a sovereign power, which in his eyes was the nation. No matter the justice of its cause it should not be waged unless it was likely to be of more benefit than harm to the nation. Grotius was the first to recognise that there is justice and injustice on both sides in a war. Elsewhere Grotius stated that a war could be subjectively just, because the subjects of an unjust state were sufficiently innocent, on both sides but not objectively.
Grotius allowed self-defensive conduct but condemned vindictive behaviour, towards this end he also allowed that death might be dealt to ward off an ominous threat, which is an explicit allowance for a pre-emptive strike. He furthermore allowed the taking of life to recover stolen property. He stated that the side with a just cause had no intrinsic right to kill innocent subjects except in self-defence. If the just side were to kill innocents carelessly, needlessly or purposefully those innocents had the right to defend themselves. However, he stressed that this did not make the war just on both sides, but that individual justice would transcend collective justice.
“Then only is the time for war, when we have right on our side, and, what is of the greatest consequence, strength also” : says Grotius as he warns us not to wage war too rashly. Grotius was the first to explicitly stress the necessity to require a reasonable chance of success. Even before considering the chances of success all attempts should be made to arbitrate between disputes and if one side were to agree to arbitration it would be wrong to fight.

Although Vitoria and Suarez defended that objective justice was necessary to wage war they considered it wholly separated from subjective elements. Grotius’ thought certain actions to have intrinsic justice because they were in accordance with natural law and thus with the will of God. This allowed for a consideration of moral quality of an action quite apart from its formal appearance. Likewise, an action could be sufficiently unjust that the immoral quality of it allowed for it to be reacted to by war. It should be noted that the only accepted injustices that could form a just cause were the assault on persons and the taking of property or territory. This in contrast to Vitoria and Suarez, who, if one were consistent, would only allow war in the event of mass murder. On the other criteria of Ius ad Bellum no important divergences existed.
As we regard the thoughts of these secularist writers we can distil the six criteria of the modern Ius ad Bellum. There exists a seventh criterion that requires an authority to declare a war, which was suggested by Vitoria first and agreed upon by Suarez. Although a declaration can be considered as good form, such a procedural requirement can in my opinion never serve as an indication of justice.

On the subject of Ius in Bello all three writers considered that there existed certain barriers but were unclear as to their substance. The most important of these was Grotius saying that a nation had no the intrinsic right to kill innocents, who the guilty were, remains unanswered and as he allowed that soldiers could be innocent it is not a clear discrimination. Similar to earlier times Ius in bello was largely defined by actual practice.
Despite the redefinition by Vitoria, Suarez and Grotius of the Just War theory, it had little effect on the way war was waged in their time and there after. Right was considered might in their time. The whole idea of a just cause was left behind and the State and therefore its sovereign decided whether he saw reason to go to war. As such the actions that were justifiable increased as they were adjusted to the reality of the power politics between States when they would go to war for reasons of State. The whole notion of a Just War became obsolete in the 17th century. A formal declaration was then in accordance with Ius gentium. The most illustrative of the absence of Just War thinking was the expansionistic politics of European countries in other parts of the world.
For instance, Spain was required to convert the non-European world in the name of Pope Alexander VI in the Inter Caetera. Towards this end Spain drafted a complicated document, the Requerimiento, in which the Indians were ordered to convert to Christianity, to subjugate themselves unto the Pope and peacefully allow trade and preaching under penalty of forfeiting their goods and rights to the Crown of Spain. In the following period this document was read to the Indians in Latin or Spanish, which languages they obviously did not understand, and after waiting for a reply the attack was begun. This was thus purely a formality.

