I would save them assuming I can swim. I'm saying I don't have to. That I don't owe them anything.

I see helping others with problems you didn't cause the same way I see charity. Good but optional.

People with strongly individualist, neo-liberal ethics don't want the human race to continue after they're gone. Are we really surprised at all by this?

I don't think it should even be dressed up as serious philosophy. It's just one of the extensions of the modern obsession with the self. "All that matters is my comfort and if I'm in the slightest bit inconvenienced then it's a problem". The "it's not fair to bear children" stuff is just a logical extension of this basic selfish premise, which - given no community ethic - they see no reason to avoid.

All the arguments basically boil down to - no-one should be able to impose anything at all on me, I owe no-one anything etc. The basic individualism which drives modern capitalism.

All the arguments basically boil down to - no-one should be able to impose anything at all on me, I owe no-one anything etc. The basic individualism which drives modern capitalism. — Isaac

That's something I noticed in @khaled's reasons not to help someone too. That morality is somehow transactional, something I must owe someone else. It's an interesting divide that I don't think can actually be bridged.

That's something I noticed in khaled's reasons not to help someone too. That morality is somehow transactional, something I must owe someone else. It's an interesting divide that I don't think can actually be bridged. — Benkei

I don't think people have transactional ethical intuitions in lots of circumstances; families, lovers, kids, pets, friends. If a parent's strictly transactional with a child something's gone very, very wrong.

That's something I noticed in khaled's reasons not to help someone too. — Benkei

What were my reasons not to help someone? Could you specify those? I don't remember giving any.

I believe this to be the crux of your argument. I believe I answered these when I said that your idea here seems to indicate that if a baby was born into torture, then it would not be a legitimate move to prevent that birth for the sake of the future child. Its the same with impositions. You don't need someone born at x time present, for y time future to make a difference for a person that will be born. — schopenhauer1

You're not reading what I write.

We cannot imagine a person's suffering "as if" they don't exist because that is to assign properties to "nothing" (it's akin to saying something exists that doesn't exist, which is a contradiction). We can imagine a person's suffering "as if" they do exist. And if they would be born into a situation of abject poverty, where the good does not outweigh their suffering or because of a biological defect that cannot be treated, we understand that "poverty" or that "defect" would cause unacceptable suffering and we should not have a child under those circumstances. What we are comparing then is a possibility of existence with other examples of possible lives lived and we find that possibility unacceptable. But this is fundamentally different from saying this "non-existent" child is better off never having been born because when we talk that way, it is neither a child nor a person nor capable of having any properties, because it is nothing. — Benkei

This is clear about not having babies under specific circumstances.

However, now that we know that these circumstances are not intrinsic to life, it follows that we have some measure of control over them. We imagine that poorer people are unhappier, so we alleviate poverty. We imagine disease causes suffering, we treat diseases. Even if unhappy persons currently outnumber happy persons, it appears to me that we can control for circumstances to maximise happy persons over unhappy persons. It is, after all, not a lottery when we choose to have a child. See also Nordic exceptionalism with respect to happiness. — Benkei

This is clear that the point is to improve circumstances.

I'm saying I don't have to. That I don't owe them anything — khaled

Sorry, I misread. You would help them but don't think you should. I still think that's a transactional interpretation of morality though.

I agree but am not sure how to understand "owing someone" as a basis to accept a moral duty. I have moral duties because I want to be a type of person. They're self-imposed most of the time.

You would help them but don't think you should. — Benkei

Yes. This is different form "I think I shouldn't".

I still think that's a transactional interpretation of morality though. — Benkei

What do you mean "transactional"? The alternative would be either I must not help them (which we can agree is ridiculous) or I must help them. But if we look at other scenarios such as charity or volunteer work, we don't feel morally obligated to do those do we? Or are you saying charity and volunteering are also obligatory and if so, how much must one donate to who?

am not sure how to understand "owing someone" as a basis to accept a moral duty. I have moral duties because I want to be a type of person. They're self-imposed most of the time. — Benkei

For me a moral duty is more something like a "least common denominator". Something I think everyone should be doing at least. Which in my case is not harming people intentionally.

What do you mean "transactional"? — khaled

Generally, this refers to a view of society that is comprised of individuals meeting each other on a level playing field with no previous obligations, and where the goal of social interaction is ultimately to restore that state of no obligations.

