This is a looooong attempt to get you to talk about what you think it is in a way that I can understand. — Kenosha Kid
It's not possible to answer your question because it's about something you do not describe at all. — Kenosha Kid
So clearly I'm not using the term "pattern-matching" in a way consistent with your counter-example. — Kenosha Kid
you were asking questions about a thing that is not identical to modern, scientific descriptions of it, nor with any certainty similar to any other particular notion — Kenosha Kid
I'm happy to reaffirm it here and now. — Kenosha Kid
Your eyes might physically move to focus on a secondary stimulus but, when asked, you will report no awareness of it. In terms of accounting for the difference, neurology seems to be the *perfect* framework in which to explain it, as it deals with the transmission of information between different parts of the brain responsible for different tasks. — Kenosha Kid
For sure, and that's what we have neuroscience for. I'm not going to reproduce every paper, which is what I suspect you're suggesting my burden entails — Kenosha Kid
out Isaac's Halle Berry detector description on the Quining Qualia thread for a great example — Kenosha Kid
The last part doesn't make any sense. If all is replaced, then how can there be anything that remains?Really? So if you lost a finger you're not you anymore? Which part of the body exactly carries this "I"? How much of a body can you lose or replace to still be the same "I"? Whatever "I" remains after all is replaced or changed, that is "the experiencer". — khaled
What is shape? Information.Well at least we've established that there is an event. I thought you were one of those people who pretend that the scribble refers to nothing. But I still think "what is this event" is akin to asking "what is shape", It's one of those things you can't simplify further. Why don't you take a crack at it because I can't do it. — khaled
True. That is why I don't really care much for using the term, "experience". I was only using it because that is the scribble that you know to refer to the event we are talking about. I have learned that, in order to communicate, you have to use words that your audience understands, not necessarily the words you would use, because it is the thing that we are talking about that is important, not the scribbles that we use.It's just that when I'm talking definitions with someone I get really nitpicky about words. "experiencing eggs in the fridge" is sort of vague because it can either mean simply seeing eggs in the fridge or somehow literally "Knowing beyond all doubt that there are in fact eggs in the fridge". I just wanted to be specific that we're talking about seeing things here. — khaled
If all is replaced, then how can there be anything that remains? — Harry Hindu
Information — Harry Hindu
What are all events? Information. Process. Relationships. — Harry Hindu
Information processing. — Harry Hindu
I see what you mean. But that is part and parcel of the constraints-based approach here. — apokrisis
Sameness (or synechism in Peircean parlance) is the global condition. All are within one. A continuity. A lack of differentation.
So sameness is about wholeness and the single general large scale state. It maps to the bounding constraints in other words. A constraint is an ultimate measure of sameness. It constitutes "the same". — apokrisis
But differences still then divide into differences that make a difference and differences that don't. — apokrisis
And then difference is the local exception to the general rule. In hierarchical terms, it is down there at the ground level as the grain of atomistic action. It is the many within the one. It is something plural rather than singular simply because that is how our hierarchical model of any system works. — apokrisis
The hard problem is asking why are there both conscious states and brain states.states of consciousness are just brain states — Kenosha Kid
What does this really mean? It seems to me that you can always simplify dualism into monism. Dualism is just another way of saying that everything is a relationship. The problem is that there are many relationships between more than two things. Not to mention that dualism seems to be a false dichotomy derived from the idea that the singular "I" itself possesses qualities that are on a level between everything else. The world is only hot or cold relative to your own body temperature, large or small relative to your own size, etc. In other words, these sensations are relationships between the state of your body and the state of the environment. I think this is more or less something that you might agree with and maybe any disagreement we might have will be semantics, but then that just means that the real difference between dualism and monism is just semantics.What is relevant to this thread is the point I have already tied to make. Yes, there is a dualism at the heart of everything in some strong sense. — apokrisis
But the boundary between life and non-life gets blurry. After all, life is just a more complex relationship than non-life, so it stands to reason that non-life would have very rudimentary, the most basic, the most fundamental relationships that life has, not that it doesn't have it at all. What that thing is is information. Effects are informative of their causes and vice versa. A relationship is informative of its constituents and vice versa. Information is the relationship between cause and effect and it exists in everything that is a causal relation, like scribbles on a screen and the intent that caused them to be on the screen and the information molecules have about their atoms.A holistic or triadic paradigm now explains life. And it is easy to see that it also explains mind, as semiosis already grants life an intentionality and "awareness" at the cellular level ... the subject of the cited paper here. — apokrisis
