Perfect!

:blush:

But no Rob Zombie?

Holy Crap! More Human than Human!

Some of us, anyway.

This seems to me to say that there are actually ineffable private directly apprehensible meaningful experiences. — khaled

Indeed, and had you been reading and/or listening to my efforts in our exchanges, that should not have come to surprise you. I've certainly never denied that much. To quite the contrary, I've been arguing for it, just not the same way that the qualia proponents have been. "Qualia" adds nothing to our understanding of conscious experience. Not our own, which is the only place to start, and certainly not any other 'lesser' animals'.

Just that they are not necessarily formed from "red" and "cup".

Well, given that those are names, names are part of common language, common language is not private, I've stipulated language less creatures for good reason, and common sense alone tells us that a language less creatures' conscious experience cannot include language use as content...

Yeah, not just 'not necessarily', but not at all... ever.

From the cat's POV all that happened is it just drank something disgusting.

I did not say that. I mean, just to be clear. I'm not going to defend that either. That is your account/report of the cat's point of view, not mine. I actually stated what I am willing to say is the cat's conscious experience, from both the cat's point of view(it learned that it does not like the taste of coffee), and in terms of the content of the conscious experience of drinking coffee from a red cup, and how it arrived at that meaningful thought or belief about coffee tasting(conscious experience of drinking coffee from a red cup).

It's crucial to separate our report from what we're reporting upon. That cannot be overstated. Absolutely crucial.

This is not to say that it does not see the red cup, only that it didn't "categorize" it in her experience, didn't emphasize or notice it. Am I understanding this correctly?

Good of you to pause and ask... nice improvement.

Seems you've understood some important aspects of it. She certainly saw the red cup full of Maxwell House coffee, she just did not see it as such. Who knows what it was to her? We can safely say she paid attention to it, we can safely say she noticed it. I mean she drank from it. However, the red cup itself may or may not have been meaningful to her. The coffee tasting bitter most certainly was.

he says nothing precise
— Olivier5

Coming from someone who advocates for the use of "qualia"...

...that's a tad bit ironic if it's meant to be a critique.
— creativesoul

That is so unfair! — Olivier5

Coming from someone who claimed to have taught me how to use the word "pre-theoretical", all the while ignoring the remarkable difference between their's and mine...

... again, that's a tad bit ironic.

:flower:

Sorry, I couldn't pass that up! Just joking with you. Don't take it personally, it's not meant to be.

Cats can even have a conscious experience of drinking Maxwell House coffee from a red cup without ever experiencing it as such.
— creativesoul

Hypothetically, so pre-theoretical.

Does it matter what is the cat is drinking? Is it the same to say, cats can have a conscious experience of drinking without ever experiencing it as such, which reduces to, can cats have a conscious experience of drinking without ever experiencing it as drinking? — Mww

My apologies... I suppose I could have been a bit clearer. Nice to have a Kantian around to take notice of such details!

:wink:

I meant experience drinking Maxwell House coffee from a red cup as drinking Maxwell House coffee from a red cup. I was merely drawing distinctions between our report of a language less creature's conscious experience and the language less creature's conscious experience.

It's all about the content.

That would be the distinction between rudimentary, basic, language less thought and belief(pre-theoretical conscious experience), and our accounts thereof. As I stated just moments ago, but it bears repeating... it is crucial to separate our account/report of language less creatures' conscious experience from the actual conscious experience of the creature.

...indulging in rampant anthropomorphism.

Me....enjoi-ing. For a change.

Glad I could help.

:razz:

Anthropomorphism is most certainly a mistake that I am conscientious of. It's part of my standard to make certain of not committing it. Rightfully so.

By the way, there's quite a bit that can be ascertained by that cat post than may seem at first blush, particularly regarding how our own experience involving red cups begins should that be prior to language acquisition. It's also relevant with respect to how the private aspect is no longer. It's also relevant to how the ineffable aspect is no longer. It's also relevant to which parts are directly apprehensible and what it takes for them to become so...

Whatever. Glad I entertained you. Will make sure never ever to teach you a new word in the future. That’s a promise!

But pain exists. — Banno

Not really. Consciousness is an illusion, remember? So your conscious feeling of pain is an illusion, as per Dennett... Stop complaining.

I find ‘qualia’ a useful neologism. True that some people have no use for it, or misuse it.

Physical just means detectable, measurable, modelable in terms of causality.

In one sense the term is, like the term 'natural', a distiction without a difference insofar as everything is both physical and natural.

If cat's can have conscious experiences of drinking Maxwell House coffee from a red cup without the color of the cup ever being distinguished and subsequently recognized, then it is clear that the color of the cup is not part of the cat's correlational content, and thus not part of the conscious experience.

