This seems to me to say that there are actually ineffable private directly apprehensible meaningful experiences. — khaled
Just that they are not necessarily formed from "red" and "cup".
From the cat's POV all that happened is it just drank something disgusting.
This is not to say that it does not see the red cup, only that it didn't "categorize" it in her experience, didn't emphasize or notice it. Am I understanding this correctly?
he says nothing precise
— Olivier5
Coming from someone who advocates for the use of "qualia"...
...that's a tad bit ironic if it's meant to be a critique.
— creativesoul
That is so unfair! — Olivier5
Cats can even have a conscious experience of drinking Maxwell House coffee from a red cup without ever experiencing it as such.
— creativesoul
Hypothetically, so pre-theoretical.
Does it matter what is the cat is drinking? Is it the same to say, cats can have a conscious experience of drinking without ever experiencing it as such, which reduces to, can cats have a conscious experience of drinking without ever experiencing it as drinking? — Mww
...indulging in rampant anthropomorphism.
Me....enjoi-ing. For a change.
In one sense the term is, like the term 'natural', a distiction without a difference insofar as everything is both physical and natural. — Janus
The introduction of the neologism ‘qualia’ into the discourse about the nature of mind was simply a gigantic red herring — Wayfarer
.......Counterpoint: I’m not sure we have the warrant for that.I was merely drawing distinctions between our report of a language less creature's conscious experience and the language less creature's conscious experience. — creativesoul
.......Counterpoint sustained: where is the surety of what the content is.It's all about the content. That would be the distinction between rudimentary, basic, language less thought and belief(pre-theoretical conscious experience), and our accounts thereof. — creativesoul
....that meaningfulness always comes by virtue of being part of a correlation being drawn between it and something else. (...) It's the something else that matters most here when it comes to the actual content of (...) experience. The something else must already exist in it's entirety — creativesoul
Point:
I was merely drawing distinctions between our report of a language less creature's conscious experience and the language less creature's conscious experience.
— creativesoul
.......Counterpoint: I’m not sure we have the warrant for that. — Mww
Point sustained:
It's all about the content. That would be the distinction between rudimentary, basic, language less thought and belief(pre-theoretical conscious experience), and our accounts thereof.
— creativesoul
.......Counterpoint sustained: where is the surety of what the content is. — Mww
....that meaningfulness always comes by virtue of being part of a correlation being drawn between it and something else. (...) It's the something else that matters most here when it comes to the actual content of (...) experience. The something else must already exist in it's entirety
— creativesoul
BOO-YAAH!!!!
Those illusive, enigmatic, nay, even damnable, “elemental constituents”, yes? — Mww
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