And, in science such common presuppositions can be called working hypotheses that need not be believed by any scientist involved. The argument is made, research is carried out, and everyone gets paid. The relevance of the research in terms of broader theories comes later by the way of review and assessment. — magritte

I agree, but I don't see the relevance to what was being discussed.

I don't think neuroscience is going to solve the hard problem. The idea that you can mix non-conscious stuff around in a certain way and add some electricity to it and get consciousness from it is magical thinking. Since we know consciousness exists, we should doubt the non-conscious stuff exists. We have no evidence that it does anyway. Why assume it exists? — RogueAI

If you accept that the brain produces consciousness, and you know from introspection that you have absolutely no awareness of the neural processes going on in the brain, then why would you not conclude that non-conscious processes produce consciousness?

Like memory, consciousness itself is simply some brain mechanism.

Why are we conscious, what purpose does it serve? Well as has just been said above:

I could point to blind-sight patients as evidence that phenomenal experience is necessary. Blind-sight patients don't behave, or think like normal humans. They don't have the level of detail about their environment that normal people do. Their different behavior is the result of their phenomenal experience, or the lack of one, compared to those that have it. — Harry Hindu

Are you not just saying that the mental/experiential are not perceptible material objects? — Janus

Pretty much. This seems to be what divides existing things into the physical and mental categories.

Life itself is not a perceptible material object; would it follow that life is not physical? — Janus

That's a good question. I'm not sure if it's a satisfactory answer, but if life is defined as a distinction between organic and inorganic matter, then life is a category of matter, and so life is physical in that sense. It's the matter that's perceptible, regardless of whether it's organic or inorganic.

Yes, but doesn't it "occur concurrently" only by virtue of having originally emerged or evolved, both in the individual's and the species' cases? I mean you were a zygote before you were conscious, no? — Janus

Yes, "emergence" in the concurrent sense where mind emerges from brain function could have come about via "emergence" in the evolutionary (non-concurrent) sense. I just think that we should avoid any conflation of these two different meanings of "emergence".

Perhaps they have been dissolved to the satisfaction of some.Whether or not someone thinks they have been dissolved seems to be a function of the person's presuppositions — Janus

Fair enough, and perhaps they have not been dissolved to the satisfaction of others.

I don't accept the brain produces consciousness. The existence of some non-conscious stuff is simply asserted to be the case without a shred of evidence to back it up. Mercifully, the era of materialism is fast approaching an end.

If not the brain then what?

My position is that this sort of discussion only serves to further demonstrate the philosophical bankruptcy of qualia. — Banno

Qualia are not physical and the term qualia does not refer to anything physical either. Physicalists presuppose that only physical things exist and reality is just that. Should you choose to suppose that the brain is an instance of the physical then you will have no use for the now empty word qualia which refers to mental representations.

Are there mental events and mental representations that are in need of naming? Frankish agrees with you that there are not. What if you are both wrong? Shouldn't you allow those who work in psychology or phenomenology to coin concepts and words that are of use to them?

If not the brain then what? — Janus

Did your fingers write that?
The brain is the medium that carries information that it does not understand. Think of printed symbols in a book. Do the book and the ink produce anything?

If it were conceptually sound, then perhaps it could be left alone.

But look, for example, to @Enrique's misuse, earlier in the thread.

And again, it should be noted that rejecting qualia does not lead inevitably to physicalism.

Qualia are just percepts of the mind's experiencing that can be distinguished as particulars. Like "life" or "language", the term is an intrinsically vague reference to a class of phenomena, more approximating generality than precise definition. My claim is that this class of phenomena can be subjected to a partial explanation based on biological applications of quantum physics that unify these phenomena within a new neuroscientific/physical framework, a mechanistic accounting for their causality that will transcend currently mainstream concepts. Qualia are percepts, and I'm saying we are approaching the point where percepts can be modeled by material science. Doesn't mean its the only or best way to model them, but its an important piece of the puzzle and promises a huge synthesis of philosophy, social and physical sciences in the future.

Did your fingers write that? — magritte

No I use my nose.

The brain is the medium that carries information that it does not understand. Think of printed symbols in a book. Do the book and the ink produce anything? — magritte

So, you're saying the brain doesn't produce consciousness, just like a book doesn't? So, either there is no consciousness to be produced, or it is produced by...what?

No I use my nose. — Janus

But then you betray your cause.

You 'used' your fingers means you do not believe that your fingers independently act of their own accord but are commanded by your mind. Or do you really believe your bodily organ brain commands you and your fingers? It's the other way around, you are the one and only unique 'I' that uses your body parts to carry out your intentions.

