Doesn't make the concept meaningless, just useless. — khaled

The concept of qualia is useful to annoy would-be automatons. That must count for something...

we would both refer to a given apple by the same name because we've been taught to associate "Red" with a particular experience. — khaled

No we haven't. Activation of Brodmann's area precedes signals being sent to the working memory. You literally start forming the word 'red' in response to firing from the V2 area prior to being aware of the fact that what you're seeing is red. It's not an 'experience' you're naming, it's just a chain of firing neurons, leading to the production of a name. You have the 'experience' afterwards. Does this matter to anyone except those in cognitive sciences...no, probably not. But for that very reason, I see little point in speculating about it from your armchair.

If by "this apple is red" you mean "this apple produces the experience 'red' refers to" then yes that apple is red. If by it you mean "this apple produces the experience 'red' refers to for me, equally for everyone" then no not necessarily. — khaled

I don't think anyone is saying that.

It refers to the contents of your experience. Think of "red" as a pointer if you're familiar with programming. "Red" is a word that points to a certain experience — khaled

Again, it demonstrably doesn't.

So when I say "the apple is red" I'm saying "I am having the experience 'red' points to — khaled

No, you're not. You're carrying out the consequences of a link between some stored phonology from visual stimulation, this would happen even if your working memory could be theoretically removed in such a way as you have absolutely no formation of real-time experiences at all.

...just useless — khaled

Yep.

No we haven't. Activation of Brodmann's area precedes signals being sent to the working memory. You literally start forming the word 'red' in response to firing from the V2 area prior to being aware of the fact that what you're seeing is red. It's not an 'experience' you're naming, it's just a chain of firing neurons, leading to the production of a name. You have the 'experience' afterwards. — Isaac

That I start to form the word (or expect to see) red before I see red does not in any way show that the statement "We associate 'red' with a certain experience" is false. I don't see how it is even related. If I asked you to imagine "red" you would be able to correct? Does that not mean that "red" is associated with a certain experience? Even if you formulate the word first before imagining the color, what does that have to do with anything?

You're sounding like Dennett here. Giving a completely unrelated fact to disprove something.

I don't think anyone is saying that. — Isaac

The original thing I replied to seemed like an attempt to attribute qualia to apples. Also curious how you were able to understand my comment even though it had the line "this apple produces the experience 'red' refers to". It's almost as if you can understand what I'm saying despite the irrelevant neurological facts you cite.

You're carrying out the consequences of a link between some stored phonology from visual stimulation, this would happen even if your working memory could be theoretically removed in such a way as you have absolutely no formation of real-time experiences at all. — Isaac

But when I say "the apple is red" WHILE my brain is fully intact and functioning I do in fact mean that I am having the experience 'red' points to. That saying "the apple is red" can be done without or before actually experiencing red does not make that statement false. You try to disprove something by citing completely irrelevant neurological facts.

But meaningful. Which is why when someone says "Qualia doesn't exist" it sounds to the people who use it like "When you say 'red' you are literally referring to nothing. Aka there is no experience there". This would all be so much easier if people didn't conflate a useless concept with one that doesn't exist or is meaningless.

What I'm getting out of this thread is if Dennett is right he's a terrible communicator. Or I'm a terrible reader. Or both.

would-be automatons — Olivier5

But then they'd be pretty bad automatons. Because they are not acting as humans well enough. No human doubts that they have experiences, that seems like something only an automaton would do. Maybe Dennett is bugged or something.

That I start to form the word (or expect to see) red before I see red does not in any way show that the statement "We associate 'red' with a certain experience" is false. — khaled

By 'an experience' I assumed Yuan meant some conscious awareness of mental states, otherwise I've no idea what you mean by the term.

If I asked you to imagine "red" you would be able to correct? — khaled

No. I could imagine something which is red, I don't think I can imagine 'red' I don't believe there is such a thing.

