Can you explain in more detail what it is that you see as a problem for physicalism wrt intentional content?

Sure :)

So if we took the example of the box being 2 x 2 cm, it is an inexistant object which I am capable of thinking of/imagining, but since inexistant objects (and intentional content itself) are not in the 'physical realm', how would a physicalist account of the mind actually explain this?

I struggle to see how one could locate a specific intentional content of 'a 2 x 2cm box' via behaviour, a function, or even neuroscience (more importantly how one could possibly deny it). Wouldn't the physicalist have to concede that a physical intentional state (e.g. thinking) gives rise to something non-physical (e.g. the 2x2cm box).

I know that is the approach of the eliminative materialist (deny), but what would other physicalists theorists/theories say about intentional content + more importantly is there a better response from the eliminativist? I genuinely cannot figure out how physicalism overcomes this problem since intentional content is one of the things most apparent to us and it is clearly not physical. — Rawrren

Might you be conflating "intention" with the quale of having intention? There are robots on mars that have been programmed to behave in a certain way, which seems to suggest that they possess intention. They don't however possess qualia!

Might you be conflating "intention" with the quale of having intention? There are robots on mars that have been programmed to behave in a certain way, which seems to suggest that they possess intention. They don't however possess qualia! — tom

You're conflating intentionality and intention.

But even then, intention is usually understood to be a particular kind of mental state. The robots on Mars don't "possess intention". They're just mechanically determined to behave a certain way.

You're conflating intentionality and intention. — Michael

Really, how?

Rawrren is asking about intentionality and you mention intention.

In this case I am referring to the term 'intentionality' in this philosophical sense:

"the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs"

And intentional content to be:

"the about-ness of something/the answer to the question 'what are you thinking of/about'?"

As opposed to, what I think you're trying to infer, the intention/aim/plan to do X, Y, Z :)

In this case I am referring to the term 'intentionality' in this philosophical sense:

"the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs" — Rawrren

To get anywhere, you've got to decide whether "intentionality" is a property of a mind, or whether "intentionality" can be exhibited by mindless objects.

I think intentionality can be exhibited by mindless objects: robots, computer programs, animals. This in a way solves the problem of intentionality at a stroke. The big problem remains however - that of the quale of intentionality.

"the about-ness of something/the answer to the question 'what are you thinking of/about'?"

As opposed to, what I think you're trying to infer, the intention/aim/plan to do X, Y, Z — Rawrren

And you could ask that question of a program or a dog. With enough technical ability, you could interrogate the hardware of each. With dogs, you can even get a rough idea what they are dreaming about simply by watching them.

Do you think the human genome is "about" anything?

I think intentionality can be exhibited by mindless objects: robots, computer programs, animals. This in a way solves the problem of intentionality at a stroke. The big problem remains however - that of the quale of intentionality.

Yeah this is where I accept the arguments/merits of physicalism, as it can give reasonable explanations up until the 'quale of intentionality' which is where I struggle to see how it's overcome.

And you could ask that question of a program or a dog. With enough technical ability, you could interrogate the hardware of each. With dogs, you can even get a rough idea what they are dreaming about simply by watching them.

But wouldn't one here re-enforce the notion of privileged access? I agree that e.g. we can figure out what a dog might be dreaming about, but for the most part we have no idea what it's actually thinking of and no amount of inspection from neuroscience could ever reveal the intentional content - only the intentional state? Likewise a computer surely does not have intentional content since it cannot make use of intentional states (think/hope/believe) - it only runs based on input & outputs like functionalists say.

Do you think the human genome is "about" anything? — tom

I'm interested to know where you go with this point :p No I don't since it is not part of intentionality.

So you think there is a problem specifically in the case where we are contemplating something imaginary?

I should note that physicalists do not all share the same concept of the mind, and not all of them, I imagine, will even accept intentional states as a valid or useful concept. So you would also have to argue that intentional states are absolutely indispensable in any theory of mind.

Yeah this is where I accept the arguments/merits of physicalism, as it can give reasonable explanations up until the 'quale of intentionality' which is where I struggle to see how it's overcome. — Rawrren

Yes, we want physicalism to provide an explanation of qualia, but why don't we demand explanations from the other metaphysical positions?

But wouldn't one here re-enforce the notion of privileged access? I agree that e.g. we can figure out what a dog might be dreaming about, but for the most part we have no idea what it's actually thinking of and no amount of inspection from neuroscience could ever reveal the intentional content - only the intentional state? Likewise a computer surely does not have intentional content since it cannot make use of intentional states (think/hope/believe) - it only runs based on input & outputs like functionalists say. — Rawrren

According to physics, a computer can do everything a human can - i.e. it can have identical intentional or other mental states. We simply don't know how to program them yet!