A Brief History of the Just War Tradition (3 of 3)

5. Contemporary Theory

In general there existed a positivist denial of the doctrine of war on the basis of natural law after Grotius and as such war was considered to be beyond legal control. The fault of an aggressive state was mainly looked upon as a moral fault, not a legal one and was in some minds too subjectively determined. The source of international law did not lie with universal principles such as Grotius thought, but within treaties and actual practice.
The wars of the twentieth century led to a reaction against positivism, as a thing was no longer regarded as being justified merely because it existed. Most importantly the Tokyo and Nuremburg trials introduced the notion of responsibility as the idea of an illegal war was reintroduced and the guilty individuals were punished. However, the present trend of international terrorism goes beyond imposing responsibility on individuals acting for their States. As Bowett states, with wholly different problems in mind:

“The new techniques of subversive activities and ideological propaganda, for example, call for a specific regulation…(and)…afford to individuals an unprecedented power of endangering a state´s security.”

The twentieth century has known a revival of the idea of a just war. Today aggressive war is legally no longer allowed and self-defence is the only violence permissible in international law. In practice some forms of aggressive war exist that can be considered just, namely humanitarian interventions and possibly aid to secessionist movements and counter insurgencies, depending on one’s qualification of the facts.
Of the contemporary thinkers on the subject of the just war theory Michael Walzer is regarded as one of its foremost writers, even lthough he considers the theory apart from the traditional six criteria. Walzer briefly expounds thinking on aggression and revises this by means of historical illustrations thereafter. The legalist paradigm as he calls it represents current (1977) thought on aggression and can be summed up as follows.

1) There exists an international society of independent states
2) This international society has a law that establishes the rights of its members - above all, the rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty
3) Any use of force or imminent threat of force by one state against the political sovereignty or territorial integrity of another constitutes aggression and is a criminal act
4) Aggression justifies two kinds of violent response: a war of self-defence by the victim and a war of law enforcement by the victim and any other member of international society
5) Nothing but aggression can justify war
6) Once the aggressor state has been militarily repulsed, it can also be punished

Walzer puts forward five revisions to this paradigm. The first is to allow a state the use of force before the existence of an imminent threat or actual use of force against its political or territorial integrity and is a revision of the third rule of the legalist paradigm. Walzer suggests that:

“…states may use military force in the face of threats of war whenever the failure to do so would seriously risk their territorial integrity or political independence. Under such circumstances it can fairly be said that they have been forced to fight and that they are the victims of aggression.”

He admits that such a word as “seriously” requires a normative interpretation and as such its meaning is not fixed, but stresses that although the rule is permissive it implies restrictions. Such restrictions are indeed implied by words such as “seriously”, “threats” and in a globalising world even a word such as “independence”. His implied restrictions are therefore normative considerations of these words and against the background of the Israeli six day war they are even correct, but as a general rule they are inadequate.
In terms of the Just War criteria this means that next to self-defence and the possibility of a pre-emptive strike, including wars in defence of others, and wars of recovery – both immediately arising from a conflict or after some time – a third just cause can be distinguished. Considering that the threat of war is no longer imminent it would be a contortion of the idea of pre-emptive strike to categorise it as such. Preferably such wars should be called anticipatory. The discussion on whether an anticipatory war is allowed is not concluded. The legal basis is at best shaky, but the moral case is not so clear cut.
The second, third and fourth revision by Walzer are connected to the problems of secession, counter-intervention and humanitarian intervention. He contends with if and when a foreign power may intervene in another’s territory. It is closely connected to the right of self-determination which “is the right of a people “to become free by their own efforts” if they can, and non-intervention. Non-intervention is the principle guaranteeing that their success will not be impeded or their failure prevented by the intrusions of an alien power.” In other words, people must help themselves to their own freedom, and with such freedom comes the principle of non-intervention.
In the case of secessionist movements Walzer requires of them that they demonstrate their representative character after which it would be allowed to assist them in their bid to self-determination. The reason for this is obvious for if a community is not capable of self-determination it should not be assisted in a struggle that cannot exist on its own accord for it would lack any authority. This of course has to do with the problem of identifying an authority in the first place. An ally to whom we may offer aid should have in principle all the characteristics of an authority, because an authority is a demonstration of the representative character of its relevant community. Although at first glance it appears as if another just cause is generated for a State it really is a just cause for the developing relevant community to enforce its right to self-determination. A State that assists such a community is allowed to do so in defence of a friend or ally. The difference then is that a State is allowed to aid an existing relevant community that has no legitimate authority as of yet.
From this flows that when a third State assists either the secessionist movement or the state within which boundaries the movement tries to enforce their right of self-determination yet another State may possibly attain the right to assist the other party. For even when the secessionist movement did not demonstrate its representative character the struggle becomes an external conflict simply due to the fact that an outside third has chosen a side in an internal struggle. This allows outside third States to ally themselves to either side as these sides become clearly identifiable as different authorities not because their representative character but arising from the de facto situation.

