For instance, consciousness? — frank
Why do you say emergence is illogical? — frank
It seems to me that his argument is concerned with creating a conceptual space for 'experience' (I would use the term 'being') in the objective domain - to say that, because he can't doubt the reality of experience, and because he's committed to the view that every real phenomenon is physical, then the physical must also be experiential. 'That is what I believe: experiential phenomena cannot be emergent from wholly non-experiential phenomena... Assuming, then, that there is a plurality of physical ultimates, some of them at least must be intrinsically experiential, intrinsically experience-involving....Given that everything concrete is physical, and that everything physical is constituted out of physical ultimates, and that experience is part of concrete reality, it seems the only reasonable position, more than just an ‘inference to the best explanation’. — Wayfarer
not logical that something experiential could emerge from something non-experiential. — Metaphysician Undercover
Something from nothing, for no reason? — Pfhorrest
A weakly emergent property is not reducible. — frank
I guess I was looking for a walk through that logic (if you have time). — frank
Monistic idealists have been known to suggest that matter is an emergent property if mind, so perhaps this is again a mistake of logic? — frank
Strongly emergent properties aren’t like that, and that’s what makes them like magic. You don’t just get them from some combination of the underlying behaviors, but they’re something else in addition to those parts and their arrangements. — Pfhorrest
You’re basically saying that strong emergence is only relative to a particular incomplete account of physics, and on a complete, final account of physics, there would be nothing strongly emergent. Which is to say that in actual fact, nothing is really strongly emergent, at most it is mere unaccounted for by our present physics. — Pfhorrest
But presumably I'm also in some ways a 'case' in a general trend. I think there's an implicit nebula of attitudes around the question where being a panpsychist means you're 'soft' or not ' brave enough to accept of the meaningless/contingency of consciousness' & that's a bummer. I think that nebula is fading, concomitant with shifts in cultural attitudes surrounding what a Serious Person believes, — csalisbury
" :fire: "This 'speculation on mind' called "panpsychism" has always seemed to me nothing but a facile woo-of-the-gaps compositional fallacy proffered as a solution to the MBP which, for my money, was effectively dissolved in the 17th century by Spinoza [ ... ] — 180 Proof
Is it a generational thing? Not to get too psychological, but when people insist on being strong, there could be some underlying fear.
The SEP says the peak of materialism was in the 1970s. Hmm. — frank
Baruch Spinoza (1632-77) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) provide examples of two distinct and formatively important versions of panpsychism. Spinoza regarded both mind and matter as simply aspects (or attributes) of the eternal, infinite and unique substance (ouisia, being) he identified with God Himself. In the illustrative scholium to proposition seven of book two of the Ethics (1677/1985) Spinoza writes: “a circle existing in nature and the idea of the existing circle, which is also in God, are one and the same thing … therefore, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of Extension, or under the attribute of Thought … we shall find one and the same order, or one and the same connection of causes …”. We might say that, for Spinoza, physical science is a way of studying the psychology of God. There is nothing in nature that does not have a mental aspect—the proper appreciation of matter itself reveals it to be the other side of a mentalistic coin. 1 — SEP
My response isn't "about building fortresses", just laying my cards on the table so we can dispense with bluffs and bluster and call everyone else's hand. It's facile, at best (like angelology), thus panpsychism's "popularity". So smoke 'em if you got 'em, peeps.That's about building fortresses. — csalisbury
Really? How so? Or just account for why e.g. Hegel or Maimon ... or Deleuze are - as well as I am - mis-interpreting 'Spinozism (a)s acosmist' (and not e.g. "pan(en)theist" or "pan(en)deist" or "neutral monist" or "panpsychist" ...) :confused:↪180 Proof But Spinoza was apanpsychist. — frank
In my Enformationism thesis, I get around that apparent dilemma, by using a more modern understanding of the fundamental element of both Mind and Matter : Information. Panpsychism has typically been interpreted to mean that everything is conscious to some degree. But I substitute the 21st century scientific concept of ubiquitous "Information". From that novel perspective, everything in the world -- Matter. Energy, and Mind -- is a form of Information. In that case, human-like Consciousness ("mental features") is a high-level form of Information -- a late emergence of evolution. And there's no need to assume that a grain of sand is aware of it's environment. Therefore, I would rename that ancient notion as : Pan-enformationism. :smile:"The Presocratics were struck by a dilemma: either mind is an elemental feature of the world, or mind can somehow be reduced to more fundamental elements. If one opts for reductionism, it is incumbent upon one to explain how the reduction happens. On the other hand, if one opts for the panpsychist view that mind is an elemental feature of the world, then one must account for the apparent lack of mental features at the fundamental level." --SEP — frank
My response isn't ""about building fortresses", just laying my cards on the table so we can dispense with bluffs and bluster and call everyone else's hand. It's facile, at best (like angelology), thus panpsychism's "popularity". So smoke 'em if you get 'em, peeps. — 180 Proof
Acosmism excludes, or is inconsistent with, panpsychism. — 180 Proof
So recall that the distinction between strong and weak emergence is in assessments of truths. Read the essay. — frank
Spinoza explicitly states (re: Ethics, section 1: On God) that substance - his conception - is neither 'conscious' nor 'volitional', and that substance alone is real (i.e. not an effect of any other cause/s, etc). Not remotely "neoplatonist". — 180 Proof
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