Do you think animals possess qualia? How about intentionality?

Yes imagining something would be the best example for this situation I feel.

Do you know of any reasoning as to why some reject intentionality? And if so, how do they then explain what we call 'intentional states & concepts'.

Yes, we want physicalism to provide an explanation of qualia, but why don't we demand explanations from the other metaphysical positions?

Oh I accept that other metaphysical positions have problems with it also, I'm just really interested in physicalism here and how it overcomes it haha. I'm not trying to be biased!

According to physics, a computer can do everything a human can - i.e. it can have identical intentional or other mental states. We simply don't know how to program them yet!

But I can't help but feel while this computer could seemingly do such a thing, it would not actually be acting in the same way (e.g. a computer could not imagine a blue circle).

As for animals, I'm not certain - I've never really consciously thought about it. I would think some higher-level species would be capable of intentionality, yes.

Intentional content is set by the present features of the object that you experience. It's location is where the object is.

I genuinely cannot figure out how physicalism overcomes this problem since intentional content is one of the things most apparent to us and it is clearly not physical. — Rawrren

I'm a physicalist. I'm not an eliminative materialist. In my view, intentional content, and all other mental content, is rather clearly physical. It seems obvious to me that it's something that our brains do. And neuroscience supports this via obvious correlations between mental content and observables, ranging from fMRIs to observations of patients who've had various types of brain injuries.

That doesn't mean that we have something like a blueprint of how exactly intentional content works yet. But of course, stances that posit intentional content as something nonphysical don't have anything like a blueprint of how exactly it works yet, either. So if not having a blueprint were a sufficient reason for you to reject a stance, you certainly couldn't embrace dualism.

So if we took the example of the box being 2 x 2 cm, it is an inexistant object which I am capable of thinking of/imagining, but since inexistant objects (and intentional content itself) are not in the 'physical realm', how would a physicalist account of the mind actually explain this? — Rawrren

Under physicalism, imagining a 2 x 2 cm box is a brain state. So it is an existent object in that sense.

But wouldn't one here re-enforce the notion of privileged access? — Rawrren

As well one should.

it is incredibly apparent that I can imagine an inexistent object right now - namely a 2 x 2cm box. — Rawrren

So we can imagine what is not. We can be ready to act in every way that is "realistic" to something that could physically exist.

The reason we can do this is because of symbols. A symbol is a physical thing - some mark, a vocal noise, a gesture, a DNA sequence, a brain state. It takes up time, space and energy. But it also has a meaning that exists outside the physical world.

And so symbols give the power to think about what is not. We can think about the world as any kind of other. We can indeed think about the world from the generalised idea of being a self in a purposeful or pragmatic relation with the world.

So intentionality arises because we can act on the wish of the world being physically other than it actually is. Symbols, or a modelling relation, create a space for ideas that exist outside the physics of the world even though the means of being outside that world are always still unmysteriously physical.

Yes imagining something would be the best example for this situation I feel. — Rawrren

Well, if you stipulate from the start that you are merely imagining a thing, you are, ipso facto, stipulating that the thought is not about, does not not refer to any concrete object in the world, as far as you are concerned. That is already given by your formulation, no matter what approach you then take - physicalist or otherwise. So I still don't understand, what difficulty do you see specifically for physicalism in this scenario?

Do you know of any reasoning as to why some reject intentionality? And if so, how do they then explain what we call 'intentional states & concepts'. — Rawrren

One way of viewing intentionality is linguistically, by giving interpretations of our intentional language while eschewing intentional idioms. But I confess that I am not prepared to discuss this issue in much detail. However, here are a couple of SEP articles that you may find as a good starting point for exploring different views of intentionality and surrounding issues: Intentionality, Consciousness and Intentionality.

Well, if you stipulate from the start that you are merely imagining a thing, you are, ipso facto, stipulating that the thought is not about, does not not refer to any concrete object in the world, as far as you are concerned. That is already given by your formulation, no matter what approach you then take - physicalist or otherwise. So I still don't understand, what difficulty do you see specifically for physicalism in this scenario? — SophistiCat

It seems to me as if he's just having a problem grasping mental phenomena in general as possibly being physical. He naturally thinks of mental phenomena as "the opposite of physical." He probably stressed intentionality for this because he wants to talk about physicalism that's not eliminative materialism--he wants to make sure that we're not just exiling mental phenomena period in our descriptions of how mental phenomena can be physical, and because of the old "intentionality is the mark of the mental" aphorism (initially from Brentano), that was popular enough to become a cliche in phil of mind literature.