Walzer further qualifies the principle of non-intervention for cases where the appeal to self-help is not very attractive. In the case of humanitarian intervention he says “when a government turns savagely upon its own people, we must doubt the very existence of a political community to which the idea of self-determination might apply.” Thus, humanitarian intervention is justified when it is directed against actions that disregard the moral convictions of ordinary people. Walzer's argument has been criticised as a potentially indiscriminate mandate for intervention because of the difficulty of distinguishing between tolerable and intolerable abuses.
As stated before, an ally or friend in terms of international politics requires that parties have all the characteristics of an authority to express their representational character. When a third State comes to the aid of a repressed community it cannot be defined as defence of a friend or an ally in its original meaning as it cannot ally itself to an authority. The moral cause to aid the community is obviously just. At a certain point individual rights simply transcend the rights of states, it is, however, a cause separated from any other previously existing just causes. When deciding whether there is a duty to intervene it is not too difficult to recognise human rights violations nor is it complicated to establish the helplessness of the attacked. It is very complex however to decide whether the violations are severe enough to breach a State’s sovereignty.

Walzer’s fifth and final revision of the legalist paradigm is the abolition of the paradigm’s sixth rule that once the aggressor state has been militarily repulsed, it can also be punished. He considers the domestic situation of capture and punishment of aggressor not applicable to the international society. Following the recent institution of international tribunals in which not States as whole, but human actors are held responsible and are prosecuted this view should be underlined. Since the object of the war on terror is to stop terrorist organisations and as such no punishment is aimed at States, this aspect of the legalist paradigm is unnecessary to consider in detail.

After this brief survey of the Just War Tradition we can conclude the following six criteria regarding Ius ad Bellum:

1) right authority; meaning the supreme authority, which cannot turn to a higher authority
2) just cause; of which are identifiable, self-defence, defence of a friend or ally, wars of recovery both immediate and after some time, self-determination and finally humanitarian intervention; no punitive wars are allowed
3) right intention; an authority should have as its aim the common good of all involved although the particular good of its own community may outweigh such considerations; the intention to kill is lawful for a public authority
4) last resort; all other means to solve the conflict must have been tried and failed
5) reasonable chance of success; before waging a war an authority must surmise whether a war will be successful for otherwise he will waste the lives of its citizens
6) proportionality; the evils let loose by war should be proportionate to the evil avoided or the better peace attained

As is apparent, little is said explicitly on the criteria for Ius in Bello and although the principles for these criteria existed through history their actual substance differed greatly. It is however clear that the thoughts on Ius in Bello revolved around two concepts, that of proportionality and discrimination.

But the combination of these 2 goals requires a hell of a lot of thought to devise a cunning plan for world liberation. — Paul Edwards

I like this, thumbs up. Yes, not a simple right/wrong equation.

Unless we are for psychopathic dictatorships, it's really a tactical question, not a moral one.

