Tell us exactly what it is that is missing.
And if your answer is "the qualia", then...
...all you have done is engage in the circular argument that the biological machinery cannot tell us about the qualia, and the qualia are what the biological machinery cannot tell us about. — Banno
You think there must be something more; you need there to be something more. Otherwise it's all just physics, and you think this would make it all pointless, meaningless. — Banno
I ask you to pass me the red apple. It doesn't matter if you have the same experiences as I, or if they are isomorphic, or anything at all about them, provided that you pass me the red apple. — Banno
Ockham's razor applies. — creativesoul
You can't tell us what qualia are, because they are ineffable.
And you cannot show them to us what they are, because they are private. — Banno
I can tell you what the category means but not its memebers. — khaled
As in I can't describe red to you but I can tell you what Qualia are. And no I can't show you what they are but I'm pretty sure I don't need to. They are what you refer to as "experiences". — khaled
but it's still psychonalaysing that doesn't add to the discussion. — khaled
You can't tell us what qualia are, because they are ineffable.
And you cannot show them to us what they are, because they are private. — Banno
Understanding why the issue is important enough to take up over sixty pagrs is directly relevant. — Banno
But we have a large number of people reporting to have them. — khaled
we can't speak about pain - which you just did. — Banno
Banno-inspired perception-related debates used to go 100+ pages. And it often included talk of apples. — Marchesk
:rofl:Have we come to any sort of consensus as to what color is? Or pain?
If it's not qualia, is it ... a model? A language game? A private beetle we can't talk about? — Marchesk
Because its difficult to derive meaning from anything Banno says. It probably has to do with how he uses words.Banno-inspired perception-related debates used to go 100+ pages. And it often included talk of apples. — Marchesk
This is all just more information. All causal relations, which include logical entailments, is information.More seriously, the fundamental stuff of physics like fields, energy, matter, forces, spacetime and all the stuff that's logically entailed by that. — Marchesk
I never said that my "position" was obvious. I said that qualia are obvious. — Luke
Qualia are - according to Dennett - "the way things seem to us" — Luke
But the patient didn't examine nerve endings. So how come he was able to distinguish? — khaled
Experiences are the way things seem to you. Those can't be fake. If it seems to you one way then that is the experience you're having. For you to have a fake experience would mean something seems to you one way, but actually doesn't seem to you that way, instead, seems to you another way. — khaled
There's just no evidence of this — Isaac
I am having experiences. That's evidence. Which you recognize here: — khaled
Seriously though which is it? Am I or am I not having experiences? — khaled
I'll repeat it again. It goes stimuli>experience+response. What's weird here? — khaled
Present me the neurological evidence that says that our brain activities cannot coincide with an experience. What theory breaks if I propose that at the same time my brain is processing color, I am having an experience of red? — khaled
Yes. I'm sensing that. It's a good job some people prefer to investigate matters in a more productive way than just avoiding what they find repulsive and pursuing only that which seems nice. We'd have never left the dark ages. You recall the reaction to Darwin's suggestion that we were descended from apes? — Isaac
I'd want to know why, but evidently you're not much interested in that question. — Isaac
I'd want to know how I came to learn to use such expressions, but evidently you're not much interested in that either. — Isaac
If all you want to do is say "the world seems like X to me" — Isaac
How is you having an experience evidence of "stimuli cause experiences and also responses"? — Isaac
Your claim was about the cause, not the mere existence. — Isaac
The inclusion of an aparrently direct route from stimuli to experience — Isaac
Photons hit the retina, they fire a chain of neurons in the V1, these (depending on previously cemented pathways) fire a chain of other neurons (with the important backward-acting filters). Some of these neurons represent things like the word 'red', images of other things which caused the same initial V! pattern, emotions attached to either the current image, or remembered ones... All this is held in working memory, which is then re-fired (selectively) by the hippocampus. It's this re-firing which we are aware of when we introspect, not the original chain. — Isaac
I've cited several papers which you've declined to read. — Isaac
Ockham's razor applies.
— creativesoul
I don't think it does. How do you explain the phenomenology otherwise? — khaled
I think you'll find your view is absent in scientific communities and the world in general. Dennett doesn't even take it as far as you do and he's as close to it as you'd find it in philosophy of mind. — frank
I'd want to know why, but evidently you're not much interested in that question. — Isaac
That would be the hard problem. Which I am interested in. — khaled
I want to emphasize that the statement "the world seems like X to me" is not negated by any neurological evidence you can throw at it. The world still seems the way it seems. The statement "qualia does not exist" implies "the world doesn't seem like anything, there is no X", which is absurd. — khaled
I don't think I need to present to you evidence that stimuli cause responses. — khaled
Oh that's easy. When I close my eyes I do not have the experience of color. Additionally I know there are certain ways the biological machinery can malfunction to make me colorblind. Therefore the stimuli and biological machinery must be causing that experience. — khaled
I'd say the experience is a side-product of whatever our brain is doing. As in this:
Photons hit the retina, they fire a chain of neurons in the V1, these (depending on previously cemented pathways) fire a chain of other neurons (with the important backward-acting filters). Some of these neurons represent things like the word 'red', images of other things which caused the same initial V! pattern, emotions attached to either the current image, or remembered ones... All this is held in working memory, which is then re-fired (selectively) by the hippocampus. It's this re-firing which we are aware of when we introspect, not the original chain. — Isaac
Causes the experience as well. Is there a problem now?
I've cited several papers which you've declined to read. — Isaac
All of those papers attack the model stimuli>qualia>response or stimuli>response>qualia. — khaled
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