My question was "What do you mean by....?". Which word in that question is hard to describe? — khaled
But that would be akin to saying "When I press A on my keyboard the letter A is typed on the screen". This would work for explaining how a PC works eventually by testing countless hypothesis and sometimes breaking open the PC (neurology) but it does not answer whether or not the PC is conscious, or why it would or wouldn't be. — khaled
Let's say neuroscience has provided a complete and universally accepted description of human consciousness. — Kenosha Kid
So this proactive capacity is what I would include as an essential feature of consciousness. — Kenosha Kid
something else that is undiscoverable from the outside — Kenosha Kid
Ultimately, you have to make a choice about what your language means: does your definition of consciousness admit non-living things or not? — Kenosha Kid
You associate meaning with the constraints (form), I associate meaning with the thing which is constrained (content, or matter). — Metaphysician Undercover
From my perspective, matter is inherently meaningful, because it cannot exist in a meaningless way. To exist as matter is to already have meaning. So even when matter appears to be free from constraints in an absolute way, it is still meaningful. This implies that we need to look beyond "constraints" to find the foundation of meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is very much a Wittgensteinian approach. We apply boundaries (define words) for specific purposes. This creates the appearance that the meaning of the word is associated with the boundary. However, such a boundary (definition) is not necessary for the word to have meaning. And, the word inherently has meaning simply by the fact of being used. We can use a word, and therefore it has meaning, without employing any boundary. — Metaphysician Undercover
To begin with, we cannot ever have this perfection in sameness which you propose as "the global condition". "Similar" can never obtain the absolute perfection of same. "Same" is merely an ideal, produced as a modeling condition, like an artificial scale. In reality there is no such thing as perfect continuity with a lack of differentiation. — Metaphysician Undercover
The world is only hot or cold relative to your own body temperature, large or small relative to your own size, etc. In other words, these sensations are relationships between the state of your body and the state of the environment. — Harry Hindu
But the boundary between life and non-life gets blurry. After all, life is just a more complex relationship than non-life, so it stands to reason that non-life would have very rudimentary, the most basic, the most fundamental relationships that life has, not that it doesn't have it at all. — Harry Hindu
But there just is no fact of the matter whether a word or picture is pointed at one thing or another. No physical bolt of energy flows from pointer to pointee(s). So the whole social game is one of pretence. Albeit of course a hugely powerful one.
— bongo fury
Can it both be a pretence (in physical terms) and yet also a hugely powerful one? — apokrisis
But of course, as I said, the power of any code is that it is not tied to the physics of its world. — apokrisis
It is powerful because it could refer to anything. — apokrisis
That means when it is not used that [just any] way, but instead pointed rather precisely, that is what makes it meaningful - signal rather than noise. — apokrisis
One can’t be definitely pretending anything unless that is a clear contrast to the “other” of now making clear and meaningful reference to something understood to have a genuine social reality. Something that is of material consequence. — apokrisis
Why ever not? We're talking about the power of social conventions here. Please explain the difficulty? — bongo fury
But of course, it could be said that some codes do and some don't derive their power from being tied to physics. — bongo fury
For example, nature implements a DNA/protein correlation automatically. The rest is semantics, and requires a degree of social agreement as to what symbols are (to be pretended are) pointed at what objects. — bongo fury
I'm arguing that human reference is quite generally a matter of pretence, no less when asserting unpretended truths than otherwise. — bongo fury
Why can’t it be the Holism of the relation that is meaningful? The form represents the intent. The resulting materiality is the degree to which an intent is being manifested. — apokrisis
Matter is always found as part of a process and so is in-formed by some set of constraints. — apokrisis
Reality is a hierarchical web of constraints given localised form to materiality. This is the opposite of the merological metaphysics you are trying to argue. — apokrisis
I’m not sure quite what you are thinking. But it is obvious that we don’t construct the entirety of reality through words. A lump of rock has already formed by some natural process before I decide to call it a stone, a boulder or pebble.
