Yes! Perfect.

The taste is a public concept. The experience is a unique set of memories, emotions, desires, sematic associations etc resulting from the taste. — Isaac

Wow - all that results from a public concept? — Luke

Yes. Is there some limit you had in mind to the number of things a public concept can be party to? — Isaac

Being "party to" is one thing. You've suggested that a taste experience is "a unique set of memories, emotions, desires, sematic associations etc" that results from a public concept. I would have thought that a taste experience resulted from eating or drinking instead.

I can't possibly think one thing is 'sweet' whilst other people think a different thing is 'sweet', otherwise there's no public meaning of 'sweet' for us to use and the word ceases to have any function. I might be able to detect sweetness in something that other people cannot, but what sweetness is must be public. — Isaac

"phenol-thio-urea., a substance which tastes very bitter to three-fourths of humanity, and as tasteless as water to the rest. Is it bitter?" — Luke

How do you know phenol-thio-urea is a substance which tastes very bitter to three-fourths of humanity, and as tasteless as water to the rest if we don't have a public meaning for 'bitter'? — Isaac

You've missed the point. You said that you "can't possibly think something is 'sweet' while other people think a different thing is 'sweet'. That is, you implied that we must all agree on what is 'sweet'. However, the example of phenolthiourea that Dennett gives shows that not everyone agrees that it is 'bitter'. How do you reconcile this with your claim that everyone agrees on what is 'bitter' (or 'sweet')? Are they disagreeing over the meaning of the word?

Why must it come down to a matter of ability? — Luke

Public meaning. If it weren't public concepts and our ability to detect them, then we'd have nothing to speak of and would never have learnt the term for the concept in the first place. — Isaac

How do we "detect" public concepts? I thought we just learned to use them.

So why does it seem like we see colours? — Luke

Because there's a public word for them. We're there no word, you'd be less likely to think you see colours. — Isaac

Your position is that we don't really see colours, it only seems like we do because of our language? Then how and/or why did the English-speaking community come up with these concepts?

You've suggested that a taste experience is "a unique set of memories, emotions, desires, sematic associations etc" that results from a public concept. I would have thought that a taste experience resulted from eating or drinking instead. — Luke

No. Here's a really good paper on the subject - https://academic.oup.com/scan/article/12/1/1/2823712 . I'm not sure what bearing you're expecting the fact that you 'would have thought' taste experiences result from eating or drinking to have on the matter.

the example of phenolthiourea that Dennett gives shows that not everyone agrees that it is 'bitter'. — Luke

Whether something is 'bitter' and what 'bitter' means are two different things. we might all agree what 'interesting' means, that doesn't mean we all agree on what things are 'interesting'.

How do we "detect" public concepts? I thought we just learned to use them. — Luke

See the article above.

Your position is that we don't really see colours, it only seems like we do because of our language? Then how and/or why did the English-speaking community come up with these concepts? — Luke

To do a job. I'm not following your line of thinking here. If I want to select a particular apple, then using a word to distinguish it seems like a good move, no?

I'm not sure what bearing you're expecting the fact that you 'would have thought' taste experiences result from eating or drinking to have on the matter. — Isaac

I'm sure you're right; taste is only a concept and has nothing to do with eating or drinking.

Whether something is 'bitter' and what 'bitter' means are two different things. we might all agree what 'interesting' means, that doesn't mean we all agree on what things are 'interesting'. — Isaac

According to what you've said, whether something is 'bitter' cannot be different from what 'bitter' means. How can something have a bitter taste if taste is only a concept? How can a concept be bitter?

I'm sure you're right; taste is only a concept and has nothing to do with eating or drinking. — Luke

No-one said anything about it having "nothing to do with" eating and drinking, only that it is not the result of it.

How can something have a bitter taste if taste is only a concept? — Luke

By associating the concept with it. That's what 'having a bitter taste' means. That the eating or drinking of it produces the responses some subset of which are somewhat similar to the ones we've learned to use the word 'bitter' to describe.

Disclaimer: I still don't have much time right now so sorry if my reply seems a bit rushed.

