How do you think it developed Olivier, really?

I am quite interested in pretheoretical conscious experience. In fact, I taught you how to use this word, remember? — Olivier5

Indeed. You taught me how you use it. What of mine?

It means that both Janus' seeing red cups, and my seeing red cups always always always includes red cups. — creativesoul

Absolutely, but this proposition is, for all intents and purposes, tautological, for it presupposes a certain knowledge given from a particular experience of a given object, but in a plurality of occurrences. Otherwise, there is no warrant for either red or cup for any of us, but only the presence of some object imbued with some existential conditions.
————-

How do we arrive at the need for "qualia" from here? Is the notion just being used in a sort of closeted subjectivism stance? — creativesoul

Saying to perceive a particular object is the same as what it feels like to perceive a red cup iff that particular object contains that which corresponds to the quales of red and cup, still doesn’t inform us of the origin of red or cup, or the synthesis of “object” to the quales “red” and “cup”. It is clear how the altogether distorted notion of qualia were arrived at, but the need for them has never been properly justified, in that they are neither sufficient nor necessary for what they’re supposed to do. And anything neither sufficient nor necessary can be summarily dismissed, insofar as doing so offers no jeopardy to that which is already established as the necessary means for human cognition and experience in general. Theoretically established, of course.

No idea.

Odd, isn't it. — Banno

In some ways...

I believe the genetic code emerged naturally, just like I believe other codes emerged naturally, including human language. The natural emergence of a code doesn’t make it less of a code, in my view.

Do you think Morse code emerged naturally? Can you see the difference between the way Morse code emerged and the way the genetic code emerged?

But that's the point of inverted spectra: "our verbal behavior will match even if we experience entirely different subjective colors". — Luke

Our verbal behaviour already matches despite known variations in biological machinery because those variations do not have any effect/affect upon the actual light being emitted/reflected, and that light appears exactly the same to us, each and every time we look at red cups. Red cups look exactly like red cups to each and every individual capable of seeing red cups, regardless of any variation between individual biological machinery.

That's the point.

We all pick out the red ones, regardless of any variation between individual biological machinery, and that's largely due to the public effable aspects that nearly all of our own individual experience of seeing red cups includes.

Do you think Morse code emerged naturally? Can you see the difference between the way Morse code emerged and the way the genetic code emerged? — Daemon

I certainly don’t think gods and fairies were involved in the creation of the Morse code. Some guy called Morse must have invented it.

But how do you think he invented it, if not through some chemistry-based mechanism in his brain? Why should the Morse code, that must have emerged from some chemical process in the brain of some M. Morse, be seen as a truer code than the genetic code, which supposedly emerged from some chemical process in some primordial soup?

Are you being disingenuous Olivier? [not candid or sincere, typically by pretending that one knows less about something than one really does]

Do you understand the relevant difference between Morse code and the genetic code, or would you like me to explain it to you?

Please do explain.

I know that both experiences include red cups and people seeing red cups in whatever way they appear to them, each and every time.
— creativesoul

Fantastic. Thanks for clarifying. That's exactly what I meant when I said "The experience of red cups includes what people call red cups" but I can see why that would have been confusing.

That's why it's not a problem for someone(like me) to make both claims you're asking about.
— creativesoul

Isaac or Banno would say that both claims are identical. — khaled

You're more than welcome.

Well, I'm not attempting to speak for either of them, for they are quite a bit more capable of explaining their own position than I.

However, the "in whatever way they appear to them" portion can be eliminated for red cups always appear exactly like red cups to each and every person capable of seeing red cups. That's why "All conscious experience of seeing red cups includes red cups and people seeing red cups" is better than "All conscious experience of seeing red cups includes red cups and people seeing red cups in whatever way they appear to them".

They always appear exactly like red cups, to each and every individual capable of seeing red cups, regardless of any variation between the individuals' biological machinery.

That's exactly what I meant when I said "The experience of red cups includes what people call red cups" but I can see why that would have been confusing. — khaled

No problem, but...

What do people call "red cups"?

Red cups.

See???

The experience of red cups includes red cups. Shorter. Clearer. Better.

One presupposes purpose and intent(Morse code), and the other does not.