Yet if I ask you to bring me a stone and you bring me a pebble, then something has gone wrong. My attempt to constrain your material behaviour in some meaningful way does not yet fit the bill.
You in turn could reply a small rock is as good as a large rock surely? Your belief is that the size difference is pretty immaterial - a matter of vagueness or indifference.
So your argument simply confuses levels of semiosis. — apokrisis
But that was my point. So you are confirming my position again.
A constraint imposes conditions. It defines the differences that make a difference. In that, it is imposing a generalised sameness.
Yet by the same token, that act of constraint is also ruling on what are the differences that don’t make a difference. It is also defining what can be left free as material accidents.
You might come along and declare those differences are differences that count for you and thus mar the “absolute perfection” in your eyes. if a black dog has a single white hair, it fails your test. — apokrisis
Forms rule because they have evolved to the degree needed to produce a lawful and regulated cosmos. — apokrisis
The form "represents" the intent, but this implies that the intent is prior to the form. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is what we see in human relations, society, community, the intent is prior to, and cause of existence of the formal constraints. — Metaphysician Undercover
OK, but intent, if we are to call it a constraint, is a different sort of constraint than form is. — Metaphysician Undercover
You are incapable of giving an account of how these constraints come into existence, where they come from, and why. — Metaphysician Undercover
You ask me to bring a stone. I misunderstand, so you've failed in your attempt at constraining my behaviour. You created no constraints. Would you not agree that your words still had meaning even though no constraint was created? — Metaphysician Undercover
the fact that you spoke them says that you meant something with them. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is all gibberish to me, like you're try to change the subject again, trying to wiggle away. — Metaphysician Undercover
All you seem to be saying is that if we overlook certain differences, assume that they make no difference, then we can have a true physical reality of this Ideal, "same". — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you not see that "same" is itself a form? It is the supreme, highest form in the hierarchy. It's often called "One". — Metaphysician Undercover
There is no sense in talking about the evolution of forms, when you already assume the physical existence of the highest possible form as the background for your model. — Metaphysician Undercover
There is no decision being made as we always goes with "just right". Hot and cold are merely informing you that you are no longer in a state of homeostasis, or a state of "just right".I am saying that this dualism is always actually a dichotomy, and thus something intrinsically relational.
Hotter is only ever relative to colder. And vice versa. But then a world constructed within that contrast makes possible the new thing of having some particular position on that spectrum of possibilities. You can be a body in an environment where you have this Goldilocks three choices about the temperature you prefer — apokrisis
Effects are about their causes independent of any mind. A mind is not needed to establish that relationship. It is already there. A mind is just another effect of causes, and a cause for many effects. Minds simply focus on the causal relationships that are useful and ignore the rest. That doesn't mean that causal relationships don't exist except when accessed by some mind. Cause and effect is part of everything, including life and non-life. Again, we're merely talking about degrees of complexity of some causal system.The division - the epistemic cut - lies in the fact that life and mind are how we describe systems organised by symbols. They have a coding machinery like genes, neurons or word that can store memories and so impose a self-centred structure of habits on their environments.
It is pretty easy to recognise that difference between an organism and its backdrop inorganic environment surely? — apokrisis
Or it self-organises and so intent and concrete possibility co-arise. The form is simply finality finding its fullest expression. The usual Peircean reply. — apokrisis
Formal and final cause are the diachronic and synchronic view of the same essential thing. In the moment, you can see that there is some structure. In the long run, you can see that was expressing some reason. — apokrisis
I don't think you listen.