It's called "transactional" because it treats all human interactions as market transactions between strangers. For historical reasons, this view of society underpins the idea of rights and freedoms which traces back to classical liberalism. It also lends itself to a moral philosophy which is fundamentally based around what you should not do, where positive moral duties are exceptions that arise if you have in some sense an outstanding debt. Hence again this is a transactional view where moral subjects have no standing connections to each other, and any interaction is concluded with reinstating that status quo.

This is clear about not having babies under specific circumstances. — Benkei

Okay, so we can gain common ground here at least that we can recognize future states of people who will be born and compare that to not having future people.

This is clear that the point is to improve circumstances. — Benkei

Yes, but again, I don't think these are mutually exclusive. You can try to improve circumstances while at the same time recognizing that the conditions of life are not something to impose on the person that will be born. Hence, my emphasis on the idea that we know generally what conditions will be imposed, and we even know that there is unforeseen suffering that usually happens too to that individual. The known impositions are known and even the fact that there are unknown impositions are known as well. Imposing these things on someone else is where the problem lies here. Now that we have the common ground of being able to compare a state of affairs where someone is born and thus imposed or a state affairs where no one is imposed, we can move forward with this.

Generally, this refers to a view of society that is comprised of individuals meeting each other on a level playing field with no previous obligations, and where the goal of social interaction is ultimately to restore that state of no obligations.

It's called "transactional" because it treats all human interactions as market transactions between strangers. For historical reasons, this view of society underpins the idea of rights and freedoms which traces back to classical liberalism. It also lends itself to a moral philosophy which is fundamentally based around what you should not do, where positive moral duties are exceptions that arise if you have in some sense an outstanding debt. Hence again this is a transactional view where moral subjects have no standing connections to each other, and any interaction is concluded with reinstating that status quo. — Echarmion

Better than I could've said it. Thanks.

The alternative would be either I must not help them (which we can agree is ridiculous) or I must help them. But if we look at other scenarios such as charity or volunteer work, we don't feel morally obligated to do those do we? Or are you saying charity and volunteering are also obligatory and if so, how much must one donate to who? — khaled

I don't see how it follows that if I say that if you can save someone's life that you must therefore do it, that you must therefore also give to charity and do volunteer work. I think not saving a person who's drowning would make you a bad person and therefore you should do it, not because you owe him but because it's the right thing to do. While it's laudable to give to charity or to help others through volunteer work and you'd be a better person for it, it doesn't follow that if you don't you'd be a bad person.

I think not saving a person who's drowning would make you a bad person and therefore you should do it, not because you owe him but because it's the right thing to do. While it's laudable to give to charity or to help others through volunteer work and you'd be a better person for it, it doesn't follow that if you don't you'd be a bad person. — Benkei

I'm asking what the difference is. Why does not saving a drowning person make you a bad person while not donating to charity doesn't?

Okay, so we can gain common ground here at least that we can recognize future states of people who will be born and compare that to not having future people. — schopenhauer1

No.

But this is fundamentally different from saying this "non-existent" child is better off never having been born because when we talk that way, it is neither a child nor a person nor capable of having any properties, because it is nothing. — Benkei

Yes, but again, I don't think these are mutually exclusive. You can try to improve circumstances while at the same time recognizing that the conditions of life are not something to impose on the person that will be born. — schopenhauer1

Again. I'm not imposing anything unless I know there are particular circumstances that will cause harm. Since living in and of itself does not cause suffering I have no obligation to avoid every life (only specific ones).

It also lends itself to a moral philosophy which is fundamentally based around what you should not do, where positive moral duties are exceptions that arise if you have in some sense an outstanding debt. — Echarmion

I'd go further to say that there is no such thing as a "positive moral duty". If it's a duty then doing it is what is expected, it is not positive. If you have a duty not to harm others for instance, and so you do not harm others, you are not being virtuous, you're doing the bare minimum. To be virtuous you have to go out of your way and actually help someone with something, which I repeat you don't have to do.

I'm asking what the difference is. Why does not saving a drowning person make you a bad person while not donating to charity doesn't? — khaled

Because there's a difference between a moral act and a moral obligation.

Because there's a difference between a moral act and a moral obligation. — Benkei

Why is charity a moral act but saving a drowning person is a moral obligation? You sound like you're just dodging the question by rephrasing the things I'm asking about over and over. What properties make charity optional but make saving a drowning person mandatory? I hold they're both optional because I cannot find such a morally relevant property.