Are you going to argue that “red” and “bitter” and such are similar to “hello” in that they are simply words that do things, and they don’t need a referent? — khaled

What I would ask you to consider is that the deep grammar of "I have a pain in my hand" is not so much like "I have an apple in my hand" as it is like "Ouch!" That is, that it does not work by referring so much as by exclaiming. — Banno

I guessed right.

But the question remains: How do you teach someone what pain is without them ever being in pain? There is a difference between a child saying "Ouch!" to skip school and someone saying "Ouch!" because they ran into a wall.

Even if it were true that when someone says "I have a pain in my hand" they are effectively saying "Ouch" that cannot be said of other sentences. For example: "It feels like I'm being stabbed with a knife" is different from "It feels like someone whacked me with a baseball bat", they cannot just be reduced to the same "Ouch!" In these cases the person in question is asking you to imagine a certain experience. Doctors ask about these all the time in diagnoses, so there is another language game for Qualia.

Edit: The more I think about it the more it seems that these words without referents are used to make the other party imagine a certain experience or image. In which case, sure, pain may not have a referent, but there is a distinct experience of pain still. Saying “Ouch” just brings that to the mind of the listener.

But the question remains: How do you teach someone what pain is without them ever being in pain? — khaled

So the colour-blind can't know that they're colour-blind? Ask a colour-blind person what it is that they don't see, they will answer "colours". Are they using the word incorrectly? If not, then it seems they know what colours are sufficiently to use the word.

Disclaimer: I still don't have much time so my reply will probably seem rushed.

how would we ever learn what word to use if the only thing they referred to was private experiences? — Isaac

I'd ask how we learn to use the words without having the experiences? Why is it that when we want to teach a child what "red" is we point to red things? If someone has never seen something red before, but just has a list of words he memorized as "red objects" (for example blood) none of which he has seen does that person understands what "red" means? I would say no and I'm guessing you'd say yes.

All we have is someone who obviously doesn't know all there is to know about red and you're assuming the reaction would be the same in someone who does know all there is to know about red. That's just begging the question. — Isaac

Are you seriously suggesting that if the patient was a neurologist he wouldn't be surprised? I think it's pretty reasonable to assume that among those patients at least one knew how their own illness worked from a neurological perpsective and were still surprised.

I don't think I've ever denied that our full experience at any given time may not be perfectly communicable. — Isaac

Ok so we have this word "Experience" you assign the property "Ineffable" to. Let's see what other properties we can discover for this word "Experience" (which is of course radically different from Qualia).

Would you say that it is possible to compare these "experiences"?

There's no evidence at all that you feel it at the time, phenomenologically. — Isaac

I don't see where in your reply to Luke you showed this.

If one of those responses is to reach for the word 'redness' or talk about qualia, that's no reason to draw any ontological conclusion. I could train a parrot to say 'red' every time a bell rings, doesn't mean it's having a phenomenological experience of 'red'. — Isaac

I agree, but I want to know what, by your standard, would it take to say "Isaac is having the phenomenological experience of 'red'".

So when the evidence we do have from neuroscience suggests that there's no such event — Isaac

Thing is, I don't see how neuroscience can provide any sort of evidence about phenomenology. Sounds to me like asking "The mathematical evidence for why you should vote for Biden".

So the colour-blind can't know that they're colour-blind? — Isaac

I don't see how that follows. Ask a colorblind person what "red" is and they'll probably think you're rude because you're pointing out that they don't know.

Ask a colour-blind person what it is that they don't see, they will answer "colours". — Isaac

That is not the same thing as knowing what colors are. If I never studied topology, and you asked me what I don't know about math, and I said "Topology", do I know what topology is? No, the exact opposite, I don't know what topology is, that's why it was the answer.

If not, then it seems they know what colours are sufficiently to use the word. — Isaac

Knowing that you don't see something doesn't mean you know the thing you're not seeing.... In fact it means the opposite.

All I know about topology and all color blind people know about color is that they don't know what it is but others claim to do so.

Complaints — Banno

I'd like to direct you to this article: https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20190313-what-happens-when-anaesthesia-fails

It's an article about when anaesthesia fails and instead of no longer being in pain, the person is simply paralyzed. Say I have a bottle of working anaesthesia and a bottle of paralyzing anaesthesia. According to you the only purpose of anaesthesia is eliminating complaints (as I understand). So for you it shouldn't matter which one I use right? But I am positive you wouldn't want to be treated by the latter. What is the difference?