Sure, but where did M. Morse’s intent comes from, if not some chemistry in his body? That is the hard problem, right? We postulate that chemistry produced or underwrote in Morse’s brain/mind the intent of designing the Morse code. But when chemistry is hypothesized to produce the genetic code, suddenly chemistry is not good enough to produce or underwrite an ‘actual’ code. Are you guys saying that brain chemistry is ‘magic’, or unlike chemistry in other places?

No idea. — Olivier5

Well, if you're very interested in pre-theoretical conscious experience, then you and I have shared interest. Our notion of what exactly counts as such seems much different though, based upon what you wrote regarding your own ideas, and what I know of my own...

Here's the relevant bits where I set it all out for khaled...


What is a “pretheoretical condition”?

This is pivotal.

It is the requirement that something be able to exist in it's entirety prior to any theoretical considerations, and it serves as the standard to meet in our assessments. For example, most everyone would agree that some conscious experience existed in it's entirety prior to being named and described. Since all theoretical considerations about conscious experience consist of descriptions thereof(in large part at least), and all pretheoretical conscious experiences exist in their entirety prior to theoretical considerations, it only follows that pre-theoretical conscious experience cannot consist of descriptions thereof.

In order for something to count as being pre-theoretical, it must exist in it's(their) entirety prior to being named and subsequently described.

Our conscious experience of red cups consists - in part - of red cups. In addition, the frequencies of visible light that we've recently discovered to have named "red" long ago were being emitted/reflected by certain external things long before we ever named and described them in color terms, and long before our becoming aware of the role that light and biological machinery plays in conscious experience of red cups.

We need not discuss the role that light and biological machinery plays in conscious experience of red cups in order to have conscious experience of red cups. However, we most certainly need to discuss such things in order to immediately apprehend that conscious experience of red cups comes in different varieties, some of which do indeed satisfy the pretheoretical criterion, but none of those require the idea/notion/concept of "qualia".

"Talk(ing) about experience as a subject matter in it's own right" is not equivalent to understanding words such as "red" or "bitter". Understanding words such as "red" or "bitter" is a necessary prerequisite for subsequently talking about any conscious experience thereof as a subject matter in it's own right, but just using "red" or "bitter" is inadequate for doing so.

Understanding the words is not necessary for seeing red things or tasting bitter red apples. That is because some red things are pretheoretical. Red apples are such things, and the ability to eat them and experience the involuntary autonomous response that bitter apples induce in biological machinery is also pretheoretical. So, conscious experience of eating bitter red apples can happen pretheoretically.

That said...

One can also learn how to use the terms "red" and "bitter" to talk about the pretheoretical conscious experience of eating bitter red apples. The learning process itself also counts as pretheoretical conscious experience. Once that process begins to turn inward on itself, and we begin discussing seeing and tasting bitter red apples in terms of our "conscious experience" thereof, we've begun to talk about experience as a subject matter in it's own right. Such discussion is not pretheoretical.

This thread is a prima facie example of talking about experience as a subject matter in it's own right, whereas a first grader's use of the terms "green" and "red" to pick out different colored apples is not. The grade school experience is a conscious experience of red and green apples that is not talking about the experience itself as a subject matter in it's own right. Rather, it's a conscious experience of talking about the apples. To tease the nuance out, it's a conscious experience of red and green apples that includes language use, but is prior to any theoretical considerations. Thus, some conscious experience of red and green apples consisting of language use counts as pretheoretical as well as all language less conscious experience thereof.

Morse code was devised by one conscious individual, for use by other conscious individuals. The genetic code developed due to unconscious forces.

The term "code" is used literally with something like Morse code, but metaphorically with something like the genetic code.

Morse used the (metaphorical!) codes in his brain and the other aspects of his consciousness to create a non-metaphorical "actual" code which involved sending electrical pulses through a wire.

With the genetic code there's only the metaphorical level, no conscious designer. The same is true of the bacterium. I found that such a beautiful revelation, that we can explain what looks like conscious activity through purely unconscious (chemical) means.

I don't understand your motivation in wanting to say that Morse code and the genetic code are equivalent.

I don't understand your motivation in wanting to say that Morse code and the genetic code are equivalent. — Daemon

It’s because I don’t see the origin of the two codes as fundamentally different, just because consciousness was involved in one and not the other. To me it makes no significant difference to what they do, which is to code for something else.