There is most certainly a red cup in the experience, but the color is meaningless to the cat. There is no red qualia in the cat's experience. All conscious experience is meaningful to the creature having the experience. All conscious experience of seeing red requires that the color be meaningful to the cat. The color of the cup that that cat drank from is not meaningful to the cat, despite it's having been autonomously detected by the cat's eyes. Seeing red does not equate to conscious experience of red, unless one wishes to draw and maintain a distinction between detecting red autonomously, and seeing red.

When color is meaningful, that meaningfulness always comes by virtue of being part of a correlation being drawn between it and something else. Being a part of the correlation is exactly how red becomes meaningful to the creature. Meaningful conscious experience of seeing red happens at the precise moment in time that red becomes part of the correlations drawn by the creature between the color and something else.

It's the something else that matters most here when it comes to the actual content of another's conscious experience of red. The something else must already exist in it's entirety prior to becoming meaningful to the creature... names of colors notwithstanding.

I would be more than willing to grant that some basic correlations between red and some autonomous biological function, like fear, hunger, thirst, could be drawn without issue at the language less level during the right sorts of circumstances.

In one sense the term is, like the term 'natural', a distiction without a difference insofar as everything is both physical and natural. — Janus

It's important to state precisely what and why you exclude certain hypotheses. I personally exclude from my reasoning entities whose existence I haven't ascertained, such as gods, for reasons probably similar to yours. On this ground I exclude an interventionist god as a possible explanation for minds, where I differ from Descartes. That's what the term natural means to me: we can produce a new mind without divine intervention, just by making a baby. Ergo minds emerge naturally, as opposed to needing a miracle (an exception to the rules) to emerge.

So, when you say: 'minds are physical", what type of explanation are your trying to exclude?

You:

The introduction of the neologism ‘qualia’ into the discourse about the nature of mind was simply a gigantic red herring — Wayfarer

Me, page 1:
Qualia....a metaphysical invention by those to whom “representation” doesn’t say enough, by means of that which is itself a representation, but attempts to say too much.

Bonnie Raitt:
“...A little mystery to figure out
Let's give 'em somethin' to talk about...”

Point:

I was merely drawing distinctions between our report of a language less creature's conscious experience and the language less creature's conscious experience. — creativesoul

.......Counterpoint: I’m not sure we have the warrant for that.

Point sustained:

It's all about the content. That would be the distinction between rudimentary, basic, language less thought and belief(pre-theoretical conscious experience), and our accounts thereof. — creativesoul

.......Counterpoint sustained: where is the surety of what the content is.

....that meaningfulness always comes by virtue of being part of a correlation being drawn between it and something else. (...) It's the something else that matters most here when it comes to the actual content of (...) experience. The something else must already exist in it's entirety — creativesoul

BOO-YAAH!!!!

Those elusive, enigmatic, nay, even damnable, “elemental constituents”, yes?

It took a rumor to make me wonder
Now I'm convinced I'm going inner
How about red, pain, anger, looooOOOVE?

I’m guessing “going inner” wasn’t a typo.......was it?

Some of us, anyway. — Marchesk

If you alternate Mozart and Lorn it makes both of them seem more sinister. Just thought I'd share that.

Internal qualia bad.

External qualia good.

All the world's a cartesian theatre?

Welcome back my friends, to the show that never ends.
We’re so glad you could attend, step inside, step inside.

Point:
I was merely drawing distinctions between our report of a language less creature's conscious experience and the language less creature's conscious experience.
— creativesoul
.......Counterpoint: I’m not sure we have the warrant for that. — Mww

Sufficient reason to believe that other creatures' conscious experience is different from our accounts thereof ought be fairly uncontentious... no?

Point sustained:
It's all about the content. That would be the distinction between rudimentary, basic, language less thought and belief(pre-theoretical conscious experience), and our accounts thereof.
— creativesoul
.......Counterpoint sustained: where is the surety of what the content is. — Mww

Surety is not the sort of thing that has a spatiotemporal location, so the question doesn't make sense as written. Can you reword it so that I understand what you're asking me to provide?

Are you asking me to justify my asserting what the content of the cat's conscious experience is?

....that meaningfulness always comes by virtue of being part of a correlation being drawn between it and something else. (...) It's the something else that matters most here when it comes to the actual content of (...) experience. The something else must already exist in it's entirety
— creativesoul

BOO-YAAH!!!!

Those illusive, enigmatic, nay, even damnable, “elemental constituents”, yes? — Mww

No. Elusive... perhaps depending upon method.

Not too difficult. What they can actually be is determined, in part, by virtue of their own existential dependency. For example, language less conscious experience cannot consist of language use, but some other mid-level pre-theoretical conscious experience can.

qualia are after all ineffable. But this never stops their advocates from talking about them... — Banno

Never mind. Your post was blank for 3 hours, now it isn’t. My response no longer applies.

Fading qualia.