Maybe painkillers and anaesthesia kill more than complaints. Maybe that's why they're not called complaint-killers.

How can something have a bitter taste if taste is only a concept? — Luke

By associating the concept with it. That's what 'having a bitter taste' means. — Isaac

You said earlier that taste was a concept:

The taste is a public concept. The experience is a unique set of memories, emotions, desires, sematic associations etc resulting from the taste. — Isaac

Now you're saying instead that (a bitter) taste is "associating the concept with it". What is "it"?

Now you're saying instead that a taste is "associating the concept with it". What is "it"? — Luke

:up:

If someone has never seen something red before, but just has a list of words he memorized as "red objects" (for example blood) none of which he has seen does that person understand what "red" means? I would say no and I'm guessing you'd say yes. — khaled

Say someone had such a list. They'd be indistinguishable from your someone who'd never seen anything red. So I have a reason for my answer, I don't know why you'd add something where there's no cause to.

Are you seriously suggesting that if the patient was a neurologist he wouldn't be surprised? I think it's pretty reasonable to assume that among those patients at least one knew how their own illness worked from a neurological perpsective and were still surprised. — khaled

A neurologist does not know everything there is to know about red either. Just fractionally more.

Ok so we have this word "Experience" you assign the property "Ineffable" to. — khaled

I didn't say ineffable. I said 'not perfectly communicable'. They're not the same thing. I also said that such imperfect communication need be no less imperfect than one's own recollection. You're missing important parts of my posts in your responses.

I don't see where in your reply to Luke you showed this. — khaled

The paper I cited.

I want to know what, by your standard, would it take to say "Isaac is having the phenomenological experience of 'red'". — khaled

Nothing. The sentence is nonsense. There's no such thing as 'the phenomenonological experience of 'red''.

I don't see how neuroscience can provide any sort of evidence about phenomenology. — khaled

It depends what question you want answered about it. If you're just going to take everything you feel like is the case to actually be the case then there's no further work to do is there? Why are we even talking? The whole point of any investigation is premised entirely on the idea that what feels like it is the case might not actually be the case. If you're going to respond to any such suggestion with "but it doesn't feel like that's the case", then there's no point in investigating. You already know all you want to ever know about the issue.

I don't see how that follows. Ask a colorblind person what "red" is and they'll probably think you're rude because you're pointing out that they don't know. — khaled

Of course they know. "It's the colour of stop signs, blood, teacher's ink..." that's an answer a colour-blind person could give. You want to add something to the meaning of 'red' which there's no cause to add. A colour-blind person could say "pass me the red apples" and the same job would get done as if a normally sighted person said it.

What they don't have is something like specific neurological responses associated with red objects. But that was never part of the public meaning of the word 'red'. Our parents didn't point to fMRI scans to teach us how to use the word, they pointed to red things.

That is not the same thing as knowing what colors are. If I never studied topology, and you asked me what I don't know about math, and I said "Topology", do I know what topology is? — khaled

Yes. If you ask someone studying topology in their first year what they're studying and they say "topology" have they misused the word because their studies are incomplete?

You said earlier that taste was a concept: — Luke

Yep.

Now you're saying instead that (a bitter) taste is "associating the concept with it". — Luke

Nope. That's not what the quoted text says.

It may be my poor communication. Let me try again from scratch. We'll do it with object perception because I know the routes better. The neurological process I described earlier...

Photons hit the retina, they fire a chain of neurons in the V1, these (depending on previously cemented pathways) fire a chain of other neurons (with the important backward-acting filters). Some of these neurons represent things like the word 'red', images of other things which caused the same initial V! pattern, emotions attached to either the current image, or remembered ones... All this is held in working memory, which is then re-fired (selectively) by the hippocampus. It's this re-firing which we are aware of when we introspect, not the original chain. The colour red is a public concept. We use it to indicate to other people some category of thing, we learn which word to use by experiment in early childhood (retaining those uses which work), There's nothing more to 'red' than the public use of the word. — Isaac

The public concept is applied as an inference model to explain the interoception of responses. Did you read the paper I linked? It explains the evidence for all this.