Here's the relevant bits — creativesoul

That was both cool and super, I learned something, thank you!

I see no difference with my way of using this word.

I see no difference with my way of using this word. — Olivier5

Cool. So you agree with all of that?

That was both cool and super, I learned something, thank you! — Daemon

No, thank you.

:blush:

Generally, I recognize my own take, yes.

"Pre-theoretical" means... ...stuff you do in practice without thinking about it in theory. Like when you watch large packs of birds fly. You are not necessarily theorizing about yourself watching birds fly, or even about how the birds fly. You may simply watch them. You may wonder why they fly so high or turn so suddenly, all as one, but it's not a research program yet, more a wonder, a question. You may start to reason that this is peculiar and beautiful, and start filming the phenomenon with your cellphone. You are still not theorizing much. You are just recording whatever you can of the event, thinking your friends will like this.

You may theorize latter, for instance if I ask you why you looked at those damn birds for so long. — Olivier5

I recognize my own take, yes. — Olivier5

In order for something(conscious experience) to count as being pre-theoretical, it must exist in it's(their) entirety prior to being named and subsequently described. — creativesoul

Similar, I suppose. I find no need for qualia though, whereas you seem to want to preserve it. So, something is different.

How come then that the word “red” preceded any understanding of light? And the word “bitter” preceded any atomic theory? I don’t see how these words could be coding for these properties as that implies that you need to know the properties to be able to use the words coding for them (just as you need to understand what altitude is to be able to read the map), but you don’t. — khaled

Spot on.

I find no need for qualia though, whereas you seem to want to preserve it. So, something is different. — creativesoul

What’s different is that I am using concepts like tools, opportunistically. I see them as sets, defined by the user. « Qualia » is just the set of qualitatively different tastes, smells, colors, timbres, etc. that help us perceive, represent and memorize the world. I see this concept as unproblematic, or not more problematic than others.

I don't personally believe in an afterlife, but I do think Chalmers, Nagel, McGinn, Block, etc. present more convincing arguments than Dennett, Churchland, Frankish, etc. — Marchesk

Chalmers and Nagel have their own problems... Dennett has his own as well... not sure about the rest.

They all three have the same problem though...

They do not understand how meaning arises/works, and it's role in all conscious experience as it pertains to thought and belief, of which all conscious experience consists entirely thereof. Different subject matter though.

Yes. — khaled

Thanks. Our chat is in danger of being swamped in @creativesoul's Great Debate. Creative's doing a fine job of keeping the candle of wisdom alight.

SO we agree that there is a distinction to be made between a red apple and the experience of a red apple, but no equivalent distinction to be made between a pain and the experience of a pain.

There's another preliminary issue to which I would like to draw attention, one that perhaps seems rather mundane but which caused much angst in philosophical circles when it was pointed out in the middle of the last century. Armed with their newly developed symbolic logic, philosophers had come to the conclusion that language involved names, and groups, and a few connectives. Russell was a great proponent of this, as indeed was Wittgenstein, who was so convinced that he gave philosophy away and went off to become a teacher.

But then Wittgenstein, and a few other philosophers in at both Cambridge and Oxford, noticed that there were many rather important utterances that simply did not seem to be groups, names and connectives. Consider, if you will, the word "Hello". It does not refer to a greeting; it is the greeting. It is not the name of something, so much as a thing we do with a word. A more pertinent example might be "ouch!".

Due exploration fo language will reveal whole mountains and valleys in which the meaning of the utterance is not given simply by identifying what the words involved refer to.

Now at the risk of misplacing our thread of conversation in the forrest of this thread on Dennett, I'd appreciate your view here. At the least, can you consider the possibility that there are parts of language, things we do with words, for which the meaning is not given by the referent, but is instead found in the role these utterances and scribbles play in our day to day lives? Then we might follow our thread home.

there are parts of language, things we do with words, for which the meaning is not given by the referent, but is instead found in the role these utterances and scribbles play in our day to day lives? — Banno

The councilors refused to allow the protestors to hold their demonstration because they advocated violence.

The councilors refused to allow the protestors to hold their demonstration because they abhorred violence.

But more than the referent being ambiguous. Sometimes it’s beside the point. Sometimes it is absent.