"Intentionality", eh? Let's see about that:

"Every idea or presentation which we acquire either through sense perception or imagination is an example of a mental phenomenon. By presentation I do not mean that which is presented, but rather the act of presentation. Thus, hearing a sound, seeing a colored object, feeling warmth or cold, as well as similar states of imagination are examples of what I mean by this term. I also mean by it the thinking of a general concept, provided such a thing actually does occur. Furthermore, every judgement, every recollection, every expectation, every inference, every conviction or opinion, every doubt, is a mental phenomenon. Also to be included under this term is every emotion: joy, sorrow, fear, hope, courage, despair, anger, love, hate, desire, act of will, intention, astonishment, admiration, contempt, etc.
Examples of physical phenomena, on the other hand, are a color, a figure, a landscape which I see, a chord which I hear, warmth, cold, odor which I sense; as well as similar images which appear in the imagination.
These examples may suffice to illustrate the differences between the two classes of phenomena."
Franz Brentano, "Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint", p. 60, 61.

"What positive criterion shall we now be able to provide? Or is there perhaps no positive defnition which holds true of all mental phenomena generally? Bain thinks that infact there is none.* Nevertheless, psychologists in earlier times have already pointed out that there is a special affnity and analogy which exists among all mental phenomena, and which physical phenomena do not share.
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.
This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves."
-Ibid. p. 68.

So, in short, intentionality isn't a characteristic that helps one to distinguish phenomena from the physical world, rather, it's a property of a specific class of phenomena, to distinguish them from other phenomena. All mental contents. Brentano states so himself at the start of the chapter these quotes come from:

"All the data of our consciousness are divided into two great classes—the class of physical and the class of mental phenomena. We spoke of this distinction earlier when we established the concept of psychology, and we returned to it again in our discussion of psychological method. But what we have said is still not sufficient."
-Ibid. p. 59.

So how do physicalists explain intentionality? Well, they don't. They tend to not make the distinction between mental and physical phenomena. The distinction between mental and physical phenomena is a non-issue to them.

Physicalism assumes that all mental phenomena is strictly mechanical, if intentionality is a mental phenomena then it is also, by default, a physical phenomena.
This means there is some effective mechanical procedure.

What physicalism does not do fully, yet, is give a complete account of all mental phenomena.

However this should not be a hard problem (it simply means reverse engineering the mechanisms of the brain that produce mental phenomena and intentional states, so I guess kind of a hard problem but not the hard problem).
That is to say if you can be sure that you have mental phenomena there must be some effective mechanical procedure for arriving at that conclusion without error.
If there is not such an effective mechanical procedure then you cannot actually arrive at the conclusion without error.

For physicalism there is no issue, all mental phenomena has an effective mechanical procedure.
Of course this remains a assumption at this point and will remain so until a full account of mental phenomena is arrived at.

But if there is not an effective mechanical procedure for all mental phenomena this would be quite a difficult philosophical problem.
It would mean that our own mental phenomena is undecidable and there is no way for formal logic to assail the issue.

Note that if mental phenomena and intentional states are undecidable then there is no method for concluding that those phenomena or states exist.
It would be undecidable as it were, so being sure that they exist, physicalism assumes, is the same as being sure there is an effective mechanical procedure to determine that existence.

For any problem that has a definite yes or no answer there is an effective mechanical procedure for resolving that issue.
If mental phenomena has no effective mechanical procedures then it should not be possible to say...
Determine with certainty that you have intentional states...for example.
If you can determine that you have intentional states then there is an effective mechanical procedure for doing so.

The physicalist answer to the question of intentionality is actually philosophically boring, it assumes that there is some mechanical process at work that can effectively produce mental phenomena.

It would be more interesting, to be sure, if we imagine that something else is the case and then still presume that intentional states can be arrived at without any effective procedure.
If there were some other method for achieving this that would be quite a remarkable breakthrough indeed.

However no such breakthrough has been discovered so, philosophically, physicalist proceed with what we can know based on current methods.