Where does a river get its snaking curves from? From the constraints of a least action principle. It must arrange itself so as to balance the amount of water feeding it and the slope of the land which it must cross. If a straight line is too short to shift enough water in enough time, then it must throw out snaking loops and house the water that way.
So the constraints are all the physical boundary conditions - the volume of water, the slope of the land, the hardness or softness of the terrain. The finality lies in the imperative of least action. The form is found in some degree of sinuosity. The river is the result - constrained within its suitably designed banks. It now seems a stable thing - an object of some kind we can honour with a name. — apokrisis
So you are failing to demonstrate that language could have private meaning. Any meaning I could decode from the situation is relying on some familiarity with a communal habit. — apokrisis
Seems a simple point. If I draw a line in the sand, there are now two sides to the matter.
To be constrained is to be the one thing, and thus not any other thing. The usual negative space story.
And talking of wiggling out of trouble, you've skirted the key issue - that sameness seems singular and difference plural for good systems reason. That was a poor choice of target on your part. — apokrisis
If you stick your big toe over the line I've drawn in the sand, I might just over-look it. If it's your whole foot, I would start to get peeved.
Between black and white, we can leave as much grey as we like - if we are actually indifferent.
As far as I'm concerned, I can decide you haven't yet done enough to cross my line. — apokrisis
But science shows that forms are emergent and so themselves form a developmental hierarchy. There are the most truly general constraints - we call them the laws of physics, or even the principles (like the least action principle). And then there are all the local rules and regulations, such as the strength of gravity on a planet the size of earth. — apokrisis
So to the degree that you are only concerned with linguistic semiosis, you are not engaging with my biosemiosis. — apokrisis
As I said above, to say that forms are "emergent" is simply a way of saying that where they come from, how they come into existence, and why they come into existence, is unknown. So let's be clear here, science does not show that forms are emergent. Science leaves these aspects of the understanding of forms as unknown. Then speculators such as yourself will apply some metaphysical principles, and conclude "forms are emergent". But these speculations completely ignore the well respected metaphysics based in the evidence that final cause, intention, creates forms. Therefore the claim that forms are emergent (where they come from, how they come into existence, and why they come into existence, is unknown) is completely unwarranted, because we already know very well, that intention creates forms. — Metaphysician Undercover
Your singularity of "sameness" is just an Ideal which has not been substantiated, or sustained by any physical evidence. I say it's a perfection which is physically impossible, for very good reasons, just like Aristotle's eternal circular motion is physically impossible, and like any sort of perpetual motion is physically impossible, for very good reasons. You assume this Ideal sameness, for "good systems reason", but that's just a pragmatic reason, to facilitate the creation of your model. And since this Ideal has in no way been substantiated by physical evidence, and it actually appears to be most likely physically impossible, your good pragmatic reason turns out to be actually a very bad ontological reason. — Metaphysician Undercover
Forms can be either emergent (bottom-up) or intentional (top-down). An intentionally-created form is contingent upon a conscious system that perceives the potential form. An emergent form is contingent upon a conditional relation between components, such that the form’s potential is realised. The difference between these two descriptions appears to be the perception of potential. But it isn’t. The difference is the assumption of a self-conscious system that apperceives the form’s potential. — Possibility
What is consistently overlooked in this discussion of consciousness is an assumption of self-consciousness inherent in top-down explanations. — Possibility
‘Sameness’ refers to absolute, not physical, possibility. It’s an ideal reference to what matters when we remove the assumptions of a self-conscious perspective. — Possibility
It is from our relation to this possibility/impossibility of ‘sameness’ that any potential for difference can be perceived - a binary relation that renders ‘the self’ either non-existent or as existence itself. — Possibility
That proposing an ideal ‘sameness’ is illogical doesn’t give you cause to exclude the possibility as such, in an absolute sense. — Possibility
Illogical or not, it is a necessary part of understanding the system. — Possibility
We're talking about human rational inference, right? So we're talking about a human being figuring out that A > C, not some out-there truth that A > C. That's what I presumed anyway. If you meant something like the latter, it doesn't seem to be a question about human reason at all. — Kenosha Kid
It seems to me immensely unlikely that mind is a mere by-product of matter. For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms.