However, the Iraq war was a mess, the plan changed several times and the US answers to establishing a democracy seem to be flawed. — Judaka

Yes, goal was moral, execution of plan incompetent. That said, nobody in Iraq is pining for the days of Saddam. The Iraqi government appears to be incompetent and corrupt, but it's not invading it's neighbors, not terrorizing Iraqis to the degree of Saddam, not seeking WMD.

If Saddam had remained in power we'd now be seeing a nuclear arms race between Iraq and Iran, leading to a wider arms race across the region.

In my opinion, it was conducted near-perfectly, given what was known at the time — Paul Edwards

Invasion, near perfect. Occupation, a mess.

I like this, thumbs up.

Thankyou sir!

Unless we are for psychopathic dictatorships, it's really a tactical question, not a moral one.

Yes, thankyou for expressing that in your own words. It is enlightening.

A key problem in such discussions is that Americans (and many other Westerners) have had freedom for so long we typically no longer appreciate it. Understandable, but an obstacle.

As example. A forum user may wail against the war in a thousand posts, but the moment a mod deletes one of their posts they go hysterical. All perspective and context lost. They can rationalize Saddam all day long, but would launch rockets against the mod if they could. So long as it's somebody else's freedom being discussed it's all theory, once it's MY freedom being affected, reality returns.

Occupation, a mess.

No, the occupation was done perfectly too, given the information available at the time. It was necessary to disband the old security forces, and hope that that was enough to make the Iraqi people believe, really believe (because it was true) that the new security forces were totally different from the past ones, and were there to protect their rights, not violate them, so it was OK for good people to sign up to the new security forces.

And it WORKED. There were long lines of volunteers for the new security forces, despite the fact that the country was occupied by a non-Muslim force. Some even called those volunteers traitors. But enough Iraqis treated the west as a friend, that enabled us to stand up new security forces that were required to swear allegiance to democracy, not some dictator. And above all, it was a SUCCESS. Iraq now has a very vibrant democracy. Something that many people said was impossible. We have no way of knowing what would have happened if we had used a different approach. It might have led to failure, the inability to stand up democracy in an Arab Muslim country, spelling doom for the project of worldwide democracy.

A key problem in such discussions is that Americans (and many other Westerners) have had freedom for so long we typically no longer appreciate it. Understandable, but an obstacle.

Yes, well said.

As example. A forum user may wail against the war in a thousand posts, but the moment a mod deletes one of their posts they go hysterical. All perspective and context lost. They can rationalize Saddam all day long, but would launch rockets against the mod if they could. So long as it's somebody else's freedom being discussed it's all theory, once it's MY freedom being affected, reality returns.

Yes, exactly right.

Basically they're not putting themselves into the shoes of an Iraqi. Let's see if we can get agreement with your/my position in this thread.

There were long lines of volunteers for the new security forces, despite the fact that the country was occupied by a non-Muslim force. — Paul Edwards

Also note that Sistani was under pressure to declare a jihad on the invading force. There would have been a very messy bloodbath if he had done that. Not at all what we wanted. Fortunately, a combination of the security vacuum plus Al Sadr being allowed to trash Sistani's favorite mosque was enough to get Sistani to call on the Iraqis to do the exact opposite of a jihad - and sign up to the new security forces under US control. It was strategically brilliant. It's a pity we can't rerun history so that you could see the terrible alternative of a Shiite jihad in action.

Well, the 2003 Iraq war fails on a few levels to be considered a just war based on what has been written on the subject. Quite obviously so to be honest. — Benkei

I'll need something specific to be able to contest the claim, and it's far from obvious. Ending the Iraqi holocaust (including institutional rape) is probably the most just war in the history of the world, and if Just War Theory fails to spell that out then the theory needs to be adjusted.

From reading your posts, you seem to have a pre-conceived conclusion

In the 1980s when I was a teenager I had a conclusion that if only the USSR wasn't standing in the way, we would be able to wage war against Eastern Europe's dictators and install democracies and see if the people REALLY wanted communism.

After Eastern Europe I was after the rest of the world.