Physicalism assumes that all mental phenomena is strictly mechanical, if intentionality is a mental phenomena then it is also, by default, a physical phenomena.
This means there is some effective mechanical procedure. — m-theory

I'm not saying anything about physicalism one way or the other. What I am pointing out however, is that the distinction between physical and mental phenomena is peculiar to Brentano and (some) members of his school.

oops, I did not read the last bit of your post carefully enough...sorry

But if there is not an effective mechanical procedure for all mental phenomena this would be quite a difficult philosophical problem.
It would mean that our own mental phenomena is undecidable and there is no way for formal logic to assail the issue. — m-theory

If there's not an effective mechanical procedure for some mental phenomena, then presumably at least some mental phenomena are obtained via some sort of nonphysical, non-mechanical procedure, no?

I don't see why that would suggest that they're "undecidable" metaphysically, unless you're strictly talking about logic and not metaphysics there. But I don't know why you'd be strictly talking about logic. There can be an effective mechanical procedure for all mental phenomena while logic might not be able to address any mental phenomena in terms of effective mechanical procedures. (Unless you're also strictly meaning something about logic or computation theory by "effective mechanical procedure," but then that would make dubious the claim that physicalism amounts to saying that anything about mentality is an "effective mechanical procedure.")

I think intentionality can be exhibited by mindless objects: robots, computer programs, animals. This in a way solves the problem of intentionality at a stroke. The big problem remains however - that of the quale of intentionality. — tom

Why group animals with robots and computer programs? Animals have nervous systems, and they have their own goals independent of us (often enough at odds with us). Computer programs and robots just do what we design or program them to do. As such, attributing intentionality to them could just be a case of anthropomorphism. Seeing intentionality in things that lack it because they have a behavior or look familiar to us. It's like seeing shapes in clouds or thinking the volcano god is angry.

Note that if mental phenomena and intentional states are undecidable then there is no method for concluding that those phenomena or states exist. — m-theory

You mean there is no objective method. Subjectively, I know that mental phenomena exist, because I experience it. That's how I can know with certainty that nobody else can be a solipsist, to the extent one takes solipsism seriously.

That is to say if you can be sure that you have mental phenomena there must be some effective mechanical procedure for arriving at that conclusion without error. — m-theory

You mean to be sure other people have mental content? Because again, I experience my thoughts, my perspective, my dreams, etc. Whatever mental content are, I have them, and I cannot doubt that I have these experiences, however one wishes to categorize them.

However no such breakthrough has been discovered so, philosophically, physicalist proceed with what we can know based on current methods. — m-theory

You mean what can be objectively known. Here is a potential problem for physicalism. It beings with objectivity, which means factoring out our individual subjective experiences. This works great for science. But it has the one big problem of turning around and explaining subjectivity, because at the start, subjectivity was removed.

In Lockean terms, you get rind of color, sounds, smells, etc to explain the world in terms of number, shape, extension, etc. That's great until you need to account for our having colors, smells, etc.

How does one derive smell from number? Is there a mathematical equation for experience? Do you now what sort of algorithm would enable a machine to experience the sweet smell of rose?

Why group animals with robots and computer programs? Animals have nervous systems, and they have their own goals independent of us (often enough at odds with us). Computer programs and robots just do what we design or program them to do. As such, attributing intentionality to them could just be a case of anthropomorphism. Seeing intentionality in things that lack it because they have a behavior or look familiar to us. It's like seeing shapes in clouds or thinking the volcano god is angry. — Marchesk

Because animals are exquisitely engineered robots! Animals must have certain brain-abilities in order to function as they do, and one of those seems to be intentionality. It seems impossible to explain their behaviour without recourse to intentionality.

Obviously current robots don't have the complexity of behaviours associated with even relatively rudimentary animals, but then, they've not had 3.5 billion years of nature selecting these behaviours! Even so, is it really possible to explain the behaviour of a robot without recourse to "computational" states that refer to other things? I'm not so sure. I think a tiny amount of intentionality is still intentionality.

We know that robots don't possess qualia, and there is no reason (anthropomorphic fallacy aside) to suspect animals do. Thus neither has the quale of intentionality.

You mean there is no objective method. Subjectively, I know that mental phenomena exist, because I experience it. That's how I can know with certainty that nobody else can be a solipsist, to the extent one takes solipsism seriously. — Marchesk

No, I mean there is no logical method if it is undecidable.

You mean to be sure other people have mental content? Because again, I experience my thoughts, my perspective, my dreams, etc. Whatever mental content are, I have them, and I cannot doubt that I have these experiences, however one wishes to categorize them. — Marchesk

To say you are definitively aware of experiencing your thoughts, to physicalist, is no different from saying there is an effective method for being certain about the existence of your thoughts.
That is to say that thoughts are decidable.
If they are not decidable that poses problems for physicalism sure, it would mean that we cannot
logically determine if we experience intentional states.
But it would also be a problem for everyone else as well.