And what is it about you that provides you with different evidence of your consciousness than I have of your consciousness? — Harry Hindu
It’s an ideal reference to what matters when we remove the assumptions of a self-conscious perspective. — Possibility
I'm not clear on how this answers the question.And what is it about you that provides you with different evidence of your consciousness than I have of your consciousness?
— Harry Hindu
I can introspect myself, but others can't. — bert1
The question is trying to ask why we have two different views of our own mental processes - an introspective and extrospective view of one's own mental processes. — Harry Hindu
Right, so the supposed top-down forms are really, fundamentally bottom-up. So we hit the Kantian problem, the supposed top-down forms, the independent, intelligible forms, the noumena, are inaccessible to us, as independent. We assume top-down forms, we assume that they are inaccessible, and this makes these supposed top-down forms fundamentally unknowable. In reality though, this assumption is unsubstantiated and unwarranted because all forms are fundamentally bottom-up, and this is what Plato described as apprehending "the good". When all forms are apprehended as bottom-up, we dissolve the division which makes some forms appear to be fundamentally unintelligible. That any forms could be unintelligible is itself a basic contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover
This ideal is fundamentally incoherent. To remove the self-conscious perspective from the self-conscious perspective makes no sense. If we could do such a thing, we would not be left with an "ideal", we would be left with a non-ideal. So anything presented as an absolute, as an ideal, produced from removing the self-conscious perspective, is fundamentally wrong. We can see this in your phrase "...what matters when we remove the assumptions of a self-conscious perspective". Clearly, without that self-conscious perspective, nothing matters, therefore there cannot be an ideal here. — Metaphysician Undercover
The problem is that you come up with the opposite conclusion of what is logical. You cannot render the self-conscious mind as non-existent in a thought experiment, and then use that self-conscious mind which is supposed to not be there, to come up with an ideal which represents existence without the self-conscious mind. That is illogical, as contradictory. Therefore it is just fundamentally illogical to propose the removal of the self-conscious perspective, and we must accept the absolute reality of the self-conscious perspective. If we deny the reality of the self-conscious perspective we rob ourselves of the capacity to access reality. — Metaphysician Undercover
Yes it does. That something is illogical is very good reason to reject it from the realm of possibility, as impossible. This is fundamental to epistemology, and the only means for obtaining true certainty, the process of eliminating the impossible. — Metaphysician Undercover
Understanding that if it is illogical, it is therefore impossible, is of the highest priority. This is falsification, it is how we reject falsehood. And, "understanding the system" which has been rejected as false, is what guides us away from falsity in our quest for truth. — Metaphysician Undercover
Kant’s aesthetics suggest that the noumena does not consist only of independent, intelligible forms but of qualitative relations that transcend logical construction - accessible to us through the ‘free play’ of our faculties of understanding, imagination and judgement in relation to experience. — Possibility
I agree that all consolidation of forms are fundamentally bottom-up, but I would add that all relations are fundamentally top-down, and that their structure prevails over form, regardless of logic. It will require both to render our existence fully intelligible. — Possibility
And yet, despite all logic, it remains possible to imagine such an ideal. — Possibility
To clarify, I’m not saying that we should remove the self-conscious perspective itself, only the assumptions that centre it. — Possibility
Despite our best efforts, we continue to act contrary to logic when it suits us to do so. Reality is not a purely logical structure. It must be understood as inclusive of illogical relations, or we will remain ignorant of its possibilities, and continue to be blindsided by suffering. — Possibility
Not deny the reality of the self-conscious perspective, but deny its necessity - dislodge its central, immovable position. — Possibility
I would have thought my continual reference to existence and understanding, rather than certainty and knowledge, made it clear that my perspective is ontological. You’re referring to logical, not absolute, possibility, here. I understand that what we can know with any true certainty will always be relative to a particular value structure - such as logic. But I also understand that this is not reality. So eliminating the impossible, while it enables us to articulate what we know, deliberately excludes accessible information about reality. — Possibility
Again, you’re after truth in a logical structure - what you can claim to know with certainty, not what you can understand or relate to. When I talk about ‘understanding the system’, I mean access to information that enables us to improve predictions about future interactions with reality. That includes not just recognising falsehood in order to reject it, but understanding the relational conditions under which such falsehoods arise. — Possibility
I really can't see this distinction. A "form" is an arrangement of parts. A "relation" is the way in which one thing is connected to another. The only difference appears to be that "relation" implies distinct things, related to each other, whereas "form" implies that those things which are related to each other compose a whole, a form. So the matter of whether a relation is simply a relation, or whether it is a part of a whole, is just a matter of perspective.