Philosophy uses words some ordinary some technical to convey its message. Unfortunately all words are loaded to a lesser or greater extent which with skill can facilitate begging the question in an argument. The podcast is loaded with skunk words to stink out its supposed opponents.

Edit: I reviewed the first 3 minutes of the Frankish podcast to show some detail.
@ :28 the introduction says "this podcast has a subjective impact ... for you",
and if there is to be anything to talk about this must be correct. It is the subjective character of experience that is to be explained or explained away.
@ 3:11 Frankish affirms that "qualia the way experience feels to you -- mental things within you -- something private" is to be the issue, one way or another.

To evaluate experience as a consequence of consciousness we must realize that experience can only be subjective and private to the first person 'I'. To propose tentative elements for that private subjective experience which may be discussed publicly by referring singular events to 'qualia' requires a third person public stance, something similar to what is done in the social sciences. To do so is hand-waving until it can be verified in public communication or practice.

Suppose we're invited to a wine and cheese blind tasting where 5 bottles of wine are in identical decanters marked only by numbers and 5 more decanters have custom blends of the originals. But the fun only starts when we are asked to note in detail the experienced taste and bouquet of each of the 10. Can you smell and taste the distinctions, and can you describe those sensations so someone else can appreciate and valuate the 10 samples just by reading your notes?

@ :46 According to Chalmers, "making sense of this is the hard problem of consciousness",
But by @ 1:01 Frankish is already talking of "the illusion of qualia"
'illusion' doesn't sound like a very objective introduction to me.
@ 1:08 "explaining 'consciousness' is the hard problem", so by now consciousness is a fixed material or physical object with properties to be picked out of a basket of Wittgensteinian apples
@ 1:24 Frankish has moved on to physical brain somehow causally 'producing' physical consciousness. Yikes !
@ 2:00 "how does the brain produce these experiences" , so experience need also be discrete objects to be physically 'produced'

The issue with Frankish is that to him the mind is nothing more than a brain in a beetle box. We can't see it, so we can't talk about it. True for Frankish, but maybe other people can open that box first before they talk about it.

But then you betray your cause.

You 'used' your fingers means you do not believe that your fingers independently act of their own accord but are commanded by your mind. Or do you really believe your bodily organ brain commands you and your fingers? It's the other way around, you are the one and only unique 'I' that uses your body parts to carry out your intentions. — magritte

No, it's just a way of speaking. I can say "I wrote it"; you can ask "what part of you performed the action and I can say " The fingers" or "the nose", but really the action was performed by the entire body, with the fingers or the nose being merely the most proximate part of me to the keyboard.

The brain is the "command centre" of the body without which there can be no function at all. We know this because we know what happens when we take psychoactive drugs or receive a bullet to the brain. You cannot control your brain function; you are not even aware of it.

The brain is the "command centre" of the body without which there can be no function at all. We know this because we know what happens when we take psychoactive drugs or receive a bullet to the brain. You cannot control your brain function; you are not even aware of it. — Janus

Apologize for getting spiritual, but maybe its possible that the physical substance of consciousness transcends the organic body, a functional complex of which the brain is a key component yet not the entirety? Any philosophy that talks about a possible qualitative experience of soul in connection with material contexts? Sounds like something your Mr. Chalmers would have been into.

That's certainly a possibility we can imagine, but we can't imagine how it would be possible (think about Descartes' "interaction problem"). It's true that we cannot really imagine how the brain/ body gives rise to consciousness either, but that difficulty seems to be based on our subjective, linguistically reified notion of what conscious is; something which doesn't seem compatible with physical processes as we understand them. Or to put it more accurately, we can't (currently) harmonize our disparate ways of imagining the mental and the physical into one coherent model.

I'm curious if Buddhist philosophy has something introspective to say about the structure of consciousness in this respect. Seems beyond the Western psychological tradition. Even the postulated collective unconscious is typically viewed by Western academia through the theoretical lens of evolutionary rather than transpersonal mechanisms, as if the common substance of mind is transmitted solely via heredity instead of a nonlocality such as quantum physics and quantum biology have been modeling. Jung did address the concept of synchronicity, but I haven't read his proposals.

I think Buddhist philosophy does postulate, not a structure, but a nature of consciousness. Consciousness is understood to be eternal, and either co-arising (with matter) or fundamental (cf. the Consciousness Only school); either way it is idealist in orientation.

Note that the Buddhist conception of consciousness is entirely driven by introspection, and the reification of linguistic concepts, not by empirical research. Proponents will insist that consciousness is not a thing, and that it thus cannot be subjected to empirical investigation; but this attitude assumes its conclusion.

