we would both refer to a given apple by the same name because we've been taught to associate "Red" with a particular experience. — khaled
If by "this apple is red" you mean "this apple produces the experience 'red' refers to" then yes that apple is red. If by it you mean "this apple produces the experience 'red' refers to for me, equally for everyone" then no not necessarily. — khaled
It refers to the contents of your experience. Think of "red" as a pointer if you're familiar with programming. "Red" is a word that points to a certain experience — khaled
So when I say "the apple is red" I'm saying "I am having the experience 'red' points to — khaled
No we haven't. Activation of Brodmann's area precedes signals being sent to the working memory. You literally start forming the word 'red' in response to firing from the V2 area prior to being aware of the fact that what you're seeing is red. It's not an 'experience' you're naming, it's just a chain of firing neurons, leading to the production of a name. You have the 'experience' afterwards. — Isaac
I don't think anyone is saying that. — Isaac
You're carrying out the consequences of a link between some stored phonology from visual stimulation, this would happen even if your working memory could be theoretically removed in such a way as you have absolutely no formation of real-time experiences at all. — Isaac
That I start to form the word (or expect to see) red before I see red does not in any way show that the statement "We associate 'red' with a certain experience" is false. — khaled
If I asked you to imagine "red" you would be able to correct? — khaled
The original thing I replied to seemed like an attempt to attribute qualia to apples. — khaled
But when I say "the apple is red" WHILE my brain is fully intact and functioning I do in fact mean that I am having the experience 'red' points to. — khaled
By 'an experience' I assumed Yuan meant some conscious awareness of mental states — Isaac
No. I could imagine something which is red, I don't think I can imagine 'red' I don't believe there is such a thing. — Isaac
I was just saying that I don't think anyone means to argue for you second interpretation. — Isaac
If your answer 'red' points to an experience of 'redness', they why are you prone to use it even when seeing the word 'red' printed in blue ink? — Isaac
The solution, as I see it, is to put qualities like color, etc., back in the world where they belong. It is the apple that is red, there is not red qualia in people's minds
— Andrew M
But how come some (colorblind) people see the apple as green? — khaled
And how do you confirm that the apple is in fact red? — khaled
You can’t see the apple from my perspective to confirm that when you say “red” you are referring to the same experience as when I say “red”. — khaled
The problem is this: we can confirm that we all agree on some properties of the apple/experience them the same way. Properties such as shape can be confirmed by asking someone to draw an apple and you’ll find people will agree on an apple’s shape. But someone can be seeing inverted colors from me and there will be absolutely no way to confirm or deny that. In other words, we can confirm the wavelength reflected off the apple, but we cannot confirm whether or not the experience produced when that wave enters our eyes is the same. — khaled
And how do you confirm that the apple is in fact red? — khaled
We would normally assume that two people who look at a red apple and say that it is red are having the same experience. However if their experiences were different, then there would be physical differences that account for it. — Andrew M
What I meant was how do you confirm that the apple results in the same experience for everyone. You can't. You only know that it results in some experience we all decided to dub "red" (even though it might look different for everyone). — khaled
Well if it makes no physical differences then we have no reason to assume that the two people have the same experience but other than that I agree.
And Qualia, means specifically these experiences. So just because we can't describe the contents of our experiences to others (if my red was your green we would never be able to tell) doesn't mean those contents don't exist. — khaled
No. I could imagine something which is red, I don't think I can imagine 'red' I don't believe there is such a thing. — Isaac
No we haven't. Activation of Brodmann's area precedes signals being sent to the working memory. You literally start forming the word 'red' in response to firing from the V2 area prior to being aware of the fact that what you're seeing is red. — Isaac
If the apple looks different to you than to me, then our experiences are different. That's a difference that is, in principle, discoverable. — Andrew M
Not on the ordinary definition of experience (one's practical contact with the world). On that definition we can, and do, describe our experiences. — Andrew M
Apples aren't red. They reflect light in a wavelength range we see as red. — Marchesk
This nonsense can be dispensed with by dropping some acid. — Banno
There are red apples. You're not bothered to be saying something so obviously false?
You sure? — Banno
The equating of experience with qualia assumes dualism, which I reject.
— Andrew M
How? — khaled
Talk of the mind, one might say, is merely a convenient facon de parler, a way of speaking about certain human faculties and their exercise. Of course that does not mean that people do not have minds of their own, which would be true only if they were pathologically indecisive. Nor does it mean that people are mindless, which would be true only if they were stupid or thoughtless. For a creature to have a mind is for it to have a distinctive range of capacities of intellect and will, in particular the conceptual powers of a language-user that make self-awareness and self-reflection possible. — Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience - Bennett and Hacker
If the apple looks different to you than to me, then our experiences are different. That's a difference that is, in principle, discoverable.
— Andrew M
But not for creatures with sensory modalities different enough from us. — Marchesk
Experiences aren't limited to perception, and there is a limit to my ability to communicate what it's like to be me to you. We never fully know what other people experience. Their full feelings, dreams, thoughts, and being in their own skin is only something they experience. — Marchesk
Even with perception, if the difference is great enough, we can't always know. Some have suggested there are tetrachromatic females who have more vivid color perceptual abilities. Their ability to communicate what that's like to us would be limited by our 3 primary color combinations, if this is indeed so. I believe the evidence is still inconclusive, though. — Marchesk
"Red" doesn't refer to an experience, it refers to the color of the apple.
— Andrew M
Apples aren't red. They reflect light in a wavelength range we see as red. Red is part of the visual experience. — Marchesk
Would apples be red in the world of the blind? — Janus
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