All we have at the time of the initial experience (stimulus to response) is the chain of neural firing, various associations. When inferring a cause for these various mental states we reach for public concepts as models. These are usually a very fuzzy fit and always applied post hoc.

'Bitter' is just such a concept. We apply it to a range of mental states caused by drinking or eating (or imagining such).

You can see this with the influence colour words has on perception of colour shades.

When it comes to producing speculative hypotheses regarding the origins of life and consciousness physical theories are all we have, because only they are testable. That doesn't mean you can't speculate idealistically; it just means there is no way to test such speculations. — Janus

Is it the theory that is physical, or what the theory is about (what it points to) that is physical, or both?

Is testing physical theories a physical or non-physical process? How can a non-physical thing test physical things? What does "physical" even mean?

This is one of the problems with philosophy. Speaking ways that create the very problem you are trying to solve.

They'd be indistinguishable from your someone who'd never seen anything red. — Isaac

In behavior yes, but you know they have never seen anything red. I would say then that they don't understand the word.

I don't know why you'd add something where there's no cause to. — Isaac

There is plenty of cause to.
The difference between anesthesia and paralysis
The surprise experienced by people when they first see something regardless of their empirical knowledge about it
The fact that doctors talk about qualia all the time (does it feel like stabbing or blunt force?)
etc

All of these seem to indicate that there is some experiential content that the words refer to or at least are associated with.

A neurologist does not know everything there is to know about red either. Just fractionally more. — Isaac

I never said "everything there is to know about red". I was not repeating mary's room. I said that understanding of neurology does not remove the surprise of actually seeing/hearing for the first time. Which suggests that something happens when seeing/hearing for the first time, although you keep denying there is.

I didn't say ineffable. I said 'not perfectly communicable'. — Isaac

Those are the same thing.

The paper I cited. — Isaac

Might get back to you on that.

EDIT: Read until the first table. Don't see anything contravertial here. So far the only thing Lisa has said is that our emotional categories are man made and do not need to exist in nature. And that we cannot locate certain emtions in the brain. Both are things I knew already and I don't see a problem with. If anything she admits that there exist such emotions as "fear" and "anger". That there is some experiential content behind those words. Which already seems to disagree with what you're saying. That emotional categories are man made or that we cannot find "fear" in the brain is no threat to the claim that there is experiential content behind the words.

Nothing. The sentence is nonsense. There's no such thing as 'the phenomenonological experience of 'red''. — Isaac

I could train a parrot to say 'red' every time a bell rings, doesn't mean it's having a phenomenological experience of 'red'. — Isaac

Here you said that training a parrot to say red repeatedly doesn't mean it has "the phenomenological experience of 'red'". In other words there is this thing, that is not nonsense, that the parrot doesn't have. What is that thing? It makes no sense to me to say somthing doesn't have X if X doesn't mean anything.

If you're just going to take everything you feel like is the case to actually be the case then there's no further work to do is there? — Isaac

That's not what's happening. Talk of phenomenology is talking of everything you feel like. It does not imply anything about the mechanisms causing it. Which is why I think your connection between neurology and phenomenology is fundamentally misguided.

The whole point of any investigation is premised entirely on the idea that what feels like it is the case might not actually be the case. If you're going to respond to any such suggestion with "but it doesn't feel like that's the case" — Isaac

But that's not what's happening. I say "it feels like X" you say "No it doesn't feel like X, nothing feels like anything". If you want to say "Sure it feels like X but that's not what's happening in your brain" no one would disagree. You are debating whether or not we have experiences in the first place.

Of course they know. "It's the colour of stop signs, blood, teacher's ink..." that's an answer a colour-blind person could give. — Isaac

That's like me saying topology is an area of math. Or citing some of its uses. It doesn't mean I know what topology is don't you agree? I know things about topology in general but I don't know what it is. Similarly, colorblind people know things about color but don't know what it is.

A colour-blind person could say "pass me the red apples" and the same job would get done as if a normally sighted person said it. — Isaac

Not really. If I passed him the green apples he wouldn't complain but a person who can see color would. There is a difference there. But fine let's say that the same job gets done. And I know that to you that means they understand the word. However, being able to use the word well in one situation does not show full understanding. Being able to use it well in every situation does don't you agree?