You mean what can be objectively known. Here is a potential problem for physicalism. It beings with objectivity, which means factoring out our individual subjective experiences. This works great for science. But it has the one big problem of turning around and explaining subjectivity, because at the start, subjectivity was removed. — Marchesk

There would be no logical method to decide, subjectively or objectively, that we have experiences.
If there is a logical method for deciding the existence of experiences and intentional states then there is no issue for physicalism.

In Lockean terms, you get rind of color, sounds, smells, etc to explain the world in terms of number, shape, extension, etc. That's great until you need to account for our having colors, smells, etc. — Marchesk

If a color or smell is undecidable then how could you be certain you were experiencing colors or smells?
If you can be certain physicalism assumes this means these things are decidable and that therefor an effective mechanical procedure is the account.
Sure it would be more interesting if we imagine that there is something else going on, but no breakthroughs in methodology exist to warrant such speculation, it is simply a speculation for speculations sake.
There is no issue for a physicalist because if you can be certain about these things, then that means these things are decidable, which means that there is an effective mechanical procedure to account for that decidability.

That leaves two options, these things are not decidable, a problem for the physicalist and everyone else.
Or there is some other method for decidable problems in new formal systems of logic as of yet undiscovered, an unnecessary assumption at this point.

How does one derive smell from number? Is there a mathematical equation for experience? Do you now what sort of algorithm would enable a machine to experience the sweet smell of rose? — Marchesk

The answer is simple.
How does one know for certain if there is a smell such that this question is answered definitively yes or no?
The only currently known method for this is with an effective procedure of finite steps.
Or decidability.
If there is no effective method and a smell is an undecidable thing, then this is not simply an issue for physicalism, it is an issue for anybody claiming that they smell.
If smell was undecidable you would not actually know if you smell or not.

For a physicalist saying that you know for certain that you smell is the logical equivalent of saying there is an effective method for deciding that you smell.

You can conjecture that decisions about the existence of intentional states and/or experiences is undecidable from current understandings in logic, sure.
It is probably more interesting than the physicalist position, sure.
But it certainly isn't logically necessary to speculate thus, at least not at this point.

If they are not decidable that poses problems for physicalism sure, it would mean that we cannot logically determine if we experience intentional states. — m-theory

I disagree that this something to be logically determined. My experiences would be the premises one starts with to make a logical argument. It's not something to be argued for. There is no line of reasoning I follow to logically determine that I see red. I just see red and am aware of it. That's where logical argument can begin, but not before then.

I don't need to determine that I have experiences. I have experiences, period. What do those experiences amount to (or what is their origin and nature)? That's something which can possibly be determined by logical argument, but not that I have them.

Now whether you have experiences which I don't have (as an extension of my experiences) is something which can and has been argued ad nauseam. But notice that the solipsist need not and cannot make an argument for their own experiences. They just are. It's brute.

All logical argument has to start somewhere.

You can conjecture that decisions about the existence of intentional states and/or experiences is undecidable from current understandings in logic, sure.
It is probably more interesting than the physicalist position, sure.
But it certainly isn't logically necessary to speculate thus, at least not at this point. — m-theory

The same sort of thing could be said of external objects. An idealist could turn your argument on it's head and claim that material objects are undecidable for the physicalist.

I disagree that this something to be logically determined. My experiences would be the premises one starts with to make a logical argument. It's not something to be argued for. There is no line of reasoning I follow to logically determine that I see red. I just see red and am aware of it. That's where logical argument can begin, but not before then. — Marchesk

So you don't use logic to know if you have experiences or not?

I don't need to determine that I have experiences. I have experiences, period. What do those experiences amount to? That's something which can possibly be determined by logical argument, but not that I have them. — Marchesk

So there is no logical method for deciding if you do or do not have mental phenomena?

Now whether you have experiences which I don't have (as an extension of my experiences) is something which can and has been argued ad nauseam. But notice that the solipsist need not and cannot make an argument for their own experiences. They just are. It's brute. — Marchesk

Or it is possible that there is some logical method for determining your experiences, but it is simply not within your subjective awareness, and thus seems to be brute when in fact it would be an effective logical method.

I also don't agree with the notion that because mental phenomena just are, no unpacking necessary, that therefor there is an issue for physicalism.
That would actually be an issue for those making the claim that mental phenomena just are.