Now, your top-down/bottom-up distinction is just a matter of perspective. If you apprehend the whole (form) which the related things are parts of, it appears as top-down, and if you do not, the relations appear to be bottom-up. But as I explained already, the whole is just an unsubstantiated Ideal, so all such relations are really bottom-up, as the whole which would validate any top-down relations is just an imaginary ideal which cannot actually be found. — Metaphysician Undercover
Oh yes, quite definitely. It is possible to imagine all sorts of impossible things, but that does not make them possible. But with logic we can assess imagined things, which people might claim as possible, and designate some as impossible, and this is the epistemic basis for certainty. — Metaphysician Undercover
The reality is that the self-conscious perspective is central, and placing it anywhere else would be a false premise. Notice that Copernicus did not remove self-consciousness as central, but just found the means to account for the illusions created by this position. These illusions are the false Ideals, "the global position", which lead to the idea of top-down causation. Self-consciousness being at the center of reality is constrained by the forms that surround it, and this creates the illusion of top-down acting constraints, what you call relations. But in reality, all these other constraints are just bottom-up forms produced from other points which are equally the center of reality.
That is the difficult part to grasp, there is not one particular "center of reality", but each point is equally a center of reality, just like each self-conscious being is equally a center of reality. We attempt to build "relations" between these points of self-consciousness, with our intellectual powers, so we assume an overriding whole, the Ideal external world, and model the points with a spatial-temporal reference. But these top-down relations are all artificial, imaginary relations, while the real relations are internal to these points which are each equally the center of reality. This is what the study of genetics indicates, the real relations are internal, and from within these internally related points the bottom up causation is active. Now each point of self-consciousness has its own bottom-up formal structure, and to build a true model of reality requires relating them one to another, each as the center of reality. This is why the principles of physics cannot model the true reality, because it hasn't developed the principles required to relate individual points to each other, when each is the center of the universe. As the center of the universe, they are each the same, but as individual points, they are each different. — Metaphysician Undercover
A ‘form’ is a consolidated arrangement, whereas ‘relation’ refers to the variability in arrangement: the structural potential that informs any consolidation. It is very much a matter of perspective (that is what we’re talking about). Relation does not necessarily imply ‘distinct things’ but the existence of rules and laws that structure consolidation at each dimensional level. While I agree that a consolidation of form would validate top-down relational structure, its insubstantiality does not preclude its possible existence. — Possibility
Relation does not necessarily imply ‘distinct things’ but the existence of rules and laws that structure consolidation at each dimensional level. While I agree that a consolidation of form would validate top-down relational structure, its insubstantiality does not preclude its possible existence. — Possibility
That also doesn’t make them necessarily impossible - only logically so. — Possibility
My approach is developed partly from Carlo Rovelli’s deconstruction of time, and his resulting description of physical reality not as objects in time, but as ‘correlated events’. As individual points they are each different (and ‘move’ in relation to each other), but when each is the centre of an unfolding universe of spacetime, they are the same. — Possibility
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