The original thing I replied to seemed like an attempt to attribute qualia to apples. — khaled

Yes, which, as you pointed out, is also consistent with your first interpretation. I was just saying that I don't think anyone means to argue for you second interpretation.

But when I say "the apple is red" WHILE my brain is fully intact and functioning I do in fact mean that I am having the experience 'red' points to. — khaled

How can you possibly when the centres of your brain associated with the semantic connection to the word red are not even active at the time the word is beginning to be formed? In fact, colour words are quite unique in the route they take from sensitisation to motor function. They barely touch your working memory from only a few years after the acquisition of the term.

If you still disagree, then perhaps you'd like to offer your alternative explanation for the errors seen during Stoop tests for mismatched colours and written words. If your answer 'red' points to an experience of 'redness', they why are you prone to use it even when seeing the word 'red' printed in blue ink?

But then they'd be pretty bad automatons — khaled

Well yes, otherwise you could not annoy them.

Well yes, otherwise you could not annoy them. — Olivier5

:lol:

By 'an experience' I assumed Yuan meant some conscious awareness of mental states — Isaac

Correct. The word "red" is associated with awareness of a certain mental state. Now if I told you "but actually, you formulate the word before you become aware of the mental state" what bearing does that have on the statement?

No. I could imagine something which is red, I don't think I can imagine 'red' I don't believe there is such a thing. — Isaac

Yea that's what I meant. You can imagine a red screen taking up your vision. Therefore "red" must be associated with some sort of experience no? Or else what does "red" mean exactly? In the absence of an associated experience, when I say "this apple is red" what am I saying?

I was just saying that I don't think anyone means to argue for you second interpretation. — Isaac

When I say "attribute qualia to apples" I meant my second interpretation. Anyways.

If your answer 'red' points to an experience of 'redness', they why are you prone to use it even when seeing the word 'red' printed in blue ink? — Isaac

That I am prone to use it even then does not invalidate the statement "red is associated with a certain experience". And again, I don't see how they're related. If you're going to continue down this path then for the next neurological fact you cite, can you explain how it invalidates the statement "red is associated with a certain experience"

Yep. Talk of qualia distracts us from the world in which we are embedded. It's vestigial idealism. — Banno

:up:

An anecdote about "usefulness":

When Galileo discovered the four largest moons of Jupiter thanks to his newly invented telescopes, it made a big sensation as it contradicted the then canonical cosmology based on Ptolemy. This is when Galileo started his defense of heliocentrism, based on his astronomical observations. One theologian (Ingoli I think) objected that since the whole world was created by God for man, and since the moons of Jupiter did not affect mankind in any way, they are useless, and therefore the moons of Jupiter cannot possibly exist... A dogmatic argument if there ever was one.

To which students from the university of Florence responded through a satirical poem: But the moons of Jupiter annoy Monsignor Ingoli, and therefore they are very useful to mankind!

What is useless to one, can be useful to another... :-)

The solution, as I see it, is to put qualities like color, etc., back in the world where they belong. It is the apple that is red, there is not red qualia in people's minds
— Andrew M

But how come some (colorblind) people see the apple as green? — khaled

Because their visual systems differ from the norm.

And how do you confirm that the apple is in fact red? — khaled

By looking (if you're not colorblind). Or asking someone (if you are).

You can’t see the apple from my perspective to confirm that when you say “red” you are referring to the same experience as when I say “red”. — khaled

"Red" doesn't refer to an experience, it refers to the color of the apple. Now suppose I were feeling hungry, saw a red apple, and my mouth watered - that's an experience. It's an experience that you might have had as well. But perhaps you don't like red apples, so then your experience would be different.