Again. I'm not imposing anything unless I know there are particular circumstances that will cause harm. Since living in and of itself does not cause suffering I have no obligation to avoid every life (only specific ones). — Benkei

So if you've been reading my last posts, I perplexed how natalists/optimists think that we do not know the general impositions/conditions imposed on a person and we also know that all life has some form of known and unknown forms of suffering. You don't seem to be reading my posts.

We do know that but they're not caused by living and therefore dealing with only a sufficient cause misses the point.

Here's some examples to clairfy. Let's assume selling guns is illegal.

I sell you a gun. You go out and murder someone. Did I murder that person?
I sold you a gun 10 years ago. You go out and murder someone. Did I murder that person?
My grandfather sold your grandfather a gun. You inherited it and go out and murder someone. Did my grandfather murder someone?

The proximate cause is you murdering someone. The sufficient conditions are the sale and your murder taken together. The sale of the gun alone is a necessary condition. You murdering the person alone is a necessary condition too.

I sell your neighbour a gun. You steal it and murder someone. Did I murder that person?

Here there's a proximate cause: your murder. An intervening cause, your theft. All necessary conditions but only together do they form the sufficient condition of murder.

And certainly the death is avoided by taking away the gun before I can sell it but my sale of the gun cannot be morally blamed for the murder because there's no causal link - at least, we do not say the sale caused the death, we point to the proximate cause - your decision to murder someone. And this is what you keep doing, you blame the sale for every bad things that happens afterwards.

The only scenario where this is acceptable is the following:

I sell you a gun knowing you will use it to murder someone. You murder someone. In that case I'm almost as morally culpable as you except for the agency you exercised by actually pulling the trigger. But I can certainly be blamed for that death.

The only scenario where this is acceptable is the following:

I sell you a gun knowing you will use it to murder someone. You murder someone. In that case I'm almost as morally culpable as you except for the agency you exercised by actually pulling the trigger. But I can certainly be blamed for that death. — Benkei

Ok, so you go the point right here though. We know what life's impositions are. It is not something that is unknown. You keep making it seem like we cannot fathom what things befall people who are born. Of course we know. If anything, one of the themes of my posts are to recount what those are.

Why is charity a moral act but saving a drowning person is a moral obligation? You sound like you're just dodging the question by rephrasing the things I'm asking about over and over. What properties make charity optional but make saving a drowning person mandatory? — khaled

Because I think people should make an effort to search for answers themselves. Should you stuff your face with cake everyday because you can? Or is it better to refrain from doing so? Is there an obligation to refrain?

I hold they're both optional because I cannot find such a morally relevant property. — khaled

And that's cute too. There is no moral property to be found. You either subscribe to a moral framework or you don't.

Should you stuff your face with cake everyday because you can? Or is it better to refrain from doing so? Is there an obligation to refrain? — Benkei

No moral obligation either way. It is better for your health to refrain from doing so. No moral obligation.

There is no moral property to be found — Benkei

I didn't say "moral property". I said "morally relevant property". So for example: In one case you caused the harm and so you must alleviate it but in the other you didn't so it's not any of your business. Note this doesn't apply for charity vs drowning.

Because I think people should make an effort to search for answers themselves. — Benkei

I've found my answer. They're both optional. And I've given my reasoning behind it. I'm asking for yours. Because if you don't consider charity obligatory then I can see no reason to consider saving a drowning person obligatory. In both cases you didn't cause the harm. In both cases you could help alleviate it. But in one you must and in the other you don't have to. Why is that?

Ok, so you go the point right here though. We know what life's impositions are. It is not something that is unknown. You keep making it seem like we cannot fathom what things befall people who are born. Of course we know. If anything, one of the themes of my posts are to recount what those are. — schopenhauer1

Yes yes, you keep falling back on the intrinsic suffering of life but those aren't caused by life. You seem to have problems grasping what causality means and why you must distinghuish between intrinsic suffering and particular and specific suffering. The first are morally irrelevant (because not caused by) the second are not caused by because it's not a sufficient condition without proximate causes. It's only when we're aware of particular and specific circumstances that will be proximate causes for suffering that there's reason to consider not having a child.

