I know that is the approach of the eliminative materialist (deny), but what would other physicalists theorists/theories say about intentional content + more importantly is there a better response from the eliminativist? I genuinely cannot figure out how physicalism overcomes this problem since intentional content is one of the things most apparent to us and it is clearly not physical. — Rawrren
Might you be conflating "intention" with the quale of having intention? There are robots on mars that have been programmed to behave in a certain way, which seems to suggest that they possess intention. They don't however possess qualia! — tom
In this case I am referring to the term 'intentionality' in this philosophical sense:
"the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs" — Rawrren
"the about-ness of something/the answer to the question 'what are you thinking of/about'?"
As opposed to, what I think you're trying to infer, the intention/aim/plan to do X, Y, Z — Rawrren
I think intentionality can be exhibited by mindless objects: robots, computer programs, animals. This in a way solves the problem of intentionality at a stroke. The big problem remains however - that of the quale of intentionality.
And you could ask that question of a program or a dog. With enough technical ability, you could interrogate the hardware of each. With dogs, you can even get a rough idea what they are dreaming about simply by watching them.
Do you think the human genome is "about" anything? — tom
Yeah this is where I accept the arguments/merits of physicalism, as it can give reasonable explanations up until the 'quale of intentionality' which is where I struggle to see how it's overcome. — Rawrren
But wouldn't one here re-enforce the notion of privileged access? I agree that e.g. we can figure out what a dog might be dreaming about, but for the most part we have no idea what it's actually thinking of and no amount of inspection from neuroscience could ever reveal the intentional content - only the intentional state? Likewise a computer surely does not have intentional content since it cannot make use of intentional states (think/hope/believe) - it only runs based on input & outputs like functionalists say. — Rawrren
Yes, we want physicalism to provide an explanation of qualia, but why don't we demand explanations from the other metaphysical positions?
According to physics, a computer can do everything a human can - i.e. it can have identical intentional or other mental states. We simply don't know how to program them yet!
I genuinely cannot figure out how physicalism overcomes this problem since intentional content is one of the things most apparent to us and it is clearly not physical. — Rawrren
So if we took the example of the box being 2 x 2 cm, it is an inexistant object which I am capable of thinking of/imagining, but since inexistant objects (and intentional content itself) are not in the 'physical realm', how would a physicalist account of the mind actually explain this? — Rawrren
But wouldn't one here re-enforce the notion of privileged access? — Rawrren
it is incredibly apparent that I can imagine an inexistent object right now - namely a 2 x 2cm box. — Rawrren
Yes imagining something would be the best example for this situation I feel. — Rawrren
Do you know of any reasoning as to why some reject intentionality? And if so, how do they then explain what we call 'intentional states & concepts'. — Rawrren
Well, if you stipulate from the start that you are merely imagining a thing, you are, ipso facto, stipulating that the thought is not about, does not not refer to any concrete object in the world, as far as you are concerned. That is already given by your formulation, no matter what approach you then take - physicalist or otherwise. So I still don't understand, what difficulty do you see specifically for physicalism in this scenario? — SophistiCat
Physicalism assumes that all mental phenomena is strictly mechanical, if intentionality is a mental phenomena then it is also, by default, a physical phenomena.
This means there is some effective mechanical procedure. — m-theory
But if there is not an effective mechanical procedure for all mental phenomena this would be quite a difficult philosophical problem.
It would mean that our own mental phenomena is undecidable and there is no way for formal logic to assail the issue. — m-theory
I think intentionality can be exhibited by mindless objects: robots, computer programs, animals. This in a way solves the problem of intentionality at a stroke. The big problem remains however - that of the quale of intentionality. — tom
Note that if mental phenomena and intentional states are undecidable then there is no method for concluding that those phenomena or states exist. — m-theory
That is to say if you can be sure that you have mental phenomena there must be some effective mechanical procedure for arriving at that conclusion without error. — m-theory
However no such breakthrough has been discovered so, philosophically, physicalist proceed with what we can know based on current methods. — m-theory
Why group animals with robots and computer programs? Animals have nervous systems, and they have their own goals independent of us (often enough at odds with us). Computer programs and robots just do what we design or program them to do. As such, attributing intentionality to them could just be a case of anthropomorphism. Seeing intentionality in things that lack it because they have a behavior or look familiar to us. It's like seeing shapes in clouds or thinking the volcano god is angry. — Marchesk
You mean there is no objective method. Subjectively, I know that mental phenomena exist, because I experience it. That's how I can know with certainty that nobody else can be a solipsist, to the extent one takes solipsism seriously. — Marchesk
To say you are definitively aware of experiencing your thoughts, to physicalist, is no different from saying there is an effective method for being certain about the existence of your thoughts.You mean to be sure other people have mental content? Because again, I experience my thoughts, my perspective, my dreams, etc. Whatever mental content are, I have them, and I cannot doubt that I have these experiences, however one wishes to categorize them. — Marchesk
You mean what can be objectively known. Here is a potential problem for physicalism. It beings with objectivity, which means factoring out our individual subjective experiences. This works great for science. But it has the one big problem of turning around and explaining subjectivity, because at the start, subjectivity was removed. — Marchesk
In Lockean terms, you get rind of color, sounds, smells, etc to explain the world in terms of number, shape, extension, etc. That's great until you need to account for our having colors, smells, etc. — Marchesk
How does one derive smell from number? Is there a mathematical equation for experience? Do you now what sort of algorithm would enable a machine to experience the sweet smell of rose? — Marchesk
If they are not decidable that poses problems for physicalism sure, it would mean that we cannot logically determine if we experience intentional states. — m-theory
You can conjecture that decisions about the existence of intentional states and/or experiences is undecidable from current understandings in logic, sure.
It is probably more interesting than the physicalist position, sure.
But it certainly isn't logically necessary to speculate thus, at least not at this point. — m-theory
I disagree that this something to be logically determined. My experiences would be the premises one starts with to make a logical argument. It's not something to be argued for. There is no line of reasoning I follow to logically determine that I see red. I just see red and am aware of it. That's where logical argument can begin, but not before then. — Marchesk
So there is no logical method for deciding if you do or do not have mental phenomena?I don't need to determine that I have experiences. I have experiences, period. What do those experiences amount to? That's something which can possibly be determined by logical argument, but not that I have them. — Marchesk
Or it is possible that there is some logical method for determining your experiences, but it is simply not within your subjective awareness, and thus seems to be brute when in fact it would be an effective logical method.Now whether you have experiences which I don't have (as an extension of my experiences) is something which can and has been argued ad nauseam. But notice that the solipsist need not and cannot make an argument for their own experiences. They just are. It's brute. — Marchesk
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