The problem is this: we can confirm that we all agree on some properties of the apple/experience them the same way. Properties such as shape can be confirmed by asking someone to draw an apple and you’ll find people will agree on an apple’s shape. But someone can be seeing inverted colors from me and there will be absolutely no way to confirm or deny that. In other words, we can confirm the wavelength reflected off the apple, but we cannot confirm whether or not the experience produced when that wave enters our eyes is the same. — khaled

People may or may not agree on the apple's shape if they are wearing different kinds of distorting glasses. That is what colorblindness and color inversion amounts to. We would normally assume that two people who look at a red apple and say that it is red are having the same experience. However if their experiences were different, then there would be physical differences that account for it.

which students from the university of Florence responded through a satirical poem: But the moons of Jupiter annoy Monsignor Ingoli, and therefore they are very useful to mankind! — Olivier5

:nerd:

In my experience, they are still some "Monsignor Ingoli" in this world, and they do easily get irate. So I shamelessly plagiarized the joke...

And how do you confirm that the apple is in fact red? — khaled

What I meant was how do you confirm that the apple results in the same experience for everyone. You can't. You only know that it results in some experience we all decided to dub "red" (even though it might look different for everyone).

We would normally assume that two people who look at a red apple and say that it is red are having the same experience. However if their experiences were different, then there would be physical differences that account for it. — Andrew M

Well if it makes no physical differences then we have no reason to assume that the two people have the same experience but other than that I agree.

And Qualia, means specifically these experiences. So just because we can't describe the contents of our experiences to others (if my red was your green we would never be able to tell) doesn't mean those contents don't exist.

What I meant was how do you confirm that the apple results in the same experience for everyone. You can't. You only know that it results in some experience we all decided to dub "red" (even though it might look different for everyone). — khaled

Just a heads up that we're using the word "experience" very differently.

If the apple looks different to you than to me, then our experiences are different. That's a difference that is, in principle, discoverable.

Well if it makes no physical differences then we have no reason to assume that the two people have the same experience but other than that I agree.

And Qualia, means specifically these experiences. So just because we can't describe the contents of our experiences to others (if my red was your green we would never be able to tell) doesn't mean those contents don't exist. — khaled

Not on the ordinary definition of experience (one's practical contact with the world). On that definition we can, and do, describe our experiences.

The equating of experience with qualia assumes dualism, which I reject.

The equating of experience with qualia assumes dualism, which I reject. — Andrew M

How?

No. I could imagine something which is red, I don't think I can imagine 'red' I don't believe there is such a thing. — Isaac

What about "seeing red" when someone is angry? The image being your entire visual field turns red in a fit of rage. That doesn't happen to me, but I can imagine it, and maybe it happens for some people.

No we haven't. Activation of Brodmann's area precedes signals being sent to the working memory. You literally start forming the word 'red' in response to firing from the V2 area prior to being aware of the fact that what you're seeing is red. — Isaac

That can only work on immediate responses prior to being conscious and not when taking your time to reflect on the red cup before you. Also, this is a learned response, not something infants do. They don't utter "red" the first time they see a red object. You're talking about a learned reflex.

If the apple looks different to you than to me, then our experiences are different. That's a difference that is, in principle, discoverable. — Andrew M

But not for creatures with sensory modalities different enough from us.

Not on the ordinary definition of experience (one's practical contact with the world). On that definition we can, and do, describe our experiences. — Andrew M

Experiences aren't limited to perception, and there is a limit to my ability to communicate what it's like to be me to you. We never fully know what other people experience. Their full feelings, dreams, thoughts, and being in their own skin is only something they experience.

Even with perception, if the difference is great enough, we can't always know. Some have suggested there are tetrachromatic females who have more vivid color perceptual abilities. Their ability to communicate what that's like to us would be limited by our 3 primary color combinations, if this is indeed so. I believe the evidence is still inconclusive, though.

"Red" doesn't refer to an experience, it refers to the color of the apple. — Andrew M

Apples aren't red. They reflect light in a wavelength range we see as red. Red is part of the visual experience.

Apples aren't red. They reflect light in a wavelength range we see as red. — Marchesk

What is it to see something as red? Could I express such an experience by saying, "To me, the apple looks red" or maybe "To me, the apple looks like it is red"?