So for instance if someone drew a red lake and asked the colorblind person "What color is this?" and the colorblind person said "blue" that would be evidence that the colorblind person does not understand the word "color" sufficiently to accomplish the same job as an ably sighted person would doesn't it?

So how might we teach the colorblind person to be able to distinguish all the colors perfectly in each situation? And that includes seeing new things for the first time too? Answer: We can't. In other words we cannot teach someone to fully understand "red" if they've never seen red things.

"topology" have they misused the word because their studies are incomplete? — Isaac

No but as I said, their understanding is rudamentary and far from perfect. And I'm sure you'd agree that the only way for them to understand it perfectly is to be able to use it in every scenario. For topology this is easy, they just finish the course. For color not so much.

In behavior yes, but you know they have never seen anything red. I would say then that they don't understand the word. — khaled

Why?

The difference between anesthesia and paralysis — khaled

One prevents either nociception or working memory function (depending on type), the other prevent muscle function. I'm not seeing how this relates at all to the meaning of words like 'red'.

The surprise experienced by people when they first see something regardless of their empirical knowledge about it — khaled

We've just been through this. It is not "regardless" of their emprical knowledge. You've not demonstrated at all that surprise is not eliminated by empirical knowledge. All you've shown is that two states of empirical knowledge both show surprise, ie neither have acquired sufficient knowledge to eliminate surprise altogether. You haven't even shown that the neurologist is not less surprised. It's all nothing more than armchair speculation.

The fact that doctors talk about qualia all the time (does it feel like stabbing or blunt force?)
etc — khaled

Agai, how would this even be a useful question if there were not a public meaning for these terms. If they referred to private experience then the doctor will have learned nothing whatsoever from your answer.

I never said "everything there is to know about red". — khaled

And yet...

regardless of their empirical knowledge about it — khaled

How would you know that the surprise is "regardless" of empirical knowledge unless you're referring to 'everything there is to know'? Anything less than that and you haven't made your case at all, the surprise might be caused by a lack of some empirical fact of which both the neurologist and the layman were previously unaware.

I didn't say ineffable. I said 'not perfectly communicable'. — Isaac


Those are the same thing. — khaled

Not as I intended it they're not. Ineffable implies some metaphysical impossibility. 'Not perfectly communicable' was just meant to imply fallibility in language. Again, you ignored the important bit. We can communicate an experience with no less fidelity than we ourselves recollect it.

So far the only thing Lisa has said is that our emotional categories are man made and do not need to exist in nature. — khaled

Look at the inferential method she demonstrates. The same thing applies to 'red'. I'll dig out a paper specifically on perceptual features if you're having trouble making the cross-over, I just thought the emotions paper was clearer about the role of public concepts.

It makes no sense to me to say somthing doesn't have X if X doesn't mean anything. — khaled

Sorry, it made sense to me when I wrote it. I mean exactly the thing you say it makes no sense to mean.

I say "it feels like X" you say "No it doesn't feel like X". — khaled

I've nowhere said that the way things feel to you to be is not the way things feel to you to be. I'm saying they're not the way things actually are. In other words, I have a better model.

You haven't answered my question on this. What exactly are you investigating if you're going to assume that the way things seem to you to be is the way they actually are?

That's like me saying topology is an area of math. Or citing some of its uses. It doesn't mean I know what topology is don't you agree? — khaled

No. You've just said what topology is. How is "it's an area of maths" not an answer to the question "what is topology?".

I don't see how the fact that it's possible to give more detailed answers means that less detailed ones are now not answers. As you say...

"topology" have they misused the word because their studies are incomplete? — Isaac


No but as I said, their understanding is rudamentary and far from perfect. And I'm sure you'd agree that the only way for them to understand it perfectly is to be able to use it in every scenario. For topology this is easy, they just finish the course. For color not so much. — khaled

"Understand it fully". Now you've snuck in a 'fully' which wasn't there before. So how does the postgraduate student now understand it 'fully' when the post doctorate student clearly understands more? You're placing an arbitrary threshold on 'understanding' just to match your theory. Colour-blind people understand the meaning of the word 'red'. Normally sighted people understand more. Artists (arguably) understand more still. Colour scientists understand even more. Why draw the line at some arbitrary point?