So the unavoidable suffering of life that you're so hung up on such a death, boredom and whatnot, are morally irrelevant.

No obligation either way. It is better for your health to refrain from doing so. No. — khaled

Right. So one is better but there's no obligation. Not that hard was it?

Right. So one is better but there's no obligation. Not that hard was it? — Benkei

That's not what I understood you were saying

I think not saving a person who's drowning would make you a bad person and therefore you should do it, not because you owe him but because it's the right thing to do. — Benkei

Is this "therefore you should do it" a moral obligation or a moral act? I thought you meant it as an obligation.

If you meant that it's better to save a drowning person than to not, then no one is disagreeing there, sorry for misunderstanding if that's the case.

So the unavoidable suffering of life that you're so hung up on such a death, boredom and whatnot, are morally irrelevant. — Benkei

How so?? Those are structural to life itself, and are known knowns, if you will. That should be the most morally relevant because of how structural they are to life itself. And if suffering is intrinsic or equated with life somehow, then there is a cause, and that would be what starts life, which is birth. So there is a cause here, which is being born. We can at least say that if it is true that there is inherent suffering to life, that being born is where this starts. So we can compare a state of affairs where no inherent suffering is taking place for a future individual and where it is. Being born is the demarcation between these states of affairs. I also want to put out there that capacity is a large underlying factor here. Where one has a capacity to cause the future suffering one can also have the capacity to prevent the suffering which will by default of inherent suffering be imposed on the future individual.

As far as contingent/proximate reasons for suffering, even these things are well known. Because we are debating whether it is good to impose things on other people, especially negative states that one must deal with, if we know that X general cases are dealt with by almost everyone (as if it was inherent to existence) why would we not assume that indeed, this will be just one more thing that this particular instance will also have to deal with?

See, I think you know this. You know that we all can generalize what basic categories of suffering, necessary or contingent can befall the future person. The real question is not "Will these generally recognized forms of suffering occur" (because we know with almost certainty it will) but whether causing impositions itself is something one should not do.

That's a moral obligation, obviously. You seem to graps the concept of doing something because it's better without an obligation as well. So that explains the difference between a moral act and a moral obligation, doesn't it? You don't have to agree even if you understand it.

I've answered all this in the OP already. Either suffering is intrinsic or it isn't. When it's intrinsic it's irrelevant, if it's not intrinsic it's not a sufficient condition. Simple.

the second are not caused by because it's not a sufficient condition without proximate causes. — Benkei

If I'm understanding this correctly I think it's laughable. We can all agree that murdering people by shooting them is wrong correct? However when you shoot someone, that is not a sufficient condition to cause their deaths or even to harm them, as your gun might jam. So the way you put it makes it sound like "It is wrong to kill innocents, but pointing a gun at an innocent person and pulling the trigger is fine since pulling the trigger is not a sufficient condition for causing harm" :lol:

I've answered all this in the OP already. Either suffering is intrinsic or it isn't. When it's intrinsic it's irrelevant, if it's not intrinsic it's not a sufficient condition. Simple. — Benkei

I'd like to get back to this, because perhaps I just don't understand your point with intrinsic suffering being irrelevant.

However, I think I have addressed your issue with contingent suffering, which you did not address here. See my last post.

As far as contingent/proximate reasons for suffering, even these things are well known. Because we are debating whether it is good to impose things on other people, especially negative states that one must deal with, if we know that X general cases are dealt with by almost everyone (as if it was inherent to existence) why would we not assume that indeed, this will be just one more thing that this particular instance will also have to deal with?

See, I think you know this. You know that we all can generalize what basic categories of suffering, necessary or contingent can befall the future person. The real question is not "Will these generally recognized forms of suffering occur" (because we know with almost certainty it will) but whether causing impositions itself is something one should not do. — schopenhauer1

You seem to graps the concept of doing something because it's better without an obligation as well. So that explains the difference between a moral act and a moral obligation, doesn't it? — Benkei

I understand the difference. In an early reply I outlined this

I see helping others with problems you didn't cause the same way I see charity. Good but optional. — khaled

What I don't understand is what makes charity optional but saving people from drowning mandatory? Here you made it seem like saving people from drowning is also optional:

Right. So one is better but there's no obligation. Not that hard was it? — Benkei

But if that's not your intention I ask again: Why is donating to charity optional but saving people from drowning mandatory?