Proponents will insist that consciousness is not a thing, and that it thus cannot be subjected to empirical investigation; but this attitude assumes its conclusion. — Janus

Isn't that the case for any foundational premise? If we instead begin with the premise that we have direct access to material objects, then idealism and skepticism are boh assumed to be false.

Yes, I agree there are foundational assumptions to any metaphysical standpoint. What foundational premise you afopt comes down to where you think your most reliable sources of knowledge lie. 'Is scripture, introspection and conceptual extrapolation more reliable as a guide to the nature of things than sensory experienve and scientific investigation' seems to be the pertinent question.

None of this explains why have a different experience of my raw sensory input with memory, motivation, etc. than you have of my raw sensory input with memory, motivation. — Harry Hindu

Sorry for the late reply. I've seen this argument a few times and never got the sense of it. We don't need any knowledge of the workings of the brain to understand why I don't experience your sensory input. It is not a neurological question. It's not even a sensible question imo.

This assumes that consciousness only exists in one part of the brain. — Harry Hindu

Actually it doesn't, which is why it is broken down into functional systems not specific parts of the brain. Either system could be, and likely is, distributed. But certainly parts of the brain are dominant in certain functions.

You say that "we" are not conscious of our decision, then how can we associate the decision with "we"? — Harry Hindu

The answer to that is precisely why we labour under the illusion that we make those decisions consciously. Recall that we are not conscious of the unconscious causes of conscious phenomena. Decisions from System 1 are presented to System 2 apparently uncaused (i.e. without System 2 being aware of the process). So from System 2's point of view, decisions originate in System 2. There are lots of published tests for this.

Sorry for the late reply. I've seen this argument a few times and never got the sense of it. We don't need any knowledge of the workings of the brain to understand why I don't experience your sensory input. It is not a neurological question. It's not even a sensible question imo. — Kenosha Kid

How about why you have experiences at all?

Actually it doesn't, which is why it is broken down into functional systems not specific parts of the brain. Either system could be, and likely is, distributed. But certainly parts of the brain are dominant in certain functions. — Kenosha Kid

The answer to that is precisely why we labour under the illusion that we make those decisions consciously. Recall that we are not conscious of the unconscious causes of conscious phenomena. Decisions from System 1 are presented to System 2 apparently uncaused (i.e. without System 2 being aware of the process). So from System 2's point of view, decisions originate in System 2. There are lots of published tests for this. — Kenosha Kid

What the heck does this even mean? What is the difference between unconscious and conscious phenomena, or systems? If the systems are distributed, then how is it that they aren't aware of what is going on in the other parts? How is the brain itself not aware of what it's different systems are doing? Can an unconscious system be aware of what the unconscious and conscious systems are doing?

If it is an illusion that you make decisions consciously, then you conscious understanding of brains should be called into question. You basically pulled the rug out from under yourself. Happy landings!

How about why you have experiences at all? — Harry Hindu

I'm not sure what specifically you're asking. We have brains that react to external stimuli and convert that reaction into what we consciously experience via various transformations and augmentations. What bit of that are you questioning: How things can react to external stimuli (physics)?; Why we have brains that can do this (evolution)?; How brains do this (neurology)?; Or are you just asking about the first-/third-person distinction, e.g. why a stimulated nucleus accumbens feels like pleasure?

What is the difference between unconscious and conscious phenomena, or systems? — Harry Hindu

My bad, I used the term 'phenomena' in an inconsistent way. What I meant was that there are _processes_ in the brain that we are not conscious of (e.g. outline detection, pattern-matching, etc.) and processes that we are conscious of (e.g. rational decision-making).

How is the brain itself not aware of what it's different systems are doing? — Harry Hindu

A child can just ask 'why?' to every answer; that's not interesting conversation. Do you believe that you are conscious of every thing your brain does, including the cited examples of inverting the retinal image, white-shifting colours, outline detection? Do you claim you make a conscious effort to do these things? Do you consciously regulate your breathing at every moment? Consciously produce dopamine when you spot something surprising that you consciously decide is good?

If not, then you already know that you are unconscious of many (indeed) of the processes occurring in the brain, and your incredulity is less than credible.

I'm not sure what specifically you're asking. We have brains that react to external stimuli and convert that reaction into what we consciously experience via various transformations and augmentations. What bit of that are you questioning: How things can react to external stimuli (physics)?; Why we have brains that can do this (evolution)?; How brains do this (neurology)?; Or are you just asking about the first-/third-person distinction, e.g. why a stimulated nucleus accumbens feels like pleasure? — Kenosha Kid

You used the term, "experiences", so I'm asking you how you were using the term.