Not really. If I passed him the green apples he wouldn't complain but a person who can see color would. There is a difference there. But fine let's say that the same job gets done. And I know that to you that means they understand the word. However, being able to use the word well in one situation does not show full understanding. Being able to use it well in every situation does don't you agree? — khaled

Not one of us has that level of understanding. To use the word well in 'every' situation.

So for instance if someone drew a red lake and asked the colorblind person "What color is this?" and the colorblind person said "blue" that would be evidence that the colorblind person does not understand the word "color" sufficiently to accomplish the same job as an ably sighted person would doesn't it? — khaled

Yes. Not understanding the word as sufficiently as all other users of it has, thankfully, never been a criteria for understanding the meaning of a word.

So how might we teach the colorblind person to be able to distinguish all the colors perfectly in each situation? And that includes seeing new things for the first time too? — khaled

Give them a spectrometer and tell them that anything with a wavelength of approximately 625-740 nanometres is called 'red'.

@Banno

Pain is interesting. Per Hilton's law (@Isaac is it Hilton's?), any nervous pathway that is used extensively, will become a pain superhighway, so pain from any source in the area will use the same pathway and present the same feeling to the subject.

How do we explain this without resorting to talk of phenomenal consciousness?

I'll try:

Um, I have no idea. How do you explain it? Just reject Hilton's law?

I don't know if this will help you all, but it is fascinating. One point that particularly interested me: the researchers said that they believed the therapy almost immediately restored colour vision, but it took the monkeys weeks to realise they could now see new colours.

________________________________________________________________________

Colour blindness corrected by gene therapy

Treated monkeys can now see in technicolour.

Researchers have used gene therapy to restore colour vision in two adult monkeys that have been unable to distinguish between red and green hues since birth — raising the hope of curing colour blindness and other visual disorders in humans.

"This is a truly amazing study," says András Komáromy, a vision researcher and veterinary ophthalmologist at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, who was not involved in the research. "If we can target gene expression specifically to cones [in humans] then this has a tremendous implication."

About 1 in 12 men lack either the red- or the green-sensitive photoreceptor proteins that are normally present in the colour-sensing cells, or cones, of the retina, and so have red–green colour blindness. A similar condition affects all male squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus), which naturally see the world in just two tones. The colour blindness in the monkeys arises because full colour vision requires two versions of the opsin gene, which is carried on the X chromosome. One version codes for a red-detecting photoreceptor, the other for a green-detecting photoreceptor. As male monkeys have only one X chromosome, they carry only one version of the gene and are inevitably red–green colour blind. A similar deficiency accounts for the most common form of dichromatic color blindness in humans. Fewer female monkeys suffer from the condition as they have two X chromosomes, and often carry both versions of the opsin gene.

"Here is an animal that is a perfect model for the human condition," says Jay Neitz of the University of Washington in Seattle, a member of the team that carried out the experiment.
Computer test for colour blindnessThe monkeys were trained to touch a screen when they saw coloured patches.Neitz Laboratory

Neitz and his colleagues introduced the human form of the red-detecting opsin gene into a viral vector, and injected the virus behind the retina of two male squirrel monkeys — one named Dalton in honour of the British chemist, John Dalton, who was the first to describe his own colour blindness in 1794, and the other named Sam. The researchers then assessed the monkeys' ability to find coloured patches of dots on a background of grey dots by training them to touch coloured patches on a screen with their heads, and then rewarding them with grape juice. The test is a modified version of the standard 'Cambridge Colour Test' where people must identify numbers or other specific patterns in a field of coloured dots.

Colour coded

After 20 weeks, the monkeys' colour skills improved dramatically, indicating that Dalton and Sam had acquired the ability to see in three shades (see video). Both monkeys have retained this skill for more than two years with no apparent side effects, the researchers report in Nature1.

