He's explained to me how people see things like 3 times now. — khaled
And every time I ask what that has to do with anything. How does an explanation of how the camera works imply that the footage on said camera (qualia, metaphorically) doesn't exist?
It has everything to do with the privacy aspect of conscious experience that we've been touching upon. — creativesoul
that we cannot know what they experience when doing so. We've agreed since, I think, that despite that, we can still - at the very least - know that they're seeing red cups, — creativesoul
That capacity includes the individual's own biological machinery as well as their skill with common language use. — creativesoul
Why invoke "qualia" here? What does it add that "footage" lacks? — creativesoul
An explanation of the underlying biological machinery doesn’t help here. Because we don’t know what connection the biological machinery has to the experience. — khaled
Why invoke "qualia" here? What does it add that "footage" lacks?
— creativesoul
Qualia IS the footage. — khaled
Do you agree that all conscious experience of seeing red cups includes red cups? — creativesoul
What has convinced you to believe otherwise? — creativesoul
So what is the camera? — creativesoul
...conscious experience of seeing red cups requires the capability of seeing red cups, and that all the evidence suggests that biological machinery plays an irrevocable role in helping to provide that capability. — creativesoul
How do you teach someone what pain is without them ever being in pain? — khaled
Or used to illicit sympathy or used to sexually gratify or used to frighten into submission or used to win philosophical debates...The more I think about it the more it seems that these words without referents are used to make the other party imagine a certain experience or image. — khaled
a painkiller (if successful) stops me feeliing pain; so it kills pain. — Janus
It has to do with the claim that we do not know what connection biological machinery has to conscious experience of seeing red cups. We most certainly do know that biological machinery plays an irrevocable role, wouldn't you say? — creativesoul
I seem to be arguing against the position that everything real has properties.Which idea of qualia am I trying to extirpate? Everything real has properties, and since I don't deny the reality of conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties. I grant moreover that each person's states of consciousness have properties in virtue of which those states have the experiential content that they do. That is to say, whenever someone experiences something as being one way rather than another, this is true in virtue of some property of something happening in them at the time, but these properties are so unlike the properties traditionally imputed to consciousness that it would be grossly misleading to call any of them the long-sought qualia. Qualia are supposed to be special properties, in some hard-to-define way. My claim--which can only come into focus as we proceed--is that conscious experience has no properties that are special in any of the ways qualia have been supposed to be special.
Are you implying the need for omniscience? — creativesoul
What does that have to do with our knowing that conscious experience of seeing red cups requires red cups and a creature capable of seeing red cups, and that that capability itself requires biological machinery? — creativesoul
Not interested. — creativesoul
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