So both in 1990 and 2003 I naturally supported the wars. The 1990 war had about 90% approval in Australia, and I was not surprised. The 2003 war had 50% opposed which shocked me to the bone.

I have spent my time since 2003 investigating all the reasons people offered for opposing the Iraq war, and have exhausted my independent research and now wish to speak to professional philosophers instead of operating in a vacuum.

and are trying to collect information to strengthen your case.

Or have my case defeated in the free marketplace of ideas, as the case may be. Note that the Russian I referred to earlier used to be anti-war, but after months of debate I converted him, and he wrote a blog post explaining how he got from A to B, which is very enlightening.

Which is fine because many people do that but it doesn't make for interesting discussions.

Well it's interesting to me.

I'll post an overview I wrote years ago about the historic development of just war theory as well.

Wow, that is very long! I've started reading it.

Basically they're not putting themselves into the shoes of an Iraqi. Let's see if we can get agreement with your/my position in this thread. — Paul Edwards

Good luck with that. :-)

No, the occupation was done perfectly too, given the information available at the time — Paul Edwards

The missing information, imho, was that we didn't fully grasp how traumatized the Iraqi people were. Once Saddam's knife was off their neck, a great deal of bottled up rage came poring out. And it couldn't be directed at Saddam, so they rebelled against us.

Bush thought the Iraqis would welcome us with open arms. He thought he was invading Belgium in WWII.

The missing information, imho, was that we didn't fully grasp how traumatized the Iraqi people were. Once Saddam's knife was off their neck, a great deal of bottled up rage came poring out. And it couldn't be directed at Saddam, so they rebelled against us.

"they" didn't do just one thing. They were split 50/50 on whether Iraq was "liberated" or "humiliated". No-one at all predicted such a split. The predictions were either they would obviously be grateful (I thought this) or that they would unite and fight to the last man against foreign invaders.

Bush thought the Iraqis would welcome us with open arms. He thought he was invading Belgium in WWII.

The fact that they WEREN'T like Belgium is part of the reason we needed the war. To properly respond to 9/11, we need to convert all of the Middle East into clones of Belgium. And again, we needed a security vacuum to see what values the Iraqis had internalized. Did they share Islamic values? What are Islamic values? How was Saddam able to commit atrocities and still be a Muslim destined to enter Heaven? Wasn't there anything in the Koran that said if you commit atrocities you go to Hell? Maybe we need to update the Koran in response to 9/11. The invasion of Iraq would be used to inform future action in response to 9/11. It was basically a large social experiment. Also an experiment to see if a light force could be used in a war of liberation as opposed to a war of conquest.

It was all highly successful. We converted an enemy into a (completely unforced) friend.

"they" didn't do just one thing. They were split 50/50 on whether Iraq was "liberated" or "humiliated". No-one at all predicted such a split. — Paul Edwards

Right. My point too. No one predicted it. Someone in charge should have.

We Americans are technically brilliant, and culturally clueless. So, invasion went great, occupation a mess.

Right. My point too. No one predicted it. Someone in charge should have.

Even if someone did predict it, they would have had their opinion drowned out by people predicting that the Iraqis would act near-uniformly one way or another. The opposing theories needed to be tested by practice. We have the same problem with Iran. No-one knows for sure how the Iranians will react to a liberating force. We have the Iraq example of 50/50 split and we have the Afghan result of about 87% supporting the war of liberation, but we simply don't have enough invasions under our belt to predict this with any accuracy. Hence every venture is an experiment.

We Americans are technically brilliant, and culturally clueless. So, invasion went great, occupation a mess.