Adding the missing gene was sufficient to restore full colour vision without further rewiring of the brain even though the monkeys had been colour blind since birth. "There is this plasticity still in the brain and it is possible to treat cone defects with gene therapy," says Alexander Smith, a molecular biologist and vision researcher at University College London, who did not contribute to the study.

"It doesn't seem like new neural connections have to be formed," says Komáromy. "You can add an additional cone opsin pigment and the neural circuitry and visual pathways can deal with it."

Why? — Isaac

I could ask the same of you. Why is your standard so low?

One prevents either nociception or working memory function (depending on type), the other prevent muscle function. — Isaac

Anesthesia prevents both (you don't move during surgery). And in that case we have behavioral equivalence (the complaints are removed). However if all there was to anesthesia and pain killers is complaint removal then it shouldn't matter which is used in surgery. But I'm positive you'd rather have anesthesia than be paralyzed during surgery, even though it's behaviorally equivalent (which apparently according to you means the pain doesn't exist)

We've just been through this. It is not "regardless" of their emprical knowledge. You've not demonstrated at all that surprise is not eliminated by empirical knowledge. All you've shown is that two states of empirical knowledge both show surprise, ie neither have acquired sufficient knowledge to eliminate surprise altogether. You haven't even shown that the neurologist is not less surprised. It's all nothing more than armchair speculation. — Isaac

So you are seriously suggesting that with enough knowledge the surprise would be eliminated. I think that's a much less reasonable expectation.

Does it also follow then that we can teach children colors by having them look at enough fMRI scans and reading enough neurology books?

If they referred to private experience then the doctor will have learned nothing whatsoever from your answer. — Isaac

Incorrect. The doctor knows that the private experience we each describe as "like knives" is indicative of a certain condition that is not the same as the descriptor "like blunt force". However we do in fact need to be having an experience to make this distinction.

Not as I intended it they're not. — Isaac

Fair enough.

Look at the inferential method she demonstrates. The same thing applies to 'red'. — Isaac

Give me a quote or something I don't know what you're referring to.

I'll dig out a paper specifically on perceptual features if you're having trouble making the cross-over — Isaac

Don't, I won't read it. One is enough for now since I already think it will be a waste of time from reading the first bit.

I'm saying they're not the way things actually are. — Isaac

Let me just dig into this a bit. So if I say "I am experiencing red", you would reply "Actually, you're not experiencing red, you're.....". What is the ......? Could you do that for "I am in pain" too? What exactly would you put in place of those dots?

You haven't answered my question on this. What exactly are you investigating if you're going to assume that the way things seem to you to be is the way they actually are? — Isaac

The way I see it is that there are two different domains here. One can talk about phenomenology or one can talk about neurology. When I say "I am in pain" I am talking phenomenologically, meaning, I am talking of the way things feel like. And usually doing so to get some sort of sympathy or help in this case.

Me saying "I am in pain" however is not to say "There is this hunk of brain that's active right now that is making me in pain". That would be false (there is no specific point in the brain where pain happens) and would be implying that the way things seem to me reflects the structure of my brain, a completely unwarranted assumption. So just because I feel distinct experiences doesn't mean that they are traceable to distinct patterns or chunks in my brain (fear and excitement for example are very similar from my limited reading on the subject)

However you seem to me to be doing something weird. You are saying that the neurology somehow implies phenomenology. That since there is no specific point in my brain governing "pain" there cannot be a distinct sensation of pain in my experience. I think that's an equally unwarranted assumption.

So your question makes no sense to me in the first place. On a pheonomenological level, the way things seem to me is the way they are, by definition. On a neurological level, I don't know much nor do I care to investigate further.

"Understand it fully". Now you've snuck in a 'fully' which wasn't there before. — Isaac

Yea but it's what I meant.

Colour-blind people understand the meaning of the word 'red'. Normally sighted people understand more. Artists (arguably) understand more still. Colour scientists understand even more. Why draw the line at some arbitrary point? — Isaac

Because you're gonna have to draw it somewhere. You draw it at being able to use it correctly literally once. I draw it at whether or not you've seen something red.

Not one of us has that level of understanding. To use the word well in 'every' situation. — Isaac

Sure but a colorblind person will use the word wrong consecutively if you just keep showing them pictures of things painted in colors that are usually not the color of those things. To say they understand color is like saying the person who gets 10% on a calculus exam understands calculus.