Apples aren't red. — Marchesk

There are red apples. You're not bothered to be saying something so obviously false?

You sure?

Supposedly, primary properties are things like mass and size; they inhere in the object. Secondary properties are things like colours; they are found in the mind.

This nonsense can be dispensed with by dropping some acid.

This nonsense can be dispensed with by dropping some acid. — Banno

I recommend cauliflower.

This nonsense can be dispensed with by dropping some acid. — Banno

What kind of acid? Hydrochloric, sulphuric? Where do you have to drop it? How does it dispense with nonsense?

There are red apples. You're not bothered to be saying something so obviously false?

You sure? — Banno

Would apples be red in the world of the blind?

We’re just going back over the same ground at this point.

The equating of experience with qualia assumes dualism, which I reject.
— Andrew M

How? — khaled

See Dennett's Cartesian Theater or Ryle's ghost in the machine. Those are metaphors for subject/object dualism, where experiences are private to a subject (hence the need to posit qualia - the content of experience) rather than being a person's interactions in the world (the ordinary, everyday usage).

It's not just a matter of a simple word definition. Subject/object duality is a conceptual scheme that pervades philosophy, in various and often subtle ways.

The mind is not a container or a theater or something mysterious apart from the world, it's a way of talking about an agent's capabilities for engaging in the world. As Bennett and Hacker put it:

Talk of the mind, one might say, is merely a convenient facon de parler, a way of speaking about certain human faculties and their exercise. Of course that does not mean that people do not have minds of their own, which would be true only if they were pathologically indecisive. Nor does it mean that people are mindless, which would be true only if they were stupid or thoughtless. For a creature to have a mind is for it to have a distinctive range of capacities of intellect and will, in particular the conceptual powers of a language-user that make self-awareness and self-reflection possible. — Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience - Bennett and Hacker

If the apple looks different to you than to me, then our experiences are different. That's a difference that is, in principle, discoverable.
— Andrew M

But not for creatures with sensory modalities different enough from us. — Marchesk

Do you mean we can't discover that their experiences are different or in what ways? I'm not color blind, but a quick look at the images on the color blindness Wikipedia page gives me a sense of how a color blind person would see things, and thus how their everyday experience would differ from mine. Similarly for animals, whose visual systems vary further, as you know.

That doesn't tell me much about bats, but I don't see an in-principle line that can't be crossed regarding future knowledge.

Experiences aren't limited to perception, and there is a limit to my ability to communicate what it's like to be me to you. We never fully know what other people experience. Their full feelings, dreams, thoughts, and being in their own skin is only something they experience. — Marchesk

Yet, still, we have empathy and shared experiences. I see the limits as practical, not as in-principle.

Even with perception, if the difference is great enough, we can't always know. Some have suggested there are tetrachromatic females who have more vivid color perceptual abilities. Their ability to communicate what that's like to us would be limited by our 3 primary color combinations, if this is indeed so. I believe the evidence is still inconclusive, though. — Marchesk

Sure. Though technological or biological modifications could conceivably be developed that alter one's experiences.

"Red" doesn't refer to an experience, it refers to the color of the apple.
— Andrew M

Apples aren't red. They reflect light in a wavelength range we see as red. Red is part of the visual experience. — Marchesk

You're speaking a different language to me, which is a philosophical choice. But on ordinary usage, as in scientific practice, there are red apples. In my view, ordinary language is straightforward, coherent and useful. And isn't susceptible to the kinds of philosophical problems that arise for subject/object dualism.

Would apples be red in the world of the blind? — Janus

Yes. Color terms are abstractions. Is the apple red even at night and even if no-one is looking at it? The answer again is yes, it is. That is, the apple is red independent of the environment external to it, including sentient human beings. Nonetheless, a human perspective is implicit in the forming of that abstraction.

If everyone were blind, no-one would have formed that abstraction. It would have no use.