My bad, I used the term 'phenomena' in an inconsistent way. What I meant was that there are _processes_ in the brain that we are not conscious of (e.g. outline detection, pattern-matching, etc.) and processes that we are conscious of (e.g. rational decision-making). — Kenosha Kid

What does it mean to be "conscious" of something?

A child can just ask 'why?' to every answer; that's not interesting conversation. Do you believe that you are conscious of every thing your brain does, including the cited examples of inverting the retinal image, white-shifting colours, outline detection? Do you claim you make a conscious effort to do these things? Do you consciously regulate your breathing at every moment? Consciously produce dopamine when you spot something surprising that you consciously decide is good?

If not, then you already know that you are unconscious of many (indeed) of the processes occurring in the brain, and your incredulity is less than credible. — Kenosha Kid

It depends on what you mean by, "conscious" and "conscious efforts". How does one come to consciously know that they are unconscious of many processes occurring in the brain? :brow: It sounds like a meaningless contradiction to me.

How does one come to consciously know that they are unconscious of many processes occurring in the brain? :brow: It sounds like a meaningless contradiction to me. — Harry Hindu

Really? It seems odd to ask a question about it then, seeing as asking questions about something is a perfectly obvious means of learning about things you weren't conscious of. Have you ever, for instance, read a history book, or a science book, or a biography? You really do make the most bizarre statements.

Like I said, I sounds like a meaningless contradiction. I asked the question to get clarification. Asking a question isnt making bizarre statements. Asking questions stems from trying to understand others' bizarre statements. Why don't you just answer the questions?

Which part of the brain asks questions - the conscious part, or the non-conscious part? Your still haven't made a meaningful distinction between conscious processes and unconscious processes.

Asking questions stems from trying to understand others' bizarre statements. Why don't you just answer the questions? — Harry Hindu

You're asking about the possibility of something that, if not possible, would not allow you to ask questions about anything. It seems extremely moot to me.

Also I did answer the question by example. :roll: If you've ever read a nonfiction book, you have gained knowledge of things you never had conscious experience of. You do not experience Agincourt when you read about it, but you still acquire knowledge about it. Same goes for science. You can learn about things the brain does that we are not conscious of by study, research, education, reading out of interest, etc. I don't really get why this is where the conversation is going. It seems a tad basic.

If you've ever read a nonfiction book, you have gained knowledge of things you never had conscious experience of. You do not experience Agincourt when you read about it, but you still acquire knowledge about it. Same goes for science. You can learn about things the brain does that we are not conscious of by study, research, education, reading out of interest, etc. I don't really get why this is where the conversation is going. It seems a tad basic. — Kenosha Kid

Your example is to basic and leaves too many questions left unanswered. How does consciously observing scribbles on a page provide knowledge of unconscious processes?

Is the web page that appears on your computer monitor a unconscious process? If it is, then are you consciously aware of an unconscious process? Is your breathing an unconscious process? Are you consciously aware that you are breathing? You may not be consciously controlling it, but can be aware of it and you can force yourself to breath faster, slower or deeper or hold your breath. You can even make noises when your breath. How do you explain how we can be both not conscious and conscious of our breathing?

What is the observable difference between conscious and unconscious processes?

I don't accept the brain produces consciousness. The existence of some non-conscious stuff is simply asserted to be the case without a shred of evidence to back it up. — RogueAI

You have this backwards. You are the one that have asserted that neurology cannot produce consciousness. Science OTOH does not need to assert the inverse; though it is a working premise at the moment, given that we can see a correspondence between activation or damage to specific locations in the brain having a predictable effect on consciousness.

How does consciously observing scribbles on a page provide knowledge of unconscious processes? — Harry Hindu

This is a straw man / shift of the goalposts. The point being debated was whether we are consciously aware of unconscious processes. And we are of course; I am aware that my vision performs a lot of processes that are not under my control. This is a very different thing than having an awareness of those specific processes.
It's like the difference between knowing someone took a cookie from the jar and knowing exactly who and what happened.

How does consciously observing scribbles on a page provide knowledge of unconscious processes? — Harry Hindu

Again, this is nothing but an infinite regress of childish 'Why?'. That we can learn about things we didn't witness is not in doubt in the scope of the question. That we can do so is sufficient to answer the question of whether we can, through study, have knowledge of brain function, including functions on the inputs to consciousness.

Again, this is nothing but an infinite regress of childish 'Why? — Kenosha Kid

No. Its an effort to get you to back up your own statements. You can't even answer my question about the observable distinction between conscious an unconscious processes. So again, you continue to make statements using terms that you can't even explain or define in any coherent way.