Not understanding the word as sufficiently as all other users of it has, thankfully, never been a criteria for understanding the meaning of a word. — Isaac

I would argue it is somewhat. You have to be at an average level at least. A parrot doesn't understand what a shark is because he learns to use it in one sentence such as "Sharks swim in the sea". And if your definition of "understanding" means that that parrot knows what a shark is I think it's ridiculous, even while recognizing that that parrot did in fact use the word correctly.

Give them a spectrometer and tell them that anything with a wavelength of approximately 625-740 nanometres is called 'red'. — Isaac

That's like saying you can teach a kid math by giving him a calculator. I obviously meant for them to be able to distinguish it alone.

Is it the theory that is physical, or what the theory is about (what it points to) that is physical, or both? — Harry Hindu

I would say the theory is ideal, in that it's humans creating a map of the territory, while the territory itself might be understood as physical, assuming a physicalist ontology. That does allow for the possibility that the theory is missing something fundamental. A map is only as good as the map makers and their knowledge of the territory.

Our use of language. — Isaac

That's absurd. Does this mean birds don't see colors?

And why don't we have the equivalent language for the rest of the EM spectrum or sonar?

Earlier you spoke of not being able to take a screenshot of another individual's sight. Isaac is offering you as close a proximity of that as we can get. He's explaining how the 'camera' works 'inside all of our heads'(the biological machinery - 'private' - aspect of experience). It's worth setting aside presuppositions, opening up your defenses, and allowing a bit of knowledge in.

A parrot doesn't understand what a shark is because he learns to use it in one sentence such as "Sharks swim in the sea". And if your definition of "understanding" means that that parrot knows what a shark is I think it's ridiculous, even while recognizing that that parrot did in fact use the word correctly. — khaled

Making the same sound as "shark" is not equivalent to correct use of the term. Parrots may make the sound, but correct word use requires a bit more.

He's explaining how the 'camera' works 'inside all of our heads'(the biological machinery - 'private' - aspect of experience) — creativesoul

And I still don't see what that has to do with anything. And furthermore it seems to me like every two paragraphs he insists that there is no such thing as "experience". With infamous quotes like "You don't see red"

It's worth setting aside presuppositions, opening up your defenses, and allowing a bit of knowledge in. — creativesoul

He's explained to me how people see things like 3 times now. And every time I ask what that has to do with anything. How does an explanation of how the camera works imply that the footage on said camera (qualia, metaphorically) doesn't exist?

Parrots may make the sound, but correct word use requires a bit more. — creativesoul

Ask Isaac. I wouldn't be so sure. After all if a colorblind person says "I can't see color" then that apparently means the colorblind person understands color according to him.

Anyways parrots are pretty intelligent so I wouldn't put it past them to actually know what they're quacking about.

Now you're saying instead that (a bitter) taste is "associating the concept with it". What is "it"? — Luke

The involuntary biological response.

He's explaining how the 'camera' works 'inside all of our heads'(the biological machinery - 'private' - aspect of experience)
— creativesoul

And I still don't see what that has to do with anything. — khaled

It has everything to do with the privacy aspect of conscious experience that we've been touching upon.

Earlier, with me, you invoked the idea that because we cannot take a screen shot of what another is seeing during an experience of seeing red cups, that we cannot know what they experience when doing so. We've agreed since, I think, that despite that, we can still - at the very least - know that they're seeing red cups, however red cups appear to the individual. Hence, variation in biological machinery does not impede our ability to know some things about another's experience. If we can know some things about another's experience, then it is not private.

Our personal and idiosyncratic capacity to respond to red cups is the extent of the privacy aspect of seeing red cups. That capacity includes the individual's own biological machinery as well as their skill with common language use. We've spoken about the language aspect(the use of which is a part of some conscious experience of red cups), Isaac is a good resource for the biological machinery aspect.

Creative's doing a fine job of keeping the candle of wisdom alight. — Banno

Thanks, but from my vantage point it seems like some language use just whirls people so far away from red cups that the language itself is no longer connected to anything aside from itself and it's user.

Sounds like an argument for private language!

How so?