He's explained to me how people see things like 3 times now. — khaled

To his credit.

And every time I ask what that has to do with anything. How does an explanation of how the camera works imply that the footage on said camera (qualia, metaphorically) doesn't exist?

Why invoke "qualia" here? What does it add that "footage" lacks?

It has everything to do with the privacy aspect of conscious experience that we've been touching upon. — creativesoul

I don’t think it does. As in it doesn’t add anything new. We already agreed how “private” private is.

that we cannot know what they experience when doing so. We've agreed since, I think, that despite that, we can still - at the very least - know that they're seeing red cups, — creativesoul

An explanation of the underlying biological machinery doesn’t help here. Because we don’t know what connection the biological machinery has to the experience. We only know its connection to behavior.

That capacity includes the individual's own biological machinery as well as their skill with common language use. — creativesoul

Again, an explanation of the underlying neuroscience doesn’t help to explain the phenomenology. As in, me knowing your eyes cannot perceive red light does not allow me to imagine your experience. So nothing new about privacy is said by explaining how we see.

I am reading Isaac’s explanations and I find them interesting, just unrelated.


The more I talk to you the more I don’t understand what your gripe is with Qualia. It seems to be minor at best.

Why invoke "qualia" here? What does it add that "footage" lacks? — creativesoul

Qualia IS the footage.

Do you agree that all conscious experience of seeing red cups includes red cups?

An explanation of the underlying biological machinery doesn’t help here. Because we don’t know what connection the biological machinery has to the experience. — khaled

I know that the conscious experience of seeing red cups requires the capability of seeing red cups, and that all the evidence suggests that biological machinery plays an irrevocable role in helping to provide that capability.

What has convinced you to believe otherwise?

it just means "in terms of observable phenomena".

Not just (or necessarily even) complaints: a painkiller (if successful) stops me feeliing pain; so it kills pain. There may not have been any complaints.

Although pain (or illness) is sometimes termed 'a complaint', so if you mean it in that sense, then yes.

Why invoke "qualia" here? What does it add that "footage" lacks?
— creativesoul

Qualia IS the footage. — khaled

So what is the camera?

phenomenonological — Isaac

I found the extra "non" a bit amusing...

Do you agree that all conscious experience of seeing red cups includes red cups? — creativesoul

We went over this. Yea sure.

What has convinced you to believe otherwise? — creativesoul

I don’t believe otherwise. What you said doesn’t contradict what I said.

We don’t know the connection the biological machinery has to the experience. For instance: we feel like we’re in a theatre, watching things (a Cartesian theatre), however we know the brain doesn’t have that structure (there is no “control room” where our senses come together). So it remains a mystery how the biological machinery produces this unified experience.

So what is the camera? — creativesoul

The eye. I am making Cartesian theatre metaphor. Your eye is the camera and it is projecting footage on the screen which you watch. This “footage” is Qualia. What I have just said is not a statement of neurological fact, but of phenomenological fact. I am perfectly aware there is no “control room” in the brain where all our sensations are gathered. However that does not change the fact that it feels that way. And it is a mystery why it feels that way, as far as I know.

I'll get to your recent comments, but my replies require a bit of paving, so...

...conscious experience of seeing red cups requires the capability of seeing red cups, and that all the evidence suggests that biological machinery plays an irrevocable role in helping to provide that capability. — creativesoul

Do you agree?

Do you agree? — creativesoul

I do, but what is that supposed to be relevant to?

"I have a pain in my hand" is more like "Ouch!" than like "I have an apple in my hand".

Not "the same as". There remain differences.

How do you teach someone what pain is without them ever being in pain? — khaled

How do you know what "pain" is?

"That's just a scratch. You don't know what pain is; I've had a broken arm. That's real pain".

Ah, broken arm? You don't know what pain is. I've had a bowl perforation..."

"Call that pain? You don't know what pain is. I've had second degree burns to both legs..."

That is, "how do you teach someone what pain is" is a misguided question, because it assumes that there is a something that pain is... That there is something it is like to be in pain... as if, again, I could hold pain in my hand like an apple. If pain talk is emphatic, then there need be no such thing.

Learning what pain is consists in no more than being able to use the word suitably.

"How do you teach someone what pain is" assumes that there is some thing that is had in common by a scratch, a broken arm, a bowl perforation, a broken heart, a betrayal; and of course this is wrong.

All that red things have in common is that we use the same word for them.

All that pains have in common is that we use the same word for them.

The more I think about it the more it seems that these words without referents are used to make the other party imagine a certain experience or image. — khaled

Or used to illicit sympathy or used to sexually gratify or used to frighten into submission or used to win philosophical debates...

You are right; more progress is made when we stop looking for the meaning of 'pain' and look instead to the uses of the word.

There's obviously more to pain than language use. Surely you're not suggesting otherwise.

a painkiller (if successful) stops me feeliing pain; so it kills pain. — Janus

Curiously, I can't know that you are in pain, according to those who advocate for qualia and the privacy of pains, because your pain is ineffable.

So I'm just going to give you these pills that stop you being so annoying...

It has to do with the claim that we do not know what connection biological machinery has to conscious experience of seeing red cups. We most certainly do know that biological machinery plays an irrevocable role, wouldn't you say?

Of course not. It's just that the assumption that pain is a thing is misguided.

It has to do with the claim that we do not know what connection biological machinery has to conscious experience of seeing red cups. We most certainly do know that biological machinery plays an irrevocable role, wouldn't you say? — creativesoul

We don't presently understand how phenomenal consciousness work, but we do relate it to functions. We don't fully understand gravity either, but we know it has to do with time and space.

Of course not. It's just that the assumption that pain is a thing is misguided. — Banno

It's not a physical object. True.

More than that. It seems not to be individuated.

More than that. It seems not to be individuated. — Banno

You mean atomic?

Are you implying the need for omniscience?

:worry:

What does that have to do with our knowing that conscious experience of seeing red cups requires red cups and a creature capable of seeing red cups, and that that capability itself requires biological machinery?

In looking for a place for criticism of the position I've given, I'd look to the following paragraph:

Which idea of qualia am I trying to extirpate? Everything real has properties, and since I don't deny the reality of conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties. I grant moreover that each person's states of consciousness have properties in virtue of which those states have the experiential content that they do. That is to say, whenever someone experiences something as being one way rather than another, this is true in virtue of some property of something happening in them at the time, but these properties are so unlike the properties traditionally imputed to consciousness that it would be grossly misleading to call any of them the long-sought qualia. Qualia are supposed to be special properties, in some hard-to-define way. My claim--which can only come into focus as we proceed--is that conscious experience has no properties that are special in any of the ways qualia have been supposed to be special.

I seem to be arguing against the position that everything real has properties.

This is where some philosophical work is needed.

Are you implying the need for omniscience? — creativesoul

Huh?

What does that have to do with our knowing that conscious experience of seeing red cups requires red cups and a creature capable of seeing red cups, and that that capability itself requires biological machinery? — creativesoul

We do relate qualia to biological functions. So?

No.

It's just that the assumption that pain is a thing is misguided. — Banno

If it isn't a thing, what is it?

Not interested.

No — Banno

Experience is like a symphony. Pulling single notes out will be lossy because of the way the parts influence each other.

Is that what you mean?

If it isn't a thing, what is it? — Daemon

That's a good question. What is your answer? Now's your chance.

Not interested. — creativesoul

Ok. I take it you didn't really have a point to make there.