But on ordinary usage, as in scientific practice, there are red apples. In my view, ordinary language is straightforward, coherent and useful. And isn't susceptible to the kinds of philosophical problems that arise for subject/object dualism. — Andrew M
I really don't understand the obsession with ordinary language philosophy. Ordinary language has all sorts of assumptions baked into it. Why take those at face value? — Marchesk
Apples aren't red. — Marchesk
There are red apples. You're not bothered to be saying something so obviously false? — Banno
Especially when one goes about picking which parts of ordinary language to rely on in ad hoc manners. In ordinary language, intentions are not illusory, for one example. We all speak as though sentient beings are endowed with agency (granted, and sometime speak of insentient things, like computers, as though they are endowed with agency; such as in, “it's thinking,” when a computer program doesn’t process information fast enough). — javra
Ordinary language has naive realist assumptions. I really don't understand the obsession with ordinary language philosophy. Ordinary language has all sorts of assumptions baked into it. Why take those at face value? — Marchesk
Also, science doesn't say the apple is red, it says the apple reflects light of certain wavelength that we see as red. Important distinction. — Marchesk
Correct. The word "red" is associated with awareness of a certain mental state. Now if I told you "but actually, you formulate the word before you become aware of the mental state" what bearing does that have on the statement? — khaled
That I am prone to use it even then does not invalidate the statement "red is associated with a certain experience". And again, I don't see how they're related. If you're going to continue down this path then for the next neurological fact you cite, can you explain how it invalidates the statement "red is associated with a certain experience" — khaled
What about "seeing red" when someone is angry? The image being your entire visual field turns red in a fit of rage. That doesn't happen to me, but I can imagine it, and maybe it happens for some people. — Marchesk
That can only work on immediate responses prior to being conscious and not when taking your time to reflect on the red cup before you. — Marchesk
Also, this is a learned response, not something infants do. They don't utter "red" the first time they see a red object. You're talking about a learned reflex. — Marchesk
Yep. That's right, I'm not sure what bearing you think that has on the issue. It's a fairly simple matter of demonstrating pretty conclusively that the use of the word 'red' does not reference a conscious experience. It can't do because the decision to use the word has already been made prior to any occipital originating signals in areas of the brain associated with conscious awareness. — Isaac
We can go into that too if you like (spoiler - it's not by association with conscious awareness of 'redness' either), b — Isaac
What we have no use for at all is armchair speculation about what the constituents of our perception-response system might be without any cause or evidence for such an arrangement. — Isaac
'm calling them stories in a technical sense. We treat these stories as reality whether we like it or not, even whilst we're trying to investigate them scientifically ( — Isaac
Your claim is that X is associated with Y — Isaac
the use of the word 'red' does not reference a conscious experience. It can't do because the decision to use the word has already been made prior to any occipital originating signals in areas of the brain associated with conscious awareness. — Isaac
Do you mean that under the 'normal' range of light temperature and intensity the constitution of what we call a red apple is such that its surface will reflect that part of the electromagnetic spectrum such as to appear red to any creature with the requisite visual system or something else? — Janus
That is, the scientist's specialized language is ultimately grounded in ordinary, everyday experience. — Andrew M
No, it's more straightforward than that (or, at least, doesn't depend on language like "light temperature and intensity", "reflect", "electromagnetic spectrum", "visual system", "appear").
I mean that there are features of the environment that are naturally distinguishable by normally-sighted human beings in decent lighting (whatever the physical details of that happen to be). Further, it has been useful to create language to designate those features. — Andrew M
The point to note here (which I tried to illustrate in the physics student story earlier) is that scientific language doesn't supersede conventional use. Instead, it logically assumes it. That is, the scientist's specialized language is ultimately grounded in ordinary, everyday experience. It's a human view of the world as distinct from a Platonic "view from nowhere". — Andrew M
Minds and Machines
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David Chalmers on dualism — https://www.edx.org/course/minds-and-machines
I can sit here and stare at a red object for five seconds before commenting on it, which means I've had time to be consciously aware before deciding to speak. And during that time, I may notice detail that wasn't immediately obvious and report that — Marchesk
How could we talk of being in pain or having dreams without there being such experiences? — Marchesk
It's armchair speculation to suppose it's some form of self-reporting illusion. — Marchesk
You have also equivocated between sensations being identical to certain neuronal activity and them being illusions — Marchesk
Conscious experience isn't a story we tell ourselves. It just is how we experience the world and our own bodies. — Marchesk
I am not claiming that when someone says "the apple is red" that they are necessarily having a certain experience. I am claiming that in general use (and assuming one isn't lying of course), "the apple is red" is used to indicate a certain experience produced by the apple. You have shown that saying X, and Y occuring are two seperate operations in the brain which occur at around the same time. So what? You have disproven the former claim but did nothing to the latter. — khaled
if I look at a red apple and say nothing, then describe to someone the color of the apple 3 minutes later, what am I referencing? What does "the apple is red" then mean if not "The apple invoked the experience we agreed to dub 'red' "? — khaled
but we're talking about ontological commitments here. — Isaac
It 'means' whatever the term was used to do. — Isaac
They do not have 'meanings' held in perpetuity in some platonic realm. — Isaac
Isn't the domain of ordinary, everyday experience precisely what is categorized under 'folk psychology' by eliminative materialists? Isn't it precisely that which is to be superseded by properly-formulated scientific expression? — Wayfarer
"That there are features of the environment that are naturally distinguishable by normally-sighted human beings in decent lighting (whatever the physical details of that happen to be)." is basically the same story I told without specifying as many details as I included. — Janus
However, when you say unreflectively that an apple is red that should not be taken to imply that the apple is red when no one is looking at it, because colours are qualities that exist only by virtue of being seen. It is not wrong to say that apples are red, but it is merely shorthand for saying that we see apples as red.
An animal that has no red photo-receptor cells in its retina cannot see red, and so for that animal apples are not red. If humans had been lacking red photo-receptors then we would never have said that apples are red. So, beyond the context of ordinary communication, it seems to make no sense to speak of apples being red tout court. — Janus
The apple is nonetheless red, but the animal is unable to perceive that. — Andrew M
Properties of consciousness would be more like the pattern of signals it has, the causes and consequences of it,...etc — Isaac
Here is the context from the quoted post that I was responding to:
"An animal that has no red photo-receptor cells in its retina cannot see red..." — Andrew M
No, you're talking about ontological commitments here. — khaled
It 'means' whatever the term was used to do. It might be to get you to pick one of a similar colour, or to evoke some emotion, or to get a refund on purchase of five green apples... we use words to do things, so long as the ting gets done, the word has been used well. They do not have 'meanings' held in perpetuity in some platonic realm. — Isaac
I never claimed that the meanings of words never change. But your position would judge all dictionaries as nonsense then no? Are you ok with that? After all words apparently can't mean anything outside of the context of their use. — khaled
This means that there is a broad biological (ecological) meaning to the perception of a red apple by a potential apple consumer, human or animal. The apple physically looks "red" (pigments are produced by the apple skin to absorb green wavelengths) right in time to signal its maturity to the consumer.as such [the redness of an apple] is already loaded with meaning and potentiality. — Olivier5
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