What specifically did you want done differently if a 50/50 split could have been predicted? The most obvious thing was to not disband the old security forces. But it is unclear exactly what sort of mess that may have caused if the Iraqis rejected the security forces as being the same unreformed forces that committed human rights abuses against them. We needed a fresh start, and to arm the good 50% against the bad 50%. That is what was done. And we got heaps of great experimental data. The barrier to war has been lowered because we now know we can do it with a small force. And if in future we reuse the old security forces, we can be in and out in 3.5 weeks. There is no longer any need to do nation-building. ie in Iran we can just leave all of that to the Iranians. In Iraq it was important to close off the theory that it was impossible for Arab Muslims to handle democracy. We don't have that open theory with Iran. Or North Korea.

I don't think the topic would be as controversial if everyone thought that the US was invading Iraq on behalf of the Iraqi people, for the purpose of their liberation. The major reason given was the WMDs which weren't actually there, that objective was flawed from the start. If the war reason given was "Hussein you're evil and we are going to depose you for the good of the Iraqi people" then I think the war would be viewed differently. The oil is probably the largest cause for scepticism, combined with the history of imperialism with the British and French.

The other issue is that even though it's been years since the Iraq war, Iraq is still a mess and with that knowledge, it's difficult to call the war a success from the standpoint of helping the Iraqi people. If Iraq was now a peaceful, solid democracy that the people supported then more people would support the invasion.

Mostly the big difference in your view and the view of many others is how well Iraq is doing right now. Between the IS, Shiite, Sunni, Kurdish militia groups, the corruption and incompetence within the Iraqi democracy and wide-scale protests, Iraq seems like a wartorn, unstable country with an ineffectual government. Based on that view, the Iraq war seems worse than if our view is that Iraq is a "vibrant democracy". The future of Iraq seems uncertain and I think even if people see the US as merely spreading democracy to Iraq and nothing else, how could they see those attempts as well-executed? It's not an easy task but I don't know if people can accept that it had to be this difficult and chaotic, not yet even knowing how things will turn out.

Of course, Iran is a menace and whatever power Iran acquires will certainly be used to be an even greater menace but Iran is not a small country. The issue isn't whether the US could easily defeat Iran but whether war against belligerent non-democracies is a sustainable strategy. What about North Korea, China, Saudi Arabia and others? Will the US just invade them all?

I don't think the topic would be as controversial if everyone thought that the US was invading Iraq on behalf of the Iraqi people, for the purpose of their liberation.

Once a decision had been made that Saddam needed to be removed for other reasons, the US did indeed take the exact action of merely liberating the Iraqi people, and not even forcing a bus timetable on them. And it doesn't make any difference if Bush personally just hated countries that start with the letter "I". The rest of the non-Bush world should have supported the action, which was exactly a liberation, no more, no less. They went in, set up democratic institutions, and left. They would have taken any WMD they found with them though.

The other issue is that even though it's been years since the Iraq war, Iraq is still a mess and with that knowledge, it's difficult to call the war a success from the standpoint of helping the Iraqi people.

There is no longer institutionalized rape, or institutionalized tongue-chopping. The Iraqi holocaust is over. Isn't that enough? The rest is down to the quality of the Iraqi people. If the Iraqis aren't the same as the Swiss, so be it.

What about North Korea, China, Saudi Arabia and others? Will the US just invade them all?

That depends on how this debate goes. Iraq was the most justified invasion. If I can't convince you of Iraq, I probably can't convince you on any other country. I don't believe we can take on China, it is too big and has nuclear weapons. I don't want a nuclear war to liberate them. North Korea I'm not sure about. We may have left it too late. It's a pity that Iraq wasn't easier. With Saudi Arabia I don't expect to turn on allied dictators until we've finished dealing with enemy dictators. But after 9/11 (with 15 Saudi hijackers), yes, Saudi Arabia needs to be reformed. We can now point to Iraq's democracy and say "you have 3 months to look like that or the bloodbath will start". Before we didn't have any reference point. Iraq gave us that. It was a vital step in responding to 9/11. Iraq was the country with the most chance of success. No history of Islamic radicalization. These are Arab Muslims we can probably live with. Saudi Arabia needs to be the same.